FIRST SECTION
CASE OF DIMITRIJOSKI v. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
(Application no. 3129/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 October 2013
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Dimitrijoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Elisabeth Steiner, President,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 17 September 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 3129/04) against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Macedonian national, Mr Radoslav Dimitrijoski (“the applicant”), on 7 November 2003.
2. The Macedonian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs R. Lazareska Gerovska.
3. On 24 October 2007 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government.
4. On 1 February 2011 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). The case was assigned to the newly composed First Section (Rule 52 § 1). In accordance with Protocol no. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 28 § 1 b).
THE FACTS
5. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Prilep.
6. On 14 January 1998 the applicant lodged a civil action against the State claiming compensation for alleged failure of the domestic courts to decide his appeal in other proceedings in which he had sought reopening of a criminal case against him. During the proceedings, the applicant specified his claim on several occasions.
7. On 3 June 1999 the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the first-instance court”) dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 26 January 2000 the Skopje Court of Appeal confirmed that decision. On 14 November 2002 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s appeal on points of law and remitted the case for re-examination.
8. Between 27 February 2003 and 5 July 2005 the first-instance court ordered ten adjournments, of which two were requested by the applicant.
9. On 5 July 2005 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 28 December 2005 the Skopje Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration.
10. On 14 April 2006 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 24 November 2006 and 28 May 2008, respectively, the Skopje Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court confirmed that decision.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
11. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
12. The Government objected that the applicant had not exhausted a length remedy introduced in 2006 and amended, substantially, in 2008.
13. The applicant did not comment.
14. The Court recalls that the exhaustion requirement in respect of the length remedy concerns applications that post-date the Adži-Spirkoska case (see Adži-Spirkoska and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), nos. 38914/05 and 17879/05, 3 November 2011). It is so since only after the improvements noted in this case were made, was the Court able to regard the length remedy as effective (see Ogražden Ad and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, nos. 35630/04, 53442/07 and 42580/09, §§ 17 and 29, 29 May 2012).
15. The present case has already been pending before the Court decided the Adži-Spirkoska and Others case. The impugned proceedings ended in 2008, also prior to that decision. The applicant accordingly was not required to exhaust the length remedy, which was, at the time, ineffective. The Government’s preliminary objection must accordingly be rejected.
16. The Court further notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
17. The Government submitted that there had been complex circumstances related to the case. They further argued that the applicant had specified his claim on several occasions and that several adjournments had been attributable to him (see paragraphs 6 and 9 above). The national courts were active and dealt with the applicant’s case with due diligence, except between 2000 and 2001, when the Supreme Court had been overloaded.
18. The applicant contested the Government’s arguments.
2. The Court’s assessment
19. The Court notes that the proceedings in question started on 14 January 1998, when the applicant brought his claim before the first-instance court. They ended on 28 May 2008 when the Supreme Court finally decided the case. They therefore lasted ten years, four months and fifteen days at three judicial levels.
20. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
21. The Court does not consider that the case required examination of complex issues. Moreover, the applicant’s submissions specifying his claim cannot be considered to his detriment (see Jovanovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 40233/03, § 31, 25 March 2010).
22. On the other hand, the Court finds significant delays attributable to the domestic courts. In this connection, it observes that the proceedings laid dormant for over two years and seven months before the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). This time cannot be regarded as reasonable (see Mihajloski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 44221/02, § 38, 31 May 2007). The workload of that court to which the Government referred in their observations cannot be considered as an excuse for the protracted length of the proceedings (see Dumanovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 13898/02, § 45, 8 December 2005).
23. Against this background, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
24. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
25. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
26. The applicant claimed 450,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage for loss of income. He further claimed EUR 950,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the emotional suffering caused by the length of the proceedings.
27. The Government contested these claims.
28. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage for the protracted length of the proceedings. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 2,400 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
29. The applicant did not seek reimbursement of the costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court does not award any sum in this respect.
C. Default interest
30. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months EUR 2,400 (two thousand and four hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 October 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André WampachElisabeth Steiner
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy