CASE OF ELDAR HASANOV v. AZERBAIJAN

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF ELDAR HASANOV v. AZERBAIJAN

(Application no. 12058/21)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

10 October 2024

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

 Ivana Jelić, President,
 Alena Poláčková,
 Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
 Lətif Hüseynov,
 Gilberto Felici,
 Erik Wennerström,
 Alain Chablais, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 12058/21) against the Republic of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Azerbaijani national, Mr Eldar Humbat oglu Hasanov (Eldar Hümbət oğlu Həsənov – “the applicant”), on 19 February 2021;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”);

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 17 September 2024,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1.  The application concerns an alleged lack of adequate medical treatment provided to the applicant when he was in detention, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, and the alleged lack of justification for the applicant’s pre‑trial detention, in breach of Article 5 of the Convention. It also raises issues under Articles 18 and 34 of the Convention.

THE FACTS

2.  The applicant was born in 1955 and is serving a prison sentence in Baku. The applicant was represented by Mr J. Javadov, Mr E. Abbasov and Mr E. Aslanov, lawyers based in Baku.

3.  The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Ç. Əsgərov.

4.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

5.  The applicant is a former Prosecutor General (from March 1995 to April 2000), the former Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Romania (from March 2001 to March 2013), and the former Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina (until 17 August 2020).

6.  According to the applicant, prior to and around the time of the events of the present case, various local media sources published a number of articles concerning him, in which it was claimed, inter alia, that he had links to the political opposition and had political ambitions, and that accusations had been made that when he was an ambassador he had failed to take action about recently reported sales of arms by Serbia to Armenia which had come to light in or about July 2020.

7.  In July 2020 the State Security Service (“the SSS”) established a special investigation team and initiated criminal proceedings in connection with suspected instances of embezzlement, abuse of official authority and bribery by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Five senior officials of the Ministry were arrested and charged with the above-mentioned criminal offences. It appears that the preliminary investigation in that case also gave rise to suspicions against the applicant.

8.  On 9 August 2020 the applicant, who was then still the ambassador to Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, arrived in Baku for an official visit to Azerbaijan by a Serbian government delegation.

9.  On 12 August 2020 the Sabail District Court authorised the SSS to conduct searches of residential premises and personal vehicles belonging to the applicant following a request by the SSS based on information received from the Ministry of Finance on suspected unlawful expenditure, overspending of State funds and a lack of financial accountability in the Azerbaijani Embassy in Serbia.

10.  On the morning of 13 August 2020 SSS officers arrived at the applicant’s flat in Baku and presented the search warrant. Following the search, the applicant was arrested on the same day and detained as a suspect. Subsequently, on 17 August 2020, he was dismissed from his position of the Ambassador.

11.  On 14 August 2020 the SSS formally charged the applicant with criminal offences under Article 308.2 (aggravated abuse of official authority) and Article 308-1.1 (using State funds otherwise than for their designated purpose) of the Criminal Code. In particular, the applicant, as the ambassador responsible for Embassy expenditure and the efficient use of public funds who was accountable to the relevant State authorities for the proper implementation of budgetary instructions, was accused of overspending public funds beyond the designated amounts by abusing his official powers in order to gain an illegal advantage for himself and third parties and deliberately using his official powers against the interests of the public service, including overspending on specified numbers of budget line items in successive years: six budget line items in 2015, six in 2016, four in 2017, six in 2018, nine in 2019, and two in the remaining period up to 3 July 2020. In total, the overspending had been calculated to amount to 180,802.05 euros (EUR) (equivalent to 318,229.20 Azerbaijani manats (AZN)) during the entire audit period, including EUR 102,728.88 (equivalent to AZN 180,802.82) of overspending during the period from 3 May 2016 (the date of entry into force of Article 308-1 of the Criminal Code) to 3 July 2020.

12.  On the same day, 14 August 2020, following a request lodged by the SSS investigator, the Sabail District Court ordered the applicant to be remanded in custody until 3 November 2020. During the hearing, the applicant and his lawyer argued, inter alia, that the accusations against him did not have any basis and were arbitrary, and asked the court to take into account the fact that he had never been convicted before, that he had children and grandchildren, that he suffered from serious health problems and had to adhere to a strict regime of prescription medications, and that he was planning to have surgery in September 2020. The court justified its decision as follows:

“The court, having had regard to the nature of the criminal offences with which [the applicant] has been charged ..., the valid and real possibility that [his release] could evoke negative emotions in society and that [if released] he would illegally influence persons who have worked as his subordinates for a long period of time, considers that the preventive measure of remand in custody should be applied in respect [of the applicant]...”.

13.  The applicant appealed. In his written grounds for appeal and oral submissions at the appellate hearing, he and his lawyer argued that the material in the case file did not give rise to a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a criminal offence, that the gravity of the alleged offences could not be a main factor in ordering pre-trial detention, that the first‑instance court had not given relevant or sufficient reasons for ordering his detention, and that it had not taken into account such factors as the applicant’s advanced age, his poor health, his long-term public service in high-ranking positions, the awards he had received for his service, his numerous publications in the legal field, and so on. During the appellate hearing, the applicant also asked the court to substitute the remand in custody with the preventive measure of house arrest.

14.  In their submissions to the appellate court, the prosecuting authorities noted that they had received “operative information” that on 13 August 2020 an employee of the Embassy in Serbia (unnamed in the court decision) who had a close personal relationship with the applicant had made a phone call to the Embassy driver and instructed him to go immediately and take certain items, including documents, from the applicant’s residence and hide them at another address. The prosecuting authorities submitted that they were taking steps to have that unnamed employee brought to Azerbaijan. In view of the above, they asked the appellate court to uphold the detention order to prevent the risk of the applicant obstructing the investigation.

15.  On 20 August 2020 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance court’s detention order. It noted that the “reasonable suspicion” against the applicant had been confirmed by the preliminary evidence in the case file, including evidence concerning the overspending of public funds as well as a statement of the Embassy’s financial attaché (named in the court decision) indicating that the excess spending on the budget line items referred to in the financial audit had been executed on the direct instructions of the Ambassador. As to the risk that the applicant could illegally influence his ex-subordinates, the court noted that the prosecuting authorities had clearly explained that that possibility was the reason for seeking the applicant’s remand in custody and that they had supported their submissions by the evidence included in the case file. This preliminary evidence was presented to the other party and to the courts in compliance with the requirements of confidentiality. While the court agreed with the defence’s submissions that the gravity of the criminal charges did not in itself constitute a key factor in choosing a pre-trial preventive measure, it observed that the choice of the preventive measure of remand in custody had been based on the risk that the applicant would obstruct the investigation. As to the applicant’s arguments concerning his health, the court noted that no documents had been presented to it showing that he had been under constant medical supervision. As to the non‑custodial preventive measures such as house arrest, the court held that “in the current situation” choosing such measures was not appropriate and that there was a need to isolate the accused from society in the initial stages of the investigation. The court observed that, nevertheless, in the event that grounds established by law for a non-custodial preventive measure were to arise, the defence would have a right to apply to the first-instance court in that regard. The court concluded that it agreed with the first-instance court’s conclusion that there was a valid and real possibility that the applicant would obstruct the investigation by illegally influencing participants in the proceedings.

16.  On 21 August 2020 the criminal case against the applicant was transferred to the Prosecutor General’s Office.

17.  On 7 September 2020 the applicant applied to the Nasimi District Court asking to be released on bail, reiterating his previous arguments and asserting, in particular, that he was suffering from a number of serious health conditions. On 12 September 2020 the Nasimi District Court rejected the applicant’s request, holding that a number of further investigative steps were still to be carried out and that there was a risk that the applicant, if released, would obstruct the investigation by using his broad personal connections to illegally influence relevant persons both within the country and abroad in order to suppress evidence, information and documents necessary for establishing the objective truth.

18.  The applicant appealed, relying largely on the same arguments, and complaining that the first-instance court’s finding that there was a risk that he would obstruct the investigation was not supported by or based on any specified factual circumstances suggesting there was such a risk. On 22 September 2020 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, reiterating the first-instance court’s reasoning.

19.  In the meantime, on 18 September 2020 the Prosecutor General’s Office, in addition to the charges under Articles 308.2 and 308-1.1 of the Criminal Code, charged the applicant with criminal offences under Article 193-1.3.2 (laundering of money or other assets, in large amounts), Article 313 (forgery by an official), Article 178.3.2 as in force before 1 December 2017 (fraud causing large-scale loss) and Article 179.3.2 (embezzlement or squandering in large amounts) of the Criminal Code. In particular, the applicant was accused of the following:

(a)  in December 2012, while he was still Ambassador to Romania and had also recently been appointed Ambassador to Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina with an official residence then in Bucharest, during the process of purchasing a building in Sarajevo for the Azerbaijani Embassy’s office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he had deliberately overstated the purchase price and related expenses to a commission sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for that purpose. He had interfered in a visit to the property by the members of the commission, obstructed their attempts to meet the seller of the property in person, and had deceived the members of the commission by indicating that a total amount of EUR 4,905,000 needed to be allocated from public funds for the purpose whereas he had already privately agreed a purchase price of EUR 1,800,000 with the seller. Following the transfer of EUR 4,905,000 to the bank account of the Embassy in Romania, in 2013 he concluded a purchase agreement with the seller for an overstated purchase price, while actually paying EUR 1,800,000 for the property. The difference of EUR 3,105,000 was subsequently transferred in parts, using documents forged by the applicant as false justifications for the transfers and with the aid of accomplices including B.A. (a relative of the applicant’s personal driver) and others whose identities were still being investigated, to various bank accounts in Türkiye, Romania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, some of which belonged to various private companies registered offshore, as well as in Romania and in Türkiye, but which belonged de facto to the applicant. Thereafter, EUR 2,700,000 of this money was laundered in Türkiye by various means with the aid of the applicant’s accomplices;

(b)  after his appointment in 2013 as the Ambassador to Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, his official residence being in Belgrade, in 2018 the applicant overstated the costs of urgent repairs to the fence around the courtyard of the Embassy in Serbia and embezzled public funds in the amount of EUR 36,800 with the aid of accomplices and by way of forged official documents;

(c)  in 2019, with the aid of accomplices and by way of forged official documents, he overstated the costs of installation of new security cameras for a monument erected in Belgrade at the expense of the Azerbaijani government and embezzled public funds in the amount of EUR 102,100; and

(d)  he committed unlawful overspending of public funds on multiple occasions, which was the basis for the initial criminal charges summarised in paragraph 11 above.

20.  B.A., who was identified as one of the applicant’s accomplices, was also charged with criminal offences under Articles 178.3.2 and 193‑1.3.2 of the Criminal Code and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

21.  On 23 October 2020, at the request of the prosecuting authority, the Nasimi District Court extended the period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention by three months to 3 February 2021. During the hearing, the applicant’s lawyers had reiterated their previous arguments in favour of the applicant’s release. Without expressly addressing their arguments, the court justified its decision by observing that the investigation period had been extended because there was a need to carry out various investigative and procedural steps; it also found that the grounds for the applicant’s detention “had not ceased to exist”.

22.  The applicant appealed, reiterating his previous arguments and complaining that the first-instance court’s extension order was not based on any specific factual grounds justifying the applicant’s continued detention. On 2 November 2020 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that “the first-instance court [had] correctly concluded [that the period of pre-trial detention should be extended] given the possibility of [the applicant] absconding or obstructing the investigation by illegally influencing the participants in the criminal proceedings”.

23.  On 29 January 2021, at the request by the prosecuting authority, the Nasimi District Court further extended the period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention by another three months, to 3 May 2021. Without expressly addressing the defence’s arguments, which were essentially similar to those raised in previous hearings, the court justified its decision by providing essentially the same brief reasoning as in its previous extension order (see paragraph 21 above), observing in particular that there was a need to carry out various investigative and procedural steps and finding that the grounds for the applicant’s detention “had not ceased to exist”. The applicant appealed, essentially reiterating his previous arguments. On 4 February 2021 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, providing the same reasoning as in its earlier decision of 2 November 2020 concerning the preceding extension order (see paragraph 22 above).

24.  On 30 April 2021 the Binagadi District Court further extended the period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention by another three months, to 3 August 2021. While the applicant essentially reiterated his previous submissions, the court held that there was a need to carry out various investigative and procedural steps, that a large amount of investigation material had been collected, and that there was a possibility that the applicant would abscond or would obstruct the investigation by illegally influencing the participants in the criminal proceedings. On 8 May 2021 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant, finding summarily that the arguments raised in the appeal (which were essentially similar to the applicant’s previous arguments) were not a basis for quashing the decision of the first-instance court and that that decision had been lawful.

25.  On 17 May 2021 the prosecuting authority reclassified the charges against the applicant as falling under Articles 179.3.2, 193-1.3.2, 308.2, 308‑1.1 and 313 of the Criminal Code, dropping the charge under Article 178.3.2 of the Criminal Code.

26.  On 25 June 2021 the applicant applied to the Binagadi District Court asking for the substitution of his pre-trial detention with house arrest. He asked the court to take into account his poor health, his need for specialised medical treatment, his age, and the fact that the investigation was nearing completion. He also argued that his arrest and continued detention were motivated by ulterior purposes, namely by the alleged hostile and vengeful attitude towards him of A., a high-ranking official of the Presidential Administration responsible for working with the law-enforcement authorities. He alleged that A. had harboured that attitude since a relative of his had been detained and convicted when the applicant was Prosecutor General. He further argued that a biased attitude towards him was also held by the Government Agent before the Court, who had previously been A.’s subordinate at work.

27.  On 5 July 2021 the Binagadi District Court dismissed the applicant’s request. It noted that the applicant had been transferred to the Hospital of the Military Medical Department (“the MMD”) of the SSS for inpatient medical examinations and treatment (see paragraph 59 below) and that he had failed to support his request for house arrest with any relevant or substantive arguments. On 16 July 2021 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld this decision observing, inter alia, that the grounds for ordering the applicant’s pre‑trial detention “had not ceased to exist”.

28.  On 23 July 2021 the Binagadi District Court further extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 13 September 2021. On 30 July 2021 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld that decision. The parties’ submissions and the reasoning provided by the courts were essentially the same as in the proceedings concerning the previous extension (see paragraph 24 above).

29.  The criminal case was sent for trial. The hearing began in September 2021, and by a judgment of the Baku Court of Serious Crimes of 21 January 2022 the applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. The conviction was subsequently upheld by the Baku Court of Appeal.

30.  The applicant submitted that prior to his arrest he had been diagnosed with and suffered from various chronic conditions and illnesses, including multiple spinal disc herniations and protrusions, spinal cord compressions, osteochondrosis, various heart and cardiovascular conditions, hypercholesterolemia, a colon problem (polyps), hyperuricemia, type 2 diabetes, immunodeficiency, Vitamin D deficiency, and so on. He had been examined twice a year and treated by a Swiss cardiologist. He noted that he had undergone seven (unspecified) surgeries in the six years preceding his arrest, and at the time of his arrest and during his pre-trial detention he was taking up to twenty different medications daily.

31.  Following his arrest in August 2020, the applicant was detained on remand in the SSS detention facility. From the documents submitted by the Government, it appears that on 14 August 2020, following the applicant’s arrest, the detention facility started keeping separate medical records (a “medical record book”) about him. For the period between that date and 30 September 2020, the record book contains around twenty handwritten entries made at intervals of one to four days. From the signatures, it appears that most of the entries were made by the same doctor. The first entry was relatively lengthy and, in so far as it was legible, contained results of an ultrasound examination which did not reveal anything of concern. The remaining entries were brief and essentially recorded the applicant’s complaints. The applicant appeared to often complain about back pain, decreased mobility in his right leg, insomnia, general weakness, dizziness, diarrhoea and constipation, chest pain and palpitations, shortness of breath, anxiety, and so on. It was noted that he had refused to undergo a colonoscopy, an electrocardiogram (“ECG”), and an examination by a neurosurgeon, with some of those entries specifying that the reason was his lack of trust in doctors whom he did not know. Several entries indicated that he was continuing to take his own medications which had been prescribed to him before his arrest, and one entry listed thirteen such medications that he was taking on a daily basis. A couple of entries indicated that he had been offered a few medications, apparently (in so far as they were legible) for musculoskeletal and gastric pain and breathing problems, some of which he refused. On 23 September 2020 blood tests showed that his HB (haemoglobin), HCT (haematocrit) and sugar levels were within the appropriate norms. On 30 September 2020 the applicant underwent an ECG test, the results of which were recorded in a handwritten note in the medical record book which is not fully legible.

32.  The medical record book available in the case file, submitted by the Government, contained no entries between 30 September 2020 and 12 March 2021, when the applicant was seen by a therapist, who observed that the applicant’s overall health, blood pressure and pulse were satisfactory and that he had been given a Covid-19 vaccination. The following entry was by a neurologist and dated 30 March 2021, consisting of just a few handwritten words, of which only “neuropathy” was legible.

33.  Separate medical reports dated 16, 19 and 28 October 2020 indicated that the applicant had been examined by three specialists. An examination by a cardiologist on 16 October 2020, apparently conducted both in person and also with reference to medical records and information provided by the applicant, resulted in diagnoses of, inter alia, progressive angina pectoris, hypercholesterolemia, diabetes, hyperuricemia, Vitamin D deficiency, and sciatica in connection with vertebral pathology. It was observed that he had a left ventricular hypertrophy and that his left ventricular function was at 52%. The cardiologist recommended, inter alia, inpatient treatment, in isolation because he was in a high-risk group for Covid-19. Moreover, as the medications that the applicant was taking were not fully adequate given the deterioration of his health, the cardiologist recommended joint comprehensive examination and treatment by a group of specialists including a cardiologist, an endocrinologist, a neuropathologist and a gastroenterologist.

34.  An examination by a gastroenterologist on 19 October 2020 resulted in, inter alia, a recommendation that the applicant undergo a colonoscopy. It was observed that he had had gastrointestinal problems for around eight years and was complaining of widespread pain in the abdominal area, bloating, nausea, constipation, blood in the stool, occasional vomiting, and so on. He had had surgery for the removal of polyps several years before, but had not had a colonoscopy in four years. A neurosurgeon who examined him on 28 October 2020 observed that the applicant had osteochondrosis, several cervical and lumbar disc herniations and protrusions, and narrowing of the spinal canal. He recommended conservative drug treatment and physiotherapy for cervical herniations, a laminectomy and transpedicular fixation surgery for the L4-L5 disc, and the removal of herniations in the lumbar area.

35.  On 26 October 2020 the applicant had cervical and lumbar magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scans at the MMD Hospital. The scan revealed multiple pathological conditions, including several herniated discs, narrowing of the spinal canal and compression of the spinal cord, narrowing of neural foramina, compression of nerve roots, cervical osteochondroma, and so on.

36.  On 9 December 2020 the applicant’s lawyer referred to the above‑mentioned medical reports and asked the prosecuting authorities to lift the preventive measure of remand in custody imposed on the applicant and to order a forensic medical examination. On 11 December 2020 the prosecuting authorities partly granted the request and ordered a forensic medical examination.

37.  On 27 December 2020 the applicant had an ECG test at the MMD, which revealed sinus tachycardia. On 28 December 2020 the applicant underwent thyroid and lung examinations, which do not appear to have revealed any serious conditions or pathologies in those organs. A 7mm fibrous nodule was detected in the subpleural area of the lower right lung. On the same day, biochemical and blood tests were carried out, which showed that most factors were within the normal ranges, except for slightly raised haemoglobin and blood glucose levels, high VLDL cholesterol, and a slightly raised prothrombin time (measured in seconds).

38.  Following the prosecuting authorities’ decision of 11 December 2020 (see paragraph 36 above), on 14 January 2021 a forensic report on the applicant’s health was issued by a committee of experts who had seen him on 11 January 2021. According to the applicant, this examination was carried out for a “formalistic purpose” and “from a distance, without even a physical examination”, by “incompetent” persons who merely briefly questioned him, with the result that it contained “incorrect and inconsistent” diagnoses.

39.  The forensic report of 14 January 2021, issued by the above‑mentioned expert committee of six physicians and forensic experts, stated that the forensic examination had been carried out between 15 December 2020 and 14 January 2021. The questions put to the committee by the prosecuting authorities mainly related to their assessment of the seriousness of the health problems, whether those problems were compatible with detention, and whether they required specialised treatment or could be treated at the detention facility or a prison medical facility. It appears that the examination had mainly been based on the applicant’s medical records, although the experts had seen the applicant in person on 11 January 2021. The report summarised the applicant’s medical history before and after his arrest, and repeated the diagnoses made following the earlier examinations (see paragraphs 33-35 and 37 above). The committee concluded that the applicant’s current state of health was not incompatible with detention, did not preclude his participation in the investigation and did not require any emergency surgery or other urgent specialised medical interventions. On the basis of observations of the dynamics of his illnesses, it also concluded that “an adequate course of treatment could be found”, and that, if necessary, any medical treatment could be provided either at the place of his pre-trial detention or at the Medical Facility of the Prison Service of the Ministry of Justice.

40.  On 23 February 2021 the applicant’s lawyer asked the Prosecutor General’s Office to approve the examination of the applicant by three private doctors of his own choice at his own expense. The lawyer asserted that the applicant’s health was deteriorating.

41.  On 26 February 2021 the Investigation Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office decided to postpone consideration of the request “until the circumstances relevant for deciding on the request”. It observed that on 11 January 2021 the applicant had been examined by a committee of medical experts which had issued a forensic report on 14 January 2021. It further observed that less than two months had passed since that examination and that therefore a request had been sent to the SSS detention facility enquiring whether there had been a material change in the applicant’s health condition since then.

42.  It appears that on 18 March 2021 the applicant’s lawyer re-sent the request which had been made on 23 February 2021. In response, on 30 March 2021 the Prosecutor General’s Office sent the lawyer a copy of its decision of 26 February 2021, without any information as to whether there had been any further decisions.

43.  In April 2021 the applicant appealed against the postponement decision of 26 February 2021 (see paragraph 41 above) under the judicial supervision procedure set out in Article 449 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”), arguing that it was unlawful because the procedural rules did not allow for the postponement of a decision on an urgent request and that it was in breach of the applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the Convention. By decisions of 21 and 27 April 2021 the Binagadi District Court and the Baku Court of Appeal rejected the appeal as inadmissible, finding that the type of decision challenged by the applicant was not among those which could be challenged under the judicial supervision procedure, which were exhaustively listed in Article 449.3 of the CCrP.

44.  The case material does not include any documents relating to medical examinations or any medical records from between mid-January to early April 2021 (except two brief handwritten entries in the medical record book, referred to in paragraph 32 above). The applicant submitted that during this period he had been treating himself with the medication prescribed before his arrest. That medication had been given to the detention facility staff by his relatives and then given to the applicant by the medical staff of the detention facility without any supervision, intervention or medical advice. From February 2021 his health had started to deteriorate, and after the end of March 2021 it started to worsen significantly day by day. He met his lawyer four or five times in April 2021 and complained to the lawyer on each occasion that he had stomach and back pains; had to use a cane to walk; that he had often lost his balance while standing or walking and by that time had fallen on the floor over seventy times, falling several times a day because of pain (sciatica) and cramps in his legs; and that he had intestinal obstructions.

45.  On 2 and 3 April 2021 the MMD Hospital carried out biochemical and general blood tests on the applicant, the results of which mostly appeared to be within the normal range, with slight deviations in MCV (mean corpuscular volume), MCH (mean corpuscular haemoglobin), thrombocytes, fibrinogens, and prothrombin time (measured as a percentage).

46.  On 7 April 2021 an investigator from the Investigation Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office considered the applicant’s lawyer’s request of 23 February 2021 (see paragraphs 40 and 42 above) and dismissed it, finding (based on a submission received in the meantime from the SSS concerning the MMD Hospital) that the MMD Hospital was appropriately equipped to examine and treat the applicant and was staffed with the specialised and experienced physicians needed in the applicant’s case.

47.  On 28 April 2021, after the applicant’s request under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraphs 48-49 below), additional medical examinations were carried out by the MMD Hospital, including consultations by (a) a neurosurgeon, who diagnosed the applicant with osteochondrosis of the neck and spine, several spinal disc herniations, spinal stenosis, chronic pain syndrome and diabetic neuropathy, and recommended conservative treatment and prescribed two medications; (b) cardiologists, who diagnosed him with coronary heart disease and angina pectoris and prescribed three medications; (c) a gastroenterologist, who observed that the applicant had had a polypectomy two years before and that as recently as two weeks previously had had blood in his stool, and recommended a colonoscopy and a computed tomography (“CT”) scan of the gastrointestinal tract; it was noted that the applicant had stated that he would decide whether to follow this recommendation after “consulting his personal doctor”. ECG, ultrasound and cardiac ultrasound examinations and blood tests were also performed.

48.  On 19 April 2021 the applicant requested the Court to indicate to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that he should be placed in a specialised private clinic for medical treatment, including surgery, and given access to the specialists of his own choice named in his domestic request of 23 February 2021 (see paragraph 40 above).

49.  On 20 April 2021 the Court (the duty judge) adjourned the decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pending receipt of information from the respondent Government. The Government were requested under Rule 54 § 2 (a) of the Rules of Court to provide detailed information about the applicant’s state of health and any medical treatment provided to him during his detention. In reply, the Government submitted the information requested, supported by medical records as summarised above. The applicant was given an opportunity to comment on the Government’s submissions; these comments, where relevant, are also included in the above summary.

50.  Having considered the parties’ submissions, on 7 May 2021 the Court (the duty judge) made the following indication to the Government:

“- that, at the earliest possible date, the applicant be transferred on an inpatient basis to the Military Hospital of the Military Medical Department of the State Security Service, or the Medical Institution of the Penal Service of the Ministry of Justice, or a similar specialised medical facility within the penal system, for a new comprehensive assessment by the facility’s specialist doctors of his current health condition, determination of any need for inpatient treatment and/or supervised outpatient treatment, assessment of necessity of any urgent interventions (such as spinal fixation surgery, colonoscopy or other interventions relevant to the conditions the applicant is suffering from) and, in the event of such necessity, carrying out such urgent interventions;

- the Government are requested to inform the Court, by 11 June 2021 at the latest, of the measures taken as indicated above and of any treatment provided, and to submit a plan of any future inpatient and/or outpatient treatment.”

51.  By a letter of 11 May 2021, sent to the Court on 12 May, the Government expressed their “deep concern” about the Court’s above‑mentioned decision, saying that it had been “apparently taken solely on the basis of the applicant’s submissions”. Arguing that the parties’ submissions up to that date had not suggested that the applicant suffered from any urgent or life-threatening conditions, the Government asked the Court to lift the interim measures indicated on 7 May 2021. On 17 May 2021 the Court (the duty judge) refused the Government’s request and notified the parties that the interim measure indicated on 7 May 2021 continued to apply.

52.  On 18 May 2021 the applicant informed the Court that the Government were refusing to place him on an inpatient basis to a penal medical facility. The letter was forwarded to the Government for information.

53.  By a letter dated 25 May but sent to the Court on 26 May 2021 the applicant informed the Court that he had still not been transferred to a prison medical facility and was not receiving any outpatient treatment, medical examinations or interventions, and that his health was deteriorating. Enclosed with this letter was, inter alia, a copy of a letter of 22 May 2021 sent by the prosecuting authorities to the Head of the SSS detention facility asking them to comply with the Court’s decision of 7 May 2021 by ensuring that the applicant was examined again, within a short period of time, by the medical staff of the MMD Hospital and sending the results of the examination to the prosecuting authorities. Enclosed with the letter was also a copy of the applicant’s own typewritten letter dated 22 May 2021 to the SSS detention facility in which he referred to the prosecuting authorities’ above‑mentioned letter of 22 May 2021 and argued that in that letter the prosecuting authorities were actually asking for an outpatient examination rather than a transfer to a hospital on an inpatient basis. He emphasised that the Court had indicated that he should be transferred to a hospital as an inpatient and stated that he had refused to undergo any short-term outpatient medical examination. In a handwritten note on that typewritten letter, the applicant also accused A. and the Government Agent (see paragraph 26 above) of “non-compliance” with the interim measures. The applicant’s letter, together with the enclosures, was forwarded to the Government for information.

54.  On 11 June 2021, the deadline indicated by the Court (see paragraph 50 above), the Government informed the Court that following the Court’s decision of 7 May 2021 the medical staff of the MMD Hospital and the SSS pre-trial detention facility had offered to transfer the applicant to the MMD Hospital as an inpatient for him to undergo a comprehensive medical examination. However, “the applicant [had] refused to be transferred to the hospital without providing any plausible reasons”. In this connection, the Government referred to the applicant’s above-mentioned letter of 22 May 2021. The Government also submitted a copy of a statement dated 24 May 2021 and signed by the staff of the SSS detention facility and the MMD (though not signed by the applicant), which indicated that on 24 May 2021 they had “again” offered to transfer the applicant to the MMD Hospital as an inpatient but he had refused to be transferred, claiming that the prosecuting authorities’ letter of 22 May 2021 (mentioned in paragraph 53 above) “had not fully reflected the European Court’s decision [of 7 May 2021]”.

55.  The Government’s letter, together with its enclosure, was forwarded to the applicant for comment. By a letter of 18 June 2021, the applicant submitted that he had never refused to be transferred to the MMD Hospital, but that he had merely refused any outpatient examination, which was what he understood the prosecuting authorities had been seeking from the SSS medical staff, whereas the Court’s interim measure had clearly indicated that he should be transferred to a hospital for inpatient examination and treatment. He also submitted that his health had been worsening and that by that time he had lost his balance and fallen over in the detention facility over a hundred times since his arrest, and he asked the Court to indicate to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that he should be placed in a specialised private clinic of his choice.

56.  Following the above developments, on 22 June 2021 the Court (the duty judge) made the following indication to the respondent Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:

“- to ensure the applicant’s immediate transfer on an inpatient basis to the Military Hospital of the Military Medical Department of the State Security Service or a similar facility for a new comprehensive assessment by the facility’s specialist doctors of his current health condition, determination of any need for any ongoing inpatient treatment and/or supervised outpatient treatment and assessment of necessity of any urgent interventions relevant to the conditions the applicant is suffering from, and, in the event of such necessity, carrying out such urgent interventions;

- to inform the Court, by 19 July 2021 at the latest, of the measures taken as indicated above and of any treatment provided, and to submit a plan of any future inpatient and/or outpatient treatment deemed necessary.”

57.  In the same decision the Court indicated the following to the applicant:

“- to duly submit to steps taken by the relevant authorities and medical personnel with a view to implementation of the above-mentioned measures indicated by the Court.”

58.  On 1 July 2021 the applicant informed the Court that he had still not been transferred to a prison medical facility. The letter was forwarded to the Government for information.

59.  On 5 July 2021 the applicant informed the Court that on 2 July 2021 he had been transferred to the MMD Hospital.

60.  On 16 July 2021 the Government confirmed that the applicant had been transferred to the MMD Hospital on 2 July 2021 and submitted information on the medical care provided to the applicant since then. The Government’s submissions of 16 July were followed by further submissions and documents sent on 20 August 2021.

61.  In particular, the Government submitted that, following the transfer of the applicant to hospital, complex physical, laboratory and instrumental examinations had been carried out. The applicant was first examined by a gastroenterologist and an oesophagogastroduodenoscopy and total colonoscopy were performed under intravenous sedation. The applicant underwent a colonoscopic polypectomy and polyps were removed and sent for pathohistological examination. Appropriate further conservative treatment was prescribed. On 7 July 2021 the applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist and several eye treatment procedures were carried out.

62.  On 8 July 2021 the applicant was examined by a neurologist and was diagnosed with benign paroxysmal positional vertigo (“BPPV”), left-sided discogenic cervical radiculopathy and discogenic lumbar radiculopathy. Recommendations and medication were prescribed.

63.  On the same day, 8 July 2021, the applicant underwent a complete abdominal ultrasound, a doppler ultrasonography of the bilateral carotid and vertebral arteries, and a CT scan of the abdomen and chest. On 13 July MRI and MRA (magnetic resonance angiography) tests were carried out. On 14 July the applicant was examined by an otorhinolaryngologist. No significant pathological changes were discovered as a result of those examinations and tests.

64.  In support of their submissions (see paragraphs 61-63 above), the Government provided a statement of the MMD dated 9 July 2021, and a large number of medical documents, including numerous test results.

65.  The applicant was hospitalised until 22 July 2021, when he was transferred back to the SSS detention facility. According to the Government, as of 22 July 2021 the applicant’s general condition was satisfactory, and his respiratory system, blood pressure and pulse were normal.

66.  On 2 August 2021 the applicant was again transferred to the MMD Hospital after he reported increased dizziness and continued to complain of back and neck pain and having falls. More tests of various kinds were carried out. On 10 August 2021 the main cause for dizziness and loss of balance was recorded as BPPV, with which the applicant had been diagnosed earlier. This condition, however, carried minimum risk to life. During the second hospitalisation, the applicant was treated conservatively by several types of medication. On 17 August 2021 the applicant was transferred back to the SSS detention facility.

67.  In his comments to the Government’s submissions, the applicant said, inter alia, that by 2 August 2021 the total number of falls he had had in detention had exceeded 170 and that he had also had falls in the hospital. He also noted, with reference to a statement obtained from a private doctor, that it was recommended that patients with BPPV (usually elderly people) should be under constant supervision, have walks in the open air and lead an active lifestyle as preventive measures. The applicant claimed that after his “sudden” and “unexplained” transfer back to the SSS detention facility on 17 August he had not been receiving adequate medical treatment in the detention facility.

68.  On 23 August 2021 the applicant asked to be examined by a private neurologist. This was allowed by the detention facility officials and he was examined on 2 September 2021. It appears from an opinion drawn up and signed by the neurologist following the examination that he first examined the applicant’s medical records and then heard the applicant’s complaints and examined him physically, without conducting any specialised tests. The neurologist diagnosed the applicant with second-stage dyscirculatory encephalopathy caused by cerebral atherosclerosis, right‑sided pyramidal insufficiency and vestibulo-atactic syndrome, and diabetic polyneuropathy. He noted that the patient was at risk of a transient ischaemic attack and that there was a serious risk of ischaemic optic neuropathy. He recommended immediate hospitalisation in a specialist neurosurgical hospital and a number of tests, including electromyography and electroneuromyography, doppler ultrasonography, pure sound audiometry, and so on.

69.  The applicant’s trial began on 3 September 2021 with a preliminary hearing in the Baku Court of Serious Crimes. According to the applicant, during two of the subsequent hearings, on 13 and 17 September 2021, he had fainted and the hearings were stopped. On 13 September an ambulance was called, but it took a long time to arrive because the emergency services were overloaded because of the pandemic, and the applicant was sent back to the detention facility to receive medical assistance there. On 17 September again an ambulance was called. This time it arrived promptly and an emergency doctor provided care to the applicant in the courtroom for about an hour. Having also taken into account the applicant’s medical history and previous diagnoses, the emergency doctor diagnosed the applicant with a transient ischaemic attack, arterial hypertension, heart arrhythmia in the form of tachycardia, and dyscirculatory encephalopathy, and recommended hospitalisation (inpatient, with bed rest) and intensive dynamic observation of the patient. It appears that, nevertheless, the applicant was taken back to the SSS detention facility and continued to be brought to the court hearings twice a week.

70.  According to the applicant, the authorities were informed and aware of the above-mentioned opinions of the neurologist of 2 September 2021 (see paragraph 68 above) and of the emergency doctor of 17 September 2021 (see paragraph 69 above). However, according to the Government, the applicant did not inform the SSS detention facility or the MMD about those opinions and did not send them copies of those documents, and the Government became aware of those opinions only after they were forwarded to them by the Court, following which the Government Agent’s Office forwarded them to the MMD. According to the undated information provided by the MMD and submitted subsequently by the Government to the Court on 26 October 2021, the diagnoses in the neurosurgeon’s opinion of 2 September 2021 were not confirmed, except that of diabetic polyneuropathy, which had indeed been detected during the applicant’s hospitalisation in the MMD Hospital and it was not necessary or expedient to carry out the tests recommended by the neurologist. As to the diagnoses made by the emergency doctor on 17 September 2021 (in particular that of a transient ischaemic attack), they were also not confirmed, as such diagnoses could not have been adequately made by an emergency doctor without a complex medical examination. Moreover, the applicant had been examined by the SSS detention facility and MMD doctors immediately after each of the twelve court hearings held before that point (11 October 2021), including the hearing of 17 September 2021.

71.  According to the applicant, on 15 October 2021 his health deteriorated sharply and he was again transferred from the detention facility to the MMD Hospital. According to the Government, he was transferred to the MMD Hospital pursuant to a decision by the MMD to convene a committee of six doctors from the MMD Hospital and other hospitals for another comprehensive examination of the applicant, following the developments described in paragraph 70 above. Before the physical examination by the doctors on 16 October 2021, the applicant underwent a number of tests, including blood and urine tests, ECG, MRI, electroencephalography, doppler ultrasonography, and so on. It appears from the medical report of that committee that they confirmed only the diagnoses made previously at the MMD Hospital (including BPPV) and recommended certain adjustments to the applicant’s prescriptions. On 17 October 2021 the applicant was transferred back to the SSS detention facility.

72.  It appears that throughout the applicant’s participation at subsequent hearings, an ambulance crew from the General Medical Department (“the GMD”) of the SSS ensured any medical assistance he needed. According to the applicant, during a hearing on 25 October 2021, he fainted again. He was put on a stretcher and taken back to the SSS detention facility in an ambulance.

73.  On 17 November 2021 the President of the Section to which the case was allocated considered whether the application under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court should continue in view of the information submitted by the parties up to that point, and decided that Rule 39 would continue to be applied until further notice, with modified interim measures. In particular, the Government were asked to ensure that the applicant was provided with appropriate medical treatment in detention, either on an outpatient or inpatient basis, as considered appropriate by qualified doctors. The Government were also asked to inform the Court periodically, starting with an initial deadline of 19 January 2022 and then every three months thereafter, of the applicant’s state of health and the medical treatment provided, if the applicant remained in detention.

74.  The Government did not provide any of the information requested under the above-mentioned decision by the first deadline of 19 January 2022. Following a reminder by the Court that the failure of a Contracting State to comply with a measure indicated under Rule 39 may entail a finding of a breach of Article 34 of the Convention, on 21 February 2022 the Government submitted their first periodic report.

75.  The report stated that starting from 19 November 2021, the applicant’s health had been being monitored by the medical staff of the GMD and the SSS detention facility and that appropriate medical assistance was provided to him when necessary. Although the applicant was under constant medical supervision, he did not always take the prescribed medication regularly or follow other recommendations, including that of taking regular physical exercise, and he continued to smoke. In January 2022 he was provided dental treatment, and in February 2022 he underwent blood tests. During this period, while the applicant’s general condition was mostly stable and no requests were being received from him, in the course of two court hearings in January 2022 he had experienced emotional tension and high blood pressure. He had been offered sedative and hypotensive medication, which he had refused to take, and he had insisted on continuing to participate in the hearings.

76.  According to the applicant, from 19 November 2021 he was “effectively banned” from being attended by any doctors and his requests to be seen by three private doctors of his own choice were rejected.

77.  The Government submitted their next periodic report on 4 May 2022 (after the second deadline of 19 April 2022 indicated by the Court and following another reminder). According to the report, the applicant’s health was generally stable and was satisfactory overall. There had been some episodes of heightened emotional tension and high blood pressure, which had returned to normal after the applicant had been given the appropriate medication. In the meantime, on 3 May 2022 the applicant wrote to the Court, briefly and without any further factual detail, saying that the authorities had “persistently den[ied]” him access to doctors for the “past eight months” and that he had not received any medical assistance.

78.  The Government submitted their next three periodic reports on 25 July 2022 (after the deadline of 19 July 2022), by the deadline of 19 October 2022, and on 23 January 2023 (after the deadline of 19 January 2022), providing the following information.

79.  Following his criminal conviction, in April 2022 the applicant was transferred to Prison Facility no. 9 under the Ministry of Justice and since then his health had been monitored by the Medical Department of the Ministry of Justice. The following medical care and assistance were provided:

- On 5 and 6 May 2022 he was examined by a departmental head of the Medical Department of the Ministry of Justice and underwent a number of tests, including blood tests.

-  From 10 May 2022 he was placed in the medical-sanitary unit of the penal facility, where he remained for an unspecified period of time, for the observation of his chronic conditions.

-  On 4 June 2022 he was examined by a cardiologist and underwent a number of tests. No significant changes were observed since his previous examinations at the SSS medical facilities.

-  On 23 June 2022, following a request by his lawyers, he was examined by a private doctor of his choice. Based on the doctor’s recommendations, a number of laboratory and instrumental examinations and various blood tests were carried out. No serious pathological changes were observed. Several more visits by the same doctor were ensured at later dates, in particular two visits in September 2022 and nine visits after 19 October 2022.

-  On 7 July 2022 the applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist.

-  Given that the applicant had reported that he had diabetes, on 16, 18 and 21 July 2022 he was seen by an endocrinologist who observed his blood sugar levels on different days and further blood sugar level analyses were carried out by a private clinic. His prescription was adjusted and he was instructed to follow a strict diet. It was also established that the applicant did not have diabetes and, at this time, he was diagnosed with “pre-diabetes, insulin resistance”. Periodic weekly supervision by an endocrinologist continued after that.

-  On 20 July 2022 the applicant was seen by a neurologist who recommended additional instrumental examinations.

-  On 28 July 2022 the applicant underwent a colour Doppler ultrasound examination of his carotid arteries, an electroneuromyography, and an MRI of his brain and spinal cord area at the Central Clinical Hospital. No serious pathological changes were observed and his treatment was adjusted from that previously prescribed.

-  On 12 August and 15 September 2022 the applicant was examined by a cardiologist and a therapist respectively. New cardiology tests were carried out and no negative changes were observed.

-  In November 2002 the applicant was examined by a therapist and a neurologist, and in December 2022 and January 2023 by a cardiologist of the Medical Department of the Ministry of Justice. Several related tests and examinations were carried out again and no significant changes were observed.

-  In December 2022 the applicant underwent twelve sessions of physiotherapy for neck and back ache, which had a positive effect for a certain period of time; however, the pain later returned.

-  In January 2023 the applicant underwent a number of other examinations, including audiometry, videonystagmography and, at his own request, an x-ray examination of his right shoulder which did not reveal any serious pathology.

80.  Throughout the above-mentioned period, the applicant mainly complained of cramp-like pains in the head, neck and back, occasional falls after losing his balance, dizziness when making sudden movements, hypertension and palpitations. His overall health was generally assessed as satisfactory following the appropriate medical examinations and, according to the Government, the applicant’s lawyers and family members were kept informed about the applicant’s health and were given copies of the medical records. According to the applicant, the medical assistance provided by the medical staff from the prison facility during the above-mentioned period was not fully adequate and sufficient and there was no improvement in his state of health, but “the relevant State medical bodies [were] trying to provide appropriate medical assistance within their capabilities”.

81.  Following the Government’s repeated requests for the interim measures to be lifted, and the applicant’s submission of 2 March 2023 that he did not object to that, and given the information provided by the parties, on 13 April 2023 the President of the Section to which the case was allocated decided to lift the interim measures indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

82.  The relevant provisions of the CCrP concerning pre-trial detention are described in detail in the Court’s judgments in Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan (no. 37138/06, §§ 83-102, 9 November 2010) and Muradverdiyev v. Azerbaijan (no. 16966/06, §§ 35‑49, 9 December 2010). The relevant international reports and documents are summarised in Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 59620/14, §§ 100-01, 2 June 2016).

THE LAW

83.  The applicant complained that he had not been provided with adequate medical treatment in detention. Article 3 of the Convention provides as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

84.  The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. In particular, they submitted that the applicant’s domestic appeals had only challenged his pre-trial detention and its extensions and that he had not lodged any complaints with the domestic courts concerning his allegedly inadequate medical treatment in detention. The applicant had also not made any formal complaint either to the prosecuting authorities or to the courts against the detention facility administration in connection with the alleged lack of adequate medical treatment.

85.  The applicant disagreed with the Government’s objection and submitted that he had raised the issue of inadequate medical treatment a number of times with various authorities. In particular, on 23 February 2021 he had made a request to the Prosecutor General’s Office to be examined by three private doctors in view of the deterioration of his health, but the decision on his request had been “unlawfully postponed”. In April 2021 the applicant’s lawyer had applied to the Binagadi District Court under the judicial supervision procedure, challenging that postponement, requesting an examination by the three private doctors and arguing that the applicant had not been provided with adequate medical treatment, but his application was rejected by the first-instance and appellate courts (see paragraphs 40-43 above). Moreover, he had raised grievances concerning the lack of adequate medical treatment in his appeals against the decisions to extend his pre-trial detention and during the hearings at the Baku Court of Serious Crimes.

86.  The Court reiterates that the rule that domestic remedies must be exhausted set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention obliges applicants first to use the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to obtain redress for the Convention breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. Article 35 § 1 also requires that complaints which an applicant intends subsequently to bring before the Court should be made first to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements laid down in domestic law, although there is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Shuriyya Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan, no. 69460/12, § 38, 10 September 2020, with further references). Moreover, where the fundamental right to protection against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, the preventive and compensatory remedies have to be complementary in order to be considered effective (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 98, 10 January 2012, and Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461/10, § 73, 27 November 2012).

87.  As regards where the burden of proof lies, if the Government claims non‑exhaustion it must satisfy the Court that the remedy it refers to was an effective one available both in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is, that it was accessible, capable of providing redress for the applicant’s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success. Once this burden of proof has been discharged, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy suggested by the Government was in fact exhausted, or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from this requirement (see Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan, no. 59620/14, § 126, 2 June 2016, with further references).

88.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes at the outset that the Government merely noted that the applicant had not lodged any complaints with the prosecuting authorities or courts concerning his medical treatment in detention. They neither specified what type of remedy would have been an effective remedy in their view, nor provided any further information as to how such a remedy could have prevented the alleged violation or its continuation or provided the applicant with adequate redress. In this connection, the Court also observes that it has already rejected similar objections raised by the Government in previous cases (see Yunusova and Yunusov, cited above, §§ 122-30, and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, nos. 68762/14 and 71200/14, §§ 100-06, 20 September 2018) and sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.

89.  The Court also notes that the applicant’s attempts to obtain redress for the alleged violations of his rights under the CCrP were to no avail as the domestic courts refused to entertain his complaints for want of jurisdiction (see paragraph 43 above).

90.  The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s objection of non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies. It further notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

91.  The applicant submitted that the authorities had refused his repeated requests for adequate medical supervision and treatment that was regular and systematic and involved a comprehensive therapeutic strategy, including, inter alia, medical examinations by “independent” doctors. This had resulted in incorrect and inconsistent diagnoses which had failed to address the seriousness of his illnesses. He was transferred to the MMD Hospital only for short periods of time and was not offered continued inpatient care. He underwent a polypectomy after his first transfer to the MMD Hospital, following the Court’s second indication under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This delayed medical intervention came after “intolerable aggravation of his condition” which caused him unbearable pain and difficulties. The applicant submitted that, even when the Court’s decisions on interim measures applied, there had been some periods when he had not received any medical treatment or had access to doctors. Moreover, he argued that a number of diagnoses made by the MMD and other doctors and/or treatment prescribed by them were incorrect.

92.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been provided with adequate medical assistance and treatment during his detention. During that time, he had undergone surgery and had been under constant and adequate medical supervision. When necessary, he had been transferred to the MMD Hospital and after his health had stabilised he was returned to the pre-trial detention facility.

(a)   General principles

93.  The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s conduct (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 199, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill‑treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. Assessment of this minimum level depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 91, ECHR 2000-XI, and Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, § 97, 20 October 2016). Although the purpose of such treatment is a factor to be taken into account, in particular whether it was intended to humiliate or debase the victim, the absence of any such purpose does not inevitably lead to a finding that there has been no violation of Article 3 (see Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, § 74, ECHR 2001-III, and Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 203, ECHR 2012).

94.  The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kudła, cited above, § 94; Muršić, cited above, § 99; and Rooman v. Belgium [GC], no. 18052/11, § 143, 31 January 2019). Furthermore, when assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as the specific allegations made by the applicant (see Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, § 119, ECHR 2006‑IX, and Schmidt and Šmigol v. Estonia, nos. 3501/20 and 2 others, § 122, 28 November 2023).

95.  In exceptional cases, where a detainee’s state of health is absolutely incompatible with his or her detention, Article 3 may require the release of that person under certain conditions. However, Article 3 cannot be construed as laying down a general obligation to release detainees on health grounds. It rather imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance. Medical treatment provided within prison facilities must be appropriate, that is, at a level comparable to that which the State authorities have committed themselves to provide to the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this does not mean that every detainee must be guaranteed the same level of medical treatment as is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities. A lack of appropriate medical care and, more generally, the detention in inappropriate conditions of a person who is ill may in principle amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see Yunusova and Yunusov, cited above, § 138, with further references).

(b)   Application of these principles in the present case

96.  Having had regard to the particular circumstances of the present case and the parties’ submissions, the Court considers that the present complaint should be examined with regard to two distinct time periods, namely the period between the applicant’s arrest on 13 August 2020 and his first transfer to the MMD Hospital on 2 July 2021, and the period after 2 July 2021.

(i)      Period between 13 August 2020 and 2 July 2021

97.  The Court notes that the material in the case file demonstrates – and it was not disputed by the parties – that, when detained, the applicant had been suffering from several chronic conditions and illnesses including, among other things, multiple spinal disc herniations and protrusions and spinal cord compressions, various heart and cardiovascular conditions, colon problems and type 2 diabetes, and that he was taking up to twenty types of medication on a daily basis. The Court therefore observes that, although nothing suggests that these conditions were in principle incompatible with detention, they required appropriate medical supervision and care on a regular, systematic and comprehensive basis, taking into account the various conditions the applicant was suffering from and his relatively advanced age.

98.  The Court reiterates in this regard that the “adequacy” of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The mere fact that a detainee was seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical assistance was adequate. The authorities must also ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee’s health problems or preventing their aggravation. The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through (see Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152/06, § 137, 23 March 2016, and Yunusova and Yunusov, cited above, § 142, both with further references).

99.  The Court also reiterates that it is not necessary to show that a failure to provide requisite medical assistance led to a medical emergency or otherwise caused severe or prolonged pain to find that a detainee was subjected to treatment incompatible with the guarantees of Article 3. The fact that a detainee needed and requested such assistance but it was unavailable to him may, in certain circumstances, suffice to conclude that such treatment was degrading within the meaning of that Article (see Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456/05, §§ 86-87 and 90, 4 October 2005, and Davtyan v. Armenia, no. 29736/06, § 88, 31 March 2015).

100.  After his arrest, between 14 August and 30 September 2020, the applicant was seen relatively regularly, around twenty times in total, usually by the same doctor, who appears to have been a member of the SSS detention facility’s medical staff. While some tests were conducted, namely an ultrasound examination, a blood test and an ECG, it is not entirely clear what conclusions they led to. Most of the entries in the medical record book corresponding to this period were brief and concerned the applicant’s recurring complaints. It appears that the doctor suggested, inter alia, a colonoscopy and a visit from a neurosurgeon, which the applicant refused because of his “lack of trust” of unfamiliar doctors. However, it is not entirely clear from those entries what the doctor’s reasons for those recommendations were or why no further attempts were made to follow through with them despite the applicant’s refusal. It appears that, during this period, the applicant’s complaints were addressed on a symptomatic basis, without comprehensive medical examinations in order to accurately diagnose the underlying conditions and to engage a comprehensive therapeutic strategy. Furthermore, the Court notes that the medical record book did not contain any entries at all for the period between 30 September 2020 and 12 March 2021, which suggests that for some reason regular visits by the detention facility doctor may have abruptly stopped at the end of September 2020.

101.  Nevertheless, the available material demonstrates that on 16, 19 and 28 October 2020 the applicant was examined by three specialist doctors. On the basis of the applicant’s medical records before his arrest and an MRI scan conducted on 26 October 2020 and following physical examinations, they concluded that he was suffering from various conditions and recommended a number of further examinations and specialised interventions, including a joint comprehensive examination on an inpatient basis by a committee of specialists with a view to prescribing more adequate treatment, a colonoscopy, psychotherapeutic treatment and medication for cervical herniations, and possible surgery to treat spinal disc herniations. None of those recommendations were followed through in a prompt manner in the following months, although it appears that the authorities were informed of the diagnoses and opinions of the specialists referred to.

102.  On 11 December 2020 the prosecuting authorities allowed the applicant’s lawyer’s request for an examination by a medical committee and on 27 December 2020 the applicant underwent a number of medical tests. The committee of six doctors examined the applicant only on 11 January 2021, a month after the prosecuting authorities’ decision. However, it appears that the committee saw the applicant only briefly and, reiterating the previous diagnoses that had been based on the available medical records, concluded that “an adequate course of treatment could be chosen” and, if necessary, any medical treatment could be provided at the place of pre-trial detention or in a prison medical facility, without actually recommending or prescribing any specific treatment (which, however, it was not in any event competent to do in the circumstances, given that the scope of its answers was limited to the specific questions put by the prosecuting authorities).

103.  In view of the above-mentioned delays, in February and March 2021 the applicant repeatedly asked to be examined by private doctors of his own choice at his own expense, but the decision on his request was postponed by the prosecuting authorities for around six weeks and then dismissed on 7 April 2021. The applicant’s complaints concerning this delay were rejected by the courts for lack of jurisdiction to examine complaints concerning that type of decision of the prosecuting authorities.

104.  According to the applicant, at around this time (from February 2021) his health began to deteriorate significantly and, in addition to stomach and back pain, difficulty walking, and intestinal obstructions, he consistently complained of dizziness and of often losing his balance and falling. The Court notes that the cause of the sudden falls was diagnosed as BPPV only several months later, after the interim measures had been indicated to the respondent Government. However, this symptom could have been indicative of a significantly more serious health issue, and it was not promptly and accurately diagnosed despite the applicant’s repeated complaints. On the contrary, it appears from the available documents that, around the time when the applicant’s condition began worsening, no medical examinations or tests were carried out for more than two and a half months, between the examination of the applicant by the medical committee on 11 January 2021 and early April 2021, when new blood tests were conducted. There are no medical records pertaining to this period, except two very brief and only partly legible entries in the detention facility’s medical record book concerning a visit by a therapist on 12 March 2021 apparently in connection with a Covid-19 vaccination and a visit by a neurologist on 30 March 2021. In this context the Court reiterates that it is for the authorities to ensure that a comprehensive record is kept concerning the detainee’s state of health and his or her treatment while in detention (see Blokhin, cited above, § 137).

105.  Moreover, following the blood tests conducted on 2 and 3 April 2021, it appears that the applicant was not seen by a doctor and did not undergo any medical examinations for almost another month, until the end of April 2021, after he had already lodged a Rule-39 request with the Court on 19 April 2021 and after the Government had been informed of it on 21 April 2021. Specifically, several consultations with specialist doctors and medical tests took place on 28 April 2021, treatment was prescribed and a colonoscopy recommended again.

106.  Following that, however, no specialised examinations or treatment were provided for around two more months, until 2 July 2021 when the applicant was transferred to the MMD Hospital, despite the fact that in the meantime the Court made two indications under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraphs 50, 56 and 60 above). As for the Government’s argument that the delay in the applicant’s transfer to the MMD Hospital was attributable to the applicant who himself refused to be transferred (see paragraph 54 above), which the Court will also further examine in more detail below in the context of the complaint under Article 34 of the Convention, the Court considers, having had regard to the parties’ submissions and the documents provided (see paragraphs 53-55 above), that there was either a mere misunderstanding or miscommunication between the applicant and the authorities as to whether the authorities’ intention was to arrange an outpatient or an inpatient examination of the applicant. It nevertheless appears that the applicant was merely insisting on being transferred to the MMD Hospital on an inpatient basis and protesting against what was, in his view, the authorities’ non‑compliance with the interim measures. The Court does not attach significant importance to that incident, especially taking into account the lack of adequate medical assistance during the previous months and the Government’s delayed compliance with the interim measures indicated by the Court. The Court cannot therefore conclude that the applicant had actually refused adequate medical treatment.

107.  Having regard to the above, the Court finds that the applicant did not receive adequate medical treatment for his illnesses while in detention during the period between 13 August 2020 and 2 July 2021. As a result of this lack of adequate medical treatment, he was exposed to prolonged mental and physical suffering diminishing his human dignity. The authorities’ failure to provide him with the medical care he needed amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.

108.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the period of the applicant’s detention between 13 August 2020 and 2 July 2021.

(ii)    Period after 2 July 2021

109.  The Court notes that on 2 July 2021 the applicant was hospitalised for a period of around three weeks. A number of complex physical, laboratory and instrumental examinations were carried out and the applicant was examined by a number of qualified specialist doctors. He underwent a colonoscopy, which had been recommended several months earlier, after which a polypectomy was performed. He was diagnosed with BPPV, which turned out to be the cause of his dizziness and frequent falls, and appropriate treatment was prescribed.

110.  Following the applicant’s renewed complaints, he was again transferred to the MMD Hospital for more than two weeks, during which time more specialised tests were carried out. During this time, he was given several types of medication as part of a conservative course of treatment.

111.  As to what may be described as the conflicting medical opinions issued by a private neurologist on 2 September 2021 and an emergency doctor on 17 September 2021, who diagnosed the applicant either with the risk of or with an actual transient ischaemic attack, as well as with other illnesses, the Court observes that those diagnoses were made without any specialised medical tests. It further notes that on 15 and 16 October 2021 the applicant underwent several specialised medical tests at the MMD Hospital, where he was transferred for the third time, following which a committee of doctors convened for this purpose did not confirm the diagnoses of ischaemic heart attack and other illnesses which had not been diagnosed before the private neurologist’s opinion of 2 September 2021 (see paragraph 71 above). Neither were those diagnoses ever confirmed by the medical examinations of the applicant carried out later. As to the neurologist’s recommendation that the applicant be transferred to a specialised (non-prison) neurosurgical hospital, the Court notes that no evidence has been submitted to demonstrate that the medical facilities which were made available to the applicant during the relevant period, namely the MMD Hospital, lacked any of the medical equipment or qualified staff that would be required to carry out the recommended specialised examinations and to provide appropriate treatment.

112.  It appears that after the two instances when the applicant fainted during court hearings in September 2021, at subsequent hearings a GMD ambulance crew was on call to ensure any medical assistance he needed.

113.  As to the period following the Court’s third decision under Rule 39 of the Rule of Court of 17 November 2021, the Court notes that the Government submitted its first periodic report with a significant delay of over one month, while most of the remaining periodic reports were also submitted with delays. Nevertheless, it appears from the information submitted by the Government that throughout this period the applicant was under regular medical supervision as an outpatient, underwent a number of medical examinations, was allowed to be examined by doctors of his choice numerous times, and was prescribed and administered physiotherapeutic treatment and medication, and that his medication intake was supervised, as it was noted that he himself did not always regularly take the prescribed medication.

114.  Having regard to the above, the Court finds that during the period after 2 July 2021 the applicant received both inpatient and outpatient medical treatment which, on the whole, cannot be considered inadequate. Even assuming that there might have been some shortcomings and there might have been some time periods during which the medical supervision might not have been very regular (see, for example, the applicant’s submissions summarised in paragraphs 76-77 above), the available material does not disclose that the medical care provided to the applicant after 2 July 2021 was inadequate to such a degree as to cause him suffering reaching the minimum level of severity required by Article 3 of the Convention.

115.  There has accordingly been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the period of the applicant’s detention after 2 July 2021.

116.  The applicant complained that his arrest and detention had not been based on reasonable grounds for suspecting that he had committed a criminal offence. Article 5 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows, in the relevant part:

“1.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(c)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so ...”

117.  The Government submitted that there had been sufficient information and evidence giving rise to a “reasonable suspicion” that the applicant had committed the criminal offences of which he was suspected and with which he was charged.

118.  The applicant reiterated his complaint, arguing that there was no information or evidence in the prosecution’s possession or presented by it to the domestic courts which could objectively give them a reason to suspect that he had committed a criminal offence.

119.  The Court reiterates that under the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, a person may be detained, in the context of criminal proceedings, only for the purpose of bringing him or her before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence. The “reasonableness” of the suspicion on which an arrest must be based forms an essential part of the safeguard laid down in Article 5 § 1 (c). Having a reasonable suspicion presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence. What may be regarded as reasonable will, however, depend on all the circumstances (see Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, § 314, 22 December 2020, with further references).

120.  The Court has also held that Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention does not presuppose that the investigating authorities have obtained sufficient evidence to bring charges at the time of arrest. The purpose of questioning during detention under Article 5 § 1 (c) is to further the criminal investigation by confirming or dispelling the concrete suspicion grounding the arrest. Thus, facts that raise a suspicion need not be of the same level as those necessary to justify a conviction or even the bringing of a charge, which comes at the next stage of the process of criminal investigation (see Selahattin Demirtaş, cited above, § 315, with further references).

121.  As a rule, problems with the “reasonableness of suspicion” arise at the level of the facts. The question then is whether the arrest and detention were based on sufficient objective elements to justify a “reasonable suspicion” that the facts in issue had actually occurred. In addition to its factual side, the existence of a “reasonable suspicion” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c) requires that the facts relied on can be reasonably considered to fall under one of the sections of the law dealing with criminal behaviour. Thus, there could clearly not be a “reasonable suspicion” if the acts or facts held against a detained person did not constitute a crime at the time when they occurred (ibid., § 317, with further references).

122.  The Court reiterates that when assessing the “reasonableness” of a suspicion, it must be able to ascertain whether the essence of the safeguard afforded by Article 5 § 1 (c) has been secured. Consequently, the respondent Government have to furnish at least some facts or information capable of satisfying the Court that the arrested person was reasonably suspected of having committed the alleged offence (ibid., § 319).

123.  While reasonable suspicion must exist at the time of the arrest and initial detention, it must also be shown, in cases of prolonged detention, that the suspicion persisted and remained “reasonable” throughout the detention (ibid., § 320).

124.  In the present case, the applicant was initially suspected of the aggravated abuse of official authority and using State funds otherwise than for their designated purpose, and, in addition, was later charged with the criminal offences of laundering the proceeds of crime in large amounts, forgery by an official, and embezzlement or squandering in large amounts. It is not disputed that all of the above qualified as criminal offences under the domestic law.

125.  It appears that the initial suspicion about the applicant was based on information provided by the Ministry of Finance (available in the case file) about suspected unlawful expenditure and overspending of State funds and breach of financial accountability in the Azerbaijani Embassy in Serbia, corroborated by a witness statement (see paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 above). Within the meaning of the previously cited case-law, such evidence objectively linked the applicant to the alleged criminal offences of abuse of official authority and using State funds otherwise than for their designated purpose, and was sufficient to have created “reasonable suspicion” about him. Accordingly, the suspicion created by the initial information received by the authorities was reasonable at the time of his arrest and initial detention. Furthermore, from the material in the case file it appears that relatively promptly, about a month after the applicant had been arrested and charged, further evidence was obtained by the investigation which supported the initial suspicion, as well as giving rise to suspicion that he had committed the other criminal offences with which he was subsequently charged (see paragraph 19 above).

126.  The Court considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, the available evidence, which was described in the prosecution’s submissions to the courts and in the relevant court decisions, would raise a reasonable suspicion in an objective observer that the applicant had committed the criminal offences referred to and that it has not been shown that the evidence was not sufficient for this suspicion to persist throughout the entire period of his pre‑trial detention (compare Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 37138/06, §§ 140-43, 9 November 2010; Rafig Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 45875/06, §§ 76-79, 6 December 2011; and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, no. 11948/08, §§ 43‑46, 20 February 2014).

127.  For these reasons, the Court finds that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

128.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that the domestic courts had failed to justify the need for his pre-trial detention and to provide reasons for his continued detention. Article 5 § 3 of the Convention reads as follows:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

129.  The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

130.  The applicant maintained his complaint.

131.  The Government submitted that the domestic courts had given sufficient and relevant reasons for the applicant’s pre-trial detention.

132.  The Court refers to the general principles established in its case-law and set out in Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova ([GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 84‑91, 5 July 2016), which are equally pertinent to the present case.

133.  As regards the period to be taken into consideration for the purposes of Article 5 § 3, this commenced on 13 August 2020, when the applicant was arrested (see paragraph 10 above), and ended on 21 January 2022, when the Baku Court of Serious Crimes convicted him (see paragraph 29 above). The applicant was therefore held in pre‑trial detention for one year, five months and eight days in total.

134.  The applicant was brought before a judge on 14 August 2020, the day after his arrest, and the Sabail District Court ordered the applicant’s remand in custody until 3 November 2020, finding that there was a risk that he would obstruct the investigation by influencing potential witnesses and that his release “could evoke negative emotions in society”. The Court notes, however, that the first-instance court did not provide any reasons why it considered those grounds relevant in the applicant’s case. Nevertheless, the Court notes that, following the applicant’s appeal, the Baku Court of Appeal limited the justification for the applicant’s detention only to the ground that there was a risk of the applicant obstructing the investigation by illegally influencing participants in the proceedings. In this connection, the appellate court in its decision referred, albeit briefly, to the prosecution’s submission that on 13 August 2020, the day of the applicant’s arrest, an unnamed employee of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Serbia who had a close personal relationship with the applicant had attempted to hide or otherwise tamper with some documentary evidence at the applicant’s official residence (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). The Court observes that if this reasoning is coupled with the reasoning in the Nasimi District Court’s subsequent decision of 12 September 2020 refusing to release the applicant on bail, which was upheld by the Baku Court of Appeal on 22 September 2020 (see paragraphs 17-18 above), then, despite the reasoning being very brief, it appears the Baku Court of Appeal may also have taken the view that the prosecution’s submission suggested that the applicant might have been personally implicated in attempts to tamper with the evidence. The courts deciding on the initial period of the applicant’s pretrial detention (from 14 August to 3 November 2020) could therefore arguably be considered to have provided, albeit briefly, relevant and sufficient reasons for detaining the applicant. However, in the circumstances of the present case, the Court does not consider it necessary to make a determination in this regard because, even assuming that relevant and sufficient reasons had been provided for that initial period of detention, the subsequent decisions extending the applicant’s detention lacked such reasons.

135.  In particular, in its extension order of 23 October 2020, the Nasimi District Court merely observed that the grounds for the applicant’s detention “had not ceased to exist”, without providing any reasons for that conclusion (see paragraph 21 above). It appears to the Court from the case material that by then the prosecuting authorities had obtained more documentary and other evidence against the applicant in the framework of the criminal proceedings, which apparently included documents from the Embassy in Serbia, and that this evidence was the basis for further charges brought against the applicant on 18 September 2020. However, the Nasimi District Court’s extension order of 23 October 2020 contained no reasoned re‑assessment of the circumstances which had been the original basis for finding that, in the initial stages of the investigation, there was a risk that the investigation would be obstructed by tampering with evidence, and no further or other reasons were given for finding that the grounds for the applicant’s detention “had not ceased to exist”. Likewise, following the applicant’s appeal against the extension order, no reasons were provided by the Baku Court of Appeal for finding that there was still a risk that the investigation would be obstructed. Moreover, in addition, the appellate court also held, for the first time, that there was a risk of the applicant absconding, without providing any reasons for this finding (see paragraph 22 above). Similarly, all the subsequent first-instance and appellate decisions extending the applicant’s detention and refusing to order house arrest instead also found that those two grounds had not ceased to exist, without providing any reasoning (see paragraphs 23-24 and 26-28 above).

136.  Accordingly, the Court observes that in their decisions extending the detention of the applicant the domestic courts used a standard template and limited themselves to repeating a number of grounds for detention in an abstract and stereotyped way, without giving any reasoning why they considered those grounds relevant to the applicant’s case. They failed to mention any facts specific to the applicant’s case which were relevant to those grounds and to support those grounds with relevant and sufficient reasons. The Court has repeatedly found violations of Article 5 § 3 in previous Azerbaijani cases where similar shortcomings were noted and analysed in detail (see, among others, Farhad Aliyev, cited above, §§ 191‑94; Muradverdiyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 16966/06, §§ 87-91, 9 December 2010; Zayidov, cited above, §§ 64‑69; and Avaz Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 37816/12 and 25260/14, §§ 60-62, 22 April 2021).

137.  In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the legal issue raised under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in the present case, in so far as it relates to the extensions of the applicant’s pre-trial detention, is essentially repetitive of those earlier cases and it does not see any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion. The Court therefore considers that the authorities failed to give “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons for the applicant’s continued pre‑trial detention.

138.  Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

139.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that the judicial review of his pre-trial detention had been inadequate.

140.  Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above (see paragraphs 132-138 above), the Court considers that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of this complaint (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014, and Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan, nos. 34015/17 and 26896/18, §§ 53-54, 1 February 2024).

141.  On 8 March 2022 the applicant raised a complaint under Article 18 of the Convention that his rights under Article 5 of the Convention had been restricted for purposes other than those prescribed in the Convention, which reads as follows:

“The restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.”

142.  The Government submitted, firstly, that the applicant had raised this complaint for the first time in his submissions dated 8 March 2022, which was more than four months after the date of the relevant final domestic decision concerning the applicant’s pre-trial detention. They argued, therefore, that the complaint had been lodged out of time.

143.  The Government argued, secondly, that the applicant had not raised the complaint and arguments raised before the Court in the domestic courts. The complaint that the applicant made in his submissions to the Binagadi District Court on 25 June 2021 was not “sufficient evidence” that the domestic remedies had been exhausted because it was made after he had lodged his application form with the Court.

144.  Commenting on the applicant’s specific arguments (see paragraphs 145-150 below), the Government further submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted for criminal offences such as forgery by an official, money laundering and embezzlement of State funds. None of the accusations against the applicant even remotely concerned the applicant’s political activity. The acts of which he was accused were not related to “his participation in political life, real or imagined”, his criticisms or some reasons of vengeance. The applicant had failed to substantiate and prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of any ulterior purpose. His arguments were based on “irrelevant references to past events” of decades before and were mere “theories of a sophisticated political conspiracy against [him]” which could not be indicative of an ulterior purpose. No evidence had been presented by the applicant to support his claim that he was a leading political figure suspected of having links with the opposition and, on the contrary, he had been a State official for many years and appeared to have always been a strong supporter of the current government. Even if the applicant had criticised members of the Russian diplomatic corps or Russian policy towards Azerbaijan, there was no evidence that this had led to his arrest or had given rise to a predominant ulterior motive for prosecuting him. As to the applicant’s argument concerning the alleged vindictive aspects of the relationship between him and a senior government official, it referred to the events of more than twenty years before and amounted to accusations against specific individuals without any evidence or legal basis. As a whole, the applicant’s complaint under Article 18 was nothing more than mere speculation and an attempt to avoid being held accountable.

145.  The applicant submitted that he was “an active participant in Azerbaijani politics and a leading figure in Azerbaijani society”. Before his arrest he had served as Prosecutor General and as an Ambassador to various countries. His argued that his rights under Article 5 of the Convention were restricted for purposes other than those prescribed under that provision.

146.  He argued firstly that his arrest and detention were related to his alleged role, as the Ambassador to Serbia, in the sale of arms by Serbia to Armenia, which had come to light in July 2020. The applicant submitted in support of that argument that on 15 July 2020, during a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, the President of Azerbaijan had sharply criticised the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the context of the ongoing July 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan border clashes, following which on 16 July the President had dismissed the Minister of Foreign Affairs from his post. According to the applicant, “at the same meeting”[1], the President stated, inter alia:

“Some of our diplomats abroad are turning into envoys of the countries in which they work. This must end. This is also a manifestation of erroneous staff policy. Some diplomats have betrayed the state and committed treason and are not concealing it. They are controlled by the secret services of the countries they live in. We have sufficient information...”

147.  The applicant was arrested on 13 August 2020, after Azerbaijan had “criticised Serbia for selling arms to Armenia”. Following his arrest, several media sources (the applicant mentioned four such media sources, namely teref.az, musavat.com, Caucasus Watch and JAM-News) published articles stating that the applicant had been arrested “on suspicion of treason” and/or in connection with the sale of arms by Serbia to Armenia. Moreover, the applicant submitted that, during a search in his office in the Embassy in Serbia, the authorities had seized diplomatic correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning arms sales to Armenia as well as copies of newspaper articles concerning that matter.

148.  Secondly, the applicant argued that another reason for his arrest and the criminal proceedings against him was his criticism of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy towards Azerbaijan and of the Russian Foreign Minister. In support of this argument, the applicant submitted a copy of an interview he had given to a media source named Moderator.az which had been published in January 2017 and in which he had made critical comments apparently in connection with a then recent statement by the Russian Foreign Minister to the effect that the Karabakh conflict was not entirely an internal Azerbaijani affair.

149.  Thirdly, in his observations, the applicant argued that another reason for his arrest and the criminal proceedings against him was that he was seen as a strong political figure with potential links to opposition parties in Azerbaijan. In this connection, in his observations in respect of the present complaint, which was made on 8 March 2022, he referred to a number of articles published in various media sources which he had mentioned in the supplement to his original application form of 19 February 2021. They contained allegations or statements that the applicant had been involved in power struggles within the “party in power” or opinions voiced from the point of view of the political opposition, concerning the potential effects of his arrest on them. In his submissions in the supplement to the original application form, which were made before the present complaint under Article 18 was raised, the applicant stated, in connection with those specific media articles, that the domestic media had often made comments about his “having political claims, contacts with the political opposition, and other implausible accusations” against him.

150.  Lastly, the applicant argued that yet another reason for his arrest and the criminal proceedings against him was the hostile relationship between him and A., the Head of the Department for Working with the Law‑Enforcement Authorities at the Presidential Administration. During the applicant’s tenure as Prosecutor General between 1995 to 2000, a close relative of A. had been prosecuted and convicted. The applicant said that because of this, during the following twenty years while he had been an ambassador to various countries, A. “had not stopped being hostile towards the applicant and his children, family members and relatives. All of [the applicant’s] children were forced to leave Azerbaijan”. Following the applicant’s arrest, A.’s above-mentioned relative had given an interview in which he called the applicant an “unworthy son of his Motherland ... turning a blind eye to [the sale of weapons to Armenia], wanting to carry out a coup in the country to become a leader” and alleged that the applicant had political ambitions and “wanted to become a president”.

151.  The applicant argued that he had repeatedly and sufficiently brought his grievances relating to the present complaint under Article 18 of the Convention to the attention of the domestic courts.

152.  As to the Government’s objection concerning the four-month time‑limit, the Court reiterates that the applicant’s pre-trial detention ended on 21 January 2022, when the Baku Court of Serious Crimes convicted him (see paragraph 133 above). Accordingly, since the present complaint under Article 18 is raised in conjunction with the applicant’s complaint under Article 5, the time-limit for lodging that complaint started to run on that date, which marked the end of the applicant’s pre-trial detention (see, mutatis mutandis, Solmaz v. Turkey, no. 27561/02, § 36, 16 January 2007, and Bordikov v. Russia, no. 921/03, § 80, 8 October 2009). Protocol No. 15 to the Convention, which entered into force on 1 August 2021, has amended Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to reduce the period for lodging an application from six to four months and, according to the transitional provisions of the Protocol (Article 8 § 3), this amendment applies only after a period of six months following the entry into force of the Protocol, that is starting from 1 February 2022. Accordingly, on the date when the applicant’s pre-trial detention ended, which was before 1 February 2022, the six-month time‑limit still applied. The present complaint was lodged on 8 March 2022, less than six months after 21 January 2022. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government’s objection.

153.  As to the Government’s objection concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court notes that, indeed, it appears from the material in the case file that most of the applicant’s arguments made before the Court have not been raised before the domestic courts. However, it does not consider it necessary to determine whether the applicant has exhausted the domestic remedies because, even assuming that he did do so, the complaint is in any event inadmissible for the reasons specified below.

154.  The Court refers to the general principles concerning the interpretation and application of Article 18 of the Convention, in particular as set out in its judgments in Merabishvili v. Georgia ([GC], no. 72508/13, §§ 287-317, 28 November 2017) and Navalnyy v. Russia ([GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, §§ 164-65, 15 November 2018) (see also Selahattin Demirtaş, cited above, § 421).

155.  The Court has already found that the applicant’s arrest and pre-trial detention served a purpose prescribed under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention (see paragraphs 119-127 above) (contrast Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 15172/13, § 141, 22 May 2014, and compare Merabishvili, cited above, § 318). It has also found that the domestic authorities had failed to give “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons for the applicant’s continued pre‑trial detention, in breach of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 137-138 above). It has not been argued that those measures constituted a restriction of any other rights of the applicant under the Convention. It follows that, even if it is established that the restriction of his right to liberty also pursued a purpose not prescribed by Article 5 § 1 (c), there will only be a breach of Article 18 if that other purpose was predominant (ibid.).

156.  The Court notes that the applicant has not clearly defined what he says the ulterior purpose or purposes behind the arrest actually were, instead essentially presenting four different groups of arguments which, in his view, pointed to the existence of such an ulterior purpose or purposes. However, these arguments do not appear to be inter-related with each other in any cohesive manner and could even be described as completely unrelated to each other.

157.  As to the argument that the actual reasons for the applicant’s arrest were related to the Serbian arms sales to Armenia, the Court observes the following. The statement by the President which the applicant referred to (see paragraph 146 above) did not mention him by name. Having regard to this statement both out of context and in the context of the longer speech made by the President during a meeting with the new Minister where he touched on many other points, it is not possible to identify the applicant as one of the diplomats referred to in the specific quotation. Neither did the applicant explain why exactly he considered that this statement could be interpreted as referring to him personally. Furthermore, while it is true that the applicant was arrested and then dismissed from his post of the Ambassador to Serbia relatively soon after the row concerning the arms sales by Serbia to Armenia, in the absence of other direct or circumstantial evidence or information on the relevant primary facts, this close timing by itself is too tenuous a basis to conclude that his arrest and subsequent detention were made for an ulterior purpose.

158.  In this connection, the Court further observes that the applicant also submitted that, following his arrest, several articles were published in various media linking his arrest to the arms sales issue. However, those publications referred either to unclear or unnamed sources or to some analysts’ opinions as to what the reason for the applicant’s arrest might have been. Those publications were relatively short articles mainly conveying the news of the applicant’s arrest. It cannot be discerned from their content whether or not they were based on any hard evidence or facts. They did not refer to any public statement made by a State official in respect of the applicant. On the contrary, precisely because the applicant’s arrest followed so soon after the then recent arms sales question had been raised that it might have been expected that some journalists and analysts would attempt to clarify whether that was the actual cause of the applicant’s arrest. However, as the case material demonstrates and contrary to what was stated in some of those publications, the applicant was not actually arrested for “treason” and, moreover, it appears that the publications of that nature were very few and limited in time to the immediate aftermath of the applicant’s arrest, and that no more information of that kind was published subsequently as the criminal proceedings against the applicant progressed. While the Court takes note of the opinions voiced in the media about the applicant’s case, it reiterates that, as the political process and the judicial process are fundamentally different, the Court must base its decisions on “evidence in the legal sense” and its own assessment of the specific relevant facts (see Ilgar Mammadov, cited above, § 140).

159.  As to the applicant’s further submission that diplomatic correspondence concerning the arms sales was seized from his work office in the Embassy, having considered the record of an inspection that took place on 13 August 2020, the Court observes that this correspondence was among many other documents and items listed as having been found in his office during the inspection. However, as the record clearly indicates, none of those items or documents, including this correspondence, were actually seized. Neither does it appear from the material available in the case file that this correspondence was ever used or referred to in any other decisions in the framework of the criminal proceedings against the applicant.

160.  While the Court is sensitive to any potential evidential difficulties that could be encountered by an applicant claiming to have been the victim of a violation of Article 18, it observes that, apart from the above-mentioned points which the applicant simply listed in his submissions, no other evidence was presented by him in this regard. Moreover, he failed to provide a meaningful and detailed explanation as to what his role, as an Ambassador, actually was in the matter relating to the arms sales in question or what in his view the authorities’ position concerning his alleged role or shortcomings in this regard might have been or why exactly he considered that this matter had led to ulterior motives for arresting him. The Court notes that the applicant was prosecuted for embezzlement, forgery by an official and other offences allegedly committed by him as the head of a diplomatic mission responsible for its financial affairs, and that he was not prosecuted for any acts related to his core professional diplomatic duties as an Ambassador. Even assuming that there might have been some dissatisfaction with the applicant’s actions or inaction as an Ambassador in connection with the question of arms sales, the Court considers that it cannot be established from the material put before it that the restriction of the applicant’s rights pursued an ulterior purpose related to the arms sales by Serbia to Armenia.

161.  As to the applicant’s argument that the actual reason for his arrest was his critical remarks about the Russian Foreign Minister and Russia’s policy towards Azerbaijan in an article that had been published in January 2017 (see paragraph 148 above), more than three and a half years before his arrest, the Court finds it completely unsubstantiated and therefore entirely implausible in the circumstances of the present case.

162.  Similarly, the Court finds that the applicant’s submissions that he was arrested because he was a strong political figure suspected of having close links with the opposition are also unsubstantiated (see paragraph 149 above). In this regard, in those submissions relating to his complaint under Article 18 raised at a later stage, he again mentioned several articles he had referred to in the supplement to his original application form, which included what he himself described as “implausible accusations”. The applicant presented no other evidence or information showing that his arrest and detention had been motivated by any ulterior purpose to do with his alleged perceived link with the opposition or his being “a strong political figure”.

163.  Lastly, as regards the applicant’s submissions concerning his personal relations with A. (see paragraph 150 above), the departmental head at the Presidential Administration, the Court notes that they essentially amounted to a statement that he had personally and singlehandedly orchestrated the entire criminal case against the applicant, in the framework of which he had been arrested and detained. The applicant’s submissions that A. had been hostile towards him and his family and relatives and had somehow “forced his children to leave Azerbaijan” are very general and vague and unsupported by any evidence and they lack even a minimal degree of factual detail. The only detail provided is that A. was allegedly hostile towards the applicant because a relative of his had been convicted during the applicant’s tenure as Prosecutor General and that that relative (and not A. himself) had publicly voiced his negative opinions about the applicant. The above information is not sufficient for a finding that the applicant’s arrest and detention were applied for an ulterior purpose.

164.  Given the above, it cannot be established that the applicant’s arrest and pre-trial detention pursued any ulterior purpose.

165.  For these reasons, the Court finds that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

166.  The applicant complained that the Government had failed to comply with the interim measures indicated by the Court under Rule 39 and had thus violated his right of individual application under Article 34 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”

167.  The applicant submitted that despite two decisions on interim measures taken by the Court on 7 May and 22 June 2021 which indicated to the Government, inter alia, that the applicant should be transferred, “at the earliest possible date” and then “immediately”, to a prison medical institution as an inpatient for a comprehensive assessment of his health, the Government had failed to comply with the measures indicated in a timely manner and he had been transferred to the MMD Hospital only on 2 July 2022. In the applicant’s view and according to his interpretation of the prosecuting authorities’ letter of 22 May 2021 (see paragraph 53 above), in the meantime, between the Court’s two decisions, the authorities had intended to carry out only a “short” medical examination on an outpatient basis. Moreover, at various times the Government either did not submit plans of the applicant’s future treatment as requested by the Court or the plans submitted were not implemented. Following the Court’s third decision, on modified interim measures dated 17 November 2021, the Government submitted their periodic reports with significant delays and the information submitted was incomplete and/or misleading as to the adequacy of the medical treatment provided to the applicant.

168.  The Government submitted that they had provided detailed information concerning the applicant’s health and the medical supervision and treatment he had received, and that they had abided by all the time‑limits set by the Court. As for the applicant’s allegations of the “so‑called delays” in complying with the Court’s decisions of 7 May and 22 June 2021, the Government denied that there had been a violation of Article 34 and argued that those delays were attributable to the applicant’s own actions and his resistance to cooperating with the authorities, which constituted his “defence strategy”.

169.  The Court reiterates that, by virtue of Article 34 of the Convention, Contracting States undertake to refrain from any act or omission that may hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application, which has been consistently reaffirmed as a cornerstone of the Convention system. A respondent State’s failure to comply with an interim measure entails a violation of that right (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, §§ 102-29, ECHR 2005-I). Such measures are indicated by the Court for the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the right of individual application and with a view to preventing imminent potential irreparable harm from being done. It follows from the very nature of interim measures that a decision on whether they should be indicated in a given case will often have to be made within a very short space of time. Consequently, the full facts of a case will often remain undetermined until the Court’s judgment on the merits of the complaint to which the measure is related. It is precisely for the purpose of preserving the Court’s ability to render such a judgment after an effective examination of the complaint that such measures are indicated. Until that time, it may be unavoidable for the Court to indicate interim measures on the basis of facts which, despite making a prima facie case for such measures, are subsequently added to or challenged to the point of calling into question the justification for the measures. For the same reasons, the facts that the damage which an interim measure was designed to prevent subsequently does not occur despite the State’s failure to act in full compliance with the interim measure or that information obtained subsequently suggests that the risk of harm may have been exaggerated are irrelevant for the assessment of whether a State has fulfilled its obligations under Article 34 (see Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806/05, §§ 88-89 and 104, 10 March 2009).

170.  It is not open to a Contracting State to substitute its own judgment for that of the Court in verifying whether or not there had been a real risk of immediate and irreparable damage to an applicant at the time when the interim measure was indicated. It is for the Court to verify compliance with the interim measure, while a State which considers that it is in possession of material capable of convincing the Court to annul an interim measure should inform the Court accordingly (see, mutatis mutandis, Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94, § 131, ECHR 1999-IV, and Paladi, cited above, § 90).

171.  A significant delay on the part of the authorities in complying with an interim measure which results in the applicant being put at risk of the kind of treatment that the measure was aimed at protecting him against constitutes a failure by the State to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, nos. 40503/17 and 2 others, § 237-38, 23 July 2020, and Sy v. Italy, no. 11791/20, § 166, 24 January 2022).

172.  The Court must determine whether the authorities of the respondent State have complied with the interim measures indicated by the Court on 7 May, 22 June and 17 November 2021.

173.  The interim measures indicated on 7 May 2021 included the applicant’s transfer to a prison medical facility “at the earliest possible date” as an inpatient for a comprehensive medical examination, the determination of whether any treatment was required, the assessment of any requirement for urgent interventions and, if necessary, carrying out those interventions. The Government were to inform the Court, by 11 June 2021 at the latest, of the measures taken and of any treatment provided, and to submit a plan for future inpatient and/or outpatient treatment.

174.  The Court notes that the applicant was not transferred to a prison medical facility as an inpatient by 11 June 2021 and no comprehensive medical examination had been carried out. Accordingly, the interim measures indicated on 7 May 2021 were not complied with.

175.  The Government argued that this was due to the applicant’s own conduct, namely his refusal to be transferred to the MMD Hospital. The Court will therefore examine whether there was an objective impediment to compliance.

176.  At the outset, the Court notes that, for the first five days after the Court’s decision of 7 May 2021, it appears that no steps were taken by the Government in order to comply with the measures indicated and instead on 12 May 2021 the Government wrote to the Court contesting in strong terms the necessity of the measures indicated by the Court and requesting that the measures be lifted, that request eventually being rejected by the Court. Accordingly, it is apparent that initially it was not shown that there were any objective impediments to compliance with the measures and that at that stage the Government were not complying because they disagreed with the Court that there had been a real risk of immediate and irreparable damage to the applicant when the interim measure had been indicated. Furthermore, it has also not been demonstrated that any steps were taken to comply with the measures indicated until the Court’s formal decision to reject the Government’s request to lift the measures. The Court reiterates in this regard that it is not open to a Contracting State to substitute its own judgment for that of the Court in verifying whether there were grounds for indicating the interim measure (see paragraph 170 above). Rather, it must demonstrate to the Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation (see Paladi, cited above, § 92).

177.  As to the applicant’s conduct – and the parties disagreed whether the applicant actually refused the steps taken by the authorities to comply with the measures – the Court considers that it has not been demonstrated that this was a serious and objective impediment to compliance with the interim measures. In this regard, it firstly refers to its assessment of this situation above (see paragraph 106 above) and observes that, by the time of the applicant’s letter of 22 May 2021, around two weeks had already passed since the indication of the interim measures to the Government and the applicant had still not been transferred to a prison medical facility. As it has already found above, the Court considers that the applicant was merely insisting that he should be transferred to the MMD Hospital as an inpatient, in compliance with the Court’s decision of 7 May 2021, rather than refusing medical assistance altogether. Secondly, the Court observes that the Government did not inform the Court about the applicant’s alleged refusal (which, according to the Government, had taken place on 22 May and then again on 24 May 2021) and did not comment on it at all until 11 June 2021 (see paragraph 54 above). In fact, it was the applicant himself who on 26 May 2021 first informed the Court about his correspondence with the authorities of 22 May 2021, and his letter was forwarded by the Court to the Government who, as noted above, did not comment on it until 11 June 2021, the deadline set by the Court for information to be provided on the measures taken. In such circumstances, the Court considers that non‑compliance with the first decision on interim measures, which the Government were requested to ensure was executed “at the earliest possible date”, cannot have been attributable (or not solely attributable) to the applicant’s conduct and that the Government failed to inform the Court of any possible impediments in a timely manner.

178.  Following the above, and after seeking further clarifications from the applicant, on 22 June 2021 the Court took a further decision on interim measures, essentially reiterating the previous indication but with the difference that the Government were asked to ensure the applicant’s “immediate transfer” to the prison medical facility and the applicant was asked to duly submit to the steps taken by the authorities with a view to implementation of the measures indicated. Following this, the applicant was transferred to the MMD Hospital on 2 July 2021, ten days after the Court’s second decision of 22 June 2021, and the medical examinations and interventions as described above were carried out.

179.  Accordingly, the Court notes that the authorities eventually complied with the above-mentioned interim measures indicated in the Court’s second decision. It then remains to be determined whether the Government complied with the interim measures within a reasonable time. It observes in this regard that the applicant was transferred to the MMD Hospital with a delay of ten days. Given the earlier developments, namely that the measures indicated on 7 May 2021 had not been complied with, and that the measures indicated on 22 June 2021 were essentially the same, except that the applicant’s “immediate transfer” was required, the Court observes straight away that such a delay appears very long in itself.

180.  The Court must therefore verify whether such a delay in the application of the interim measure was justified by any exceptional circumstances. However, again, it notes that the Government had not informed the Court of any such exceptional circumstances or impediments.

181.  On 17 November 2021 the Court decided to continue to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, with modified interim measures. In particular, it was indicated to the Government to ensure that the applicant was provided with any necessary and adequate medical treatment in detention, whether on an outpatient or inpatient basis, as considered appropriate by qualified doctors. The Government were also asked to inform the Court periodically, starting with an initial deadline of 19 January 2022, and every three months thereafter, of the applicant’s state of health and the medical treatment provided, if he remained in detention.

182.  The Government submitted five periodic reports in total, of which four were late and two were very late. The first report was submitted with a delay of over a month (see paragraph 74 above), and the second report with a delay of over two weeks (see paragraph 77 above), in both cases after reminders from the Court. Again, the Government had not promptly informed the Court of any impediments causing any of these delays.

183.  Having regard to the above, the Court considers that the Azerbaijani authorities failed to comply with the interim measures indicated on 7 May 2021 without showing any objective impediments preventing compliance, and that there were excessively long delays in complying with the interim measures subsequently indicated on 22 June and 17 November 2021 which were similarly not objectively justified. This is sufficient to conclude that the authorities did not fulfil their obligations under Article 34 of the Convention. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to further examine the applicant’s arguments that the Government also failed at various times to submit complete information or plans of future medical treatment as indicated by the Court.

184.  The Court therefore finds that the respondent State has failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention.

185.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

186.  The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

187.  The Government submitted that the claim was excessive and that a finding of a violation would constitute just satisfaction in itself.

188.  The Court awards the applicant EUR 6,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

189.  The applicant also claimed EUR 4,234 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court, including EUR 1,000 for the legal fees of Mr E. Abbasov, EUR 3,000 for the legal fees of Mr J. Javadov, and EUR 234 for postal expenses. The applicant asked for any award in respect of costs and expenses to be paid directly to the representatives’ bank accounts.

190.  The Government submitted that the amounts in respect of legal fees were excessive and had not been actually paid by the applicant to the lawyers.

191.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,234 covering costs under all heads (including legal costs for both representatives), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, to be paid directly to his principal representative, Mr J. Javadov, to be subsequently divided between the representatives themselves as they consider appropriate.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Azerbaijani manats at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 3,234 (three thousand two hundred and thirty-four euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid directly to his principal representative, Mr J. Javadov;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 October 2024, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Liv Tigerstedt Ivana Jelić
 Deputy Registrar President

[1] In fact, contrary to the applicant’s submission, this statement was made by the President during a different meeting, namely a 16 July 2020 meeting with a newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the context of a longer speech delivered by the President congratulating the new Minister on his appointment and outlining various issues and his general directives concerning foreign policy.