FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF FARCAȘ AND OTHERS v. ROMANIA
(Application no. 30502/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5 June 2018
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Farcaș and Others v. Romania,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, President,
Egidijus Kūris,
Iulia Motoc, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 15 May 2018,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 30502/05) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Romanian nationals, Mr Ioan Farcaș (“the first applicant”), Mr Ştefan Voicu (“the second applicant”) and Ms Carmen Lelia Bărbulescu (“the third applicant”), on 12 August 2005.
2. The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms C. Brumar, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. On 19 March 2010 the application was communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicants were born in 1935, 1945 and 1956 respectively and live in Ploieşti.
A. Background of the case
5. In 1975 a group of engineers patented an invention concerning a method for separating hydrocarbon. The first applicant is one of the inventors. The second and third applicants are heirs of the other members of the group.
6. On 26 January 1995 the applicants lodged an action for compensation against company R., a privately-owned former State company which had used the 1975 invention between 1985 and 1988 (for details about those proceedings, see Farcaş and Others v. Romania, no. 67020/01, §§ 7-22, 10 November 2005).
7. In a decision of 24 June 2002 the Braşov County Court allowed in part the action lodged by the applicants against company R., and ordered the latter to pay to the first applicant 2,284,679,617 Romanian lei (ROL), an amount representing compensation for the use, between 1985 and 1988, of the invention patented in 1975. The second and third applicants appealed, and in a decision of 8 November 2002 the Braşov Court of Appeal also awarded them compensation – ROL 2,230,620,676 to the second applicant and ROL 1,669,759,157 to the third applicant.
8. On 10 March 2004 the applicants and company R. signed an agreement for the payment of the compensation awarded by the court. Between 2 and 21 April 2004 the company paid about 20% of the amounts granted.
9. On 5 May 2005 the High Court of Cassation and Justice took note of the terms of the agreement of 10 March 2004 and concluded that company R. had withdrawn its appeal on points of law against the decision of 8 November 2002 (see paragraph 7 above), which thus became final.
B. Proceedings on judicial reorganisation (reorganizare judiciară)
10. Meanwhile, on 31 March 2004 company R. had sought its judicial reorganisation under a procedure provided for by Law no. 64/1995 on judicial reorganisation and bankruptcy.
11. On 28 April 2004 the Bacău County Court allowed the application, started the reorganisation proceedings and nominated a judicial administrator. The applicants’ claims were accepted by the County Court and recorded in the register of claims compiled by the judicial administrator in conformity with the provisions of the applicable law (tabloul creditorilor, hereinafter “the register of claims”).
12. The applicants lodged an objection to the register of claims, asking to be recognised as priority creditors (creditori privilegiaţi). Eleven other creditors also lodged objections against the records in the register of claims.
13. Meanwhile, on 24 November 2004 the judicial administrator had submitted a reorganisation plan to a vote by the creditors. It was proposed that the priority claims (creanţe privilegiate) be paid in full, and the remaining unsecured non-priority claims (creanţe chirografare) be paid at a rate of 20% of their value. In an interlocutory judgment of 8 December 2004 the Bacău County Court validated the plan after examining the objections raised by the unsecured creditors (creditori chirografari). In 2006 company R. paid its debts in accordance with the plan.
14. On 11 October 2007 the Braşov County Court held a hearing on the objections to the register of claims lodged by the applicants. The first applicant was present at the hearing to represent both himself and the other applicants. The County Court gave the parties until 18 October 2007 to submit written observations. On that date, in the applicants’ absence, it adjourned delivery of the judgment to 1 November 2007. The County Court gave its judgment on 1 November 2007; it found against the applicants.
15. On 23 January 2008, in accordance with the rules on notification in relation to court documents in insolvency proceedings (see paragraph 20 below), the judgment of 1 November 2007 was published in the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings (Buletinul Procedurilor de Insolvenţă, “the Bulletin”).
16. On an unspecified date the applicants enquired about the judgment’s date of delivery and asked the County Court to provide them with a copy of the judgment, which was sent to them on 31 January 2008; they received it on 4 February 2008. On 13 February 2008 they lodged an appeal by post.
17. Before the Braşov Court of Appeal, the applicants argued that, as they had not had access to the Bulletin, they had not been able to know on which date the judgment had been published.
18. In a final decision of 17 April 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed that argument and concluded that the appeal had been made out of time, as it had been lodged more than ten days after 23 January 2008, the date on which the Braşov County Court’s judgment had been published (see paragraph 15 above). Relying on the Constitutional Court’s decision no. 1137 of 4 December 2007 (see paragraph 21 below), the Court of Appeal considered that the notification procedure via the Bulletin had offered sufficient safeguards to the participants in the proceedings, and had been justified by the nature of the insolvency procedure.
19. On 21 June 2010 the County Court closed the insolvency proceedings and noted that company R. had complied with all the obligations set out in the reorganisation plan (see paragraph 13 above), and thus it no longer had any debts.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Publication of court documents in the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings (Buletinul Procedurilor de Insolvenţă)
20. The version of Law no. 85/2006 on insolvency procedure (hereinafter “the 2006 Insolvency Act”) in force at the material time, which replaced Law no. 64/1995 in full as of 20 July 2006, provided that all notifications during an insolvency procedure would be served by being published in the Bulletin, with the exception of a notice of the opening of such proceedings, which would be served in accordance with the general procedure provided for by the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant parts of the 2006 Insolvency Act in force at the material time read as follows:
Article 3
“29. The Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings is a publication edited by the National Trade Register Office with the aim of publishing notices of court hearings, summons [convocări] and notices of procedural acts issued by the courts, the judicial administrator and the liquidator after the opening of the proceedings provided for by this Law.”
Article 7
“(1) Notification in relation to court proceedings and the communication of any procedural acts, summons or notifications will be done via the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings. ... The Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings will also be made available in an electronic format.
...
(8) The Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings will be published by the National Trade Register Office in order to allow the publication of notices of court proceedings, summons and notifications of procedural acts issued by the courts after the opening of the proceedings provided for by this Law.
(9) From the date they are published, the publication of procedural acts or, if applicable, court decisions in the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings replaces [service of] a notice of court proceedings, summons or notification of procedural acts on each individual participant in proceedings, and such acts will be presumed to have been served on the date of their publication [in the Bulletin].”
Article 8
“(2) The time-limit for lodging an appeal [recurs] is ten days from the date when notice of a court judgment is given, unless the law provides otherwise.
(3) The appeal will be examined by specialised benches within thirty days of the case file being registered with the appeal court. The notice of appeal proceedings will be served via the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings. ...”
21. In its decision no. 1137 of 4 December 2007, the Constitutional Court considered that the special notification procedure as regulated by Article 7 of the 2006 Insolvency Act was justified for the following reasons:
“The fact that the persons concerned will be notified via the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings after the opening of the insolvency procedure cannot be considered to breach the right of defence. In accordance with Article 126 § 2 of the Constitution, the legislature has the exclusive power to enact procedural norms, and it can create special regulations derogating from the common law in order to deal with specific situations. The provisions of Article 7 § 1 of Law no. 85/2006 are justified by the specificity of insolvency proceedings, which involve a great number of parties and many diverse procedural acts which could jeopardise the course of the proceedings; [publication via the Bulletin] is justified as a special measure which ensures speed in processing these cases.”
22. On 26 November 2008 Article 8 § 3 was amended by Government Emergency Ordinance no. 173/2008; in its new version, it provided that the notification of appeal court proceedings was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, at that time, required that the text of a court decision be given to the parties concerned (see S.C. Raisa M. Shipping S.R.L. v. Romania, no. 37576/05, § 18, 8 January 2013).
23. In 2014 the 2006 Insolvency Act was replaced by Law no. 85/2014 on the prevention of insolvency and on insolvency procedure (hereinafter “the 2014 Insolvency Act”). Articles 42-43 of the new Act provided that service of the notification of appeal proceedings was exclusively via the Bulletin, which only existed in an electronic format.
B. Price of the Bulletin
24. In Government Decision no. 124/2007, published in the Official Bulletin of 13 February 2007, the price of the Bulletin was set at: 1.20 Romanian lei (RON) for one issue; RON 212.55 for a monthly subscription; RON 637.66 for a three-month subscription; and RON 2,550.65 for a yearly subscription. Subscriptions had to be ordered thirty days in advance and could only start on 1 January, 1 April, 1 July or 1 September for a three-month subscription, or on 1 January for a yearly subscription. The electronic version of the Bulletin was priced at RON 79.16 for a monthly subscription, RON 237.49 for a three-month subscription, and RON 949.95 for a yearly subscription. Access to the electronic version was provided within two days of subscription. Sales of the paper version of the Bulletin started in the second half of 2007.
C. Aim of the reorganisation procedure
25. At the material time, the 2006 Insolvency Act provided as follows:
Article 103
“(1) After the reorganisation plan is confirmed, the debtor will conduct its activity under the supervision of the judicial administrator and in accordance with the confirmed plan, until such time as the court will order, by means of a reasoned decision, either that the reorganisation proceedings be terminated, or that all measures to allow the debtor to restart its commercial activity be taken, or that the reorganisation proceedings be terminated and bankruptcy [proceedings] be started under the provisions of Article 107 and following.”
26. Article 2 of the 2014 Insolvency Act stated that the aim of the law was to provide a collective procedure for paying off a debtor’s liabilities (pasivul), while giving the debtor, whenever possible, the chance to recover its activity.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF A LACK OF ACCESS TO COURT IN THE APPEAL INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
27. Under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention, the applicants complained that their appeal in the insolvency proceedings had been unlawfully declared out of time.
28. In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the safeguards of Article 6 § 1, implying the full panoply of a judicial procedure, are stricter than, and absorb, those of Article 13 (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 146, ECHR 2000‑XI). It will therefore examine the complaint from the standpoint of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention alone, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
29. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ observations
30. The applicants reiterated that they had not had a subscription to the Bulletin, and they had not had a computer or access to the Internet. In such circumstances, they would have been forced to go to Braşov in order to find out about the outcome of the first-instance proceedings. They reiterated that a copy of the judgment had eventually been sent to them at their request and after they had paid the requisite fees, but they had received it on 4 February 2008 (see paragraph 18 above), the very day that the time-limit for filing their appeal had expired.
31. The Government argued that the right to fair proceedings was not absolute, and could be subject to legitimate restrictions. In the case at hand, the restrictions imposed on the applicants had been provided for by law and had pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring that insolvency proceedings were efficient and expeditious. Moreover, the Bulletin had been created in order to allow for better and faster access to proceedings and the harmonisation of judicial notifications, as well as to create a national database concerning insolvency proceedings, in coordination with the National Trade Register Office. The Government contended that access to the Bulletin was free, as it could be read at the Trade Register’s offices attached to each county court, or accessed on the Internet.
2. The Court’s assessment
32. The Court makes reference to the general principles concerning service of court notifications (see Zavodnik v. Slovenia, no. 53723/13, §§ 70-74, 21 May 2015). It also reiterates that its task is not to review the relevant law and practice in abstract, but to determine whether the manner in which the law and practice were applied, or the way in which they affected an applicant, gave rise to a violation of the Convention (see Zavodnik, cited above, § 74). In doing so, the Court must ascertain whether, given the facts of the case, a fair balance was struck between, on the one hand, the interests of the effective administration of justice, and on the other hand, those of the applicants (ibid., § 75).
33. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicants asked the domestic courts to recognise them as priority creditors in the insolvency proceedings regarding company R. The first applicant, who represented the applicants in the domestic proceedings, was present at the hearing before the court of first instance on 11 October 2007, but not when the court gave its judgment on 1 November 2017 (see paragraph 14 above). The judgment was published on 23 January 2008 in the Bulletin (see paragraph 15 above), and from that date the ten-day time-limit for lodging an appeal started running (see paragraph 20 above). In accordance with the special rules on notification, the applicants did not receive written notice of the date the judgment was delivered; a copy of the judgment of 1 November 2007 was sent to them, at their request, only on 31 January 2008. They received it on 4 February, the very day of the expiry of the time-limit for lodging an appeal (see paragraph 18 above). Consequently, their appeal, lodged by post on 13 February 2008, was declared inadmissible by the Court of Appeal without examination of the merits of their complaint for failure to comply with the relevant time-limit (see paragraph 18 above).
34. The Court has already found that the existence of a special notice procedure served the legitimate aim of ensuring that insolvency proceedings were expeditious and efficient, in so far as the personal service of court documents could add substantially to the costs and length of proceedings (see Zavodnik, § 76). The Court accepts that personal service might have hampered the expeditious assessment of the case in the proceedings currently under examination, in the light of the number of participants in those proceedings (see paragraph 12 above). However, it must be satisfied that the manner in which this limitation of the right of access to a court was applied in the present case struck a fair balance between the various interests at stake and did not render the applicants’ rights illusory (see Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37). In this vein, it notes that no alternative means were available to the domestic courts to notify the parties about the course of the proceedings (see, in contrast, Zavodnik, cited above, § 78 in fine, where notice of a hearing could have been published in the mass media).
35. In order to assess the impact of the special notice procedure on the applicants’ rights, the Court must ascertain what means they realistically had at their disposal to keep abreast of the domestic proceedings.
36. The Court is not convinced that the applicants could have subscribed to the Bulletin at that time, as, in accordance with the applicable Government Decision, they would have had to purchase such a subscription thirty days in advance (see paragraph 24 above). This option would also have entailed significant costs for them (ibid.). Moreover, nothing in the file indicates that the applicants could have had individual issues delivered to their homes in a timely manner. The Court further notes that the first applicant, who represented all the applicants in the domestic proceedings, was elderly and did not use a computer or have access the Internet (see paragraphs 4 and 30 above; see also, mutatis mutandis, Zavodnik, cited above, § 79 in fine).
37. According to the Government, the applicants had the possibility to consult issues of the Bulletin at their local county court (see paragraph 31 above). However, the Government have not put forward any evidence that would allow the Court to conclude that the applicants could have consulted the Bulletin free of charge. Be that as it may, the first applicant (representative of all the applicants) would have had to visit his local county court on a regular basis from 1 November 2007, the date when the judgment was issued, to 23 January 2008, the date when the text of the judgment became available (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above).
38. Admittedly, this period of almost three months is not in itself unreasonably long (see, in contrast, Zavodnik, cited above, § 78, where the applicant was expected to consult the court’s notice board for eight years). However, in assessing its reasonableness, regard must be had to the applicants’ specific situation. In this connection, the Court observes that the first applicant (representative of all the applicants) lived more than 100 km away from the county court which delivered the judgment. Even considering that he would have had access to the court documents at the county court situated in his home town, as argued by the Government (see paragraph 31 in fine, above), the Court reiterates that the first applicant was elderly at that time (see paragraph 4 above, as well as Zavodnik, cited above, § 79 in fine). In these specific circumstances, the Court considers that the fact that the first applicant would have to have gone to the county court regularly for a period of three months would have put a significant burden on him.
39. The Court finds it an aggravating factor that, in the absence of any alternative means of notification, the domestic courts were deprived of their power to assess the participants’ individual situation and, if necessary, adapt the service procedure to their situation. This lack of flexibility rendered the applicants’ right of access to a court illusory (see, mutatis mutandis, Artico, cited above, § 36).
40. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that no fair balance was struck between the interests of the effective administration of justice and those of the applicants. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicants’ lack of access to a court in the appeal insolvency proceedings.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-ENFORCEMENT OF FINAL COURT DECISIONS
41. The applicants complained about the length of their proceedings against company R. and pointed out that the final decisions rendered in their favour (the decisions of 24 June and 8 November 2002 – see paragraph 7 above) remained unenforced. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
The latter provision reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
A. The parties’ observations
42. The Government argued that the mechanism put in place for enforcing final judgments against debtors who were private actors had allowed the applicants to have their claim registered in the register of claims and obtain payment of their claim in accordance with the provisions of the reorganisation plan voted on by the creditors and sanctioned by the court.
43. Relying on SC Magna Holding SRL v. Romania (no. 10055/03, § 42, 13 July 2006), the Government further argued that the case concerned a dispute between private parties, for which, in principle, the State should not be held responsible.
44. The applicants contended that the system put in place by the State in order to assist them in obtaining the enforcement of court decisions had been deficient, and reiterated that they had suffered loss because of the impugned non-enforcement.
B. The Court’s assessment
45. The Court has repeatedly held that “when the debtor is a private actor, ... the State is not, as a general rule, directly liable for debts of private actors and its obligations are limited to providing the necessary assistance to the creditor in the enforcement of the respective court awards, for example, through a bailiff service or bankruptcy procedures” (see Acar and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 26878/07, § 29, 12 December 2017; Dachar v. France (dec.), no. 42338/98, 6 June 2000; and Pelipenko v. Russia, no. 69037/10, § 49, 2 October 2012).
46. The Court further reiterates its case-law to the effect that an applicant’s inability to obtain the enforcement of a judgment making an award in his or her favour constitutes an interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, as set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, among other authorities, Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, § 40, ECHR 2002‑III, and Jasiūnienė v. Lithuania, no. 41510/98, § 45, 6 March 2003).
47. The Court also notes that the aim of the reorganisation procedure is to help a debtor company find, along with its creditors, a solution which allows it to continue its commercial activity (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). In this connection, the Court notes that the creditors in the instant case voted on a plan in accordance with the legal rules in place and the domestic court validated it, taking into account the objections raised (see paragraph 13 above). This decision does not appear in any way arbitrary.
48. The applicants, whose claims were not secured, received 40% of their claim: 20% before the opening of the insolvency proceedings (see paragraph 8 above) and 20% within the reorganisation procedure (see paragraphs 13 in fine and 19 above). As for their outstanding claim, the judgment in their favour remained unenforced on account of the existence of an objective impossibility in that respect, particularly in view of the fact that the debtor, a private party, did not have sufficient assets (see, mutatis mutandis, Shestakov v. Russia (dec.), no. 48757/99, 18 June 2002).
49. As for the overall length of the enforcement proceedings, the Court has already found in Farcaş and Others v. Romania (no. 67020/01,
§§ 31-34, 10 November 2005) that the applicants were responsible for the protraction of the first set of proceedings giving rise to the final decision of 5 May 2005 (see paragraph 9 above), whereas the authorities were diligent overall.
50. Furthermore, the Court notes that, despite the inherent complexity of the insolvency proceedings, a reorganisation plan was adopted on 24 November 2004, within a year of those proceedings being opened, and the relevant payments were made to the creditors in 2006 (see paragraph 13 above).
51. In view of the above, the Court is of the opinion that the State acted diligently and in a timely manner to assist the applicants in executing the court judgments in their favour (see, mutatis mutandis, Fociac v. Romania, no. 2577/02, §§ 70-78, 3 February 2005).
52. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
53. The applicants raised additional complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 14 of the Convention and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the proceedings giving rise to the final decision of 5 May 2005 (see paragraph 9 above).
54. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
55. Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
56. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
57. The first and second applicants claimed the following amounts in respect of pecuniary damage: (a) updated sums based on the amounts awarded to them by the court decisions which remained unenforced, and (b) penalties in respect of those sums. In particular, the first applicant claimed RON 855,746.50 under heading (a) and RON 757,337.20 under heading (b), while the second applicant sought RON 835,254.80 and RON 738,664.50 respectively.
58. The first and second applicants also claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
59. The Government asked the Court to strike out the application in so far as it concerned the third applicant because of her failure to submit just satisfaction claims. They also argued that the amounts sought were excessive, and that the finding of a violation should constitute sufficient just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
60. The Court considers that the first and second applicants have not shown the existence of a causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the first and second applicants EUR 3,600 each in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount. The Court makes no award in respect of the third applicant, as no claim was submitted.
B. Costs and expenses
61. The first and second applicants also claimed RON 6,312 each, an amount representing the reimbursement of their travel costs for all court hearings before the domestic courts. They did not send the relevant bills.
62. The Government argued that the applicants had failed to prove that they had actually incurred the costs claimed.
63. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its
case-law, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
64. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaint concerning access to a court in the appeal insolvency proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the first and second applicants, within three months, EUR 3,600 (three thousand six hundred euros) each in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the first and second applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 June 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Andrea TamiettiPaulo Pinto de Albuquerque
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy