THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 51838/07
by Eduard FEDOTOV
against Moldova
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 24 May 2011 as a Chamber composed of:
Josep Casadevall, President,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Egbert Myjer,
Ineta Ziemele,
Luis López Guerra,
Mihai Poalelungi,
Kristina Pardalos, judges,
and Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 5 September 2007,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Eduard Fedotov, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1937 and lives in Chişinău.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
3. By letter of 30 January 2007 the applicant requested Chişinău local council to provide him with accommodation in Chişinău. The local council failed to reply to the applicant’s letter.
4. On 19 March 2007 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings against the Chişinău local council seeking a court order obliging the latter to reply to his letter and to pay him 9,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) in non-pecuniary damage.
5. On 20 April 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s claims. It ordered the local council to reply to the applicant’s letter and to pay the applicant MDL 200 (12 euros (EUR) at the time) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
6. By a final judgment of 11 July 2007, the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the judgment of 20 April 2007.
7. According to the applicant, the monetary award has not been enforced to date. It is not apparent from the case file whether the local council complied with the judgment in the part concerning the reply to the applicant’s complaint, and, if so, when they did so.
B. Relevant domestic law
8. The relevant domestic law has been set out in Prodan v. Moldova (no. 49806/99, ECHR 2004‑III (extracts)).
COMPLAINTS
9. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the authorities’ had failed to pay him the amount awarded by the domestic courts. He further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had not had an effective domestic remedy in respect of the above-mentioned complaints.
10. Finally, relying on Article 14 of the Convention, he alleged that he had been subjected to discriminatory treatment.
THE LAW
A. Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
11. The applicant claims that the failure to pay him MDL 200 (EUR 12) awarded by the final judgment in his favour, as well as the local council’s failure to reply to his letter of 30 January 2007 was in breach of Article 6 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These provisions, in so far as relevant, read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
12. The Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether the final judgment in the applicant’s favour has been enforced, because it must first determine whether his complaints are admissible under Article 35 of the Convention, as amended by Protocol No. 14 to the Convention which entered into force on 1 June 2010.
13. The Protocol added a new admissibility requirement to Article 35 which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:
“3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:
(...)
(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.”
14. The Court reiterates that the new provision shall apply from the date of its entry into force to all applications pending before the Court, except those declared admissible (see Gaftoniuc v. Romania, (dec.), no. 30934/05, 22 February 2011).
15. Thus, the Court will examine of its own motion whether: (a) the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage; (b) whether respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits; and (c) whether the case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal.
1. Whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage
16. The Court notes that the main element of the criterion introduced by Protocol No. 14 is whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage.
17. The Court has previously held that this criterion applies where, notwithstanding a potential violation of a right from a purely legal point of view, the level of severity attained does not warrant consideration by an international court (see Adrian Mihai Ionescu v. Romania (dec.), no. 36659/04, 1 June 2010; Korolev v. Russia (dec.), no. 25551/05, 1 July 2010; and Gaftoniuc v. Romania, cited above). Further, the level of severity shall be assessed in the light of the financial impact of the matter in dispute and the importance of the case for the applicant.
18. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes at the outset the small pecuniary loss which prompted the applicant to bring his case to the Court. The applicant’s complaint concerned an alleged failure by State authorities to pay him a sum equivalent to approximately EUR 12 at the relevant time. The remainder of the judgment concerned the local council’s obligation to reply to the applicant’ letter.
19. The Court is conscious that the impact of a pecuniary loss must not be measured in abstract terms: even modest pecuniary damage may be significant in the light of the person’s individual circumstances and the economic situation of the country or region in which he or she lives. However, while taking into account such varying economic circumstances, the Court considers it to be beyond doubt that the petty amount at stake in the present case was of minimal significance to the applicant.
20. The Court is mindful at the same time that the pecuniary sum involved is not the only element that determines whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage. Indeed, a violation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage without affecting a pecuniary interest. However, the Court does not consider that any such issues have been raised by the applicant.
21. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage as a result of the alleged violations of the Convention.
2. Whether respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits
22. Considering the present case, as required by Article 35 § 3 (b), and having regard to its responsibilities under Article 19 of the Convention, the Court does not see any compelling reason relating to the respect for the Convention to warrant its examination on the merits. The Court has on numerous occasions determined issues analogous to those arising in the instant case and has ascertained in great detail the States’ obligations under the Convention in such respect (see, among many others, Cebotari and Others v. Moldova, nos. 37763/04, 37712/04, 35247/04, 35178/04 and 34350/04, 27 January 2009). An examination on the merits of the present case would not bring any new element to the Court’s existing case-law.
23. Moreover, on 23 July 2010 a new Moldovan Law on bailiffs was enacted upon recommendation of experts of the Council of Europe. This new legislation created a system of private bailiffs aimed at ensuring an effective and timely enforcement of court orders.
24. The Court concludes that respect for human rights, as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, does not require an examination of the present application on the merits.
3. Whether the case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal
25. The Court observes that Article 35 § 3 (b) does not allow the rejection of an application on the grounds of the new admissibility requirement if the case has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.
26. In the Court’s view, the facts of the present case taken as a whole disclose no denial of justice at the domestic level. The applicant’s initial complaints against the defendant were considered at two levels of jurisdiction and his claims were granted. Further, Moldovan legislation had in place at the relevant time a mechanism for enforcement of judgments through bailiffs in order to ensure the fulfilment of positive obligations imposed upon the State in this respect.
27. Thus, the Court considers that the applicant’s situation does not constitute a denial of justice that can be imputed to the Government.
28. The Court concludes that the applicant’s case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b).
4. Conclusion
29. The three conditions of the new inadmissibility criterion having therefore been satisfied, the Court finds that this complaint must be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 3 (b) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Other alleged violations of the Convention
30. The Court has examined the remainder of the applicant’s complaints as submitted by him. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and its Protocols.
31. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Santiago QuesadaJosep Casadevall
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy