FIRST SECTION
CASE OF FÚROVÁ AND NEVEDELOVÁ v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no. 1780/22)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14 December 2023
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Fúrová and Nevedelová v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President,
Lətif Hüseynov,
Ivana Jelić, judges,
and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 23 November 2023,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application against Slovakia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 30 December 2021.
2. The applicants, Slovak nationals, were represented by Mr M. Bezák, a lawyer practising in Bratislava.
3. The Slovak Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the application.
THE FACTS
4. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the application are set out in the appended table.
5. The applicants complained of the excessive length of civil proceedings concerning a payment due to them after their successful anti-discrimination claim, which they had brought against the State on 29 January 2014. Subsequently, the Bratislava I District Court dealt with multiple procedural issues, including recusal of several judges. On 3 December 2020 the court delivered a judgment granting the applicants’ claim. On 22 December 2021 the defendant filed an appeal. On 5 August 2021 the file was transmitted to the Bratislava Regional Court. In June 2022 the appellate proceedings remained pending.
6. Following the applicants’ constitutional complaint lodged on 10 July 2020, on 16 June 2021 the Constitutional Court found a violation of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time (II. ÚS 192/2021). It ordered the District Court to proceed without unnecessary delay and to reimburse the applicants’ legal costs. However, it made no award for non-pecuniary damage, pointing namely to the fact that the applicants had not specified any reasons justifying their claim for compensation.
THE LAWALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
7. The applicants complained that the length of the civil proceedings in question had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
8. The Government expressed the view that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of the alleged violation. They referred to the Constitutional Court’s findings in respect of its refusal to award any compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The Government added that there were specific circumstances justifying the lack of any award in the present case, which related to the initial anti-discrimination dispute from which the applicants, judges of the Supreme Court, derived the payment claim at stake.
9. The applicants disagreed, pointing to the presumption of non-pecuniary damage applicable in length of proceedings cases and considering that the arguments concerning the previous anti-discrimination proceedings were irrelevant.
10. The Court observes, first, that at the time of the Constitutional Court’s judgment, the proceedings had been pending before the District Court for more than seven years, and that the appellate proceedings appear to be still pending.
11. It should further be noted that, although the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicants’ right to a hearing without unjustified delay, it awarded no financial compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
12. It remains to be assessed whether the above redress can be considered appropriate and sufficient (see, for example, Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), no. 48470/99, 20 March 2003). In that connection the Court reiterates that there is a strong but rebuttable presumption that excessively long proceedings will occasion non-pecuniary damage, although in some cases the non‑pecuniary damage may be only minimal or non-existent (see Nardone v. Italy, no. 34368/98, 25 November 2004); the domestic courts will then have to justify their decision by giving sufficient reasons (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 204, ECHR 2006-V).
13. In the present case, the Constitutional Court justified its conclusion that no financial compensation was necessary for the applicants’ non‑pecuniary damage by stating that the applicants had failed to explain the specific reasons underlying their claim. However, having regard to the facts of the case and to the principles established in its case-law, the Court does not find such reasoning appropriate and sufficient. It further notes that, in contrast with the case of Šedý v. Slovakia (no. 72237/01, § 89, 19 December 2006), the Constitutional Court did not blame the applicants for having prolonged the proceedings; also, the alleged specific reasons referred to by the Government (see paragraph 8 in fine above) were not mentioned at all by the Constitutional Court.
14. In view of the above, the Court considers that the redress obtained by the applicants at the domestic level cannot be considered sufficient in the light of its case-law. Therefore, the applicants can still claim to be “victims” of a breach of the “reasonable time” requirement.
15. The Court further reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
16. In the leading case of Obluk v. Slovakia (no. 69484/01, 20 September 2006), the Court already found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention in relation to the length of judicial proceedings.
17. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of justifying the overall length of the proceedings at the national level. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
18. These complaints are therefore admissible and disclose a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
19. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law (see, in particular, Obluk, cited above), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Declares the application admissible;Holds that this application discloses a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the excessive length of civil proceedings;Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 December 2023, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Viktoriya Maradudina Krzysztof Wojtyczek
Acting Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
Application raising complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
(excessive length of civil proceedings)
Application no.
Date of introduction
Applicant’s name
Year of birth
Representative’s name and location
Start of proceedings
End of proceedings
Total length
Levels of jurisdiction
Domestic court
File number
Domestic award (in euros)
Amount awarded for non-pecuniary damage per applicant
(in euros)[1]
Amount awarded for costs and expenses per application
(in euros)[2]
1780/22
30/12/2021
Jaroslava FÚROVÁ
1966
Viera NEVEDELOVÁ
1963
Bezák Martin
Bratislava
29/01/2014
pending
More than 9 years and 8 months and
20 days
2 levels of jurisdiction
Constitutional Court
II. US 192/2021
0
6,500
250
[1] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.
[2] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.
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