CASE OF GHEDIR AND OTHERS v. FRANCE

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF GHEDIR AND OTHERS v. FRANCE

(Application no. 20579/12)

JUDGMENT

(Merits)

(Extract)

STRASBOURG

16 July 2015

FINAL

16/10/2015

This judgment is final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Ghedir and Others v. France,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Angelika Nußberger, President,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Ganna Yudkivska,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
André Potocki,
Helena Jäderblom,
Aleš Pejchal, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 23 June 2015,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 20579/12) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two French nationals and two Algerian nationals, Mr Abdelkader Ghedir and Mr Houcine Ghedir, and Mr Abbas Ghedir and Ms Fatiha Ghedir, respectively (“the applicants”), on 23 March 2012.

2. The applicants were represented by Mr A. Ursulet, a lawyer practising in Paris, and Mr G. Thuan dit Dieudonné, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr F. Alabrune, Director of Legal Affairs with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that the first applicant had been the victim of disproportionate use of force in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

4. On 2 April 2013 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicants were born in 1983, 1985, 1937 and 1947 respectively and live in Villepinte, apart from the second applicant, who lives in Drancy. The second, third and fourth applicants are the first applicant’s brother, mother and father, respectively.

A. The first applicant’s arrest

6. During the afternoon of 30 November 2004 the first applicant, who was smoking a cigarette in the Mitry-Villeparisis railway station, was identity-checked by officers of the General Security Service (“SUGE”) of the French National Railway Company (“SNCF”).

7. Just before 8 p.m. on the same day two police officers from the Mitry Mory police station, S.D. and S.G., were called out to that railway station after a report that an individual had been throwing stones at the trains. Arriving at the railway station, they saw a man who did not correspond to the description provided, who appeared to be drunk, and who reacted aggressively when approached. They called for reinforcements just as five SUGE officers arrived on the scene. The individual in question, who was later identified as the first applicant, ran off towards an underground passageway.

8. The SUGE officers, who included L.P., Y.F. and O.D.B., stopped and questioned the first applicant. The latter put up no resistance to his arrest. The SUGE officers then took him outside the main entrance to the railway station had placed him against a wall.

9. The statements given by witnesses to that scène diverge concerning the subsequent events (see paragraphs 15 to 18, 20 and 34 to 44 below).

10. The first applicant was forced to the ground by the SUGE officers, who handcuffed him behind his back, before frisking him. He was then placed in a police vehicle parked nearby. The operation ended at 7.59 p.m.

11. During his transport to and arrival at the police station, the first applicant complained of nausea, and had to be helped out of the vehicle by the police officers. The latter mentioned that he was bleeding profusely from the chin.

12. Having arrived in the police cells, the first applicant lost consciousness and went into a coma. A doctor present in the police station administered first aid, before the arrival of the fire brigade ambulance at 8.14 p.m. and then the emergency medical services (SMUR) at 8.45 p.m. He was then transferred to the Lagny-sur-Marne hospital, and later, to the Beaujon hospital in Clichy.

13. The first applicant was remanded in custody at 8.15 p.m. on charges of insulting members of the police force and deliberate violence against a public-service employee, although the measure could not be notified to him owing to his state of alcoholic intoxication, according to the police report. The police custody was terminated at 10.10 p.m. on the instructions of the State Prosecutor.

B. Flagrante delicto procedure

14. The duty officer at the Meaux public prosecutor’s office was advised of the case at 8.40 p.m. He ordered the opening of a flagrante delicto procedure on charges of deliberate violence against persons performing public duties, assigning the task to the Versailles Regional Police Department (“DRPJ”).

15. The police and SUGE officers who had been involved or present during the first applicant’s arrest were questioned. Their versions contradicted each other: the SNCF employees spoke of a model arrest, whereas some of the police officers described it as “robust”. Among the latter, N.T., D.F. and R.D. pointed out that they had seen a SUGE officer, identified as Y.F., kneeing the first applicant in the face while he was being held on the ground by two other officers. They added that, noticing that Y.F. was about to knee him again, police sergeant A.H. had restrained him by the leg and said “that’ll do”.

16. A.H. did not mention that fact during his first questioning. He was interviewed again, and he explained that when he had arrived at the railway station on the evening in question he had noted the presence of five SUGE officers surrounding the first applicant, who was waving his arms. One of them had attempted to take the latter by the arms, but he had brushed him off. The officer identified as Y.F. had replied “don’t you hit me”, and had become “annoyed” with the first applicant. With the help of three colleagues he had brought him to the ground. Given the applicant’s refusal to allow himself to be handcuffed, he had struck him on the head with his left knee. A.H. said that he had then approached the scene. Seeing Y.F. moving his left leg back to knee him again, he had prevented him from doing so. When asked why he had not mentioned these facts in his first witness statement, the police officer stated that he had “thought that it was for the person concerned to shoulder his responsibilities”.

17. N.T. submitted that before being brought to the ground the first applicant had not been violent, but when an SUGE officer had touched him he had tried to remove his hand. One of the SUGE team had then, unsuccessfully, attempted to punch him in the face.

18. Some of the police and SUGE officers mentioned that the first applicant had had a cut on his chin before his arrest.

19. On 2 December 2004 L.P., Y.F. and O.D.B. were remanded in custody.

20. On 3 December 2004 the scene was reconstructed in the presence of two members of the prosecutor’s office and the five SUGE officers and the six police officers who had been involved in the arrest. The SUGE officers said that the arrest had been effected without any particular difficulties, the first applicant having been handcuffed on the floor, emphasising that he had displayed no injuries on being handed over to the police officers. The latter presented a different version of events, explaining how the applicant had been kneed in the head.

21. Dr M.K., who had operated on the first applicant at the Beaujon hospital, told the investigators that the injuries noted might have been compatible with one very violent blow, such as a hard slap, a kick or a knee strike, a blow from a medium-weight blunt instrument, or even a heavy fall. He did not consider the injury compatible with a truncheon blow.

C. Medical examinations and treatment

22. At the Lagny-sur-Marne hospital, a brain scan showed an acute subdural haematoma of the left hemisphere. Blood tests showed alcohol levels of 1.51 grams per litre of blood and the presence of active cannabinoids (THC), pointing to exposure to cannabis between 2 and 24 hours before the testing.

23. The first applicant was admitted to the Beaujon hospital on 1 December 2004 and immediately taken to the operating theatre, where he underwent emergency surgical evacuation of his haematoma. A control scan carried out the same day showed a residual subdural haematoma.

24. On 1 December 2004 a forensic doctor was called upon to examine the first applicant, and noted that he was in a stage-3 coma on the Glasgow Coma Scale (on which stage 0 corresponds to death and stage 15 to a wakeful state). The doctor described a temporo-parietal fracture on the left-hand side, a closed 3.4 centimetre-long wound on the left side of the chin, two haematomas on the left tibia and a scratch on the left cheek. He also mentioned a subdural haematoma of the left hemisphere which was extended and compressive and had been the reason for the applicant’s emergency transfer to hospital.

25. A second scan carried out on 3 December 2004 showed an odontoid fracture associated with a fracture of the lateral mass of vertebra C2.

26. On 15 and 28 December 2004 the first applicant underwent further operations.

27. From 14 February to 12 December 2005 he was hospitalised at the Bouffémont Functional Rehabilitation Centre.

28. The discharge assessment drawn up by the said Centre mentioned a large number of neurological after-effects, including the partial loss of active motor skills in all four limbs, and serious cognitive and behavioural disorders (disinhibition, maladjustment, inability to concentrate, temporal disorientation, demotivation and loss of initiative, and passive opposition).

29. On 12 December 2005, since his condition had not improved, the first applicant was transferred to another rehabilitation centre. On 26 June 2008 the first applicant’s residual rate of permanent partial disability (IPP) was estimated at 95 %, given his lack of autonomy in respect of all the basic activities of everyday life. He was confined to a wheelchair and was unable to engage in any autonomous occupational activity.

D. Judicial investigation

30. On 3 December 2004 the Meaux Public Prosecutor requested the instigation of a judicial investigation against L.P., Y.F. and O.D.B. on charges of intentional violence having caused over eight days’ total unfitness for work (ITT), aggravated by the following three circumstances: the violence had been jointly, by persons performing public duties, in a place used for acceding to public transport.

31. On the same day the three persons targeted by the request for an investigation were formally charged. L.P. and O.D.B. were placed under judicial supervision, while Y.F. was placed in preventive detention until 28 July 2005, when he would be released under judicial supervision.

32. The applicants, assisted by counsel, applied to join the proceedings as civil parties.

33. On 8 December 2006, in view of the evolution of the first applicant’s state of health, the State Prosecutor requested further investigations, reclassifying the charges as intentional acts of violence have caused a permanent disability. The three SUGE officers were formally charged on this new basis.

1. Witness statements gathered

34. A large number of witnesses were heard by the investigators on letters rogatory, and some of them were directly questioned by the investigating judge.

35. Three train passengers present at the material time stated that they had not seen the first applicant being struck.

36. Two individuals who had been with the applicant on the day in question, S.M. and S.Gh., were also questioned. S.M. explained that during the afternoon he and the first applicant had drunk alcohol and had been fined for smoking in the railway station. They had then reasoned with a person who had been on the railway tracks throwing stones at the trains. S.M. pointed out that the first applicant had a swollen lip and small scars on his face, around the chin. While they had been together the first applicant had neither fallen nor bumped his head.

37. S.Gh. told the investigators that the first applicant had been “shoved” by one of the officers involved, who had forced him face-down on to the ground, without his head actually touching the floor. She added that when he had been on the ground an SUGE officer had kicked him, with medium force, on the head or his upper body, although she was unable to say whether the kick had landed on his head. She further stated that when the first applicant refused to get into the vehicle, one of the staff involved had hit him lightly on the back of the head or upper body with a black objet, possible a truncheon, but that the blow had not been violent. The investigating judge summoned S.Gh. four times to appear before him, but she did not attend. Moreover, having subsequently mentioned the violent acts during a TV interview, she had explained that “she had been all over the place”, that she had been “taken by surprise” and that she “had overdone it a bit in front of the TV cameras”.

38. Furthermore, on 9 May 2006 an SNCF employee informed the investigators that he had been confided in by a dog-handler, claiming that he had been talking to some of the first applicant’s friends and had discovered that he had been fighting on the afternoon in question and that someone had smashed a bottle over his head. The employee explained that she had not spoken up earlier because her information was only second-hand. Furthermore, she had not considered the dog-handler particularly reliable, as he had previously given her information which she knew to be false. However, this witness statement could not be compared with other evidence or corroborated by the witness as he had died since the material time. On 26 May 2006 the police had telephoned the six dog-handlers who could have made the statements in question. The only one who had worked in the company in question at the material time had stated that he had not heard about the case and had never spoken to any friends of the victim, with whom he was not acquainted.

39. S.D. and S.G., the two police officers who had first arrived on the scene, gave statements. One said that the arrest had been carried out “robustly” and that the first applicant’s head had possibly hit the ground, as he had “fallen with his whole weight, all at once”, and the other stated that the applicant had fallen “to the ground heavily, face down”, with his head hitting the floor. The latter added, before the investigating judge, that he was virtually sure that the applicant’s head had hit the ground, even though his view was partially blocked by a vehicle. He further added that he had not seen the person being kneed.

40. The four police officers sent as reinforcements, D.F., N.T. R.D. and A.H., stated that they had witnessed a kneeing incident. R.D. affirmed that when the first applicant had been brought to the ground there had been a loud “bump”. A.H. went back on the statements made during the flagrante delicto procedure, informing the investigating judge that he did not know whether the applicant’s head had “bumped on the ground”.

41. The two SUGE officers who had been present but had not taken part in the operation explained that there had been no violence, and one of them suggested that if there had been any blows they must have been delivered in the police car or the police station.

42. As regards the persons formally charged, O.D.B. stated that no blows had been delivered. He said that the episode during which the first applicant had been brought to the ground had been a “textbook example”, explaining that there had been no violence, and that the person had just been placed on the ground. He was sure that his head had not hit the ground. He added that Y.F. had not kneed the first applicant, explaining to the investigating judge that in his view things had gone badly in the police station and the police officers were trying to “shift the blame on to them”. He added that the wound to the first applicant’s chin after his arrival in the detention area bore no comparison to the scratch which they had noted earlier on. He considered that his colleague had used the level of force strictly necessary to bring the arrestee to the ground.

43. L.P. affirmed that while the first applicant had still been standing, he had deliberately punched Y.F. on the arm. The latter had then seized him by the sleeve to knock him off balance. The applicant had ended up on his knees, and had been laid out on his side and then on his stomach. O.D.B. and he had held him by the ankles while Y.F. was handcuffing him. L.P. stated that the first applicant had been brought to the ground quite normally and that he had neither fallen to the ground nor been struck. He justified the use of that technique by the fact that the arrestee had been struggling and making incoherent statements. He added that he had had traces of blood around his nose, something which he had already noticed when fining him during the afternoon. He told the investigating judge that the first applicant’s head could not have hit the ground, after having stated while in custody that he had not been able to see his head when the person had been brought to the ground.

44. Finally, Y.F., a former trainer in the field of operational techniques, confirmed that he had fined the first applicant during the afternoon, without any further incidents occurring, even though the latter had already been consuming alcohol. He described the applicant’s annoyance and disgraceful language when they had met up again later. He complained that he had been punched deliberately and violently on his right forearm. He had pulled at the first applicant’s sleeve to bring him to his knees, and had then forced him to the ground with L.P.’s help, laying him on his right side and then turning him on to his stomach. He had personally handcuffed the arrestee by placing his knees on his body, his left knee on the back and his right knee on the posterior. His colleagues had been holding the arrestee’s legs. He specified that the latter had been “brought to the ground” and not “pushed to the ground”. The applicant’s head had not collided with anything and he had not been struck in any way, in the knowledge that he had had a slight cut on his chin and dried blood around his nose. Y.F. said that something must have happened at the police station or during his time in the police vehicle, because the injury to the chin which had been visible during the arrest had nothing in common with the wound which he had displayed at the police station; that wound had been four centimetres deep and bleeding, leaving a pool of blood. If the SUGE officers had noted such a wound on handing him over to the police, they would have immediately called an ambulance.

45. Y.F.’s administrative file showed that he had repeatedly complained of abuse and threats.

46. Consultation of the SNCF operational handbooks had shown that the head was singled out as a part of the body which should never be struck.

47. No images of the handcuffing episode could be obtained from the CCTV footage at the railway station. On the other hand, the footage did show the identity check carried out in the afternoon and the attempts by the first applicant to calm down an individual standing on the railway tracks.

2. Expert reports

a) Expert report of 25 April 2005

48. On 29 December 2004 the investigating judge commissioned an expert report on the matter from Dr T., a forensic doctor, and Professor L, a brain surgeon. They submitted their report on 25 April 2005.

49. The reports concluded that the first applicant had had a subdural haematoma of the left hemisphere which had caused brain damage.

50. In view of the nature and consequences of that haematoma, the experts considered that the length of time required to constitute it had probably been less than thirty minutes from the time of the head injury, and could not have been less than fifteen minutes. Having regard to the timescale of the events and the witness statements, the experts stated that the shock could not have occurred during the few minutes’ drive from the railway station to the police station, or on arrival at the latter. On the other hand, they found that the injuries could have been caused by the applicant being pushed to the ground, being kneed or falling full length during his arrest. Alcohol or drug consumption could not have had any direct and/or definite influence on the traumatic brain injury.

b) Expert report of 24 January 2006

51. Dr G., a neurologist, and Ms D., a neuropsychologist, examined the first applicant on 3 January 2006. They submitted their report on 24 January 2006.

52. They noted a deficiency of all four limbs and a serious deterioration of the cognitive and mental functions. They concluded that the neurological condition was directly responsible for the first applicant’s state of total dependency, and considered that it was too soon to determine the chances of consolidation but that the situation was unlikely to change greatly.

c) Expert report of 19 October 2006

53. On 26 June 2006 Dr G. and Dr S. examined the first applicant. In their report of 19 October 2006 they noted that he could neither stand nor walk, that he was completely dependent as regards everyday activities and should be placed under guardianship. His total unfitness for work was still being assessed.

54. They mentioned that the injuries observed could only have been the result of violent trauma, and that if they had been caused by being pushed to the ground, he must have been pushed extremely violently. The hyperextension of the cervical rachis and the fracture of the C2 vertebra could have been caused by a violent blow from a knee, but not the haemorrhagic lesions or the left temporal contusion, the latter having been caused either by direct blows to the skull or by the head violently hitting the ground. They confirmed that alcohol or drug consumption could not have been factors in the injuries, although they explained that the state of intoxication could have diminished the person’s reactivity in attempting to limit the consequences of falling.

55. The experts considered that the timescale of the events as reported pointed to the conditions surrounding the arrest in the railway station as having very probably, indeed certainly, been the cause of the traumatic cranio-cerebral and rachidial lesions. They pointed out that they had no information at their disposal to rule out the possibility that the first applicant had sustained other violent attacks while in the police vehicle or at the police station, but added that if such violence had indeed occurred, it was conceivable that it had caused injuries. Nevertheless, the lapse of time between the arrest and the arrival at the police station had been so short that that hypothesis was “improbable”.

56. They further explained that the bleeding in the chin area could not have been caused by the subdural haematoma, but might have resulted from the person having been violently pushed to the ground or having received any other type of blow.

57. The experts concluded that the first applicant suffered from an infirmity which would leave him with permanent motor, cognitive and mental after-effects.

d) Expert report of 9 March 2009 and reconstruction of 23 November 2007

58. On 6 September and 30 November 2007 the investigating judge appointed four experts, Dr G., Dr S. and Dr L., and also M.F., an expert in “martial arts, combat and self-defence sports and the ballistics of body movements and blows”, to assist in the reconstruction of events and conduct a fresh medical examination of the first applicant. They were also mandated to determine whether the first applicant’s statement as recorded on 22 November 2007 could be deemed reliable.

59. The reconstruction took place on 23 November 2007. Police officers S.D. and S.G. confirmed that when they had first encountered the first applicant he had been acting rather nervously, seemed to have consumed alcohol, displayed an injury on his chin, and was red in the face. The SUGE officers who had met S.D. and S.G. had informed them that they had already fined the applicant that afternoon. SUGE officer C.A. explained that since the police officers had informed them that they had been insulted the decision had been taken to arrest the person concerned and the SUGE officers had asked him to come with them. C.A. had put him in an armlock. For his part, Y.F. stated that he had seized his left sleeve.

60. According to the SUGE officers, they had taken the first applicant outside the railway station, and there had been some hesitation when S.D. had told them that this was not the man who had been throwing stones at the trains. O.D.B. pointed out that Y.F. had then released him and stepped back. Y.F. explained that the first applicant had then turned angrily to face him and punched him on the forearm. He had seized the applicant by the collar, forced him to his knees and placed him on his right side. He had then placed him face down on the ground and put his hands behind his back in order to handcuff him. After frisking him, he had taken the first applicant by the right arm, and the latter had stood up otherwise unaided.

61. A.H. confirmed that the applicant had made a gesture towards Y.F.’s arm, and Y.F. had warned him: “don’t you touch me”. However, he explained that because he was resisting handcuffing, Y.F. had struck him with his left knee.

62. One of the other police officers, D.F., confirmed that he had seen the person being struck by Y.F.s left knee, while R.D. mentioned a blow from the right knee. N.T. confirmed the action described by A.H., although he was not sure which leg had been used.

63. The police officers added that the first applicant had been placed in the police vehicle and that when they had almost reached the police station he had said that he was going to vomit. They pointed out that the man had been very calm, but when he was about to leave the vehicle he said that he would need help because his knee hurt. D.G. had helped him out of the car, holding one of his legs. That was when the applicant’s head had slid along the head-rest and hit the car doorframe. D.G., seeing that he had fainted, had asked a colleague to help him. Outside the vehicle the first applicant had vomited liquids and remained inert, mumbling rather than speaking. He had then been dragged into the sobering-up area.

64. The experts submitted their report on 9 March 2009. They observed that in Y.F.’s version of events there had been no mention of blows or of the first applicant’s head hitting the ground. They also noted that in A.H.’s version, the blow was described as incapable of having had a major impact. They found that during the manoeuvre to bring the first applicant to the ground, he had been in a position to break his fall and, possibly, if he had been kneed, to protect himself. Moreover, they stated that if the kneeing incident was taken on board, the time which had elapsed between the latter and the arrival at the police station, when the first symptoms of the brain damage became evident, would have been between 2 minutes and 10 seconds and 3 minutes and 30 seconds. They concluded that in view of the minimum period of evolution (the “response time”) between the traumatic injury and the first symptoms, that is to say between fifteen and twenty minutes, the kneeing could not be deemed to have caused the brain injury.

65. The experts considered that the various statements by the persons charged and the witnesses, as well as the reconstructions of the different versions, were “completely incompatible with the forensic medical findings as regards the nature and/or seriousness of the injuries described in the various hospital and forensic reports”, such injuries being “necessarily the outcome of violent traumatic injuries”.

66. They pointed out that the observations made during the reconstruction meant that it was unlikely, or even impossible, that the fracture had occurred during the events that had taken place at the railway station or the police station, explaining that such a fracture usually caused serious neck pain and stiffness in the cervical rachis, which had not been noted by the victim, the witnesses or the participants.

67. As regards the hypothesis mentioned during the investigation to the effect that the first applicant might have been hit by a bottle during a fight that had taken place during the afternoon of 30 November 2004, the experts pointed out that they had not received any evidence to support that affirmation, but that a blow with a bottle could have caused an internal contusion which would not have produced any external symptoms on the scalp but would have caused a subdural haematoma such as that discovered on the first applicant’s admission to hospital. The first manifestations felt by the first applicant on his way to the police station had most likely stemmed from just such a traumatic injury. The manifestations in question had therefore reflected the brain’s intolerance of the mounting pressure exerted by the subdural haematoma, which had been tolerated for a few hours and had then decompensated during the transfer to the police station.

68. The experts emphasised that the lapse of time between the applicant’s arrest by the SUGE brigade and the emergence of the traumatic brain injuries had been too short to conclude that the actions carried out and the blows struck by members of that brigade might have caused the brain damage. Furthermore, the actions of the SUGE officers, as studied in detail on the day of the reconstruction, could not have explained the intracranial lesions.

69. As regards the first applicant’s condition, the experts considered that his residual rate of permanent partial disability (IPP) could be estimated at 95 %, given his lack of autonomy in respect of all the basic activities of everyday life and his inability to engage in any autonomous occupational activity. His suffering and disfigurement were estimated at 6/7, and his loss of amenity and professional damage were declared absolute, total and definitive.

70. The experts observed that the first applicant had said that he had been “attacked”. They added, however, that any memory on the applicant’s part had necessarily been “reconstructed”, either through unintentional, spontaneous fabrication or by repeating something overheard from people around him and possibly deformed by himself. He could certainly have had no direct memories of the events.

E. Opinion of the National Security Ethics Committee

71. The National Security Ethics Committee, which had been contacted by two members of parliament concerning the circumstances of the first applicant’s arrest, assessed the procedural documents and interviewed the SUGE officers, apart from the persons formally charged, and also the police officers. It adopted an opinion on 19 December 2005.

72. It first of all noted that when the applicant had been arrested in the underground carpark of the railway station he had not been accused of an offence, as the police officers had acknowledged that his profile did not match that of the person sought. It added that the two police officers who had initially been involved had pointed out that they had not wanted to arrest the first applicant, but simply to check his identity, while the head of the SUGE team had stated that he had stopped the applicant for questioning because he had thought that the police officers had been insulted and he had considered them as victims. The committee noted that the head of team had admitted that “it was a bit topsy-turvy”, and that on leaving the railway station he had been unable to understand why the officers had not handcuffed the man and taken him to the police station.

73. The committee observed that the arrest had been carried out in a confused and confusing manner. The SUGE officers had explained that they had decided to handcuff the first applicant because he had insulted them and had struck Y.F. on the forearm.

74. The committee noted that A.H. had partly confirmed that version, and pointed out that there had been a kind of confused “stand-off” between the SUGE and the police officers outside the railway station. A.H. had noted that the first applicant had been insulting the SUGE officers, that he had lunged at one of them, hitting him on the arm or the shoulder, and that the officer in question had said “Don’t you touch me!”. After the applicant had been handcuffed, A.H. had decided to apprehend him on charges of violence against persons performing public duties, which violent acts he considered to have been committed in his presence.

75. The committee observed that S.G., who had taken the first applicant to the police station, had stated that he did not know the reason for the arrest.

76. The committee noted that even supposing that the head injury might have been caused by one of the SUGE officers, the police officers whom it had interviewed had provided no further information such as to establish its origin or the time of its causation. The only conclusions to be drawn from their statements were that the arrest had been violent, because the first applicant had initially resisted handcuffing.

77. The committee observed that the police and SUGE involvement in the case had been extremely confused. It stated that the police sergeant, who had been assisted by five police officers, ought to have taken control of the situation as soon as he arrived on the scene. He should have intervened between the SUGE officers and the first applicant, immediately placing the latter under his protection, and have asked the SUGE officers why he had been stopped and questioned, with a view to deciding on the appropriate action to take. The committee noted that instead of shouldering that responsibility, the police officers had passively looked on as the SUGE officers used force which the former’s mere presence had rendered illegitimate.

78. The committee considered that the lawfulness of the apprehension had been highly questionable. Indeed, the first two police officers arriving on the scene had taken the view that the apprehension had not been justified by the first applicant’s attitude outside the railway station. Interrogation of the various parties involved had not made clear whether a serious act of violence had been committed against Y.F. or whether the first applicant had merely pushed him away. The committee noted that the incident appeared in fact to have amounted to a mere scuffle to which Y.F. had reacted impulsively.

79. It further noted that the SUGE officers had imposed the decision to apprehend the first applicant on the police officers, who were not in control of the situation. The latter had merely passively accepted the applicant’s handover in order to transport him to the police station. That confusion explained why the injury could not be imputed with any certainty to either of the services in question. The committee further stated that even supposing that the injury had been caused by the SUGE officers during the handcuffing operation, at a time when the first applicant should have been under police protection, it was surprising, at the very least, that none of the police officers present had been able to identify the act of violence which had occasioned the injury.

80. In the committee’s view, the injury under the applicant’s chin raised issues. Even supposing that it had already been there prior to the apprehension and that the wound had reopened, as the police officers affirmed, it pointed at the very least to a very rough mode of transport of an injured person. Lastly, the committee pointed out that it was not its task to issue an opinion on the origin of the head injury or to attribute it to either of the services. It added that the possibility of a joint police/SUGE operation required the respective competences to be strictly defined. It should be reiterated that the arrival of the police removes the SUGE mandate, immediately placing the operation under the sole authority of the most senior police officer present. Moreover, SUGE officers should also be aware of the conditions for the lawfulness of in flagrante apprehensions and should in fact, like police personnel, undergo compulsory conflict management training.

81. Lastly, the committee decided to transmit its opinion to the public prosecutor for assessment of the expediency of prosecuting those concerned on charges of failure to assist a person in danger.

F. Outcome of the judicial investigation

82. On 15 February 2010 the investigating judge of the Meaux Regional Court issued a discontinuance order.

83. She considered that the serious brain damage suffered by the first applicant had originated in events preceding his questioning by the SUGE officers and his transport to the police station by the police officers. She observed that the investigation had failed to establish the precise circumstances under which the events had occurred and to identify the perpetrator. No further investigation had been possible because all the witnesses identified had been heard and the first applicant was no longer capable of providing further information on the series of events of which he had been the victim.

84. The investigating judge added that the circumstance surrounding the apprehension had been caused by the first applicant’s insulting and violent behaviour. No proof had been provided of illegitimate violence, since it had transpired from the proceedings and the witness statements that the applicant’s head had not hit the ground, and that even supposing that Y.F. had kneed him, such acts did not fall within the category of deliberate violence. The judge stated that the investigation had shown that, owing to the position in which Y.F. had been standing, the intensity of his action had necessarily been limited, forming part of an operational technique.

85. The applicants, all of whom had joined the proceedings as civil parties, appealed against the discontinuance decision, seeking:

- its annulment pursuant to Articles 184 and 802 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the grounds that it was identically worded to the public prosecutor’s final submissions;

- the appointment of a panel of experts mandated to produce a fresh report under the supervision of a member of the Investigations Division, and;

- in the alternative, the committal of the defendants for trial by the criminal court for the acts of violence perpetrated against the first applicant.

86. By judgment of 3 September 2010 the Investigations Division of the Paris Court of Appeal dismissed all those requests. It held that the civil parties had sustained no damage as a result of the grounds of nullity on which they had relied, since they could have adduced their claims in adversarial proceedings before it; it also pointed out that the entire proceedings had been submitted to it and that it was empowered to deal with all aspects of the case. As regards the request for a new expert report, the Investigations Division noted that the first expert report had been drawn up by a panel of four experts with complementary specialities, who had all attended the extremely long and detailed reconstruction organised by the investigating judge, during which they had seen all those involved in the impugned events repeat several times the gestures which they had described, covering all the different versions presented. It held that another expert opinion, for which all this input could not be replicated, would be of no real value for establishing the truth, and that it was neither necessary nor practicable to repeat such a complex reconstruction, which had at no stage been criticised by the various parties involved in the proceedings. The Division added that in medical terms, the civil parties had provided no scientific evidence capable of contradicting the conclusions of the panel of experts, merely affirming that the extremely serious injuries sustained by the first applicant must have originated in the manner of his arrest.

87. As regards the violence in question, the Investigations Division noted that the first applicant had suddenly lost his temper and struck Y.F. violently on the arm, which had been a deliberate, aggressive act. They therefore considered that the SUGE officers’ intervention to neutralise him had been amply justified, subject to the operation having taken place under appropriate conditions. It nevertheless noted that the operation seemed to have been more “robust” than the SUGE officers had admitted, the latter having spoken of a “textbook” operation, which evoked a theoretical ideal and seemed “too perfect”. Furthermore, the other parties involved had described a swifter series of events than the “takedown” in three separate stages described by Y.F. As regards the possibility that the first applicant had been kneed in the head, the Investigations Department noted divergences in the various witness statements, and concluded that some uncertainty remained as regards both whether such a blow from the knee had actually been administered and whether it had been intentional.

88. Finally, as regards the causal link between the arrest and the first applicant’s injuries, the Investigations Division noted the general consensus that the applicant had been “in good shape” on being installed in the police vehicle after his handcuffing, and that neither his position in the vehicle nor the speed of transport had suggested that he had been the target of any violence at this stage of events. Referring to the reconstruction, the Investigations Division considered that by reprising all the descriptions of the actions by all those involved and taking on board the hypotheses least favourable to the SUGE officers in question, the experts had been able to ascertain that the arrestee’s head had not hit the ground in any of the reconstructed actions, that the blow from the knee, if such a blow had ever actually occurred, would have affected the right craniofacial region, that if it had been struck as described it could only have had a minor impact and that the actions carried out could not explain the intracranial lesions noted, especially the cranial fracture on the left side of the head. The Court of Appeal further observed that the experts’ findings had been very clear, considering it highly unlikely, or indeed impossible, that the fracture had been caused during the incidents at the railway station or at the police station.

89. The Division pointed out that the experts had extensively justified their change of mind on the basis of factors which they had noted from the reconstructions of all the different versions, which they had attended, and that the medical evidence gathered would appear to support the existence of a previous traumatic injury which had taken some time to manifest. Lastly, it noted that the previous findings concerning the first applicant’s physical state during the afternoon had lent credence to that eventuality. Furthermore, the time taken for the symptoms to appear would have been incompatible per se with the short lapse of time between the arrest and the first symptoms, too soon after the operation to have been caused by it.

90. The Investigations Division concluded that the investigation had failed to gather sufficient evidence that a criminal offence had been committed.

91. On 27 September 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal on points of law. It held that the applicants could not complain about the reasons given for the discontinuance decision because, owing to the devolutive effect of the appeal, the Investigations Division had substituted its own reasoning for the original one. Moreover, it considered that that Division had analysed all the facts criticised in the complaint, answered all the main points set out in the civil parties’ memorial and determined, on the basis of sufficient and non-contradictory grounds, that there was insufficient evidence that any individuals had committed the offence of collective assault having caused a permanent disability or any other offence.

92. In observations received by the registry of the Bobigny Compensation Board for Crime Victims (“CIVI”) on 16 March 2012, the Guarantee Fund against acts of terrorism and other criminal offences requested the reimbursement of provisional awards made to the first applicant to a total of 490,000 euros (EUR), under three CIVI decisions of 30 October 2006, 5 July 2007 and 8 December 2009.

...

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

95. The applicants complained that the conditions under which the first applicant had been arrested had infringed Articles 3, 5 and 13 of the Convention.

96. The Government contested that argument.

97. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case, considers that the case should be assessed only under Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

...

B. Merits

1. The substantive limb of Article 3

a) The parties’ submissions

i. The applicant

105. The applicant submitted that his arrest had been neither necessary nor legitimate. He attributed the origin of his subdural haematoma to the conditions of his arrest, and more specifically to the way in which he had been brought to the ground and the blow from the knee which he had received. He added that the factual evidence submitted to the Court was sufficiently cogent to enable the latter to disregard the findings of the domestic courts, observing that the French authorities were unable to put forward any plausible explanation for his injuries. In that regard he contested the hypothesis of a prior scuffle, which had not been supported by any conclusive evidence. Furthermore, he argued that many witnesses had testified to the violence of his takedown, when his head had violently struck the ground and he had received a sharp, violent blow from a knee.

106. As regards the causal link between the violence exercised and the injuries sustained, he referred to the initial expert reports, one of which had stated that the arrest could have caused the brain injury, and the other that the operational conditions had undoubtedly been the cause of the injuries. As regards the third expert opinion, which contradicted the first two, he pointed out that that opinion had been based solely on a reconstruction effected three years after the event, which had drawn exclusively on the information provided by the SUGE and police officers concerned. Moreover, the applicant argued that the length of time between his arrest and his collapse had been underestimated by the experts, given that security cameras had shown that the arrest had taken place at 7.59 p.m. and the fire brigade had been called at 8.14 p.m. Referring to the first expert report, he observed that the doctors had mentioned the great difficulty of accurately determining the timescale of incidents which could have varied between a few minutes and several hours. He concluded that the domestic authorities were indeed responsible for the ill-treatment he had sustained and that the time-lapse between his arrival at Lagny hospital and his transfer to Beaujon hospital had been excessively long.

ii. The Government

107. The Government submitted that the facts of the present case did not point to any violation of the substantive limb of Article 3. They affirmed that the use of force had been necessitated by the applicant’s behaviour, and considered that the domestic investigations had proved that the occurrence of a subdural haematoma could not have been caused by violent acts committed during the arrest, even though they conceded that investigations had not enabled the events which had preceded the arrest and which might have explained the injuries noted to be established with any certainty. Finally, they argued that the national authorities had done their utmost to protect the applicant’s physical integrity as soon as the first traumatic symptoms had appeared.

b) The Court’s assessment

i. General principles

108. The Court reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see, for example, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 163, Series A no. 25, and Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999‑V)

109. The Court also reiterates that according to its case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Ireland, cited above, §162, and Măciucă v. Romania, no. 25763/03, § 22, 26 May 2009).

110. In cases of alleged violations of Article 3 of the Convention, in order to assess the evidence, the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny, adopting the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”, although such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, in particular, Ireland, cited above, § 161; Selmouni, cited above, § 88; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000‑VII; Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, § 67, ECHR 2006‑IX; Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, § 117, ECHR 2006‑IX; and Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 92, ECHR 2010).

111. Where domestic proceedings have taken place it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts, and it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them (see Gäfgen, cited above, § 93, and Alberti v. Italy, no. 15397/11, § 41, 24 June 2014). Indeed, even though in such a context the Court is prepared to be more critical of the conclusions of the domestic courts (see El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, § 155, ECHR 2012), it nevertheless requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts (see, among many other authorities, Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461/02, § 59, 24 July 2008, and Alberti, cited above, § 41).

112. Moreover, the Court observes that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (“the burden of proof is upon him who affirms”). The Court reiterates its case-law under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to the effect that where the events in issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman, cited above, § 100; Rupa v. Romania (no. 1), no. 58478/00, §§ 97 and 100, 16 December 2008; and El-Masri, cited above, § 152). In the absence of such an explication the Court can draw inferences from the respondent Government’s conduct in this respect which might be unfavourable (see Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, § 274, 18 June 2002). Furthermore, the Court reiterates that whatever the outcome of the domestic proceedings, the defendants’ conviction or acquittal does not absolve the respondent State from its responsibility under the Convention (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, § 34, Series A no. 336); it is accordingly under an obligation to provide a plausible explanation of how the injuries were caused, otherwise Article 3 is applicable (see Selmouni, cited above, § 87).

113. Lastly, as regards the particular issue of violence perpetrated during police identity checks and arrests, the Court reiterates that the use of force must be proportionate and necessary in the light of the circumstances of the case. In that respect it attaches particular importance to any injuries caused to individuals targeted by the operation and to the exact circumstances under which they were caused (see Alberti, cited above, §§ 43 and 44).

ii. Application of those principles to the present case

114. The Court notes from the outset that the injuries sustained by the applicant, namely a subdural haematoma which caused a loss of consciousness followed by a coma and had major after-effects, depriving him of autonomy in respect of all the basic activities of everyday life, exceeded the severity threshold for the ill-treatment complained to fall within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention.

115. Furthermore, it observes that the circumstances of the case concern not only the applicant’s police custody but also the circumstances of his apprehension by the SUGE officers and his handover to the police officers in order to be taken to the police station. The Court will thus consider whether the alleged facts have been established by seeking the existence of a body of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions.

116. The Court first of all notes that the injuries appeared while the applicant was in police custody following an arrest involving the use of force, during which the applicant had been forced to the ground.

117. The Court notes that the domestic court considered that the investigation had ruled out any possibility that the actions of the SUGE and police officers had caused the traumatic injury to the applicant, the last expert assessment conducted having concluded that the time lapse between the arrest and the appearance of the symptoms had been too short (see paragraphs 83 and 89 above), which reinforces the assumption that the injuries had been occasioned during incidents preceding the applicant’s arrest.

118. In that regard, the Court observes that, as conceded by the Government, the investigations conducted by the domestic authorities failed to establish whether any such incidents had actually taken place. It notes that their hypothetical existence had been based exclusively on the statements of one witness relaying comments by a third person who had himself been confided in by relatives of the applicant, pointing out that he had not taken that information seriously (see paragraph 38 above). The last few expert assessments indicated that they had discovered nothing to support the assertion that the applicant had been struck on the head with a bottle during the afternoon preceding his arrest (see paragraph 67 above).

119. As regards the medical reports, the Court notes that the first doctor interviewed during the in flagrante investigation considered that the injuries found on the applicant might have been compatible with a single, extremely violent blow, such as a blow from a knee or a medium-weight non-blunt instrument, or indeed with a heavy fall (see paragraph 21 above). Subsequently, the authors of an expert report dated 25 April 2005 considered that the applicant’s injuries might have stemmed from his having been forced to the ground, received blows from a knee or fallen heavily during his apprehension by the SUGE officers (see paragraph 50 above). In another report drawn up on 19 October 2006 the experts observed that according to the sequence of events reported to them, the conditions of the arrest in the railway station had very probably, or indeed certainly, caused the traumatic injuries in question (see paragraph 55 above). Finally, an expert assessment submitted on 9 March 2009 had found that it was very unlikely, or indeed impossible, that the fracture had occurred during the incidents at the railway station or at the police station, specifying that the various statements by persons questioned had been deemed incompatible with the forensic medical findings (see paragraphs 65 and 66 above). The Court therefore notes that the different experts reached contradictory findings.

120. Furthermore, it observes that the statements of the SUGE and police officers, which had been the sole basis for the reconstruction on which the last expert assessment had been carried out, were also mutually contradictory, with each service blaming the other for the applicant’s injuries. In that connection the Court reiterates that the SUGE stated that they handed the applicant over in good condition to the police and subsequently noticed that he displayed major injuries (see paragraphs 20, 42 and 44 above). For their part, some of the police officers mentioned that the applicant’s head had hit the ground while he was being apprehended by the SNCF security service and also that he had been kneed in the head by Y.F. (see paragraphs 15 to 17, 20, 39 to 41, 61 and 62 above). The Court nevertheless observes that the statements given by some of the police officers varied widely during the investigation, the more senior officers having admitted that they had deliberately not mentioned the kneeing incident during his initial hearing in order to give Y.F. an opportunity to shoulder his responsibilities (see paragraph 16 above). The Court is surprised at such an omission and at the changes in the interviewees’ testimonies and statements, particularly in a case of deliberate violence against an individual who displayed serious injuries while in police custody.

121. Finally, as regards the justification of the use of force during the arrest, the Court once again notes contradictions among the different witness statements, some affirming that the applicant had made a violent gesture towards a SUGE officer (see paragraphs 43, 44 and 60 above), and others contesting that version by stating that the applicant had not been violent at all, and had merely pushed away the hand of one of the SNCF employees (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above).

122. The Court concludes that the internal investigations unearthed contradictory and disturbing pieces of evidence contained in both the successive expert reports and the witness statements as regards the reasons for and conditions of the applicant’s arrest and handover. It holds that the hypothesis of violence suffered by the applicant prior to his arrest, which hypothesis was deemed plausible by the Investigations Division, is insufficiently substantiated to be deemed cogent in the light of the circumstances of the case.

123. Having regard to the aforementioned conflicting items of evidence, the Court considers that the circumstances of the case highlight the existence of a body of evidence sufficient for a finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, given the domestic authorities’ failure to provide a satisfactory and cogent explanation for the injuries sustained by the applicant, the symptoms of which appeared while he was under the control of the police officers.

124. Accordingly there was a violation of the substantive limb of Article 3.

2. The procedural limb of Article 3

a) The parties’ submissions

i. The applicant

125. The applicant submitted that investigations into allegations of ill-treatment should be swift and detailed. He admitted that the in flagrante procedure in the present case had been prompt. He considered, on the other hand, that there had been several deficiencies in the judicial investigation, complaining that it had been excessively long and ineffective. In that regard, he disputed the appropriateness of the final expert report, which had been commissioned three-and-a-half years after the event, and submitted that medical experts should have been appointed to conduct a detailed analysis of the concept of “response time”, a key element in this case.

126. Lastly, he complained that the investigating judge had not issued a warrant ordering S.Gh., an eye-witness to the events, to finally appear before him after having disregarded the ordinary summonses, and that the same judge had failed to show due diligence in contacting the SNCF employee who had been confided in by a dog handler, with a view to clarifying the former’s allegations. The applicant concluded that there had been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3.

ii. The Government

127. The Government considered that the domestic authorities had conducted an effective investigation, as of the time of occurrence of the events, with a view to ascertaining the cause of the applicant’s injuries and identifying those responsible. They recalled the different inquiries made, emphasising the intensive involvement of both the judiciary and the public prosecutors. They submitted that the length of the investigation had not been excessive given, in particular, the number and complexity of many of the expert assessments conducted.

128. The Government added that the applicant’s relatives, in their capacity as civil parties, had been able to participate actively in the investigations, in particular by requesting the implementation of investigative measures. They concluded that no violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 was attributable to the national authorities.

b) The Court’s assessment

i. General principles

129. The Court reiterates that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully and in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. This investigation, as with that under Article 2, should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. If this were not the case, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, despite its fundamental importance, would be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see, among many other authorities, Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, § 102, Reports 1998‑VIII, and El Masri, cited above, § 182).

130. The investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or to use as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard. Furthermore, the investigation should be independent from the executive. Independence of the investigation implies not only the absence of a hierarchical or institutional connection, but also independence in practical terms (see El Masri, cited above, §§ 183-184, and Alberti, cited above, §§ 62-63).

131. Lastly, the victim should be able to participate effectively in the investigation in one form or another (see El Masri, cited above, § 185).

ii. Application of those principles to the present case

132. The Court notes that in the present case an in flagrante procedure was opened upon the discovery of the facts. Under that procedure, several witnesses were heard, and moreover, three SUGE officers were remanded in custody. Furthermore, a reconstruction of the scene was effected in the presence of two prosecutors.

133. The Court also notes that an investigation was promptly instigated, leading to the implementation of numerous investigative measures. Three persons were formally charged, one of them having spent several months in preventive detention. The Court considers that the length of the investigation can be explained by the scope of the inquiries carried out, since numerous hearings and no less than four expert assessments were conducted. Thus the investigation cannot be considered excessively long. Moreover, the Court observes that the statements by S.Gh. and the SNCF employee mentioned by the applicant were obtained by the investigators pursuant to letters rogatory, even if those two persons were not heard by the investigating judge himself owing to the death of the former and the absence of the latter.

134. Moreover, the Court holds that the last expert assessment, which was conducted concurrently with the reconstruction, seemed justified for reasons of establishing the truth, the medical experts having, in particular, pronounced on the issue of the “response time” between the initial shock and the first symptoms of the traumatic injury sustained by the applicant.

135. Lastly, the Court notes that the applicant, who had joined the proceedings as a civil party and was represented by counsel, had the opportunity to submit requests for investigative measures and to defend his interests.

136. Consequently, the Court holds that in the instant case the applicant has not demonstrated that the investigations failed to comply with the requirements of Article 3.

137. Therefore, there was no violation of the procedural limb of Article 3.

...

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

...

2. Holds that there has been a violation of the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention;

3. Holds that there has been no violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention;

...

Done in French, and notified in writing on 6 July 2015, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

              Claudia WesterdiekAngelika Nußberger
RegistrarPresident

Full & Egal Universal Law Academy