CASE OF GİRİŞEN v. TURKEY

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF GİRİŞEN v. TURKEY

(Application no. 53567/07)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

13 March 2018

FINAL

13/06/2018

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Girişen v. Turkey,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Robert Spano, President,
Paul Lemmens,
Ledi Bianku,
Işıl Karakaş,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,
Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 13 February 2018,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 53567/07) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Deniz Girişen (“the applicant”), on 16 November 2007.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr M. Özbekli, a lawyer practising in Diyarbakır. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.

3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been denied access to a lawyer during the pre-trial stage and that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been excessive.

4. On 11 January 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Diyarbakır.

6. On 23 December 2001 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. During his detention in police custody, the applicant was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. In particular, electric shocks were administered to his testicles.

7. On 25 December 2001 the applicant was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed in detail to his involvement in the activities of the illegal organisation and gave detailed information about the organisation and its members.

8. On 26 December 2001 the applicant gave a statement to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer in which he denied the statements he had given to the police.

9. On the same day the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, who questioned him in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant again denied his statements to the police. During his questioning, the applicant alleged to the investigating judge that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while in police custody and that his statements had been taken under duress. However, a medical report issued by Bağlar Health Clinic dated the same day stated that there was no sign that he had been subjected to violence. At the end of the hearing, the court ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention.

10. On 9 January 2002 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the State.

11. On 19 March 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant repeated his allegations of having been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody and denied his statements to the police.

12. On 27 January 2004 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Diyarbakır public prosecutor’s office against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated him. He stated that electric shocks had been administered to his body through his testicles and that his testicles had been squeezed, which had caused serious harm. He attached a medical report dated 20 September 2002 from Fırat University on the state of his testicles. The report stated that the applicant had a dilation of the veins in his left testicle of up to 2.6 mm, which had resulted in a varicocele.

13. State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court.

14.  On 25 June 2004 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor issued a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the police officers on account of a lack of evidence.

15. During the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the first-instance courts examined the applicant’s continued detention at the end of the hearings, either on their own motion or at the applicant’s request. The courts ordered that he be kept in detention owing to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the contents of the file.

16. On 12 June 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The sentence, however, was reduced to twenty years of imprisonment as the applicant was a minor at the time of the offence.

17. On 18 January 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision for procedural reasons.

18. On 2 April 2010 the applicant asked the Diyarbakır Assize Court for his release pending trial. On 9 April 2010 the court dismissed his application for release on the grounds of the nature of the offence.

19. On 30 September 2010 the Diyarbakır Assize Court issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction (görevsizlik kararı), pursuant to section 8 of Law no. 6008, which provided that juveniles could not be tried before assize courts, which had special jurisdiction to try a number of aggravated crimes enumerated under Article 250 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the material time. The case was thus referred to the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court.

20. On 2 November 2010 the applicant was released pending trial.

21. On 5 June 2012 the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant’s statements to the police, the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to sixteen years and eight months’ imprisonment.

22. On 17 June 2014 the Court of Cassation upheld the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court’s judgment.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

23. A description of the relevant domestic law and practice prior to the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) (Law no. 5271) on 1 June 2005 can be found in Çobanoğlu and Budak v. Turkey (no. 45977/99, §§ 29-31, 30 January 2007). The current practice under Law no. 5271 is outlined in Altınok v. Turkey (no. 31610/08, §§ 28‑31, 29 November 2011).

24. A description of the relevant domestic law concerning the right of access to a lawyer may be found in Salduz v. Turkey ([GC] no. 36391/02, §§ 27‑31, ECHR 2008).

25. On 15 July 2003 Law no. 4928 repealed section 31 of Law no. 3842, thus the restriction on an accused’s right of access to a lawyer in proceedings before the State Security Courts was lifted.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

26. The applicant complained that he had been subjected to various forms of ill-treatment in police custody and that the domestic authorities had failed to conduct any proper investigation into the police officers after his complaints.

27. The Court notes that on 27 January 2004 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Diyarbakır public prosecutor’s office concerning allegations of ill-treatment while in police custody.

28. On 25 June 2004 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor’s office decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings owing to a lack of evidence against the police officers.

29. The Court reiterates that within the context of Turkish law, lodging a formal complaint with the public prosecutor’s office and, where appropriate, filing an objection against a decision not to prosecute, would be sufficient to fulfil the requirements of Article 35 of the Convention (see Aydın Çetinkaya v. Turkey, no. 2082/05, § 84, 2 February 2016 with further references therein; and compare Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, § 56-57, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI). However, the applicant did not lodge an objection against the public prosecutor’s decision, thus he failed to exhaust the domestic remedies in respect of his complaint (see, among many others, Abdulgafur Batmaz v. Turkey, no. 44023/09, § 38, 24 May 2016).

30. It follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION

31. The applicant submitted that the length of his detention on remand had been excessive, in violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

32. The Government objected to that contention and argued that the applicant should have lodged a compensation claim under Article 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to the length of detention on remand. They accordingly suggested that the Court declare this part of the application inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

33. The Court notes that the domestic remedy in application of Article 141 of the CPP with regard to length of detention on remand was examined in the case of Demir v. Turkey, ((dec.), no. 51770/07, §§ 17‑35, 16 October 2012), where the Court held that that remedy had to be used by applicants whose convictions had become final.

34. In the instant case, the Court observes that the applicant’s conviction became final on 17 June 2014. From that date onwards the applicant was entitled to seek compensation under Article 141 of the CPP (see Demir, cited above, § 35), but failed to do so.

35. The Court reiterates that the assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the date on which the application was lodged with the Court. However, as the Court has held on many occasions, this rule is subject to exceptions, which may be justified by the particular circumstances of each case (see İçyer v. Turkey (dec.), no. 18888/02, § 72, ECHR 2006‑I). The Court has previously departed from this rule in cases concerning the above-mentioned remedy in respect of the length of detention, which became applicable after the final decision on the criminal proceedings (see also, Tutal and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 11929/12, 28 January 2014; İnan v. Turkey (dec.), no. 14129/11, 4 November 2014; Arıcan v. Turkey (dec.). no. 47622/10, 5 September 2017; and Ok and others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 9510/06, 5 December 2017). The Court takes the view that the exception should be applied in the present case as well.

36. As a result, taking into account the Government’s objection, the Court concludes that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

37. Relying on Articles 5 § 4 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant further complained that there had been no effective domestic remedy to challenge the lawfulness of his detention.

38. The Court considers at the outset that the complaint under Article 13 falls to be examined under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention alone, which provides a lex specialis in relation to the more general requirements of Article 13 (see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 266, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).

39. The Government contended that domestic law provided an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of pre-trial detention under Articles 267‑271 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the applicant had failed to use that remedy. They invited the Court to reject this part of the application for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

40. The Court further considers that it is not necessary to address the Government’s inadmissibility plea based on the argument of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies since the complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

41. The Court notes at the outset that the Code of Criminal Procedure governing the detention of individuals and the remedies to challenge the lawfulness of detention orders was amended on 17 December 2004. Those amendments, namely the new Code of Criminal Procedure, entered into force on 1 June 2005. There were thus two different sets of legal provisions applicable to the applicant while he was detained. That being the case, the Court will assess the applicant’s complaint concerning the absence of an effective domestic remedy to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in two different parts. The first part concerns the applicant’s detention between 23 December 2001 and 1 June 2005, that is, the period during which the former Code of Criminal Procedure was in force; the second part concerns the applicant’s detention from 1 June 2005 to which the provisions of the new Code of Criminal Procedure were applicable.

42. As regards the first period, the Court reiterates that it has already found that the remedy provided for by Articles 297-304 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby applicants could object to decisions ordering continued detention, offered little prospect of success in practice and that it did not provide for a procedure that was genuinely adversarial for the accused (see Koşti and Others v. Turkey, no. 74321/01, § 22, 3 May 2007; Bağrıyanık v. Turkey, no. 43256/04, §§ 50-51, 5 June 2007; Doğan Yalçın v. Turkey, no. 15041/03, § 43, 19 February 2008; and Cahit Demirel v. Turkey, no. 18623/03, § 34, 7 July 2009).

43. The Court reiterates that, in cases where there is a continuing situation and it is clear from the outset that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the six-month period runs from the cessation of the situation (see Dvoynykh v. Ukraine, no. 72277/01, § 46, 12 October 2006). Similarly, in respect of a complaint about the absence of a remedy for a continuing situation, such as the absence of an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of detention, the time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention also expires six months after the end of that situation – for example, when a remedy which appears to be prima facie available and effective, is introduced in the domestic legal order (see Danov v. Bulgaria, no. 56796/00, § 57, 26 October 2006).

44. The Court notes that in the present case the Government did not raise any objection to the admissibility of the application on the basis of the six‑month rule established by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In that connection, the Court is mindful of the fact that the six-month rule is a public policy rule and that, consequently, it has jurisdiction to apply it of its own motion (see Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 160, ECHR 2004‑II), even if the Government have not raised that objection (see Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979/97, ECHR 2000‑I, and Khanustaranov v. Russia, no. 2173/04, § 37, 28 May 2014).

45. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that Articles 297‑304 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure were applicable until 1 June 2005, the date on which the new Code of Criminal Procedure entered into force. However, the application was lodged with the Court on 16 November 2007. Consequently, this part of his complaint falls outside the six-month time-limit and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

46. As regards the second period, the Court reiterates that it examined the remedy provided for by the new Code of Criminal Procedure in Altınok v. Turkey, (no. 31610/08, §§ 50-61, 29 November 2011) (see paragraphs 23 and 41). In that case, the Court held that the remedy provided for in the new Code of Criminal Procedure failed to comply with the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. In particular, it held that the fact that neither the applicant nor his lawyer had had the opportunity to be notified of and to reply to the public prosecutor’s opinion meant that it failed to respect the principle of equality of arms between the parties. However, the applicant in that case complained both to the domestic courts and the Court about a specific decision ordering his continued detention. He also specifically argued that the principle of equality of arms had been violated in that the Assize Court had decided the case on the basis of the case file and had not informed him of the public prosecutor’s opinion (that was also the case in respect of the applicant in Ceviz v. Turkey, no. 8140/08, § 40, 17 July 2012).

47. In contrast to the applicants in the cases of Altınok and Ceviz, the Court notes that the applicant in the present case articulated his complaint that he had not had an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in rather vague and general terms. In that connection, the applicant neither complained about a specific decision nor referred to any procedural shortcomings under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (compare Şayık and Others v. Turkey, nos. 1966/07 and 6 others, § 17, 8 December 2009.

48. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that this complaint is unsubstantiated as the applicant has not made any specific argument concerning the means by which the domestic authorities violated his right under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see Filiz v. Turkey, no. 28074/08, § 69, 4 March 2014).

49. It follows that the applicant’s complaint concerning the lack of an effective procedure to challenge the lawfulness of his continued detention is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

50. The applicant complained that he had not had a fair trial as he had been denied the assistance of a lawyer during the pre-trial stage. He further contended under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him was unreasonable. Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, in so far as relevant, read as follows:

“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by [a] tribunal ...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

...

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.”

51. The Government contested those claims.

A. Admissibility

52. The Government raised a plea of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, arguing that the applicant had failed to raise the substance of these complaints before the domestic courts.

53. The Court reiterates its well-established case-law to the effect that the assessment of an applicant’s obligation to exhaust domestic remedies is normally carried out with reference to the date on which the application was lodged with it (see Trabelsi v. Belgium, no. 140/10, § 89, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), subject to exceptions which may be justified by the particular circumstances of the case, notably following the creation of new remedies. The Court considers that there is no reason to make an exception to the general rule in the case at hand, the Court will examine whether the applicant could be said to have fulfilled his obligation to exhaust the domestic remedies available to him as of 16 November 2007, which is the introduction day of the present application.

54. In that connection, the Court further reiterates that it has already held that the Turkish law in force at the material time did not provide any effective remedies in respect of the complaints about the length of proceedings (see Daneshpayeh v. Turkey, no. 21086/04, § 37, 16 July 2009). Thus, there was no appropriate and effective remedy at the material time which the applicants should have exercised for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, among others, Karakullukçu v. Turkey, no. 49275/99, § 28, 22 November 2005.

55. Similar considerations also apply to the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention, since his right of access to a lawyer was restricted pursuant to section 31 of Law no. 3842, as he was accused of committing an offence falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. In other words, that restriction was systemic. Therefore, in the Court’s view, the applicant’s request for a lawyer while in police custody or his subsequent complaint as to the absence of legal assistance before the national authorities would be devoid of any prospect of success (see, among others, Taşçıgil v. Turkey, no. 16943/03, § 32, 3 March 2009).

56. The Court accordingly dismisses the Government’s objections based on the exhaustion of domestic remedies. It further notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Access to a lawyer during police custody

57. The applicant complained that he had been deprived of legal assistance during the preliminary investigation stage of the proceedings pursuant to section 31 of Law no. 3842, as he was accused of committing an offence that fell within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts.

58. The Government argued that the overall fairness of the applicant’s trial had not been prejudiced by the absence of a lawyer.

59. The Court reiterates that the applicant’s access to a lawyer was restricted by virtue of Law No. 3842 and was as such a systemic restriction applicable at the time of his arrest (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391/02, § 56, ECHR 2008).

60. The Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether the systematic nature of the restriction on the applicant’s right of access to a lawyer was, in and of itself, sufficient to find a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, as, in any event, the Government have not offered any compelling reasons for the restriction or demonstrated that the absence of legal assistance at the initial stage of the investigation did not irretrievably prejudice the applicants defence rights (see Salduz, cited above, § 58, and Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others, § 274.) In that regard, the Court notes that in convicting him the first-instance court relied on the applicant’s statements to the police. Moreover, it did not examine the admissibility of evidence at the trial. Likewise, the Court of Cassation dealt with the issue in a formalistic manner and failed to remedy this shortcoming (see Bayram Koç v. Turkey, no. 38907/09, § 23, 5 September 2017).

61. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.

2. Length of proceedings

62. The applicant complained that the length of the criminal proceedings had been excessive.

63. The Government submitted that there had been no substantial periods of inactivity by the judicial authorities.

64. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999‑II).

65. In the present case, the Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 22 December 2001 with the applicant’s arrest and ended on 17 June 2014 with the final decision delivered by the Court of Cassation. It thus lasted for nearly twelve years and six months at two levels of jurisdiction, which each examined the case twice.

66. The Court further notes that even though the case involved a certain degree of complexity, it cannot be said that this in itself justified the total length of the proceedings. As to the conduct of the authorities, the Court observes that it took more than six years and two months for the trial court to deliver its judgment. No sufficient explanation has been provided for that delay and no other explanation been offered as to whether the applicant bore any responsibility for the delay in the proceedings. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court also does not discern any delays that can be imputed to the applicant.

67. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see, for example, Hayrettin Demir v. Turkey, no. 2091/07, § 54, 24 July 2012).

68. After examining all the material submitted to it the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement (see Daneshpayeh v. Turkey, cited above, § 28, and Gürbüz and Özçelik v. Turkey, no. 11/05, § 24, 2 February 2016).

69. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

70. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

71. The applicant claimed 150,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.

72. The Government argued that the claims were unsubstantiated and excessive.

73. As for Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c), the Court considers that the finding of a violation of that provision constitutes sufficient just satisfaction (see Dvorski v. Croatia [GC], no. 25703/11, § 117, ECHR 2015). It further considers that the most appropriate form of redress would be a retrial in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, should the applicant so request (see Aydın Çetinkaya v. Turkey, no. 2082/05, § 119, 2 February 2016). It therefore makes no award under this head.

74. As for the violation in respect of the length of the proceedings against the applicant, the Court finds that the applicant must have suffered pain and distress which cannot be compensated solely by the Court’s finding of a violation. It therefore finds it appropriate to award him EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

75. As far as pecuniary damage is concerned, the Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.

B. Costs and expenses

76. The applicant claimed reimbursement of the costs and expenses he had incurred in the proceedings before the national courts; postal, translation and personal expenses whilst in prison; and his family’s travel expenses to visit him in prison. However, he neither quantified them nor submitted any supporting documents and left it to the Court’s discretion to determine the amount to be awarded under this head.

77. The Government invited the Court to dismiss the claims since they had not been based on documents or invoices.

78. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.

79. In the present case, the Court observes that the applicant has not substantiated his claim in any way as he has neither quantified his costs nor submitted any supporting documents. It therefore decides not to award him anything under this head (see Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 134, ECHR 2004‑XI).

C. Default interest

80. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaints concerning the denial of legal assistance to the applicant during the pre-trial stage and the length of the criminal proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention on account of the denial of legal assistance to the applicant during the pre-trial stage;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant;

4. Holds that the finding of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage that may have been sustained by the applicant in that connection;

5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amount, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 7,500 (seven thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage in connection with the duration of the proceedings;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 March 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Hasan BakırcıRobert Spano
Deputy RegistrarPresident

 

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