CASE OF GRZONA v. POLAND

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF GRZONA v. POLAND

(Application no. 3206/09)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

24 June 2014

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Grzona v. Poland,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

George Nicolaou, President,
Ledi Bianku,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 3 June 2014,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 3206/09) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Jan Grzona (“the applicant”), on 23 December 2008.

2. The applicant was represented by Ms M. Gąsiorowska, a lawyer practising in Warsaw. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. On 26 November 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4. The applicant, Mr Jan Grzona, is a Polish national who was born in 1956 and lives in Radom.

A. Main proceedings (case nos. V GNs 2/93; V GNs 3/02; V GNs 1/05)

1. Before 1 May 1993

5. On 1 February 1993 the applicant and his wife lodged a motion with the Radom District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) for dissolution of co-ownership of a civil association (zniesienie współwłasności spółki cywilnej) and for division of its property (podział majątku spółki cywilnej). One M.J. was also a co-owner and a party to the proceedings. A petrol station was a subject of the civil association’s business activity.

2. From 1 May 1993 onwards

6. On 19 April 1994, during a hearing, the District Court allowed a motion for an expert report on the value of the property to be provided by an accountant. The report was submitted on 20 February 1995.

7. On an unspecified date M.J. submitted additional documents that were later included in the expert’s report. The applicant complained before the district court that M.J. forged the documents and that the expert report should be rejected.

8. As a result of the allegations, the prosecution service opened criminal proceedings against M.J.

9. On 30 April 1996 the Radom District Court stayed the civil proceedings for the dissolution of co-ownership and the division of its property pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings against M.J.

10. The criminal proceedings against M.J. were terminated on 14 December 2001 by a final judgment of the Radom Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). M.J. was found guilty of submitting forged documents to the court in the civil proceedings in question.

11. On 16 May 2002 the applicant lodged a motion to resume the civil proceedings.

12. On 20 September 2002 the District Court resumed the proceedings. The case file received a new number (V GNs 3/02).

13. On 1 October 2003 a new expert report on expenses incurred by co‑owners of the association was submitted to the domestic court.

14. On 2 February 2004 the Radom District Court delivered a decision (postanowienie). The court granted the ownership of the property to M.J. and his spouse and ordered M.J. to pay the applicant and his wife an equivalent of their share in the property.

15. Both parties appealed. On 29 July 2004 the Radom Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case.

16. On 13 October 2005 the court allowed the applicant’s motion for another expert report on the evaluation of the property and the parties’ shares in the company. The report was submitted to the court on 25 July 2006.

17. On 28 November 2006 the Radom District Court delivered a second first‑instance decision, granting the ownership of the petrol station to M.J. and his spouse and ordered him to pay to the applicant and his wife an equivalent of their share in the property in ten instalments.

18. The applicant appealed. In the course of the appeal proceedings the applicant lodged a motion for an additional expert’s report. The report was submitted on 4 June 2007.

19. On 19 October 2007 the Radom Regional Court merely changed the wording of the decision of 28 November 2006 and dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s appeal.

20. On 28 May 2008 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) refused to examine the applicant’s cassation appeal.

B. Proceedings under Article 417 of the Civil Code (I C 241/09; I ACa 6/10)

21. On 16 February 2009 the applicant lodged a claim for damages under Article 417 of the Civil Code. He sought a finding that the State Treasury was liable for damage caused to him by the domestic courts which had conducted the civil proceedings in his case for an unreasonably long time. He further sought a payment of compensation for costs incurred during the impugned proceedings and for the loss of earnings.

22. On 21 October 2009 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s civil action.

23. The Regional Court found that the applicant’s claim fell to be examined under Article 417 of the Civil Code. It noted that section 16 of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”) explicitly provided that parties who had not lodged a complaint about the unreasonable length of proceedings under section 5 of the Act might claim compensation on the basis of Article 417 of the Civil Code after the relevant proceedings had ended. However, in the Regional Court’s view the applicant failed to prove that the unduly long procedure had been caused by the courts’ unlawful actions or omissions as required by Article 6 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, he failed to prove that the manner in which the courts had proceeded was flawed or was an effect of mismanagement or intentional failure on the part of the courts.

24. The first-instance court admitted that the proceedings, taken out of the context of the case, had been long. However, the unusually complex character of the case, caused by the applicant’s and his partner’s lack of diligence in conducting their business, influenced the length of the proceedings. The court took into account the procedural activity of both parties as well as the fact that the trial had been stayed for over six years pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings against M.J. The court further noted that the applicant had filed a large number of procedural motions in the course of the proceedings, inter alia, a number of motions for expert reports to be prepared and a request to disqualify a judge.

25. The court dismissed the applicant’s claims for payment of compensation as unrelated to the proceedings and unsupported by evidence.

26. The applicant appealed. On 26 January 2010 the Lublin Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the applicant’s appeal.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

27. The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings, in particular the applicable provisions of the 2004 Act and of the Civil Code, are stated in the Court’s decisions in cases of Charzyński v. Poland, no. 15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V and Ratajczyk v. Poland, no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005‑VIII and the judgments in cases of Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§ 34‑46, ECHR 2005-V and Boszko v. Poland, no. 4054/03, §§ 21-24, 5 December 2006.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS

28. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

29. The Government contested that argument.

30. The Court notes that the proceedings commenced on 1 February 1993. However, the period to be taken into consideration began only on 1 May 1993, when the recognition by Poland of the right of individual petition took effect. Nevertheless, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state of proceedings at the time. The period in question ended on 28 May 2008. It has thus lasted fifteen years and one month at three levels of jurisdiction.

A. Admissibility

31. The Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies available to him under Polish law, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They maintained that the applicant had a possibility of seeking acceleration of the proceedings and compensation for the damage resulting from the excessive length of proceedings before Polish courts under section 5 of the 2004 Act. The Government also stressed that the applicant had lodged his civil claim for damages under Article 417 of the Civil Code only after he had lodged his complaint with the Court.

32. The applicant contested those arguments. He submitted that he had lodged a civil claim for damages under Article 417 of the Civil Code and thus exhausted available domestic remedy. The applicant acknowledged that although he had done so after introducing his application before the Court, this fact should be of no relevance since the remedy proved to be ineffective.

33. The 2004 Act provided the applicant with two remedies for the excessive length of the proceedings: an action under section 5 of the Act and a claim for damages under Article 417 of the Polish Civil Code referred to in section 16 of the Act.

34. The Court notes that at the time the applicant lodged his application with the Court, the main proceedings had already been terminated. Hence, the applicant could not have made use of section 5 of the 2004 Act. The applicant, however, lodged a claim for damages under Article 417 of the Civil Code. The Court has already examined that remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and found it effective in respect of complaints about the excessive length of judicial proceedings in Poland (see Krasuski v. Poland, cited above, §§ 65-72). The Court reiterates that it is well established in its case-law that an applicant must first make use of those domestic remedies which are likely to be effective and sufficient. When a remedy has been attempted, use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required (see Wójcik v. Poland, no. 26757/95, Commission decision of 7 July 1997, Decisions and Reports 90, p. 24, and Günaydin v. Turkey (dec.), no. 27526/95, 25 April 2002). In the light of the foregoing, the applicant was only required to lodge a claim for damages under Article 417 of the Civil Code.

35. As far as the Government stressed that the applicant had lodged his civil claim for damages after he had lodged his complaint with the Court, the Court notes that the proceedings under Article 417 of the Civil Code ended on 26 January 2010, thus before the Court had the opportunity to determine the issue of admissibility of the case (Karoussiotis v. Portugal, no. 23205/08, § 57, ECHR 2011). It follows that the applicant made a correct use of the available remedy for the unreasonable length of the proceedings and the Government’s objection should therefore be dismissed.

36. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

37. The Government submitted that the case was very complex on account of the quantity of evidence and the applicant’s conduct during the proceedings. While admitting that the proceedings might be considered lengthy, the Government argued that the complex nature of the case stemmed from the negligent conduct of the civil association owed by the applicant and M.J., the co-owner of the association. They stressed that the civil proceedings had been stayed for some six years and five months pending the outcome of criminal proceedings against M.J. for submitting forged documents in the main proceedings. They further submitted that on six occasions the hearings had been adjourned due to the applicant’s absence. Moreover, the applicant had made an extensive use of his procedural rights by lodging a number of procedural motions and twelve motions to adjourn the hearings.

38. The applicant contested those arguments. According to the applicant the domestic courts had failed to conduct the proceedings with due diligence. The applicant had not contributed to the length of the proceedings by making use of his procedural rights; on the contrary, he had lodged a number of motions for the proceedings to be accelerated.

39. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

40. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).

41. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. The Court notes, in particular, the overall length of the proceedings which amounted to over fifteen years for three levels of jurisdiction. It also cannot be said that the applicant abused his procedural rights; rather, by seeking a number of expert opinions he engaged in legitimate procedural activity in asserting his civil claim. The Court observes in this respect that a duty to administer justice expeditiously was incumbent on the national courts. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

42. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

43. The applicant claimed 60,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and 244,500 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately EUR 61,000) for pecuniary damage.

44. The Government contested these claims as groundless.

45. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 8,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

46. The applicant claimed PLN 71,270 (approximately EUR 17,000) for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.

47. The Government contested the claim.

48. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 900 for the proceedings before the Court and the sum of EUR 400 covering costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings concerning the excessive length of civil proceedings.

C. Default interest

49. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 8,000 (eight thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,300 (one thousand three hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 June 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Fatoş AracıGeorge Nicolaou
Deputy RegistrarPresident

Full & Egal Universal Law Academy