CASE OF HALIL ADEM HASAN v. BULGARIA

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF HALIL ADEM HASAN v. BULGARIA

(Application no. 4374/05)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

10 March 2015

FINAL

10/06/2015

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Halil Adem Hasan v. Bulgaria,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Guido Raimondi, President,
Päivi Hirvelä,
George Nicolaou,
Ledi Bianku,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
Faris Vehabović, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 17 February 2015,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 4374/05) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Bulgarian national, Mr Halil Adem Hasan (“the applicant”), on 2 December 2005.

2. The applicant was represented by Mrs S. Stefanova and Mr M. Ekimdjiev, lawyers practising in Plovdiv. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Ms M. Dimova and Ms M. Kotseva, from the Ministry of Justice.

3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that the conditions under the special regime in which he has been detained to serve his life imprisonment sentence amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

4. On 14 January 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1973. He is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment without commutation in Lovech Prison.

A. Civil proceedings for damages under the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 (the SMRDA) stemming from alleged unlawful detention (1991-95)

6. The applicant has been sentenced eleven times at the end of different sets of criminal proceedings. In 2002 the prosecutor discontinued as time-barred others, in which he had been detained during different periods in 1991, 1992 and 1995.

7. In August 2007 the applicant brought proceedings seeking compensation for his allegedly unlawful detention during the criminal proceedings against him which had been discontinued as time-barred in 2002 (see paragraph 6 above). His claim was dismissed by two levels of court in 2008. Referring to section 8 of interpretative decision No. 3 of 22 April 2004 of the Supreme Court of Cassation (see paragraph 43 below), the second-instance court held that State responsibility for damage could not be engaged as measures and steps taken before the expiration of the statute of limitations cannot be considered unlawful within the meaning of the SMRDA.

B. The applicant’s regime and conditions of detention as a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment

8. On 13 October 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery and murder and convicted to serve a cumulated punishment of life imprisonment without commutation on 26 October 2000.

9. The applicant was detained and served this punishment in the Lovech and Varna Prisons. He was in Lovech Prison between 17 January 2000 and 14 June 2002, between 12 August 2005 and 20 December 2006, and again as of 19 February 2009, where he continued to be at the time of the last information which the Court received from the Government in May 2011. He was detained in Varna Prison between 14 June 2002 and 12 August 2005, and again between 20 December 2006 and 19 February 2009.

1. Regime of detention

10. In both prisons and throughout this period the applicant was placed under the “special regime” and was kept in permanently locked cells with heightened security.

11. The applicant submitted that occasionally he had had to share his cell in Varna Prison with other inmates. According to the Government he was mostly kept alone in his cell in Lovech Prison; they did not provide information in respect of his cell in Varna Prison.

2. Sanitary facilities

(a) Toilets

12. According to the applicant the cells were not equipped with toilet facilities or taps and wash basins. He was allowed to use the common toilet and to wash his hands three times a day before meals. He had had to use a plastic bucket to relieve himself in his cell at all other times. Apart from the daily hourly walk in the open air, these had been the only times he had been allowed out of his cell.

13. The Government did not dispute that in respect of the period before the autumn of 2008, when works had been carried out in the special security wing in Lovech Prison and toilets and sinks had been installed in each of the cells of the prisoners serving sentences of life imprisonment. Likewise, the windows had been changed. The Government did not provide details in relation to sanitary facilities in Varna Prison. Referring to section 71(2) of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009 according to which persons placed under the special regime had to be kept in constantly locked cells and under heightened supervision, they explained that the “special regime” conditions did not allow unrestricted access to the toilet facilities.

(b) General hygiene

14. The applicant complained that he was allowed to shower only once a fortnight in Varna Prison. He further claimed that hygiene in the common areas was poor, with rats in the kitchen and the toilet.

15. The Government did not comment on conditions in Varna Prison but replied that the cells in Lovech Prison had been cleaned regularly. During the period between 31 May 2004 and 7 June 2004 three checks had been carried out in Lovech Prison by the deputy prison director and medical staff who reported a satisfactory situation. The Government further stressed that the applicant had been provided with 0,2 kg of soap for personal hygiene and 0,25 kg of soap for washing his clothes every month.

3. Food and medication

16. The applicant submitted that the food served in the prisons was of poor quality and that the cells were too cold in winter, too hot in summer, damp and lacking in ventilation.

17. The Government responded that the food was certified for its good quality and was prepared and supervised by a qualified cook. The weekly menu was put together by the prison cook and approved by the prison director, by medical personnel and by a prison administrator. Life prisoners received their food in their cells. When the applicant had refused to eat pork because of his religious convictions, he had been given grilled veal sausages with different side dishes. He had been provided with about 2620 calories a day.

18. The applicant further claimed that medical services were insufficient. In this regard the Government replied that prisoners serving life sentences were subject to periodical medical checks, which took place in their cells for security reasons. If they needed to be examined by outside medical personnel, they were taken to the prison medical centre. The inmates received any medication they needed from the prison’s pharmacy and could purchase different medicines from external pharmacies once a prescription had been issued. All cases requiring urgent intervention were treated without delay.

4. Occupational activities

19. The applicant claimed that he had been offered no opportunity for social contact or other occupational activities while serving his sentence of life imprisonment.

20. Without specifying any particular period of time, frequency or duration, the Government submitted that the applicant had been given the opportunity to take part in cultural and intellectual activities in Lovech Prison. He could order and receive books from the prison library which were taken to his cell. He could read a daily national and two local newspapers. The Government also submitted that the applicant could play chess and participate in essay competitions organised in the prison, to the extent to which the regime of inmates serving life-imprisonment sentences permitted.

C. First set of proceedings for damages under the SMRDA in connection with the conditions of detention

21. On 27 October 2005 the applicant brought proceedings under the SMRDA seeking BGN 25,000 in compensation for the distress and humiliation suffered during the period between 26 October 2000 and 26 October 2005 as a result of the poor conditions of detention in the prisons in Lovech and Varna, as well as of the periods of disciplinary sanctions enforced in cells lacking beds, linen, tables and chairs for a total of 40 days in the same period.

22. In their decision of 8 May 2006 the court found that the applicant, like the other inmates serving life sentences under the “special regime”, had had to use a bucket in the cell for toilet needs. Life prisoners had only been let out of their cells three times a day when they were allowed to use the communal toilets and wash the buckets; during the rest of the time they had to relieve themselves in the cells in front of other inmates. The court concluded that the humiliation of having to use a bucket for one’s physiological needs could only be justified with security reasons. As the Government had failed to produce evidence that there had been a real and serious risk to security in the applicant’s case, the restrictions applied to his access to a toilet had been excessive and beyond the ones inherent to deprivation of liberty. The court awarded the applicant BGN 200 (approximately EUR 100) in damages suffered as a result of detention in inhuman and degrading material conditions – absence of toilet facilities, bed, linen, table and chair, access of light and fresh air caused by inaction of the respondent party in the period 26 October 2000 – 26 October 2005. The applicant was required to pay court fees at the amount of BGN 992 for the remaining part of his claim.

23. Upon an appeal by both parties, on 28 December 2006 the Veliko Turnovo Appellate Court quashed the judgment and dismissed the claim. The court found in particular that the applicant’s “special regime” required heightened security arrangements and constantly locked cells, which made it impossible to allow access to the communal toilet at night. However, he had access to the toilet during the day-time slots allowed for that and it had not been established that the prison guards had prevented him from visiting the toilet then. While serving such a punishment was no doubt characterized by negative and unfavourable effects, the circumstances of the case did not attract the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and the prison authorities under the SMRDA since the enforcement of a punishment could not be considered as exercising administrative activities or as unlawful action or inaction within the meaning of Article 1 of this law. According to the appellate court the responsibility of the State for the alleged suffering could be engaged before other unspecified bodies and proceedings.

24. In a final decision no. 666/08 of 26 May 2008 issued in case no. 1685/2008, the Supreme Court of Cassation accepted that the Ministry of Justice and the prison authorities were the state bodies responsible for the execution of sentences and were therefore liable under the SMRDA for any damage caused in connection with it. It was notorious that the conditions in the Bulgarian prisons were not up to European standards, but these conditions were the same for all inmates. The execution of sentences was in itself accompanied by considerable restrictions associated with deprivation of liberty and the various regimes, especially by the “special regime” as compared to the others, and even more in placement in isolation cells as a disciplinary sanction for offences. In examining such complaints the courts had to take into account and strike the necessary balance between the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment as set by the Constitution and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 3 of the Convention, and the inevitable suffering inherent to deprivation of liberty. The court acknowledged the degrading effect of using buckets in the presence of other prisoners, but also took into account the necessity to ensure security and discipline in accordance with the requirements of the “special regime” served in this department of the prison as well as the personalities and specific conduct of prisoners. In striking this balance in the particular case, the Supreme Court of Cassation found that the applicant’s suffering did not go beyond the level of due respect to his dignity and did not require any compensation.

D. Second set of proceedings for damages under the SMRDA in connection with the conditions of detention

25. On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant brought another set of proceedings under the SMRDA seeking BGN 11,000 in compensation for damages suffered as a result of the application of the “special regime”, which excluded him from labour, educational, cultural and sport activities, during the periods 17 January 2000 – 14 June 2002 and 12 August 2005 – 20 December 2006, when he was in Lovech Prison; as well as 14 June 2002 – 12 August 2005 and after 20 December 2006, when he was in Varna Prison and with the exception of the time between 14 July 2002 and 12 August 2005 when he had been allowed to see a psychologist and take part in educational activities once a week, as well as to play table-tennis for 45 minutes on Fridays.

26. In a final judgment of 23 February 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the appellate court’s findings rejecting the applicant’s claim. In particular it observed that the lower (Veliko Turnovo Appellate) court:

“...established an absence of unlawful conduct by representatives of the prison administration leading to the applicant suffering damage. The applicant is serving his sentence under the ‘special regime’ in accordance with section 127b of the Execution of Punishments Act 1969 [the 1969 Act]. Under section 127d in conjunction with section 127a of the 1969 Act the sentence of life imprisonment without commutation is implemented either in separate prisons or in special sections of the regular prisons. According to section 167g of the regulations for the implementation of the 1969 Act life prisoners are placed in permanently locked cells under heightened security. Only after a decision of the commission under section 17 of the 1969 Act can those prisoners be accommodated in cells together with prisoners serving different sentences and can they take part in joint sport, work, educational or other activities. The lower court concluded on the basis of the legislation referred to above that the administration of Lovech and Varna Prisons cannot be said to have failed to act thus causing the applicant non-pecuniary damage. Admittedly, during the period in question the applicant did not take part in labour, educational or sport activities. However, that is explained with the type of regime under which he is serving his sentence and not with any unlawful conduct by the prison administration. The applicant has been involved in individual correctional activities; he had been allowed to spend an hour a day in the open air in a place furnished with sports equipment. As of February 2007, he has been allowed an additional hour for sport. Moreover, it has not been established that he has suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of the absence of labour, sport or cultural activities.”

27. The Supreme Court of Cassation concluded that:

“...the lower court rightly held that no unlawful failure to act by the prison administration had been established, contrary to the applicant’s allegations. In order to engage the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice under section 1 of the SMRDA for the prison administration’s alleged failure to act, it is necessary to establish that the lack of action was unlawful, in other words, that there existed an obligation to act and the administration failed to do so. The prison regime is stipulated in the 1969 Act. According to sections 43 and 127a of the 1969 Act, as well as to section 167g of the regulations for its implementation, inmates placed under the “special regime” are mandatorily kept apart from the rest of the prison population. The evidence in the file does not show that the prison administration has acted in breach of the legislative framework regulating the enforcement of the punishment given to the applicant. Mr Hasan refers to Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and to other relevant international instruments. However, the evidence gathered in his case does not show that he has been subjected to humiliation. The conditions under which he has been kept in prison are in conformity with the statutory requirements regulating the functioning of the places for deprivation of liberty.”

E. Alleged interference with the applicant’s correspondence

28. The applicant submitted that while he was in Varna Prison the entirety of his incoming and outgoing correspondence with his lawyer was subject to inspection in accordance with section 33(1)(c) of the 1969 Act.

29. He also claimed that the prison administration failed to deliver some of the letters to his mother because they were written in Turkish. He further stated that he could make telephone calls only to members of his family and not to his lawyer. Furthermore, he submitted that the visits by relatives and lawyers to him were held in special premises with a prison officer attending the meeting.

F. Alleged discriminatory treatment

30. The applicant, a Muslim of Turkish origin, claimed to have frequently been insulted on the basis of his ethnic origin and religious beliefs by the Varna prison authorities and in particular by J.V., one of the prison officers. In particular, the applicant claimed that the authorities had addressed him as “dirty Turk”, “gypsy” and other ethnically-based insults. He submitted declarations made by other prisoners in support of his statements concerning the discriminatory comments.

31. On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the district prosecutor of abuse of office by J.V. in relation to a search of the inmates’ cells. He also stated that J.V. had made discriminatory comments against him. By a final order of 23 February 2005 a prosecutor from the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office refused to open criminal proceedings against J.V. for abuse of office. As regards the alleged discriminatory insults, the prosecutor stated that they were not subject to public prosecution and that therefore the applicant should have brought a private criminal complaint before the courts.

32. Between 2006 and 2008 the applicant complained successfully under the Protection Against Discrimination Act on three occasions, alleging other type of discriminatory treatment in prison. In particular the courts found that he had been discriminated against by not having been given meals free from pork as required by his religious convictions; by having been made to put stamps on his letters to State institutions, when that had not been required from prisoners not serving life sentences; and, by having been shaved and had his hair trimmed in his cell, while prisoners with lighter sentences had access to the barber’s premises in the prison. The courts ordered the relevant authorities to discontinue the above discriminatory practices and, in the context of his claim about a failure to respect his religious convictions, to provide to him pork-free food.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS

A. Conditions of detention and correspondence in prison

33. The law relating to: (a) the detention regime of life prisoners; and, (b) prisoners’ claims for damages against the authorities was set out in detail in paragraphs 51-152 of the Court’s judgment in Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria (nos. 15018/11 and 61199/12, 8 July 2014).

34. The law relating to prisoners’ correspondence was set out in paragraphs 153-156 of the Court’s judgment in Harakchiev and Tolumov, (cited above).

35. The relevant parts of the general reports of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CPT”) and of its report on its visit to Bulgaria in 2010 and 2012, both of which included a visit to Varna Prison, have been set out in paragraphs 165-166 and paragraphs 171-174 of the Court’s judgment in Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above. In its report on its April 2014 visit to Bulgaria, published on 29 January 2015, the CPT reiterated its earlier findings and recommendations in relation to the legal framework and general state of prisons in Bulgaria, including the regime and conditions applicable to life prisoners. It pointed out in particular that the regime for life-sentenced prisoners in Bulgaria had to be fundamentally reviewed, so as to include a structured programme of constructive and preferably out-of-cell communal activities, including access to work and education. Educators and psychologists had to be proactive in working with life-sentenced prisoners to encourage them to take part in that programme and attempt to engage them safely with other prisoners for at least a part of each day.

B. Protection against Discrimination

1. General prohibition of discrimination

36. Section 4 of the Protection Against Discrimination Act 2003, which came into force on 1 January 2004, prohibits any direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, human genome, citizenship, origin, religion or belief, education, convictions, political affiliation, personal or social status, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, property status, or on any other grounds established by law or by an international treaty to which Bulgaria is party.

2. Commission for Protection Against Discrimination

37. The authority responsible for ensuring compliance with the Act and with other statutes containing equal‑treatment provisions is the Commission for Protection Against Discrimination (section 40).

38. Section 47 empowers the Commission to, inter alia, make recommendations for the enactment, repeal or amendment of statutes and regulations (subsection 8).

3. Liability for acts of discrimination

39. Under section 71(1) of the Act, a person who considers that his or her right to equal treatment stemming from the Act or from other statutes has been violated can bring a claim, seeking declaratory or injunctive relief or an award of damages.

40. Under section 73 of the Act, a person who considers that an administrative decision has breached his or her right to equal treatment stemming from the Act or from other statutes can seek judicial review of the decision.

41. Under section 74(1) of the Act, a person who has obtained a favourable ruling by the Commission for Protection Against Discrimination and seeks compensation for damage suffered as a result of the violation of his or her right to equal treatment stemming from the Act or from other statutes can bring a tort claim against the persons or authorities that have caused the damage. If the damage stems from unlawful decisions, actions or omissions of State authorities or officials, the claim must be brought under the State Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 (section 74(2)).

C. Relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006

42. Article 250 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 (“the 2006 Code”), which came into effect on 1 March 2007, provides that any person who has the requisite legal interest may request the cessation of acts carried out by an administrative authority or a public official that have no basis in the law or in an administrative decision. The request is to be made to the competent administrative court, which has to deal with it immediately and, having made the necessary inquiries, rule forthwith. The court’s decision is subject to appeal, which does not have suspensive effect (Article 254 §§ 1 and 2). In addition, Article 290 of the 2006 Code regulates the enforcement of administrative court judgments vis-à-vis an administrative official obliged in a court judgment to deliver a non-substitutable action. If the responsible official fails to act, the bailiff imposes on him or her weekly pecuniary sanctions (изпълнителна глоба), in the amount of between BGN 50 and BGN 1200, for so long as the act remains uncompleted. The bailiff’s decisions, actions or failure to act can be challenged before the administrative court (Article 294 of the Code). If the administrative court quashes a bailiff’s decision or action, or declares unlawful his or her failure to act, the court either decides the matter itself or orders the bailiff to act within a deadline it determines for it. Also, according to Article 269 § 2 of the 2006 Code, monetary judgment debts are collected on the basis of the Code of Civil Procedure 2007 under which a writ of enforcement is a condition for starting enforcement proceedings. Finally, according to Article 276 § 2 of the 2006 Code, compulsory execution can be started on the basis of a request by the individual to the bailiff, accompanied by a copy of the enforcement title which can be a final judgment in the individual’s favour.

D. Interpretative decision No. 3 of 2004 of the Supreme Court of Cassation

43. The Supreme Court of Cassation held in section 8 of its interpretative decision No. 3 of 22 April 2004 that procedural steps which had been taken before the expiration of the statute of limitations or the amnesty in respect of the crime did not constitute an entitlement to compensation, because they were lawful at the time. More specifically it held that: “...the fact that the statute of limitations, which excludes criminal liability, expired and that afterwards the legislator decided that the criminal character of the actions should be erased and that the guilty perpetrators should be excluded from criminal liability and from the consequences of the conviction, does not entitle them to compensation for damage suffered before the expiration of the statute of limitations or before the amnesty.”

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

44. The applicant complained that the conditions, in which he served his punishment under the “special regime” in Lovech and Varna Prisons amounted to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

45. The Government contested the applicant’s allegations.

A. Admissibility

46. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

47. The applicant reiterated his complaints that the conditions in which he had been detained under the “special regime” in Lovech and Varna Prisons breached his right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. Apart from the material aspects of the conditions which he claimed were inadequate, he emphasised that he had been mostly kept in isolation in his cell and was not engaged in any meaningful activities.

48. The Government contended that the conditions under the “special regime” in which the applicant had been detained in both prisons had been applied in accordance with section 167d(1) of the regulations for the implementation of the 1969 Act, and subsequently with section 213 of the newly adopted regulations for the implementation of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009. They also made detailed submissions in respect of the material conditions in which the applicant had been detained in Lovech Prison but not in respect of the conditions in Varna Prison. As regards Lovech Prison, they emphasised that the use of buckets as a toilet had been found by the Court to be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention only in cases where the applicants had had to relieve themselves in front of other inmates. Given that the applicant in the present case had been locked alone in a cell under the “special regime” for practically the whole period of his detention, he could not claim to be affected by a breach of Article 3 in that respect. They further asserted that a breach of Article 3 of the Convention could only be established if the treatment to which an applicant had been subjected reached the minimum level of severity. This had not been the case, given that the authorities had not aimed at humiliating or debasing the applicant, nor had he shown that his suffering went beyond the inevitable inconvenience of serving a prison sentence. This was true both in respect of the material conditions in which the applicant had been detained and in respect of the restrictions which he had to endure as part of the “special regime”.

2. The Court’s assessment

49. The Court has set out the applicable general principles laid down in the Court’s case-law in paragraphs 199-202 of Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above.

50. More specifically as regards toilet facilities in prisons, the Court has consistently criticised the use of buckets in the absence of in-cell toilet facilities (see, among other authorities, Kehayov v. Bulgaria, no. 41035/98, § 71, 18 January 2005; I.I. v. Bulgaria, no. 44082/98, § 75, 9 June 2005; Iovchev v. Bulgaria, no. 41211/98, § 134, 2 February 2006; Yordanov v. Bulgaria, no. 56856/00, § 94, 10 August 2006; Dobrev v. Bulgaria, no. 55389/00, § 129, 10 August 2006; Malechkov v. Bulgaria, no. 57830/00, § 140, 28 June 2007; Kostadinov v. Bulgaria, no. 55712/00, § 61, 7 February 2008; Gavazov v. Bulgaria, no. 54659/00, § 108, 6 March 2008; Radkov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 18382/05, §§ 48-49, 10 February 2011; Shahanov v. Bulgaria, no. 16391/05, § 53, 10 January 2012; Sabev v. Bulgaria, no. 27887/06, § 99, 28 May 2013; and Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, § 211).

51. In respect of activities offered to prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment, the Court notes that both under the Execution of Punishments Act 1969 and under the subsequent Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009 which superseded it, after five years of imprisonment in execution of their sentence life prisoners could be placed by a special commission under a lighter regime, if they were of good conduct (see Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, § 116). Once placed under a lighter regime, a life prisoner could - by decision of the same commission on the basis of a personality assessment - be housed with the general prison population and allowed to take part in common work, training, educational activities, sport or other activities (see Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, § 121).

52. As regards the effects of isolation on the prisoner’s personality, the Court recalls that all forms of solitary confinement without appropriate mental and physical stimulation are likely, in the long term, to have damaging effects, resulting in deterioration of mental faculties and social abilities (see Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, § 204). Also, the automatic segregation of life prisoners from the rest of the prison population and from each other, in particular where no comprehensive out-of-cell activities or in-cell stimulus are available, may in itself raise an issue under Article 3 of the Convention (see Savičs, cited above, § 139), and the isolation should be justified by particular security reasons (see Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, § 204 with further references to soft-law instruments and the repeated emphasis in CPT reports on the need to assess life prisoners’ dangerousness on a case-by-case basis there being no justification for indiscriminately applying restrictions to all prisoners subject to a specific type of sentence).

53. Turning to the present, case the Court notes that it has not been disputed that the applicant remained in a permanently locked cell, isolated from the rest of the prison population and subjected to special security arrangements in accordance with the “special regime” applied to him throughout the entire period after his incarceration in 2000 for serving his life sentence (see paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 above). This regime did not involve or allow meaningful activities and was considered lawful within the meaning of the domestic legislation (see paragraph 27 above). Furthermore, the limited possibilities for outdoor exercise and reasonable activities were confirmed by the domestic courts’ findings in the applicant’s case at least for the period up to the year 2007 (see paragraph 26 above). The Court recalls in this connection that a short duration of outdoor exercise limited to one hour a day is a factor that further exacerbates the situation of a prisoner confined to his cell for the rest of the time (see, among other authorities, Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, § 208).

54. In the present case, the domestic courts established that as of February 2007 the applicant has been allowed an additional hour a day for sport (see paragraph 26 above). Apart from that, and from the possibility for him to receive books and newspapers from the prison library in his cell, to play chess and take part in essay competitions in so far as the “special regime” of permanently locked cells permitted, the Government have not demonstrated that the relevant competent bodies (namely the special commissions referred to in Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, §§ 116 and 121) considered the possibilities for involvement of the applicant in other reasonable activities with other prisoners. Indeed, the Court was not informed of any periodic assessment of the applicant’s situation by the special commission with a view to allowing him some meaningful activities.

55. The Government have not sought to invoke convincing security reasons requiring the applicant’s isolation and have not said why it was not possible to revise his regime so as to permit adequate possibilities for human contact and meaningful occupation outside the cell. It appears also that this situation is to a great extent a result of the automatic application of the legal provisions regulating the applicant’s prison regime. In its recent judgment in Harakchiev and Tolumov (cited above, §§ 203-09), the Court found that such automatic isolation, in application of the relevant provisions of the Execution of Punishments Act 1969 and later of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009, as well as the regulations for their application, was in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. It sees no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.

56. In addition, in terms of the material conditions of the applicant’s detention, the Court notes in particular the lack of unrestricted access to a toilet during a prolonged period of time and the fact that the applicant had no other choice but to relieve himself in a bucket in his cell outside the time-slots allowed by the prison administration for visits to the communal toilet. The Court notes that the Government accepted this to have been the case before the autumn of 2008 when they submitted the situation had changed in Lovech Prison, as toilets and sinks were built in the cells of prisoners serving life sentences (see paragraph 13 above). Notably, the Government argued that this circumstance was not debasing for the applicant, given that he was alone in his cell. The Court observes, however, that the domestic courts’ findings confirmed that during the period examined in the domestic proceedings the cells were inhabited also by other prisoners (see paragraphs 22 and 24 above).

57. Furthermore, although the Government did not make submissions in respect of the conditions in Varna Prison, the CPT reports on its two visits to life prisoners in Varna Prison in 2010 and 2012 indicate, among other things, that no toilets were available in the cells of the life prisoners (see paragraph 35 above). The latter were only allowed out of their cells to use the common toilet three times a day and had to relieve themselves in buckets the rest of the time. It notes that the applicant was transferred from Varna Prison to Lovech Prison on 19 February 2009 and that until that point in time he did not benefit from a cell equipped with a toilet and sink, and had to use a bucket. Even assuming that for certain periods of time the applicant was accommodated alone in a cell, the Court has already held that subjecting a detainee to the prolonged inconvenience of having to relieve himself or herself in a bucket cannot be deemed warranted, except in specific situations where allowing visits to the sanitary facilities would pose concrete and serious security risks (see Malechkov, cited above, § 140). In the present case the Government did not invoke any such risks to justify the need for the applicant to use a bucket to relieve himself during the period before 19 February 2009. In the absence of specific evidence to confirm or dispel the applicant’s dangerousness so as to justify the prolonged necessity of the his isolation under the “special regime” conditions of detention, the Court is unable to agree that the conditions, in which the applicant was held were compliant with Article 3 (see Manolov, cited above, § 42).

58. Taking into account the cumulative effect of the above conditions, regardless of whether they flowed from the applicable regulatory framework or from its practical implementation, as well as the period of the applicant’s detention – about twelve and a half years at the present time –, the Court considers that the distress and hardship endured by him exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and went beyond the minimum threshold of severity required by Article 3 of the Convention (see Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, § 212).

59. In those circumstances, even accepting that the applicant’s allegations of inadequate ventilation, heating, hygiene, food and medical care in Lovech Prison have not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the Court considers that the prison regime under which he has been detained in both prisons, taken together with the material conditions throughout his detention in Varna Prison and the lack of unrestricted access to toilet facilities in Lovech Prison before 20 December 2006, were serious enough to be qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment (see Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, § 213).

60. There has therefore been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 IN CONJUNCTION WTH ARTICLE 3

61. The applicant complained that he did not have effective domestic remedies in respect of his grievance under Article 3 of the Convention in relation to the regime and conditions of his detention. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A. Admissibility

62. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

63. The Government submitted that a claim for damages under the SMRDA was an effective remedy which the applicant had used. The fact that the domestic courts had not awarded damages in the proceedings he had brought had only been the result of his not being able to prove that he had suffered any damage.

64. The Applicant pointed out that he had brought claims under the SMRDA, yet they had been clearly unsuccessful.

2. The Court’s assessment

65. In its well-established case-law, the Court has held that claims for damages can only be regarded as an effective domestic remedy in respect of allegedly poor conditions of detention if the applicant has been released or placed in Article 3-compliant conditions (see Iliev and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 4473/02 and 34138/04, §§ 55-56 and 68, 10 February 2011; Radkov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 18382/05, §§ 53 and 58, 10 February 2011; Iordan Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 22926/04, §§ 171-72, 24 January 2012; Chervenkov v. Bulgaria, no. 45358/04, §§ 55, 57 and 58, 27 November 2012; Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, §§ 222-25; Manolov, cited above, § 35). As in the cases mentioned above, the applicant is still incarcerated and it does not appear that, except with respect to the toilets or cell windows, the conditions of his detention – in particular, his very restrictive prison regime – have significantly changed in recent years (see paragraphs 10, 20, 26 and 27 above). A claim for damages under section 1 of the SMRDA is therefore, on its own, not capable of providing the applicant adequate relief. Moreover, such a claim, in so far as directed against conditions of incarceration that flow from the prison regime applicable to the applicant, does not stand high prospect of success, given that the Bulgarian courts have already dismissed such claims on the basis that such conditions were not unlawful within the meaning of the domestic law (see Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, § 226). Indeed, that is what happened in one of the cases brought by the applicant seeking damages for the conditions and regime in which he had been detained (see paragraphs 27-28 above). Furthermore, it seems that the proceedings instituted by the applicant involved separate examination of the various aspects of his situation and for this reason failed to take into account whether their cumulative effect on him was compliant with Article 3 so as to afford redress where appropriate as required by Article 13 of the Convention.

66. In the light of the above, the Court finds that the applicant did not have an effective domestic remedy in respect of his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention concerning the conditions and regime in which he had been detained to serve his life-imprisonment sentence. There has therefore been a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

67. The applicant complained about having been discriminated against by the demeaning and racially insulting remarks made in his respect by a prison guard in Varna Prison. He relied on Article 14 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

68. The Government contested that allegation.

A. The parties’ submissions

69. The Government asserted that a claim under the Anti-Discrimination Act (see paragraphs 36-41 above) was an effective remedy and that the applicant failed to bring such proceedings in relation to his allegations of having been subjected to discriminatory remarks.

70. The applicant submitted that a claim under the Anti-Discrimination Act was not an effective remedy, given that, even if such a claim were successful in court, there was no possibility for its compulsory execution, especially in its part where the court ordered the administrative body to discontinue the discriminatory treatment. He referred in support to one unrelated case where the victim, an individual who was not serving a prison sentence, managed to obtain a writ of enforcement in relation to the award of monetary compensation, but not in relation to the court’s order to the administrative body to discontinue the discriminatory treatment.

B. The Court’s assessment

71. The Court notes that, by bringing a claim under the Anti-Discrimination Act, the applicant could seek a three-fold result, namely: (a) recognition by the court that discriminatory treatment had taken place; (b) an order by the court to the administrative body to discontinue such treatment, where relevant; and, (c) an award of compensation (see paragraphs 36-41 above). Such a mechanism, therefore, could in principle represent an effective remedy in cases where individuals complain of discriminatory treatment and the applicant failed to resort to it in the context of his complaint about suffering racially demeaning insults. The Court then observes that the applicant used this remedy successfully on three occasions when he lodged discrimination claims complaining about other type of discriminatory treatment in prison (see paragraph 32 above). He obtained final judgments in his favour and did not claim that any of them had remained unenforced. The Court therefore finds premature a complaint about inefficient enforcement of a final judgment in relation to the alleged discriminatory remarks as the applicant has not obtained such a judgment.

72. The Court further observes that, in support of his argument about the ineffectiveness of a discrimination claim because of the impossibility to enforce it, the applicant submitted to the Court a single writ of enforcement relating to one domestic case brought by a third party. It cannot be said that one case is representative of a general practice. The Court further notes that according to the 2006 Code, monetary judgment debts are collected on the basis of the Code of Civil Procedure 2007 under which a writ of enforcement is a condition for starting enforcement proceedings (see paragraph 42 above). It is not evident from the information in the file whether the individual asked the court to issue a writ in respect of the mayor’s obligation to discontinue the discriminatory treatment and, if so, what the court’s reply to that request was. In any event, the Court notes that forced enforcement can be started on the basis of a request by the individual to the bailiff, accompanied by a copy of the enforcement title which can be a final judgment in the individual’s favour (see paragraph 42 above). Therefore, a writ of enforcement is not an absolute condition for starting enforcement proceedings in administrative cases as regards obligations other than monetary payments.

73. The Court notes that once enforcement proceedings have started in respect of non-substitutable action owed by an administrative body, if the latter fails to act in order to enforce the judgment, the bailiff can impose on him or her weekly fines until enforcement. If the bailiff fails to act, the applicant can challenge that omission in court (see paragraph 42 above). Consequently, it could not be said that the mechanism described above is ineffective, especially without having attempted it.

74. It is true that not only administrative but also civil courts tend to examine discrimination claims under the Anti-Discrimination Act and in civil cases a writ of enforcement is accepted in the theory and practice as a condition for starting forced enforcement. The Court observes that, in the hypothetical scenario whereby a partial writ of enforcement were to be issued following a successful civil court judgment in a discrimination claim brought by the applicant, under domestic legislation the applicant would have 14 days to challenge in court the writ if he considered it incomplete (Article 407 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

75. Finally, the Court notes that, in principle, it is open to the applicant to bring a claim under Article 250 of the 2006 Code, seeking from the courts a prohibitory injunction against an unlawful act of the prison authorities (see paragraph 42 above).

76. In view of the above, the Court finds that the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies in connection with his complaint of having been subjected to discriminatory insults, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and that this complaint must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

77. The applicant further complained that the prison authorities had been monitoring his correspondence systematically. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, ...

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

78. The Government submitted that the prison authorities had been monitoring the applicant’s correspondence until 15 April 2009. That had been done on the basis of the relevant law, namely section 33(1)(c) of the 1969 Act. This, they claimed, did not breach the applicant’s right to private life, given that the control of his correspondence had been carried out pursuant to the applicable legislation and was discontinued when the law was repealed in 2009.

79. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

80. The Court recalls its findings in the case of Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 15197/02, § 44, 22 May 2008, namely that the systematic interception of prisoners’ correspondence, including to and from his or her lawyer, provided for in section 33(1)(c) of the 1969 Act could not be considered “necessary in a democratic society” and was in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. In the present case the Government submitted that the applicant’s correspondence had been controlled in accordance with same legal provision, as from the time he had started serving his life sentence in 2000 until 15 April 2009 when the inspection of his letters had been discontinued. The Court notes that apart from referring to the applicable legislation the Government have not sought to further justify the monitoring of the applicant’s correspondence. It also notes that as of February 2010 prisoners’ correspondence has been governed by the regulations for the application of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009. It recalls in that connection that it has found in its earlier case-law no basis on which to assume that prisoners’ correspondence after February 2010 has been systematically intercepted and read by the prison authorities (see Bochev v. Bulgaria, no. 73481/01, § 94, 13 November 2008; and Harakchiev and Toloumov, cited above, § 275).

81. Accordingly, the Court finds that in respect of the period between 2000 when the applicant started serving his life sentence and 15 April 2009 there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the systematic monitoring of the applicant’s correspondence.

V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 IN THE CONTEXT OF THE APPLICANT’S CORRESPONDENCE IN PRISON

82. In addition, relying on Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, he complained that he did not have an effective remedy to challenge the monitoring of his correspondence. Article 13 of the Convention provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

83. The Court observes that the monitoring of the applicant’s correspondence in prison did not result from an individual decision of the prison administration or another authority but was systematic and directly resulting from the application of the express wording of the law. It recalls that it has earlier held that Article 13 of the Convention does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State’s primary legislation to be challenged before a national authority on grounds that it is contrary to the Convention (see Petrov, cited above, § 65). It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

VI. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

A. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

84. The applicant further claimed a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention because the domestic courts in the proceedings for damages in connection with his unlawful detention did not award him compensation (see paragraph 7 above). Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

...”

85. The Court reiterates that this provision protects “possessions”, which can be either “existing possessions” or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. It does not, however, guarantee the right to acquire property (see J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44302/02, § 61, ECHR 2007-...; Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004-IX). Furthermore, the Court has held that a judgment debt which is sufficiently established to be enforceable constitutes a “possession” (see Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, § 59; Burdov v. Russia, § 40; and Kotov v. Russia [GC], § 90).

86. The Court then notes that the applicant’s claim for damages was not allowed by the national courts (see paragraph 7 above); therefore, the applicant cannot claim to have had a legitimate expectation to be granted compensation for the damage he alleged he had suffered. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

B. Alleged violations in the context of the proceedings for damages in connection with alleged unlawful detention

87. The applicant further complained under Articles 6 § 2 and 13. He claimed that, by referring to an interpretative decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation (see paragraph 7 above), the civil court which refused in 2008 to award him compensation for past alleged unlawful detention breached his presumption of innocence. Article 6 § 2 of the Convention provides:

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

88. The Court notes that, as expressly stated in the terms of the Article itself, Article 6 § 2 applies where a person is “charged with a criminal offence”. However, in keeping with the need to ensure that the right guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 is practical and effective, the presumption of innocence also has another aspect. Its general aim, in this second aspect, is to protect individuals who have been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in respect of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities as though they are in fact guilty of the offence charged (see Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 25424/09, § 94, ECHR 2013). In that connection, the Court recalls that where criminal proceedings end prior to the formal indictment, irrespective of the ground for their discontinuation, the lack of a person’s criminal conviction shall as to the presumption of innocence be preserved in any other proceedings of whatever nature (see Vanjak v. Croatia, no. 29889/04, § 41, 14 January 2010; Šikić v. Croatia, no. 9143/08, § 47, 15 July 2010; Allen, cited above, § 102, ECHR 2013).

89. In the light of the above, assuming that Article 6 § 2 applies to the civil proceedings in which the applicant sought damages for unlawful detention during past criminal proceedings discontinued as time-barred (see paragraph 7 above), the Court finds that the sole application of a rule established in an interpretative decision cannot be equated with raising a suspicion about the applicant’s guilt (for the interpretative decision see paragraph 43 above). This is especially the case in the absence of any reasoning in the domestic court’s ruling suggesting or declaring the applicant’s guilt. Therefore, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

90. The applicant further complained under Article 14 in relation to Article 6 § 2 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the courts deprived him of compensation as a result of finding that he was not entitled to receive any as the proceedings against him were discontinued as time-barred. Thus, he claimed, he was discriminated against in comparison to those accused whose criminal proceedings had been discontinued on another ground which allowed them to receive compensation from the State.

91. The Court recalls that Article 14 does not prohibit distinctions in treatment which are founded on an objective assessment of essentially different factual circumstances (see Zarb Adami v. Malta, no. 17209/02, § 73, ECHR 2006‑VIII). It then notes that the proceeding against the applicant were terminated as time-barred while the proceedings against other accused were terminated on another ground, such as lack of evidence, lack of criminal conduct, etc. Thus the difference in treatment appears to have been based on an objective and reasonable assessment of essentially different factual circumstances. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and it must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

C. Other alleged violations

92. Relying on Article 14 the applicant complained that the prison authorities had failed to send some of his letters to his mother because they were written in the Turkish language. Finally, he complained under Article 34 of the Convention that the interference with his correspondence with his lawyer, the impossibility of making telephone calls and the presence of a police officer at the meetings hindered his submission of an application to the Court.

93. In the light of the material submitted before it, the Court finds that the applicant’s claims are devoid of any convincing corroboration and are generally unsubstantiated. Accordingly, they are manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible.

VII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

94. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

95. The applicant claimed 55,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

96. The Government considered that this claim was excessive and unjustified.

97. The Court finds that the applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of the breach of Article 3 of the Convention in relation to the regime and conditions of his detention and of the breach of Article 13 in relation to the absence of an effective remedy in that connection, as well as a breach of Article 8 of the Convention in relation to the monitoring of his correspondence. Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, and ruling on an equitable basis as required under Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant EUR 4,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount (see, similarly, Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, § 286).

B. Costs and expenses

98. The applicant also claimed EUR 8,092 for the costs and expenses, of which EUR 7,840 for the legal fees incurred before the Court at the hourly rate of EUR 80, EUR 150 for postal and stationery expenses, and EUR 102 for translation costs from Bulgarian into French.

99. The Government submitted that the above claim was excessive and unjustified.

100. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, having regard to the materials in its possession and these considerations, the Court finds it reasonable to award the applicant the sums of EUR 1,000 in legal fees and EUR 102 in respect of translation costs, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him, to be paid to his legal representatives, Mr M. Ekimdzhiev and Ms S. Stefanova. With regard to the claims for postage and office supplies, the Court notes that the applicant has not submitted supporting documents showing that he has actually incurred those expenses. In those circumstances, and bearing in mind the terms of Rule 60 §§ 2 and 3 of its Rules, the Court makes no award in respect of these heads of claim.

C. Default interest

101. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaints about the conditions under which the applicant has been serving his life imprisonment sentence, the absence of an effective remedy in that connection and the monitoring of the his correspondence admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the regime and conditions of the applicant’s detention;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in relation to the lack of an effective domestic remedy in respect of the regime and conditions of the applicant’s detention;

4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in relation to the monitoring of the applicant’s correspondence;

5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 1,102 (one thousand one hundred and two euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid directly to the applicant’s legal representatives, Mr M. Ekimdzhiev and Ms S. Stefanova;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 March 2015, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Fatoş AracıGuido Raimondi
Deputy RegistrarPresident

Full & Egal Universal Law Academy