CASE OF H.G.D. v. SERBIA

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF H.G.D. v. SERBIA

(Application no. 3158/20)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

7 October 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of H.G.D. v. Serbia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Darian Pavli, President,
 Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,
 Mateja Đurović, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 3158/20) against the Republic of Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 12 December 2019 by an Iranian national, H.G.D. (“the applicant”), who was born in 1994, lives in Fischbach and was represented by Mr N. Kovačević, a lawyer practising in Belgrade;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Serbian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar;

the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed;

the decision to indicate interim measure to the respondent Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 16 September 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The case concerns several complaints under Article 5 of the Convention.

2.  On 31 October 2016 the applicant arrived at Belgrade airport on a flight from Istanbul. The border control authorities denied him entry to Serbia on the ground that he had attempted to use a falsified Israeli passport and ordered his immediate return to Istanbul on the next flight. The applicant refused. He was placed in the premises of the transit zone, reserved for persons not authorised to enter Serbian territory, pending his deportation to Turkey, in a room with no bed, sanitary facilities or heating. He was locked in at all times, and under the constant supervision of the border control authorities.

3.  The applicable legislation at that time did not provide for issuing a formal decision on the applicant’s detention or expulsion, and under domestic law the applicant’s confinement in the transit zone was not characterised as a deprivation of liberty.

4.  On 25 November 2016 the police issued a detention order in connection with charges brought against the applicant (the use of a falsified document), and the applicant was transferred to a detention room of the Border Police Directorate where he spent the next forty-eight hours. After this period, he was transferred to the Asylum Centre.

5.  On 27 December 2016 the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights lodged a constitutional complaint on the applicant’s behalf, complaining that his right to liberty and security was violated during his stay in the airport transit zone. On 21 May 2019 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that his stay in the transit zone was not considered a deprivation of liberty under the national law.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

6.  The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 1, 4 and 5 of the Convention that his stay at the transit zone constituted an arbitrary deprivation of liberty as he had been detained without being informed of the reasons of his detention, without being brought before a judicial authority and provided with an interpreter into his native tongue. He further alleged that his rights to challenge the lawfulness of his detention and to seek compensation had been violated.

7.  The general principles as regards the question of whether staying at airport international zones amounts to deprivation of liberty are set out in the case of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, § 217, 21 November 2019.

8.  As to whether Article 5 of the Convention applies to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant arrived at the Belgrade airport voluntarily, on a regular flight from Istanbul. It is therefore clear that the Serbian authorities were entitled to do the necessary verifications before deciding whether to admit him (compare Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 61411/15, 61420/15, 61427/15 and 3028/16, § 142, 21 November 2019). Under domestic law keeping a person in an airport transit zone did not amount to a deprivation of liberty and, therefore, no decision to that effect was adopted in respect of the applicant. Between 31 October and 25 November 2016, amounting to twenty-six days, the applicant was kept in the transit zone of the Belgrade airport, under constant supervision of the border control authorities. In these circumstances, the Court concludes that Article 5 is applicable to the applicant’s situation.

9.  The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

10.  The applicable general principles have been summarized in Z.A. and Others, cited above, §§ 159-61).

11.  The Government have not presented any laws which regulate detention of persons in the applicant’s situation. The Court cannot identify any provision or any reference to the possibility of detention in the transit zone nor any indication of the maximum duration of detention in the zone. Indeed, under domestic law applicable at the relevant time, confinement of persons in airports’ transit zones was not characterised as deprivation of liberty, as also concluded by the Constitutional Court in the applicant’s case. Accordingly, the Court concludes that in the present case there was no statutory basis, let alone one which was strictly defined, for the applicant’s detention (compare R.R. and Others v. Hungary, no. 36037/17, § 89, 2 March 2021, and Z.A. and Others, cited above, § 165).

12.  Furthermore, the Court has already held that keeping persons in detention without judicial authorisation or clear rules governing their situation was incompatible with the principles of legal certainty and the protection from arbitrariness, which are common threads throughout the Convention and the rule of law, and was incompatible with the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see R.R. and Others, cited above, § 91).

13.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

14.  The Government submitted that there was no procedure to challenge a foreigner’s confinement in an airport’s transit zone because such confinement was not considered a deprivation of liberty under domestic law.

15.  The Court reiterates its above finding that the applicant’s detention consisted of a de facto measure, not supported by any decision specifically addressing the issue of deprivation of liberty. The Court must therefore conclude that the applicant did not have at his disposal any proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention could have been decided speedily by a court (compare R.R. and Others, cited above, §§ 97 and 98).

16.  It follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

17.  The Government submitted that only persons deprived of their liberty had, under certain conditions, the right to compensation. Under domestic law, the applicant’s confinement in the transit zone was not considered a deprivation of liberty.

18.  Thus, the Court finds that the applicant did not have an enforceable right to compensation for the deprivation of liberty which has been found to be in violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (compare Nolan and K. v. Russia, no. 2512/04, § 104, 12 February 2009).

19.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention.

20.  The applicant also complained under Article 5 § 2 of the Convention that the border police officers spoke to him English of which he did not have sufficient knowledge to understand the reasons for his confinement at the Belgrade airport transit zone.

21.  The Court notes that the applicant attempted to enter Serbia with a falsified passport, of which he must have been aware. For that reason, he was denied entry into Serbia, and ordered to return to Istanbul on the next flight which he refused.

22.  In the Court’s view, these circumstances show that the applicant was sufficiently informed of the reasons for his confinement, and that he understood that information.

23.  It follows that the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 2 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

24.  The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 300 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

25.  The Government objected.

26.  The Court awards the applicant EUR 1,800 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

27.  Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 300 covering for costs and expenses for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 1,800 (one thousand eight hundred euros) plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 300 (three hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 October 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Olga Chernishova Darian Pavli
 Deputy Registrar President