Resolution DH (2000) 82
concerning the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
of 18 February 1999
in the case of Hood against the United Kingdom
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 29 May 2000
at the 709th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies)
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11 (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”),
Having regard to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Hood case delivered on 18 February 1999 and transmitted the same day to the Committee of Ministers under Article 46 of the Convention;
Recalling that the case originated in an application (No. 27267/95) against the United Kingdom, lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 18 April 1995 under Article 25 of the unamended Convention by Mr David Hood, a British national, and that the Commission declared admissible the complaints that he had not been brought promptly before a judge or another officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power, that he had had available to him no procedure complying with Article 5, paragraph 4, to challenge his continuing detention; that he had no enforceable right to compensation or effective domestic remedy in those respects and that he had been denied a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law;
Recalling that the case was brought before the Court by the Government of the United Kingdom on 14 August 1998;
Whereas in its judgment of 18 February 1999 the Court:
- held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 5, paragraph 3, of the Convention;
- held, unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 5, paragraph 4, of the Convention;
- held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 5, paragraph 5, of the Convention;
- held, unanimously, that it was not necessary also to consider the case under Article 13 of the Convention;
- held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention;
- held, by sixteen votes to one, that the present judgement constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant;
- held, unanimously, that the respondent State was to pay the applicant, within three months, 10 500 Pounds sterling inclusive of any value-added tax which may be chargeable in respect of costs and expenses and that simple interest at an annual rate of 7.5% would be payable on this sum from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement;
- dismissed, unanimously, the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction;
Having regard to the Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers concerning the application of Article 54 of the Convention which are, for the time being, applicable by analogy to cases under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention as amended by Protocol No. 11;
Having invited the Government of the respondent State to inform it of the measures which had been taken in consequence of the judgment of 18 February 1999, having regard to the United Kingdom’s obligation under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention to abide by it;
Whereas during the examination of the case by the Committee of Ministers, the Government of the respondent State gave the Committee information about the measures taken preventing new violations of the same kind as those found in the present judgment; this information appears in the appendix to this resolution;
Having satisfied itself that on 7 May 1999, within the time-limit set, the Government of the respondent State paid the applicant the sum provided for in the judgment of 18 February 1999,
Declares, after having taken note of the information supplied by the Government of the United Kingdom, that it has exercised its functions under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention in this case.
Appendix to Resolution DH (2000) 82
Information provided by the Government of the United Kingdom
during the examination of the Hood case
by the Committee of Ministers
The Government of the United Kingdom recalled that the provisions in the Army Act 1955, which set out the procedure for courts-martial, were amended by the Armed Forces Act 1996, which entered into force on 1 April 1997 (see Resolutions DH (98) 11 in the case of Coyne against the United Kingdom, Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 24 September 1997, and DH (98) 12 in the case of Findlay against the United Kingdom, Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 25 February 1997).
Under the new Act, the role of the convening officer has ceased to exist and its functions are henceforth divided amongst three different bodies: the “higher authority”, the “prosecuting authority” and “court administration officers”.
The deficiencies identified in the Army’s system of detention before trial have been remedied by Regulations 20 to 24 of the Investigation and Summary Dealing (Army) Regulations of 1997, which also came into force on 1 April 1997 (subsequent to the arrest and detention of the applicant). These regulations provide the procedure to be followed by the commanding officer when investigating a charge against an accused person or when deciding on the continued detention of an accused person. They also deal with review proceedings by higher authorities or by commanding officers.
In particular, Regulation 20 requires that, when a commanding officer investigates a charge against an accused person in accordance with Section 76 (1) of the Act, he shall have the accused brought before him and inform him whether he is to be detained under open or close arrest; of the reason why he is to be detained; that an officer of his choice shall, if available and willing to act, be appointed to assist him, and that if he does not so choose, or if the officer so chosen is unavailable, an officer shall be nominated to assist him, unless he states in writing that he does not wish the assistance of an officer; and that he may apply in writing to his commanding officer’s immediate higher authority giving his reasons why he believes he should be released from close arrest to open arrest, or from any form of arrest, asking a higher authority to review the decision to detain him in arrest.
Finally, a right of appeal against sentence, only before the (civilian) Courts-Martial Appeal Court, has been added to the existing right of appeal against conviction.
The Government of the United Kingdom is of the opinion that the measures adopted will prevent new violations similar to those found in this case and that, therefore, the United Kingdom has complied with its obligations under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention.
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