FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF KASANDYAK v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 66128/16)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18 June 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Kasandyak v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Andreas Zünd,
Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 66128/16) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 4 November 2016 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Volodymyr Vasylyovych Kasandyak (“the applicant”), who was born in 1967 and lives in Kyiv;
the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the denial of a practical opportunity to claim compensation at the domestic level to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, of the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 28 May 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the domestic courts’ refusal to examine the merits of the applicant’s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage on account of an unlawful delay in the processing of his pension documents by his former employer, a department of the Ministry of the Interior (hereinafter “the department”). The applicant complained of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
2. By a judgment of 1 March 2011, upheld on appeal and in cassation proceedings, the Circuit Administrative Court of Kyiv found the department liable for delays in processing the applicant’s pension documents.
Civil action against the department3. Relying on the judgment of 1 March 2011 and on Article 56 of the Constitution, in January 2013 the applicant brought a civil claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage against the department, initially seeking compensation in the amount of approximately 1,600 euros (EUR) and later increasing the amount of the claim to approximately EUR 4,800.
4. By a decision of the Kyiv Court of Appeal of 23 April 2013, the applicant’s claim was dismissed. Citing Article 1173 of the Civil Code and the Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court of 31 March 1995 on judicial practice in cases of compensation for psychological (non-pecuniary) damage (see paragraph 10 below), the appellate court noted that in such cases non-pecuniary damage had to be compensated by the State and not directly by the body that had caused the damage. Therefore, compensation claims under Article 1173 of the Civil Code had to be lodged against the State and the State Treasury had to be involved in the proceedings as a defendant, along with the relevant body.
5. The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal.
Civil action against the State6. In July 2013 the applicant lodged a similar civil claim against the State, indicating the State Treasury as the defendant. He increased the amount claimed to approximately EUR 10,000. In the proceedings, the department was involved as a third party.
7. The first-instance court ordered an expert examination to evaluate the psychological harm suffered by the applicant. The expert’s conclusion of 6 August 2014 confirmed that the applicant had suffered psychological harm because of the department’s unlawful inaction which had been established by the judgment of 1 March 2011 (see paragraph 2 above).
8. By a final decision of the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of 16 March 2016, the claim was dismissed, as the applicant had not proven that the State Treasury had caused any harm to him and he had lodged no claim against the Ministry of the Interior, whose subordinate body had been responsible for the damage alleged. Relying on point 10-1 of the Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court of 31 March 1995 (see paragraph 10 below), the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court held that the body responsible for the damage alleged should have been involved in the proceedings as a defendant, along with the State Treasury.
Relevant legal framework
9. Article 56 of the Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to compensation for damage caused by unlawful decisions, actions or omissions of public authorities. Article 1173 of the Civil Code was quoted in Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine (nos. 27849/15 and 33358/15, § 20, 24 October 2024).
10. The relevant part of the Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court of 31 March 1995 on judicial practice in cases of compensation for psychological (non-pecuniary) damage reads as follows:
“10-1. When examining cases concerning claims for compensation for non-pecuniary damage under Article 56 of the Constitution, courts shall keep in mind that if such damage was caused by unlawful decisions, actions or omissions of a State body, local authority [or] their officials or agents in the exercise of their powers, it should be compensated at the expense of the State or local authority. ... When considering cases concerning compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused to citizens by unlawful decisions, actions or omissions of a State body [or] its officials or agents, the relevant State body should be the defendant, if this is provided for in a specific law (for example, Article 9 of the Operational-Search Activities Act). If the specific law or other normative act does not call for [the relevant State body to be involved as defendant] or specifies that compensation is to be paid by the State, the court shall, alongside the relevant State body, involve the appropriate body of the State Treasury of Ukraine as defendant.”
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
11. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been denied a practical opportunity to claim compensation to which, as acknowledged by the domestic courts, he had been entitled.
Admissibility12. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as he had not lodged a cassation appeal in the proceedings against the department (see paragraph 5 above). They noted that the court of cassation had had the power to quash the appellate decision of 23 April 2013 and to remit the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration, proceedings in which the State Treasury could have been involved. The Government also argued that the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-founded, as, in the second set of civil proceedings, he had indicated the State Treasury as the sole defendant, whereas he should have also directed his claims against the Ministry of the Interior, the inaction of whose subordinate body had caused the damage to the applicant.
13. The Court considers that the Government’s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the substance of the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 and must therefore be joined to the merits.
14. The Court finds that the application is neither manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
Merits15. The Court notes that the applicant’s compensation claims in both sets of proceedings were dismissed essentially for his failure to identify the proper defendant. Thus, it must be examined whether the applicant was denied access to a court contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Kostadin Mihaylov v. Bulgaria, no. 17868/07, §§ 37-43, 27 March 2008, and Spasovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 45150/05, §§ 29-33, 10 June 2010).
16. The relevant general principles have been summarised in Kostadin Mihaylov (cited above, §§ 35-42) and Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania (no. 9718/03, §§ 68-76, 26 July 2011).
17. When a public entity is liable for damages, the State’s positive obligation to facilitate identification of the correct defendant is all the more important (see Dzirnis v. Latvia, no. 25082/05, § 93, 26 January 2017).
18. In the present case, the applicant obtained a judgment acknowledging the department’s liability in the delayed processing of his pension documents and an expert report confirming that he had sustained non-pecuniary damage as a result of that delay (see paragraphs 2 and 7 above). Following the appellate court’s instructions in the first set of proceedings (see paragraph 4 above), he instituted proceedings against the State (the second set), designating the State Treasury as the defendant.
19. It is true that the applicant did not additionally direct his second claim against the department, as required under domestic law and in accordance with the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court. However, the department, whose fault had been established by the final judgment of 1 March 2011 (see paragraph 2 above) was involved in the second set of compensation proceedings as a third party and was able to make submissions on all aspects of the case, including the issue of the damage alleged by the applicant.
20. Moreover, given the instructions contained in the appellate court’s decision of 23 April 2013 and the wording of point 10-1 of the Plenary Supreme Court’s Resolution of 31 March 1995 (see paragraphs 4 and 10 above), it might not have been entirely clear to the applicant that he was required to specifically indicate the department as a co-defendant in his second compensation claim. In this regard, the Court notes that it has previously found that Article 1173 of the Civil Code is couched in very general terms, leaving its practical application dependent on further clarification of the conditions to be met and the procedure to be followed in order to quantify and obtain such compensation (see, for instance, Drozdyk and Mikula, cited above, § 32, with further references).
21. The foregoing considerations lead the Court to conclude that the judicial decisions dismissing the applicant’s action in the second set of proceedings were excessively formalistic and, in effect, denied him practical and effective access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 96-99, 5 April 2018, with further references).
22. In these circumstances, the applicant cannot be reproached for not lodging a cassation appeal in the first set of proceedings. Therefore, the Government’s objection in respect of this issue, previously joined to the merits, must be dismissed.
23. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
24. The applicant claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
25. The Government contested that claim.
26. Judging on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,500, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Joins to the merits the Government’s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and dismisses it;Declares the application admissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 June 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Registrar President