FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF KAŠČÁK v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no. 280/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
30 November 2010
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Kaščák v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Lech Garlicki, President,
Ján Šikuta,
Vincent Anthony de Gaetano, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 9 November 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 280/06) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Ján Kaščák (“the applicant”), on 19 December 2005.
2. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.
3. On 7 February 2008 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol no. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Prešov.
5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
6. On 23 March 2000 the applicant claimed a sum of money before the Prešov District Court.
7. On 5 April 2001 the District Court issued a payment order in summary proceedings. As the defendant filed an objection to the order, the court started dealing with the case in ordinary proceedings.
8. On 10 November 2004 the District Court dismissed the action. On 10 February 2005 it submitted the case to the court of appeal following the applicant's appeal.
9. On 24 August 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had violated the applicant's right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing within a reasonable time. The case was not complex and the applicant by his conduct had contributed to the length of the proceedings by not responding to a District Court' request and by asking for adjournment of three hearings. The Constitutional Court also concluded that the District Court had failed to proceed with the case in an efficient manner. It held that in view of the very simple legal question to be determined and the value of the claim, the court was obliged to organise its work in a way enabling it to decide the case within one hearing.
10. The Constitutional Court refused to award the applicant just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage since the case had already been decided by the first-instance court and the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings. It ordered the District Court to avoid any further delay in the proceedings (should the case be returned to it) and to reimburse the applicant's legal costs.
11. On 14 September 2005 the court of appeal upheld the first-instance judgment.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
12. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
13. The Government expressed the view that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violation. They referred to the Constitutional Court's findings in respect of its refusal to award any compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
14. The applicant disagreed.
15. The Court observes that at the time of the Constitutional Court's judgment, the proceedings had been pending before the District Court for five years, ten months and twenty one days.
16. It should be noted that although the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay, it awarded no financial compensation in respect of his non-pecuniary damage.
17. It remains to be assessed whether the above redress can be considered appropriate and sufficient (see, for example, Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), no. 48470/99, 20 March 2003).
18. The Court reiterates that whether the redress afforded to the applicant was adequate and sufficient having regard to Article 41 of the Convention falls to be determined in the light of the principles established under the Court's case-law (see, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006- V, and Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 65-107, ECHR 2006-V). These include, most notably, the amount of the compensation awarded to the applicant and the effectiveness of the preventive measure applied (see Sika v. Slovakia (no. 3), no. 26840/02, § 54, 23 October 2007).
19. There is a strong but rebuttable presumption that excessively long proceedings will occasion non-pecuniary damage. However, in some cases, the non-pecuniary damage may be only minimal or none at all (see Nardone v. Italy, no. 34368/98, 25 November 2004). The domestic courts will then have to justify their decision by giving sufficient reasons (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 204, ECHR 2006-V).
20. The Court observes that the Constitutional Court supported the dismissal of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction by the applicant's contribution to the length of the proceedings. Another part of the Constitutional Court's reasoning, which concerns the District Court's conduct in the proceedings, concludes that the court, despite scheduling several hearings, had failed to proceed effectively.
21. Taking into account all circumstances of the case, in particular the simple character of the dispute and the duration of the proceedings at one level of jurisdiction, the Court finds the reasons for conclusion that no financial compensation was necessary for the applicant's non-pecuniary damage insufficient.
22. Having regard to the facts of the case and to the principles established in its case-law, the Court considers that the redress obtained by the applicant at the domestic level was not adequate and sufficient. In view of the above, it concludes that the applicant did not lose his status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.
23. The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
24. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute.
25. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
26. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
27. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
28. The applicant claimed 173 euros (EUR) with interest in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
29. The Government submitted that there was no causal link between the pecuniary damage claimed and the alleged violation and that the applicant's claim concerning non-pecuniary damage was overstated.
30. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. The Court considers that it should award the full sum claimed.
B. Costs and expenses
31. The applicant also claimed EUR 73 for translation costs.
32. The Government pointed to the fact that the applicant failed to support his claim by any evidence.
33. Regard being had to the fact that the applicant failed to submit any supporting documents establishing his liability to pay the sum claimed or the actual payment of the sum, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
34. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 November 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş AracıLech Garlicki
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy