THIRD SECTION
CASE OF KESZELI v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no. 12300/12)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14 October 2014
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Keszeli v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Dragoljub Popović, President,
Ján Šikuta,
Iulia Antoanella Motoc, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 23 September 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 12300/12) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Vojtech Keszeli (“the applicant”), on 23 February 2012.
2. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.
3. On 17 September 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.
4. The Government submitted a unilateral declaration on 4 December 2012. The Court found that, in the particular circumstances of the case, it did not offer a sufficient basis for concluding that respect for human rights no longer required examination of the case within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 Convention. The Court was therefore required to continue the examination of the admissibility and merits of the case.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Šaľa.
6. On 31 May 1994 the applicant claimed a sum of money from a bank.
7. On 16 September 2005 the applicant lodged an application before the Court challenging the length of these proceedings. On 22 May 2007 the Court decided to strike that case (application no. 34161/05) out of its list of cases on the ground that a friendly settlement had been reached between the parties.
8. In the proceedings complained of the Supreme Court’s decision of 30 April 2007 to dismiss the applicant’s appeal, examined as an appeal on points of law, became final on 11 June 2007.
9. On 27 January 2010 the above decision was quashed by the Constitutional Court and the case was remitted to the Supreme Court for re‑examination.
10. On 23 September 2010 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint challenging the length of the proceedings.
11. On 7 June 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the first-instance judgment. Upon the applicant’s appeal on points of law the cassation chamber of the Supreme Court quashed that decision on 25 April 2013.
12. On 19 June 2014 the Supreme Court again dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the first-instance judgment. The applicant indicated that he intended to lodge an appeal on points of law after the service of the Supreme Court’s decision.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
13. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
14. Given that a part of the proceedings complained of is covered by the Court’s decision on application no. 34161/05 (see paragraph 7 above), the period to be taken into consideration in the present case began on 23 May 2007. It has not yet ended. It has thus lasted seven years and more than three months for three levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
15. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
16. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII, and Dvořáček and Dvořáčková v. Slovakia, no. 30754/04, § 82, 28 July 2009).
17. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above, or Kucejová v. Slovakia, no. 74550/12, §§ 24-25, 26 November 2013).
18. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
19. The applicant further complained that he had no effective remedy at his disposal as regards his complaint about the length of the proceedings concerning his claim. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
20. The Court has examined this complaint but finds that that it does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
21. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
22. The applicant claimed 28,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
23. The Government contested the claim.
24. The Court awards the applicant EUR 3,500 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
25. The applicant also claimed EUR 255 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Constitutional Court and EUR 145 for those incurred before the Court.
26. The Government contested the claim as far as it concerned the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
27. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 300 covering costs under all heads.
C. Default interest
28. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 3,500 (three thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 300 (three hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 October 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Marialena TsirliDragoljub Popović
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy