CASE OF KLIBISZ v. POLAND

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF KLIBISZ v. POLAND

(Application no. 2235/02)

JUDGMENT

This version was rectified on 24 October 2016

under Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

STRASBOURG

4 October 2016

FINAL

04/01/2017

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Klibisz v. Poland,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

András Sajó, President,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Iulia Motoc,
Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,
Marko Bošnjak, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 6 September 2016,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 2235/02) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Andrzej Klibisz (“the applicant”), on 14 December 2000.

2. The applicant was represented before the Court by Ms A. Sadowska, a lawyer practising in Poznań and Mr K. Karkoszka, a lawyer practising in Łódź. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz, succeeded by Ms J. Chrzanowska of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. The applicant mainly complained under Articles 3, 5 § 3, 6 § 1, 8 and 10 of the Convention in relation to various aspects of his criminal trial and his detention pending trial and after conviction.

4. On 24 May 2011 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant, Mr Andrzej Klibisz, is a Polish national who was born in 1968 and is currently detained in Włocławek Prison.

A. The applicant’s arrest, his subsequent detention and criminal proceedings against him

6. On 31 August 1995 the Chief Prosecutor of Lithuania requested the Polish prosecution authorities to carry out a criminal investigation against the applicant, who had been charged in Lithuania with certain offences he had allegedly committed there. On the basis of the bilateral 1993 Cooperation Agreement, the Polish authorities took over the case.

7. On 7 March 1996 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Okręgowy) issued a decision to remand the applicant in custody for a period of seven days. The applicant was suspected of the murder of a certain T.K., the attempted murder of a certain W.S. in Vilnius in 1994 and illegal possession of weapons.

8. On 8 March 1996 at 1 p.m. the applicant appeared voluntarily at the Warsaw Police Headquarters (Komenda Policji) in connection with a matter unrelated to the proceedings which are the subject of the instant application. He was immediately arrested. He was not served with the prosecutor’s decision ordering his detention.

9. On 14 March 1996 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor issued another decision to retain the applicant in custody. He gave as reasons for his decision the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question, and the gravity of the charges.

10. On 1 April 1996 that decision was upheld by the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). Neither the applicant nor his lawyer were allowed to attend the hearing. They were not, therefore, able to present their arguments to the court. In addition, neither the applicant nor his lawyer had access to the case file in order to prepare their appeal against the decisions ordering the applicant’s detention.

11. On 15 March 1996 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an interlocutory appeal, challenging the fact that his client had been detained by a prosecutor’s decision. It appears that the appeal was not entertained by the authorities.

12. On 21 March 1996 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor rejected the applicant’s lawyer’s application to have the preventive measure in question lifted.

13. On 3 June 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 30 September 1996. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer were authorised to attend the hearing and to present their arguments orally. They did not have access to the case file.

14. That decision was upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 4 July 1996. Only the prosecutor attended the appellate hearing. The applicant and his lawyer were not allowed to attend the hearing and were not granted access to the case file.

15. Subsequently, the applicant’s detention was extended by numerous consecutive court decisions. The decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 19 September 1996 (upheld by the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) on 22 November 1996) and the decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 6 December 1996 (upheld by the Supreme Court on 13 January 1997) were all justified by the courts by the existence of strong evidence against the applicant, comprising the testimony of the alleged victim W.S., the results of the line-up and confrontation with witnesses, as well as by the gravity of charges and a need to take additional investigatory measures.

16. The Supreme Court’s hearing of 22 November 1996 and the Warsaw Court of Appeal’s hearing of 6 December 1996 were held in the presence of the prosecutor, with neither the applicant nor his lawyer entitled to attend or to have access to the case file.

17. Meanwhile, the Warsaw Regional Court on 16 May and 12 August 1996, the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 8 October 1996 and the Supreme Court on 4 December 1996 refused to lift the preventive measure in question as requested by the applicant and his lawyer.

18. The court’s hearing of 16 May 1996 was held with the prosecutor present, whereas the applicant and his lawyer were not allowed to participate. In addition only the prosecutor had access to the case file.

19. On 7 February 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 8 March 1997, giving as reasons for the decision, inter alia, the fact that the suspect and his lawyer were in the process of consulting the case file.

20. On 4 March 1997 the applicant was indicted on charges of the murder of T.K., the attempted murder of W.S. and illegal possession of weapons.

21. Subsequently, the applicant’s detention was not formally extended. Nevertheless he remained in custody beyond 8 March 1997.

22. On 6 May 1997 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s interlocutory appeal lodged against the decision of 7 February 1997. The Supreme Court observed, however, that the lodging of an indictment did not transform the interim detention into a measure sine die. Consequently, if a defendant was to remain in detention, a domestic court had to issue a decision to extend the interim measure in question each time it was about to expire.

23. The applicant’s lawyer followed with an application for the release of his client pending the proceedings. On 19 May 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court refused to lift the measure and conversely, extended it until 14 March 1998. On 20 June 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision to extend the detention, but only until 8 March 1998.

24. The applicant’s subsequent applications for release were rejected by the Warsaw Regional Court on 27 June 1997 and 26 March 1998. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer had the opportunity to attend the latter hearing or have access to the case file. The prosecutor was present.

25. The applicant’s detention was further extended by the Supreme Court on 21 April 1998, until 31 August 1998, and on 15 October 1998, until 30 November 1998, on the grounds of the existence of strong evidence against him, the gravity of the charges, the complexity of the case and the need to obtain statements from witnesses who lived in Lithuania.

26. Meanwhile, the first hearing in the applicant’s case took place on 11 February 1998.

27. On 23 October 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to ten years’ deprivation of civic rights.

28. On the same day, the Regional Court decided to extend the applicant’s detention until the moment he started serving his imprisonment sentence. On 2 June 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court rejected an application for release lodged by the applicant’s lawyer.

29. On 25 January 2000 the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 23 October 1998 and ordered that the applicant’s detention be continued. On 1 February 2000 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal. On 7 April 2000 the detention decision was upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal.

30. On 19 July 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court refused to release the applicant on bail as sought by his lawyer. On 30 August and 18 December 2000, and 7 February 2001 the Warsaw Regional Court issued decisions to continue the applicant’s detention. They were upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 10 October 2000, 16 January and 3 April 2001 respectively.

31. On 7 February 2001 the Warsaw Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment and to ten years’ deprivation of civic rights (no. VIII K 168/00).

32. Subsequently the applicant’s detention was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court’s decisions of 26 April 2001 (upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 5 June 2001) and of 16 July 2001 (upheld on 31 August 2001), and by the decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 19 October 2001 (upheld by the same court on 16 November 2001).

33. On 18 December 2001 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 7 February 2001 (II AKa 467/01).

34. On 22 October 2002 the Supreme Court quashed the second-instance judgment of 18 December 2001 and decided to continue the applicant’s detention.

35. On 29 November 2002 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request to have a legal-aid lawyer appointed for the purpose of “requesting the revocation of the court decisions to extend his detention”.

36. On 7 January 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided not to lift the measure in question as sought by the applicant, and on 17 January 2003, extended his detention. The latter decision was upheld by the same court on 18 February 2003.

37. On 18 February 2003 and 11 April 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided again not to lift the measure and furthermore, in a separate decision of 11 April 2003, extended the detention until 22 July 2003. The latter decision was upheld by the same court on 13 May 2003. On 17 June 2003 and on 5 September 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal refused to lift the preventive measure. On 11 July 2003 the same court decided to extend the applicant’s detention further. On 18 July and 14 August 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided again neither to lift the applicant’s detention nor to order a substitute preventive measure.

38. On 20 October 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld in principle the judgment of 7 February 2001, altering, because of amendments to the Criminal Code, only the legal classification of certain offences accompanying the main charges of murder and attempted murder (no. II Aka 487/02).

39. On 12 May 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal and his conviction became final.

40. Throughout the criminal proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer of his own choice. The applicant was present at the hearings and accompanied by his counsel. At the final stage of the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer appointed by the court for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 20 October 2003.

B. Proceedings for compensation for unlawful detention

41. The applicant brought an action for compensation alleging that his detention between 10 March 1996 and 8 March 1997, between 8 March 1997 and 18 December 2001, and between 22 October 2002 and 20 October 2003 had been unlawful. With regard to the first-mentioned period, the applicant argued that detaining him on the basis of a prosecutor’s decision, and not a court’s, was in breach of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Regarding the second-mentioned period, the applicant argued that after his indictment he had continued to be detained beyond the term prescribed in the relevant court’s decision. Finally, in connection with the third-mentioned period, the applicant complained that having quashed his second-instance conviction, the Supreme Court had decided to extend his detention despite the fact that the applicant had been absent from the relevant hearing, thus, in breach of the principle of equality of arms.

42. On an unspecified date the applicant challenged the impartiality of numerous judges who had decided on the extension of his detention pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. He requested that those judges be excluded from the examination of his case for compensation for unlawful detention.

43. On 14 January 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s motion. In connection with the challenge of the impartiality of Judge B.S. and Judge G.S, the court held that the applicant had failed to show that there was a reasonable doubt as to the impartiality of those judges. The court stated that the applicant had merely expressed his personal conviction that the judges in question had given unjustified decisions to keep him in custody. The court concluded that the fact that a judge had given a decision contrary to the wishes of a party was not an indication of any personal prejudice of that judge against that party.

44. On 12 October 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation. With regard to the first period of detention, the court considered it to be in compliance with the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1969, which at the relevant time provided that pre-trial detention was to be ordered by the prosecutor, whose decision could be challenged in court. Regarding the second period in question, the court acknowledged that the practice of considering pre-trial detention as a measure sine die upon the indictment of a detainee had been changed by the 1996 Supreme Court’s Resolution. However, the decision to extend the applicant’s detention on 19 May 1997 was considered justified since the court had applied the literal meaning of the relevant procedural provisions. Finally, as to the third period complained of, the court found that there were no shortcomings in the impugned proceedings before the Supreme Court and that the decision to maintain the applicant’s detention upon the quashing of his conviction had been fully justified.

45. That judgment was upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 1 March 2006. A cassation appeal was not available.

C. Proceedings under the 2004 Act for compensation for unreasonable length of proceedings concerning the extension of the applicant’s detention

46. On 13 December 2004 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court two complaints under the 2004 Act. He claimed compensation for the alleged delays in the Supreme Court’s examination of his interlocutory appeals against the decisions of the Warsaw Appeal Court of 19 September 1996 and 7 February 1997 extending his pre-trial detention.

47. On 14 January 2005 the Supreme Court gave two decisions, dismissing both of the applicant’s complaints.

48. In both decisions the court considered that the proceedings in question had not been unreasonably lengthy, bearing in mind the fact that judges of the Supreme Court had had to examine voluminous material in what was a complex case.

49. On 17 December 2004 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court two complaints under the 2004 Act. He claimed compensation for the alleged delays in the Supreme Court’s examination of the Warsaw Regional Court’s appeals to extend his detention of 4 March 1998 (Supreme Court’s decision of 21 Aril 1998) and of 25 August 1998 (Supreme Court’s decision of 15 October 1998).

50. On 14 January 2005 the Supreme Court gave two decisions, dismissing both of the applicant’s complaints on the ground that no delays had occurred in the proceedings in question.

51. On 27 April 2005 the Supreme Court refused to entertain the applicant’s appeals against those decisions.

D. Proceedings for compensation for unreasonable length of the main criminal proceedings against the applicant

52. The applicant lodged thirty complaints under the 2004 Act about a breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time at various stages of the criminal proceedings against him.

53. On 16 June 2005 the Supreme Court (no. SPK 12/05) refused to entertain the complaints related to the proceedings before the Warsaw Court of Appeal no. II AKa 467/01 and no. II AKa 487/02. The Supreme Court held that the applicant had not complied with the procedural requirements of the relevant domestic law because his application with the ECHR had not been lodged during the impugned appellate proceedings but during the preceding first-instance trial no. VIII K 168/00.

54. On 16 June 2005 the Supreme Court (no. KSP 5/05) refused to entertain the complaint lodged in relation to the pending proceedings concerning the breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (no. II S 3/05), on the ground that such a complaint was not available under the applicable domestic law.

55. On 16 June 2005 the Supreme Court (no. WZ 38/05) upheld the Supreme Court’s order of 27 April 2005.

E. Criminal proceedings against the applicant for uttering threats

56. On 16 August 2000 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor opened an inquiry into the allegations that during his detention in Barczewo Prison the applicant had uttered threats and incited third persons to kill Judge B.P., who had presided in the applicant’s criminal case.

57. On 28 December 2001 the applicant was charged with the above‑mentioned offence.

58. On 30 November 2004 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor closed the investigation on the ground that the applicant had not committed the offence in question.

F. Civil proceedings for compensation instituted by the applicant

59. The applicant brought numerous civil actions for infringement of his personal rights in connection with various events.

60. On 3 February 2005 the applicant filed a civil action under Article 417 of the Civil Code seeking compensation for a breach of Article 6 and other provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, which had allegedly been committed by domestic courts and penitentiary facilities in relation to the applicant’s main criminal case (VIII K 168/00).

On 8 May 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim, considering that the plaintiff had failed to substantiate some of his allegations and to demonstrate that the remainder of the alleged procedural shortcomings and the actions of the respondent had been unlawful or linked with any damage which the applicant might have suffered.

On 2 July 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal.

On an unspecified date the applicant’s lawyer informed him that a cassation appeal against that judgment was without any prospects of success.

61. On 13 October 2005 the applicant brought a civil action under Article 417 of the Civil Code, seeking compensation for the fact that in the official letter of 27 December 2004 the Deputy Governor (Zastępca Dyrektora) of Radom Remand Centre had stated that the applicant was guilty of uttering threats against Judge B. P.

On 8 June 2006 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action. It was established that the official letter in question contained information that proceedings for uttering threats were pending against the applicant and did not, as the applicant had alleged, imply that he was guilty of uttering threats. In fact, the impugned criminal proceedings against the applicant had been terminated on 21 December 2004 but the remand centre’s administration had been informed about it only on 28 December 2004, that is, one day after the deputy governor’s letter was sent.

On 16 November 2006 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

62. On 19 November 2006 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation for infringement of his personal rights in that a judge of the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre had found him guilty of uttering threats against Judge B. P.

On 21 November 2006 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim as manifestly ill-founded. On 6 June 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal in the case.

63. On 5 November 2006 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation for breach of his personal rights in that the Governor (Dyrektor) of Radom Remand Centre had reported to the Penitentiary Commission that the applicant had been uttering threats against Judge B. P.

On 30 March 2007 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim.

On 4 July 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that judgment.

On 23 October 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal granted legal aid for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal in the case. By letter of 26 November 2007 the applicant’s lawyer informed the applicant that there were no grounds for such an appeal and that consequently that he would not lodge one on the applicant’s behalf.

64. It appears that 18 April 2006 the applicant brought another civil action for compensation in relation to an unspecified event.

On 30 November 2006 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim.

On 26 June 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. On 13 August 2007 it rejected the applicant’s request for legal aid.

65. On an unspecified date in 2009 the applicant brought a civil action for libel against a certain M.G., the applicant’s former fellow cellmate, who had allegedly informed the prosecution services that the applicant had been uttering death threats against Judge B.P.

On 22 July 2010 the Włocławek Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action, holding that he had failed to prove that the respondent had acted unlawfully.

G. Monitoring of the applicant’s correspondence

1. Letters from domestic authorities

66. The applicant submitted photocopies of three envelopes which contained letters sent to him at his address in Warszawa-Białołęka Remand Centre by the Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service, the Country Election Office (Krajowe Biuro Wyborcze) and the Central Board of the Prison Service (Centralny Zarząd Służby Więziennej) respectively.

67. The first envelope bears two rectangular stamps reading “Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz [an abbreviation]....” (“Areszt Śledczy Warszawa Białołęka Wpłynęło ... L.dz. ...”). The date of 13 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of the stamps and the date of 24 December 2002 on the other. The envelope also bears a stamp reading “Letter censored date ...” (“List ocenzurowano dnia ...”). The date of 18 December 2002 has been written by hand on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it.

68. The second envelope bears similar rectangular stamps reading “Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz....” (“Areszt Śledczy Warszawa Białołęka Wpłynęło ... L.dz. ...”). The date of 11 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of these stamps and the date of 19 December 2002 on the other. “Letter censored date ...” (“List ocenzurowano dnia ...”) has been stamped over one of the rectangular stamps. The date of 17 December 2002 has been handwritten on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it.

69. The third envelope bears two rectangular stamps reading “Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz....” (“Areszt Śledczy Warszawa Białołęka Wpłynęło ... L.dz. ...”). The date of 11 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of these stamps and the date of 19 December 2002 on the other. The envelope also bears a stamp reading “Letter censored date ...” (“List ocenzurowano dnia ...”). The date of 17 December 2002 has been handwritten on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it.

70. The applicant complained about the interference with his correspondence to the penitentiary authorities.

71. He also brought a related civil action for the infringement of personal rights, seeking 100,000 Polish zlotys (PLN - approximately 24,500 euros (EUR)) of compensation.

72. On 27 November 2006 the Warsaw Regional Court awarded the applicant PLN 5,000 in compensation for the infringement of his personal rights on account of the fact that three letters sent to him from the Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service, the Country Election Office and the Central Board of the Prison Service had been censored by mistake.

73. By virtue of the same judgment the applicant, who at the beginning of the proceedings had been exempted from court fees, was ordered to pay PLN 5,000 towards a part of an unpaid court fee.

74. The applicant and the respondent appealed.

75. On 28 June 2007 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment on the merits and quashed the part concerning the court’s fees.

2. Letter from the ECHR

76. The applicant also submitted a photocopy of an envelope containing the letter which had been sent to him on 12 December 2002 by the Registry of the Court.

77. The envelope bears two rectangular stamps reading “Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz....” (“Areszt Śledczy Warszawa Białołęka Wpłynęło ... L.dz. ...”). The date of 16 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of these stamps and the date of 24 December 2002 on the other. The envelope also bears a stamp reading “Letter censored date ...” (“List ocenzurowano dnia ...”). The date of 18 December 2002 has been handwritten on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it.

78. It appears that the applicant complained about the interference with his correspondence to the penitentiary authorities.

79. He also brought a related civil action for the infringement of personal rights, seeking PLN 100,000 of compensation.

80. On 9 August 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court awarded the applicant PLN 1,000 of compensation for unlawful interference with the applicant’s correspondence and waived the court fees.

81. The applicant did not appeal.

H. Conditions of the applicant’s detention

82. The applicant has been in continuous detention since 8 March 1996.

83. He complained that throughout his entire detention he had been held in overcrowded cells with the right to only one hour of an outdoor exercise per day and to one shower per week. More recently, the applicant submitted that despite the fact that the domestic authorities claimed to have resolved the issue of overcrowding in detention facilities, the conditions of his own detention had not improved.

84. The applicant maintained that the authorities of different detention facilities had persecuted him for helping his fellow inmates write legal motions and complaints and for spreading information about the case‑law of the ECHR. The alleged persecution took the forms of: placing the applicant under a special regime for dangerous prisoners, transferring him frequently between different detention facilities, sending him to prisons located far from his family’s home and confiscating his personal belongings.

1. Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre

85. The applicant was detained in this detention facility (in his hometown) during the following periods: (1) from 8 March 1996 until 26 March 1997, (2) from 14 January until 19 November 1998, (3) from 12 January 2000 until 20 February 2001, (4) from 3 December 2001 until 18 March 2002, (5) from 11 February until 25 June 2003, (6) from 23 July until 16 December 2003; (7) from 13 May until 1 June 2004; and (8) from 4 until 14 February 2008.

(a) Description of the living conditions

86. As established by the Warsaw Regional Court in the course of the civil proceedings described below, during the six terms of his detention in Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre, the conditions of the applicant’s detention were the following.

87. The applicant had been detained in cells, in which the space per person had at all times been inferior to 3 square metres. From 1 January until 31 December 2000 the maximum capacity of the remand centre had been exceeded by almost 5%.

88. As a non-smoker the applicant had been assigned to non-smoking cells. The internal rules, however, had not been respected by his fellow‑prisoners and the applicant had been exposed to cigarette smoke. The toilet annex in the applicant’s cells had been separated from the rest of the cell either by a piece of plywood with the entrance covered with a piece of fabric or by a concrete wall with a sliding door. In most cases the applicant’s cells had not been ventilated.

89. In addition, the applicant submitted that during his detention in Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre he had not received a non-meat diet (dieta jarska), which had been contrary to a doctor’s recommendations and which had allegedly resulted in malnutrition and, consequently, a deterioration in his health.

90. During his detention under high-security regime, from 13 May until 1 June 2004, the applicant was committed to a single-occupancy cell and was in complete isolation from other prisoners. Every day he had a one-hour period of an outdoor exercise alone. Every few days he had access to the remand centre’s day-room in which he was also alone. He did not have access to any sporting, education or leisure activities. The applicant was subjected to personal checks when he was admitted to and transferred from the remand centre and, on a daily basis, each time he left and returned to his cell. The applicant’s cell with the exception of the toilet area, the outdoor yard, day-room and all other places open to the applicant, were under constant camera surveillance.

(b) Related civil action and complaints

91. On 7 March 2006 the applicant brought a civil action in tort against Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre. He invoked Article 417 of the Civil Code and Article 3 of the Convention. He claimed PLN 500,000 in compensation for his alleged suffering, during his entire stay in that remand centre, resulting from overcrowding and poor living and sanitary conditions and from exposure to cigarette smoke.

92. On 7 November 2008 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. The domestic court examined the case under Article 23 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 448 of that code. The court held that the suffering which the applicant had experienced because of the overcrowding had not been great enough to warrant an award of compensation. It was stressed that despite the overcrowding, the overall sanitary and living conditions in the remand centre had been acceptable. The domestic court did not rule on the issue of the applicant’s passive smoking.

93. On 19 December 2008 the applicant appealed against that judgment.

94. It appears that on an unspecified date the appeal was dismissed by the second-instance court.

95. It appears that the applicant also complained to the penitentiary authorities about the conditions of his detention under high-security regime.

2. Białystok Remand Centre

96. In this facility (200 km from his hometown) the applicant was detained during the following periods: (1) from 26 March 1997 until 14 January 1998; and (2) from 11 September until 9 October 2002. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there.

3. Barczewo Prison

97. In this establishment (230 km from his hometown) the applicant was detained from 19 November 1998 until 12 January 2000. He submitted that he had been detained in an unheated cell (no. 11 wing XIV) in temperatures as low as 14 degrees Celsius with an average temperature of 16-17 degrees Celsius in wintertime.

4. Bydgoszcz Fordon Prison

98. In this facility (270 km from his hometown) the applicant was detained (1) from 20 February until 3 December 2001; and (2) from 17 January until 7 February 2006.

99. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there.

5. Warszawa Białołęka Prison and Remand Centre

100. The applicant was detained in this prison (in his hometown) during the following periods: (1) from 18 March until 24 April 2002; (2) from 22 May until 11 September 2002; (3) from 9 October 2002 until 11 February 2003; (4) from 30 September until 18 November 2005; (5) from 7 until 15 February 2006; (6) from 30 August 2007 until 4 February 2008; (7) from 14 February until 8 April 2008; (8) from 24 April until 7 May 2008; (9) from 1 until 23 October 2008; and (10) from an unspecified date after 13 February 2012 until an unspecified date before 5 March 2012.

(a) Description of the living conditions

101. In his application form of 15 November 2010 the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in Warszawa Białołęka Prison. He submitted that he had been detained together with another inmate in a single-occupancy cell measuring 5 square metres and then, together with five other inmates, in a cell measuring 13 square metres. The cells in question were run down, dirty, not ventilated and badly-lit. There was mould on the walls and water dripped from the ceiling whenever someone was using the tap in the cell upstairs. The applicant had one hour of outdoor exercise per day. Prisoners did not have the opportunity to participate in any activities. The prison’s computer room, which had been funded by the European Union, was permanently locked. The applicant had a shower once a week but could barely wash himself because the shower heads were designed to limit water consumption. The applicant’s meals were always served cold one hour and a half after the distribution round had started.

102. The applicant also submitted that he had been beaten up by a warden in Warszawa Białołęka Prison.

(b) Related civil action

103. On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil action in tort against Warszawa Białołęka Prison. He was represented by a lawyer practising in Warsaw.

104. On 12 February 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the action.

105. On 26 May 2010 the applicant was informed by his lawyer that the latter had failed to appear at the court’s final hearing and had not been aware of the ruling. In consequence the lawyer had failed to request a reasoned judgment from the first-instance court and to lodge an appeal. The lawyer offered to pay the applicant PLN 2,000 in compensation for his own negligence (“nienależyte wykonanie obowiązku”) and instructed the applicant about the possibility of bringing a civil action if he considered that amount insufficient.

106. The first-instance judgment became final on 30 August 2010.

(c) Penitentiary complaints

107. In 2002 the applicant filed several complaints with different penitentiary authorities about the lack of a vegetarian diet, frequent power cuts and other issues relating to the living conditions in Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre. None were successful.

108. On 11 July 2002 the Director of the Warsaw Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service informed the applicant that detention facilities were not under any duty to cater to the dietary preferences of detainees if, as in the applicant’s case, they were not medically justified.

109. On 7 January 2003 the applicant complained to a competent penitentiary judge, inter alia, that he had been punched by a warden in the course of an argument they had had in the morning of the same day. On 28 February 2003 the judge, who had examined witnesses’ statements and the report from the applicant’s medical examination immediately after the incident, found the applicant’s allegations to be unfounded.

6. Potulice Prison

110. The applicant was detained in that facility (287 km from his hometown) from 24 April until 22 May 2002. He alleged that he had not received proper medical care there.

7. Łódź Prison No. 2

111. The applicant was detained in this facility (140 km from his hometown) from 25 June until 23 July 2003.

(a) Description of the living conditions

112. In his application form, which was received by the Registry on 30 November 2010, the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in Łódź Prison, to which he had been committed for psychiatric observation. He alleged that his cell had been overcrowded. The toilet had been separated by a brick wall, which was only one-metre high. Because the windows had been blocked by heavy blinds, the cell had not been ventilated and the temperature inside had reached up to 40 degrees Celsius.

(b) Alleged medical malpractice

113. The applicant had had one hour of outdoor exercise per day. He also submitted that, on 4 July 2003, during an EMG head examination which had been carried out in the prison, his arm had been badly damaged and he had not been prescribed any physiotherapy for that.

(c) Related civil proceedings concerning medical malpractice and detention conditions

114. On 6 September 2006 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation for the health damage which he had allegedly suffered as a result of the negligence of the medical staff of Łódź Prison on 4 July 2003 and of inadequate care, namely the lack of physiotherapy, afterwards. On 14 April 2008 the applicant broadened the scope of his claim by alleging a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights in that the prison authorities had failed to ensure that the conditions of his detention in Łódź Prison were adequate.

115. On 22 January 2010 the Łódź Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s civil action.

116. The claim concerning the alleged medical malpractice was examined by the court under Article 417 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 445 of that code, whereas the claim concerning the allegedly inadequate conditions of detention was examined under Article 24 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 448 of that code.

117. As regards the claim under Article 417 of the Civil Code the domestic court analysed in detail the course of the medical procedure in question and a number of medical experts’ reports. It was concluded that the medical staff who had performed the applicant’s EMG scan on 4 July 2003 had not made any errors. The damage to the nerve of the applicant’s arm had occurred much later and it was impossible to determine its cause. The court considered, however, that there was certainly no causal link between the events of 4 July 2003 and the damage suffered by the applicant.

118. As regards the claim under Article 24 of the Civil Code, the respondent party raised an objection, arguing that pursuant to Article 4421 of the Civil Code the statutory three-year limitation period for claims in tort had elapsed, at the latest, three years after the applicant had left Łódź Prison, that is, on 23 July 2006.

119. The domestic court did not address the respondent’s objection and examined the case on the merits.

120. The following facts were established by the court on the basis of the data from various prison and hospital registers, and prison inspection reports. In the relevant period the applicant had been detained in cells nos. 303 and 305. The space per person in those cells had at all times been greater than the statutory minimum standard of 3 square metres. The cells had been well-lit and well-ventilated even though the windows had indeed been partly covered by semi-transparent blinds attached to the outside wall at an angle, creating a twenty-six centimetre gap between the window and the blind. A toilet annex in each cell had been sufficiently separated and clean.

121. In the light of the above facts the court held that the applicant’s personal rights had not been infringed.

122. On 20 May 2010 the Łódź Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment.

8. Włocławek Prison

123. The applicant was detained in this prison (160 km from his hometown) (1) from 16 December 2003 until 12 January 2004. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention in that period. The applicant was again committed to that detention facility (2) from an unspecified date, no later than 11 August 2011 until an unspecified date before 20 February 2012 and (3) from an unspecified date before 2 July 2012 until the present day.

124. The applicant submitted that on 11 August 2011 he was committed to cell no. 118 in wing S. On 12 August 2011 he was moved to cell no. 213 in wing E and on 19 August 2011, to another cell in wing B. On 22 August 2011 he was committed to cell no. 214 in wing D and later, to cell no. 210 in wing D. On 28 December 2011 he was transferred to cell no. 202 in wing D and on 16 January 2012 to cell no. 210 in the same wing.

125. The above mentioned cells of wing D, which was reserved to prisoners attending school, were, for the most part, shared by five inmates (including the applicant). The statutory minimum standard of 3 square metres had not been secured in those cells. They were insufficiently lit and the toilet annex was small. The applicant had access to shower once a week for 10 minutes at a time. No additional shower was allowed to the applicant on the days when he worked in the school workshop.

126. From September 2011 until September 2012 (presumably with a break when he was detained in Warszawa Służewiec Remand Centre – see paragraph 250 below) the applicant attended vocational high school three days per week. From September until late-October 2012 he was enrolled in an additional technical course from Monday through Friday.

127. From May through September prisoners could use the prison’s football pitch once a week for 45 minutes. Throughout the year they had an hour-long outdoor exercise per day in a small concrete yard.

128. The applicant submitted that he and his cellmates often quarrelled and got in fights because of tension caused by their constant rotation between cells.

129. On 23 October 2012 the applicant was transferred to a single cell no. 114 in wing F.

130. On 21 November 2012 the Penitentiary Commission of Włocławek Remand Centre decided to revoke the applicant’s authorisation to study in view of the applicant’s moderate progress in resocialisation and unfavourable criminological prognosis which he had received on 20 November 2012. On 11 December 2012 this decision was partly changed on appeal and the applicant was allowed to resume his education.

131. On 18 December 2012 the Penitentiary Commission of Włocławek Remand Centre decided to continue the applicant’s detention in a closed‑type prison in view of the seriousness of the offence of which he had been convicted, his increasingly vexatious behaviour, disobedience and unfavourable criminological prognosis.

132. The applicant is currently attending the remand centre’s school.

9. Radom Remand Centre

133. The applicant was detained in this facility (100 km from his hometown) (1) from 12 January until 13 May 2004; (2) from 28 June 2004 until 30 September 2005; (3) from 18 November 2005 until 17 January 2006; (4) from 15 February 2006 until 30 August 2007; (5) from 7 May until 1 October 2008 (one-day prison leave on 11 August); (6) from 23 October 2008 until 1 July 2009; (7) from 14 until 27 August 2009; and (8) from 24 September 2009 until 12 February 2010.

(a) Detention from 12 until 20 January 2004 under increased supervision

134. On 10 January 2004 the Deputy Director General of the Prison Service informed the administration of Radom Remand Centre that the applicant had been charged with uttering threats against Judge B.P., who had been involved in the applicant’s criminal trial (see paragraphs 56 ‑ 58 above).

As a result, on 13 January 2004 the Governor of Radom Remand Centre issued a decision, in which he established the following detention regime in respect of the applicant.

135. (1) Personnel monitoring the applicant’s private correspondence were to pay particular attention to the content of the applicant’s letters. Any letter containing threats against Judge B.P. or any other member of the justice department was to be immediately transferred to the remand centre’s governor or his deputy.

(2) The applicant’s prison education officer (wychowawca) was to monitor the applicant’s official correspondence (korespondencja urzędowa). The remand centre’s governor or his deputy was to be immediately informed if any irregularities were discovered.

(3) Two officers were to be designated to monitor the applicant’s telephone conversations. The remand centre’s governor or his deputy was to be immediately informed if any irregularities were discovered. In the event that the applicant was heard uttering threats against Judge B.P. or any other member of the justice department, the telephone call was to be interrupted.

(4) The applicant’s conversations during his visits (widzenia) were to be subject to “strict supervision” by a designated prison officer. Supervisors were to be immediately informed if any irregularities were discovered. In the event the applicant was heard uttering threats against Judge B.P. or any other member of the justice department, the conversation was to be interrupted.

136. From 12 until 20 January 2004 the applicant was detained in wing XI of Radom Remand Centre under the above-described special supervision regime. He did not submit, however, if in the material time any of his letters, phone calls or conversations with visitors had been monitored as described the preceding paragraph. The Government submitted that the relevant remand centre’s registers of correspondence or visits did not exist.

137. As to the living conditions in the remand centre, the applicant submitted that he had not received any food and had lived off what he bought in the prison canteen. The power in the electric sockets had been turned off each morning between 9 and 11 o’clock.

138. On an unspecified date in January 2004 the applicant informed the Head of the Security Department of Radom Remand Centre (Kierownik Działu Ochrony) that he feared for his life and well-being because a certain W.S., a convicted criminal who had been the victim and the prosecution witness during the applicant’s trial, had been detained in Radom Remand Centre.

(b) Detention from 20 January until 13 May 2004 and from 28 June until 5 October 2004 under high-security regime

(i) The imposition of the special regime

139. On 20 January 2004 the Head of the Security Department applied to the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre for the applicant’s classification as a “prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a detention facility” (więzień stwarzający poważne zagrożenie społeczne albo poważne zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa zakładu karnego) and his detention under high-security regime. The regime was to entail (1) general security measures as regulated by the law, including the monitoring and censorship of the applicant’s correspondence and monitoring and control of his telephone conversations and visits, and, in addition, (2) the use of handcuffs and fetters during the applicant’s transport; (3) transport only with the help of police; and (4) handcuffing the applicant behind the back anywhere outside the remand centre’s living quarters.

It was noted as reasons for the request that the applicant had been convicted of a serious offence and sentenced to a long term in prison and that he was hostile towards the officers of the justice department. In consequence, the applicant was considered likely to pose a real threat to society and remand centre’s internal order, and to abscond, in particular, during transport outside the remand centre.

140. On 20 January 2004 the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre, acting under Article 76 § 1 (7) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (“the Code”), decided to place the applicant under high‑security regime for prisoners posing a serious threat to society or to security of a detention facility. This status is regulated by Article 88 § 5 of the Code in conjunction with Article 88 (a) § 1 of that Code. The Commission’s decision did not contain any written grounds.

141. The applicant appealed.

142. On 9 February 2004 the Radom Regional Court examined the applicant’s appeal and observed that already in 2003 the Penitentiary Commission of Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre had classified the applicant as a prisoner posing a serious threat to security of that detention facility. It was also noted that one day after the applicant had been transferred to Radom Remand Centre, the Deputy Director General of the Prison Service informed the remand centre’s administration that the applicant had been uttering threats against Judge B.P. (see paragraph 134 above). It had been derived from the above-mentioned letter that the applicant was likely to pose a real threat to the security of the other judges of the bench. In view of the above, the Radom Regional Court decided to uphold the Penitentiary Commission’s decision on the applicant’s status.

143. On 20 April and 5 July 2004 the administration of Radom Remand Centre issued two identical requests to extend the applicant’s high security detention regime. The requests were justified by invoking: (1) the gravity of the offences of which the applicant had been convicted and the long sentence; (2) the fact that the applicant manifested his hostility towards the agents of the justice department; (3) serious lack of moral character; and (4) other unspecified features of the applicant’s character and his personal qualities (właściwości i warunki osobiste) which, together with the above‑mentioned elements, made him a person who posed a serious threat to the society and to the security of the remand centre.

144. On 20 April and again, on 5 July 2004 the Penitentiary Commission examined the above-mentioned requests and reviewed the applicant’s situation. It was found that the original reasons for the imposition of the special regime were still valid. Consequently, it was decided that the applicant’s status be extended, each time, for another three months.

145. The applicant initially appealed against the review decision of 20 April 2004. Later on, however, he withdrew his appeal in protest that the penitentiary authorities had not granted him access to his entire prison record but only to reports of the relevant authorities which had been used in the proceedings before the Penitentiary Commission and which concerned the applicant’s conduct and character. Consequently, on 16 September 2004 the Radom Regional Court formally discontinued the appellate proceedings.

146. During the third review proceedings, the administration of Radom Remand Centre, submitted that the applicant had stopped posing a threat to the security and internal order of the remand centre and of the officers of the justice department and did not cause any problems to the remand centre’s staff.

147. Consequently, on 5 October 2004 the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre decided that the applicant’s special status be lifted.

(ii) The features of the regime

148. On 20 January 2004 the applicant was moved to the wing for “dangerous” prisoners. On 13 May 2004 he was temporarily transferred to Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre and then, to Sztum Prison. The special regime was also enforced in these two detention facilities (see paragraphs 90 above and 204 below). On 28 June 2004 he returned to Radom Remand Centre (see paragraph 133 above).

(α) The applicant’s isolation and other special measures

149. During his detention in Radom Remand Centre, from 20 January until 8 March, 14 April until 13 July and from 3 to 13 September 2004 (a total of 5 months), the applicant was committed to a solitary cell. From 8 March until 14 April, 13 July until 3 September and from 13 September until 5 October 2004 (a total of 4 months), he shared his cell with one or two other persons.

150. The applicant submitted that from 9 March until 1 April 2004 he had been committed to cell no. 109 together with a smoking fellow inmate.

151. The applicant’s cells, except for the toilet annex, were under constant camera surveillance. The light was on all the time.

152. The applicant was scheduled to have his daily outdoor exercise in the company of another special-type prisoner from cell no. 405. Because the prisoner in question regularly refused to go outside, the applicant had his walks alone. The applicant was not authorised to participate in sporting activities with other prisoners. During one hour twice and sometimes, three times per week he had individual access to a day-room with a TV-set, books and magazines. The Government submitted that the applicant had been authorised to attend cultural and educational courses and catholic mass but they were unable to say whether the applicant had indeed made use of those facilities. The applicant submitted that with the classification as a “dangerous prisoner” he had not had access to any such activities.

153. The applicant was subjected to strip searches each time he left and returned to his cell, for example, from an outdoor exercise, telephone booth or the appointment with the prison’s doctor. The applicant submitted that on average he had been subjected to four to eight personal checks per day. He also stressed that the frequency and the very practice of strip searches was unjustified in the light of the fact that the applicant had at all times been under camera surveillance or wardens’ supervision.

(β) Censorship of the applicant’s correspondence and monitoring of his telephone calls and visits

154. The applicant’s incoming and outgoing private and official correspondence continued to be opened and read and his telephone calls and visits, to be monitored by the remand centre’s administration.

155. The applicant submitted that because of the lapse of time, he had not been able to keep the receipts or the copies of the relevant letters. He stated, however, that in 2004 he had sent approximately 4,000 letters and that all of them had been censored. He enumerated 1,128 of such letters and, additionally, 48 incoming censored letters.

The applicant also submitted that when he had been detained in Radom remand Centre in 2004 the following visits (eleven in total) had taken place: on 23 February, 15 and 29 March, 12 July, 23 August, 27 September, 4 October, 11 and 21 November and 30 December 2004 – with his brother K.K. and on 26 July 2004 - with a certain A.W.

In addition 180 telephone conversations which the applicant had in 2004 in Radom Remand Centre were controlled.

156. The Government submitted that the relevant remand centre’s registers of correspondence or visits did not exist but acknowledged that the practice of routine monitoring and censoring of the applicant’s correspondence, telephone calls and visits had been in place.

(iii) Related penitentiary complaints and civil action

157. The applicant lodged numerous complaints with the penitentiary authorities in relation to the conditions of his detention under high-security regime. They were to no avail.

158. On 30 January 2007 he also brought a civil action for compensation on account of his detention under a high-security regime from 20 January until 5 October 2004 and false accusations that he had been uttering threats against Judge B.P. The outcome of these proceedings is unknown.

(c) The applicant’s detention from 5 October until 24 November 2004 under increased supervision

(i) The conditions of the applicant’s detention

159. On 5 October 2004 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 404 in general wing IX.

(ii) The applicant’s correspondence

(α) The monitoring of the correspondence

160. On 11 November 2004 the Governor of Radom Remand Centre (Dyrektor) decided that the applicant, even though no longer classified as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a prison, should, nevertheless, be treated with particular precaution because of the threats he had uttered in the past against judge B.P. To that effect the applicant’s correspondence was to be checked by the remand centre security guard (inspektor działu ochrony) in the applicant’s presence.

161. It is uncontested that all of the applicant’s incoming and outgoing mail was opened and read.

162. The applicant submitted that on 18 and 19 November 2004 he had wished to send two private letters to his fellow prisoners K.S. and P.K. The letters contained information on prisoners’ rights and the procedure under the European Convention on Human Rights. Attached to one of the letters was a brochure containing a summary of the Court’s case-law.

163. The envelopes were inspected and the letters read by a remand centre officer. Because the letters contained comments by the applicant, which were considered as a threat to the remand centre’s internal order, they were seized.

164. It is unclear whether the above-mentioned inspection was carried out during the dispatching of the letters in the applicant’s wing and in his presence or rather, on their receipt in the wing of the addressee, K.S.

165. It appears that the letters were eventually delivered to the addressees. The ECHR’s brochure, however, was taken out and put in the remand centre’s depository (see paragraph 175 below).

(β) The applicant’s complaints about the monitoring of his correspondence

166. In November and December 2004 the applicant lodged several applications with the Radom Regional Court to complain about the monitoring of his correspondence under the increased supervision regime, the seizure of his private letter to S.N. and, further, about the arbitrariness and unlawfulness of his disciplinary punishment of 23 November 2004 and the living conditions in his solitary cell.

167. In an official letter of 27 December 2004 the Deputy Governor of Radom Remand Centre informed the Radom Regional Court that the following findings, concerning the applicant’s correspondence, had been made in the course of an internal inquiry.

168. After the decision of 11 October 2004 the applicant’s official correspondence had been monitored by an authorised officer in the applicant’s presence. The letters had been opened and their content checked. The procedure had been in compliance with Articles 90 (8) and 242 § 6 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences.

169. On 18 and 19 November 2004 two private letters had been sent by the applicant to a fellow prisoner K.S. who was, at that time, detained in wing XIII of the same remand centre as the applicant. The letters had been opened and read. It was revealed that the envelopes contained documents from the applicant’s criminal proceedings and official letters which had been sent by various penitentiary authorities to the applicant. Handwritten notes by the applicant had been on top of some of those documents. The applicant had made insulting remarks about the Deputy Head of the Prison Service. He had also informed K.S. that he was preparing an application to the ECHR about the living conditions in the remand centre and that he was going to distribute copies of it among the detainees. They would then be able simply to sign that model application and send it to the ECHR on their own behalf.

In the letter of 19 November 2004 the applicant had further informed K.S. that he had taken steps to encourage detainees to lodge complaints with the ECHR. That, in the applicant’s view, would make the remand centre’s authorities reduce the overcrowding and comply with other minimum standards set out in the Convention.

170. The warden, who had monitored the letters in question, had considered that they were aimed at raising tension among detainees. He had applied to the remand centre’s governor for authorisation to seize the correspondence. Having read the letters in question, the governor had decided to seize them and include them in the applicant’s personal file. Hehad considered that the content of the letters might be a threat to the remand centre’s internal order and security. The applicant had been informed about the governor’s decision in compliance with Article 105 § 4 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences.

171. Because the applicant’s actions had been perceived as a serious violation of the remand centre’s internal discipline and order, an application for his disciplinary punishment had been filed with the remand centre’s governor on 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 176 - 178 below).

172. On 30 December 2004 the penitentiary judge of the Radom Regional Court examined five complaints from the applicant, concerning, among others, the monitoring of his correspondence, and considered all of those complaints ill-founded.

173. As far as the issue of the applicant’s correspondence was concerned, the court found that the governor’s decision of 11 November 2004 to monitor the applicant’s correspondence had been in compliance with the law and justified in the applicant’s case. Moreover, the regional court came to the following conclusion:

“There are no grounds to call into question the [fact] of intercepting the [applicant’s] letters to [K.S.] and [P.K.] because those letters contained information and documents other than instructions as to how, where to and what to write about the conditions of [detention]. [Phrases such as]: ‘prisoners are treated inhumanely’ appeared in those letters. Such statements are groundless and [were] employed with the goal of making a particular impression and [to enhance] the ‘effectiveness of [the applicant’s] actions.’”

174. On 10 January 2005 the applicant complained to the penitentiary judge that the Governor of Radom Remand Centre had confiscated his private copy of a brochure on the case-law of the ECHR, which he had intended to send to K.S., a fellow prisoner detained in another establishment.

175. In reply, by letter of 9 February 2005 the penitentiary judge informed the applicant that his complaint was manifestly ill-founded. The judge gave an account of the events which had led to the applicant’s complaint. He considered that the governor’s decision to confiscate the brochure in question had been justified in the light of the fact that the applicant, in his letter to K.S., had incited the latter to lodge complaints against the prison authorities with the ECHR. The brochure in question was included to help K.S. in drafting his ECHR application. It was also noted that, even though as of 22 November 2004 the applicant could have requested the return of the brochure in question from the prison depository, he had not done so.

(d) The applicant’s disciplinary punishment from 23 November until 8 December 2004

(i) The imposition and the features of the measure

176. On 23 November 2004 the Governor of Radom Remand Centre received an application to punish the applicant for inciting his fellow prisoners to rebellion by disseminating information about their Convention rights and the procedure for applying to the ECHR.

177. On the same day, having heard the applicant and his prison education officer (wychowawca) the governor imposed on the applicant a disciplinary punishment in the form of fourteen days’ solitary confinement.

178. The sanction was applied from 24 November until 8 December 2004.

(ii) The applicant’s appeal against the measure

179. On 23 November 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Radom Regional Court to challenge the governor’s decision to impose a disciplinary punishment by placing him in solitary confinement. He also asked that the enforcement of the punishment be stayed while his appeal was pending.

180. On 30 December 2004 the penitentiary judge of the Radom Regional Court heard the submissions of the prosecutor and of the applicant. The court upheld the impugned decision.

181. The penitentiary court noted that the applicant had admitted that he had been disseminating information about prisoners’ Convention rights among his fellow inmates in Radom Remand Centre and that he had transferred such information by letters to K.S. and P.K. The information in question concerned, in particular, the minimum living standards required by the Convention for detention facilities and instructions on how to lodge an application with the Court. The applicant admitted that he had been encouraging his fellow inmates to send applications to Strasbourg by assuring them that he would prepare model letters for them. He stressed, however, that his actions had not been aimed at starting rebellion but rather at achieving the improvement of the living conditions in that establishment.

182. In addition, the penitentiary court took note of the threats which the applicant had been heard to express in the following words: “You wanted me in Radom [Remand Centre], so now you have it; this is only the beginning! I will put [this place] in order, do you understand?!”

183. The court found that the applicant, through his actions, had incited other prisoners to rebellion and thus the governor had been justified in imposing a disciplinary punishment on him.

184. Moreover, the penitentiary court considered that the governor had acted in compliance with Articles 144 and 145 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences in deciding that his decision of 23 November 2003 was not to be announced publicly.

185. The court did not rule on the applicant’s request to stay the enforcement of his disciplinary punishment.

(iii) Complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings concerning the applicant’s disciplinary punishment

186. On 3 December 2004 the applicant filed with the Lublin Court of Appeal via the Radom Regional Court a complaint under the 2004 Act alleging an unreasonable delay in the above-mentioned proceedings concerning the challenge to his disciplinary punishment. The complaint was rejected by the Radom Regional Court on 2 February 2005.

(iv) Conditions of the applicant’s detention during his disciplinary punishment

(α) Description of the living conditions

187. During his disciplinary punishment, from 24 November until 8 December 2004, the applicant was detained consecutively in cells nos. 305 and 306. In the applicant’s submission, the temperature in the cells in question had dropped to 12 degrees Celsius. The windows were sealed with nails and could not be opened. The glass was painted white and did not let any light inside.

(β) Related penitentiary complaints

188. On an unspecified date in December 2004 the applicant complained to the Radom Regional Court about, among other things, inadequate temperature, lighting and ventilation in his solitary cells.

189. In an official letter of 27 December 2004 the Deputy Governor of Radom Remand Centre informed the Radom Regional Court that the temperature in the cells in question had been maintained by an automatic system at 20 degrees Celsius. The lighting and ventilation had met the required standards. The windows had not been nailed shut.

190. On 30 December 2004 the penitentiary judge of the Radom Regional Court examined five complaints from the applicant, concerning, among other things, inadequate living conditions in his solitary cells.

The penitentiary court found that the temperature in the applicant’s cells had been maintained automatically at 20 degrees Celsius. The heating system had been checked and the applicant had not complained. The lighting and ventilation had been adequate in both cells in question. The windows had not been sealed. When the applicant had complained that his bed was broken, he had been moved, without any delay, to cell no. 306.

The applicant’s complaint about the conditions of his detention was therefore considered ill-founded.

(γ) Civil action concerning the applicant’s disciplinary punishment

191. It appears that on 9 May 2005 the applicant brought a civil action under Article 417 of the Civil Code and numerous articles of the Convention. He claimed compensation on account of the alleged degrading and inhuman treatment resulting from the imposition and the conditions of his disciplinary punishment.

192. On 30 March 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 29 May 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. A cassation appeal against that judgment was available to the applicant under Polish law. It is unclear, however, whether he used the remedy.

(e) The applicant’s detention in 2005 and 2006

193. On 18 July 2005 the applicant came across prisoner W.S. in the Radom Remand Centre’s yard but no incident was reported.

194. The applicant had regular visits from his relatives and friends. Altogether fifty persons were authorised to apply for a visit in the remand centre. Many of them visited the applicant regularly. The Government submitted that it was impossible to establish who had actually visited the applicant at the material time.

195. On 5 June 2006 and on an unspecified date the remand centre’s governor refused to authorise the applicant’s first cousin, P.W. and his former inmate, Z.W. to visit the applicant in the remand centre. It was considered that the persons in question were not related to the applicant and that one of them was a former detainee. The authorities also expressed the opinion that the list of people authorised to apply for a visit was long enough to allow the applicant sufficient contact with the outside world and to maintain his family ties.

196. On 23 August and 11 October 2006 the Radom Regional Court upheld the governor’s decisions.

(f) The applicant’s civil action concerning his solitary confinement and restrictions on receiving visitors

197. On 19 July 2005 the applicant brought a civil action against Radom Remand Centre, seeking compensation under Article 417 of the Civil Code for an alleged infringement of his personal rights. He claimed that, as a form of punishment for disseminating information about the ECHR, he was detained in isolation from other detainees. He also alleged a breach of Article 8 of the Convention in that: (1) the remand centre’s authorities had not authorised visits from his brother, P.W. and his close friend, Z.W.; (2) his letters and telephone conversations were monitored and the numbers of people he called were registered; (3) for eighteen months there had been no supply of hot water in the remand centre; and (4) W.S., a convicted criminal with whom the applicant was in conflict, was detained in the same establishment, which put the applicant in constant danger.

198. On 7 May 2007 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action.

A number of the applicant’s fellow inmates and the remand centre’s staff testified in the course of the civil proceedings. It was established that the applicant had been placed under a typical security regime for his own protection and at his own request. The regime was not aimed at the applicant’s isolation from other detainees and had certainly not been imposed as a punishment for his active role in disseminating information about Convention prison standards and the ECHR.

199. The fact that the applicant had had his daily outdoor exercise alone had been an incidental result of the refusal of another special-regime detainee who had been scheduled to accompany the applicant to go outside. The remand centre’s refusal to authorise the applicant to do sports together with other detainees in a gym or on an outdoor field was considered justified because such authorisation normally constituted a reward for prisoners’ good behaviour, and the applicant had not earned such a reward.

200. The monitoring of the applicant’s letters and telephone conversations was considered justified by the fact that the applicant, due to the nature of the offences of which he had been convicted and the opinions of prison wardens, had been classified by the Penitentiary Commission as a “dangerous prisoner”.

201. Lastly, it was established that the applicant had regular visits from his relatives and friends. Altogether fifty persons were authorised to apply for a visit in the remand centre. Therefore, the authorities’ refusal to authorise additional two people, P.W. and Z.W., had been justified and had not caused the applicant any harm.

202. The court concluded that all the actions undertaken by the remand centre’s administration and staff had been lawful and justified by the need to protect the remand centre’s internal order and to provide security to the applicant and his fellow inmates.

203. On 18 September 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment.

On 15 February 2008 the applicant’s lawyer informed him that there were no grounds for lodging a cassation appeal.

10. Sztum Prison

204. The applicant was detained in this prison (301 km from his hometown) from 1 until 28 June 2004. At the material time, he was still classified as a “prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a prison” and, accordingly, was detained under a high-security security regime.

The applicant did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there.

The Government submitted that the applicant’s cell had been under constant camera surveillance. The images from the area of the toilet annex were blurred.

The applicant had a one-hour period of an outdoor exercise and was subjected to a strip search each time he left and returned to his cell.

The applicant did not make any penitentiary complaints in relation to his detention in that facility.

11. Kamińsk Prison

205. The applicant was detained in this prison (287 km from his hometown) from 8 until 24 April 2008. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there.

12. Płock Prison

206. The applicant was detained in this prison (110 km from his hometown) from 1 July until 13 August 2009. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there.

13. Katowice Remand Centre

207. The applicant was detained in this remand centre (290 km from his hometown) from 27 August until 4 September 2009. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there.

14. Wrocław Prison

208. The applicant was detained in this prison (343 km from his hometown) from 4 until 24 September 2009. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there.

15. Opole Lubelskie Prison

209. The applicant was detained in this prison (165 km from his hometown) from 12 February until 13 May 2010.

(a) Living conditions in the prison

210. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the living conditions during his detention there. He submitted, however, that he had been persecuted by the prison staff, who imposed disciplinary punishment on him on any pretext. Requests for the applicant’s punishment were sent to the penitentiary court on 6, 13, 18, 19 and 20 April 2010.

(b) The applicant’s disciplinary punishment

211. On 6 January 2011 the applicant submitted information concerning his disciplinary punishment in Opole Lubelskie Prison.

212. On 20 April 2010 a certain S. M., the Deputy Governor of Opole Lubelskie Prison imposed a disciplinary punishment on the applicant in the form of fourteen days’ solitary confinement.

213. The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the time‑limit for the punishment of the alleged offences, which had taken place on 22 March 2010, had expired.

214. On 24 June 2010 the penitentiary court upheld the impugned decision, considering the applicant’s calculation of the statutory time-limit inaccurate. The decision was served on the applicant on 9 July 2010.

215. The applicant submitted to the Court that the measure had not been imposed in compliance with the law, because under Article 144 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, only a prison governor had the power to order detention in a solitary cell.

16. Pińczów Prison

216. The applicant was detained in this prison (220 km from his hometown) from 13 until 20 May 2010.

(a) The imposition of a high-security regime

217. On 13 May 2010 the administration of Pińczów Prison requested that the applicant be classified as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a prison on the following grounds: (1) the applicant had been convicted of murder with the use of arms and an attempted murder; (2) he had been previously classified as a special-type prisoner within the meaning of Article 88 § 3 of the Code; (3) in Opole Lubelskie Prison he had been gathering information about officers of Radom Remand Centre and had been inciting prisoners to rebellion; (5) he had received disciplinary punishments many times during his incarceration; (6) he seriously lacked moral character and was vexatious; (7) he had close links with the criminal world; and (8) prisoners looked up to him because of his leadership qualities and facility to dominate other people and the fact that he had become a self-declared speaker for prisoners’ rights.

218. On 13 May 2010 the Penitentiary Commission of Pińczów Prison, having heard the applicant and taken under consideration the reasons for the above-mentioned request, classified the applicant as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society and the security of the prison within the meaning of Article 88 § 3 of the Code.

219. The applicant appealed, arguing that he had been behaving correctly and therefore, his classification as a high-security prisoner had been not fair.

220. On 6 September 2010 the Kielce Regional Court examined the applicant’s appeal under Article 7 § 1 of the Code as to the formal compliance of the impugned Commission’s decision with the law and as to the alleged arbitrariness of its assessment of the applicant’s character and his conduct.

The domestic court held that that the impugned decision had been given in compliance with the law and that the substantive grounds on which it was based, were fully confirmed by the material in the applicant’s personal file, including documents, transcripts of the applicant’s intercepted telephone conversations and information derived from the monitored correspondence of other prisoners.

221. The applicant’s special status was lifted in Tarnów Prison on 9 August 2010 (see paragraph 230 below).

(b) The features of the regime

222. The applicant was placed in solitary confinement. He was entitled to a one-hour long period of outdoor exercise every day. On three occasions, however, the applicant decided not to leave his cell. In the applicant’s submission, the cell was like a dungeon, dark and not ventilated.

223. In accordance with the special detention regime, the applicant had been monitored twenty-four hours per day via a short-circuit camera installed in the cell. The toilet was not separated from the cell’s living area. The Government submitted that the recording system automatically blurred the applicant’s private parts.

224. The applicant had also been subjected to strip-searches each time he left and returned to his cell. In his submission, that was from two to eight times a day. In the Government’s submission, the applicant had not left his cell as frequently as he had claimed. At the material time, he did not receive any visitors and did not wish to attend the culture and education activities which were available in prison. Depending on whether he decided to go to the outdoor yard, he spent 23 or 24 hours inside his cell. Consequently, he had not been subjected to personal checks as often as he had claimed.

The applicant maintained that during his personal checks, he had had to undress in the presence of several wardens. The Government did not contest this but submitted instead that the officers conducting the search had all been male and that no third parties had been present.

225. The applicant also submitted that once a week on his way to and from the shower, he had been handcuffed and escorted by four wardens. Two of them watched the applicant in the shower.

(c) Related penitentiary complaints and criminal and civil proceedings

226. It appears that the applicant made a number of penitentiary complaints in relation to his detention in Pińczów Prison under high‑security.

227. On 1 July 2010 the Opole Lubelskie District Prosecutor decided to refuse to open an investigation into the applicant’s allegations that the officers of Opole Lubelskie Prison had deliberately registered in the applicant’s personal file false information about his attempts to organise prison rebellion, which in turn had led to his transfer to Pińczów Prison and his detention under a high-security regime in that facility.

228. A vast material was gathered in the course of the preliminary criminal investigation. It included copies of reports of a prison psychologist, the applicant’s supervisor, wardens and many other members of the staff and administration of Opole Lubelskie Prison who in the relevant time had examined and monitored the applicant’s conduct and resocialisation progress and who interviewed and monitored his fellow-inmates. Copies of all these documents have also been submitted to the Court. The documents in question, without any exception, stated that the applicant had seriously lacked moral character, had been a trouble maker and had been inciting his fellow inmates to rebellion. The action was scheduled for 1 June 2010 and it was going to involve breaking of the plastic window blinds in all cells.

229. In the light of the applicant’s detention history, the prosecutor came to the conclusion that the above-mentioned material was credible. Consequently, recording the relevant information about the applicant’s conduct in his personal file was not in breach of the rights and duties of the prison’s officers. Similarly, the subsequent decision of the Penitentiary Commission of the Opole Lubelskie Prison on the applicant’s transfer to Pińczów Prison had been dictated by justified fear that the applicant had posed a serious risk to the security of Opole Prison.

17. Tarnów Prison

230. The applicant was detained in this prison (300 km from his hometown) from, presumably, 20 May until an unspecified date prior to October 2010. His special detention regime was maintained until 9 August 2010.

231. Under high-security regime, the applicant was detained in a solitary cell. In his submission, the cell in question was small and badly-lit and ventilated.

232. The applicant was entitled to a daily one-hour long period of an outdoor exercise under surveillance. On two occasions he decided not to leave his cell. The Government submitted that from 20 May until 11 June 2010 the applicant had been entitled to attend culture and sports events organised in prison. Despite that, he had decided to remain in his cell.

The applicant could listen to a radio broadcast of a catholic mass and meet with a priest.

233. The applicant’s cell was under constant surveillance via a short‑circuit camera which, in the Government’s submission, blurred his private parts.

234. The applicant was subjected to strip searches each time he left and returned to his cell. In the Government’s submission, the search had been conducted by one male officer. The applicant claimed that personal checks had been conducted from two to eight times per day, often inside his cell under the camera surveillance.

235. During his detention in Tarnów Prison, the applicant’s mail and phone calls were monitored. In the applicant’s submission, his family and friends’ visits were restricted to two hours per month.

236. The applicant submitted that on 20 May 2010 the wardens at Tarnów Prison had taken away all his documents concerning his proceedings before the domestic courts and the ECHR and his own law books. On 28 June 2010 the applicant had been allowed for the first time to consult those documents and books in a separate room. He had been given 30 minutes to do so and was not allowed to take anything back to his cell.

237. The applicant lodged penitentiary complaints and brought a civil action for compensation on account of inadequate conditions of his detention in Tarnów Prison (no. I C 864/10). These proceedings are currently pending before the domestic court.

18. Czerwony Bór - Łomża Prison

238. The applicant was detained in that prison (150 km from his hometown) for an unspecified period.

(a) Living conditions in the prison

239. The applicant submitted that he had been detained in overcrowded, badly-lit and unventilated cells. He had only one-hour outdoor exercise per day and no cultural or leisure activities were available. Food served in Czerwony Bór - Łomża Prison was of poor quality and low nutritional value. In September 2010 the applicant informed the Court that prisoners did not have access to hot water.

240. The applicant also claimed to have been persecuted by the prison’s administration. He claimed that the prison authorities had imposed a disciplinary punishment on him in order to “break him” and to discourage him from writing to the ECHR.

241. He also submitted that: on 13 December 2010 he had been verbally and physically assaulted by a prison warden; on 20 December 2010 he had been assaulted by a certain A.C., a prison staff member, and on 7 January 2011 some of the applicant’s personal belongings (such as toothpaste and other toiletries, writing paper, garbage bags, coffee and pork sausages) had been stolen or destroyed by a certain A.C., a prison warden.

(b) The applicant’s disciplinary punishment

242. On 31 January 2011 the applicant submitted information concerning his disciplinary punishment in Czerwony Bór - Łomża Prison.

243. On 5 November 2010 a certain S. S., the Deputy Governor of Czerwony Bór - Łomża Prison imposed a disciplinary punishment on the applicant in the form of twenty-eight days’ solitary confinement. The measure had been ordered after the applicant had insulted the deputy governor.

244. The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that his behaviour had not justified solitary confinement. The applicant also asked that the execution of the measure be put on hold pending the proceedings before the penitentiary court.

245. By an order of 22 November 2010 a penitentiary judge of the Łomża Regional Court refused to postpone the execution of the disciplinary punishment.

246. The applicant appealed against the order, arguing that his disciplinary punishment had not been ordered in compliance with the law, because under Article 144 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, only a prison governor had the power to order detention in a solitary cell.

247. On 10 January 2011 the penitentiary court (Łomża Regional Court) upheld the impugned prison governor’s decision of 5 November 2010, having established that the applicant had written a note in which he had gravely insulted the prison’s deputy governor.

248. In a separate decision of the same date the penitentiary court upheld the penitentiary judge’s order of 22 November 2010. It was reiterated that according to the applicable provisions, disciplinary punishment should always be immediately enforced. Moreover, the court held that the wording “a prison governor” in Article 144 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences should be interpreted as extending to a prison’s deputy governor. The applicant’s disciplinary punishment had therefore been ordered in compliance with the law.

19. Zamość Prison

249. From an unspecified date the applicant was detained in Zamość Prison (253 km from his hometown). He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the living conditions in the prison.

20. Warszawa Służewiec Remand Centre

250. It appears that the applicant was detained in that facility from an unspecified date prior to 5 March 2012 until an unspecified date prior to 2 July 2012.

He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the living conditions and the regime in this remand centre.

I. The applicant’s transfers

251. Moreover, the applicant complained about the inconvenience of being frequently transferred between different prisons. He submitted that he should be detained in Warsaw Remand Centre because his family lived in that city. Instead, he had been sent to detention facilities across the whole country. Since 1996 the applicant had been transferred from one detention facility to another at least forty-four times. A number of his prisons were located as far as 300 km from his hometown.

That practice had caused the applicant and his family additional stress and suffering and effectively restricted contact with his relatives.

252. The applicant and his family lodged with the relevant penitentiary authorities multiple complaints and applications for the applicant’s definitive transfer to a prison close to his hometown.

J. The applicant’s submissions on the effectiveness of civil remedies

253. The applicant submitted that the domestic civil courts had not implemented the recent judgments of the ECHR delivered in the cases of Orchowski and Sikorski. Civil actions brought by prisoners, who alleged breaches of their personal rights on account of overcrowding and inadequate conditions of detention were always dismissed by the courts and the plaintiffs were ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings. The applicant claimed that the civil remedy was therefore illusory.

254. To that effect the applicant submitted a copy of a letter sent to him on 15 May 2009 by the Deputy of the President of the Warsaw Regional Court (Wiceprezes Sądu Okręgowego). The letter stated that out of a total number of fifteen actions in tort, which had been brought by detainees against Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre, in fourteen judgments the court had dismissed the claims and in one judgment (of 17 December 2007) the plaintiff had been awarded compensation in the amount of PLN 10,000.

255. The applicant submitted copies of a dozen other domestic court rulings in which the claims on account of overcrowding and inadequate conditions of detention had been dismissed.

K. Elections to municipal and district councils and provincial assemblies

256. On 27 October 2002 when the applicant was detained in Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre, he was not allowed to cast his vote in the elections to municipal and district councils and provincial assemblies (wybory do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw). He lodged numerous complaints in that connection.

257. By the letter of a penitentiary judge of the Supreme Court of 7 November 2002 and a letter of the Warsaw Election Commissary (Komisasz Wyborczy) of 3 December 2002, the applicant was informed that he should have been allowed to cast his vote in the elections because on 23 October 2002 the remand centre’s management had been officially notified that the ruling depriving the applicant of his civic rights had been quashed by the Supreme Court on 22 October 2002. The applicant was further informed that, following the Supreme Court’s judgment, he should have immediately lodged a reclamation about the fact that his name was missing from the register of persons entitled to vote in the remand centre (reklamacja na nieprawidłowości w spisie wyborców).

258. On 9 December 2002 the Warsaw District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of non-compliance by the staff of the Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre with their official duties (niedopełnienie obowiązków służbowych) in that on 27 October 2002 the applicant had not been allowed to participate in the local elections.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Preventive measures, including pre-trial detention

259. The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition of pre‑trial detention (aresztowanie tymczasowe), the grounds for its extension, release from detention and rules governing other “preventive measures” (środki zapobiegawcze) are stated in the Court’s judgments in the cases of Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02, §§ 27‑33, 25 April 2006, and Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§ 22‑23, 4 August 2006.

B. Remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings

260. The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for excessive length of judicial proceedings, in particular the applicable provisions of the 2004 Act, are stated in the Court’s decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland, no. 15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V; Ratajczyk v. Poland, no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005-VIII; and the judgment in the case of Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR 2005-V.

C. General rules concerning conditions of detention

261. The relevant law and practice pertaining to conditions of detention and to civil law action for compensation against the State Treasury are laid out in the judgment in the case of Orchowski v. Poland, no. 17885/04, §§ 64-75, 22 October 2009. More recent developments are described in the Court’s decision in the case of Łatak v. Poland (no. 52070/08) on 12 October 2010 (see §§ 25‑54).

D. Prisoners’ correspondence, telephone conversations, contact with family and other elements of the ordinary detention regime in a closed-type prison

262. Rules relating to the conditions of detention, means of controlling correspondence, telephone conversations and contact with family of convicted persons are set out in the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (Kodeks karny wykonawczy) (“the Code”) which entered into force on 1 September 1998.

263. The relevant parts of Article 90 of the Code provided at the material time (after the amendment of 1 September 2003 and prior to the amendment of 1 January 2012) as follows:

“In a closed-type prison:

...

(4) the movement of convicted persons on the prison premises shall take place in an organised manner and under supervision,

...

(6) convicted persons shall have a right of two visits per month, [which they can] use in one go with an authorisation of the prison governor;

(7) the visits of convicted persons shall be monitored (podlegają nadzorowi) by the prison administration; conversations during the visits shall be controlled (podlegają kontroli) by the prison administration;

(8) the correspondence of convicted persons shall be censored (podlega cenzurze) by the prison administration, with the exception of the correspondence within the meaning of Articles 8 § 3, 102(11) and 103 § 1 which shall only be monitored (podlega nadzorowi)

(9) telephone conversations of convicted persons shall be controlled (podlegają kontroli) by the prison administration.”

264. The relevant part of Article 103 § 1 of the Code provided at the material time (prior to the amendments of 1 January 2012) as follows:

“Convicts ... have a right to lodge complaints with institutions established by international treaties ratified by the Republic of Poland concerning the protection of human rights. Correspondence in those cases ... shall be sent to the addressee without delay and shall not be censored.”

265. Under Article 105 of the Code as applicable at the material time (after the amendment of 1 September 2003 and prior to the amendment of 1 January 2012), the supervision of visits, censorship of correspondence, monitoring of conversations during visits and telephone conversations, shall depend on the type of prison in which a convicted person serves his or her sentence, and on the requirements of individual programme (Article 105 § 3). The prison governor is authorised to make decisions concerning the stopping and censorship of the correspondence and the monitoring and controlling of conversations if it is required by the prison security considerations. The governor is under duty to inform the penitentiary judge and the prisoner concerned about such decision (Article 105 § 4).

266. Article 105 (a) as relevant and applicable at the material time provided the following:

Ҥ 1 A visit shall last 60 minutes ...

§ 4 A visit of a person who is not a member of the convicted person’s family or otherwise a close person [to him] shall be granted only with a permission of the prison governor.

§ 5 Visits shall take place under the supervision (pod nadzorem) of a prison guard in a manner making it possible for a convicted person to have direct contact with a visitor, at a separate table.

...

§ 7 In the event of breaking of the rules ... by the convicted person or the visitor, a visit shall be interrupted and ended before its time....”.

267. Article 242 of the Code provided at the material time (after the amendment of 1 September 2003 and prior to the amendment of 11 March 2011) the following definitions of the relevant terms:

“...

§ 6 The term of “monitoring of correspondence” (nadzór nad korepondencją) shall mean opening of an envelope and checking its contents.

§ 7 The term of “censorship of correspondence” (cenzura korespondencji) shall mean acquainting oneself with the content of a letter and deleting a part of text or making it illegible.

§ 8 the term of “stopping of correspondence” (zatrzymanie korespondencji) shall mean not transmitting it onto the addressee and putting it in the convicted person’s personal file

§ 9 The term of “supervision of a visit” (nadzór nad widzeniem) shall mean maintaining order during the visit

§ 10 The term of „monitoring of a conversation” (kontrola rozmowy) during a visit or over the telephone shall mean acquainting oneself with the content of the conversation with the possibility of interrupting it....”

268. The procedure on security measures while escorting a prisoner within or outside his detention facility was regulated at the relevant time (until 13 August 2010) primarily by the Law of 26 April 1996 on the Prison Service (Ustawa o Służbie Więziennej).

Section 19 of that law provided the following:

“1. Officers in service are entitled to apply with regard to persons deprived of liberty the following measures of direct restraint:

(...)

2) placement in a security cell;

( ...)

4) use of shackles (kajdany) or fetters (prowadnice)

(...)

2. The measures of direct restraint enumerated in paragraph 1 shall be used, if necessary, only in order to counteract: an attempt against the life or health of [the detainee himself] or of a third person, incitement to rebellion, flagrant disobedience, dangerous disturbance of the peace and order, damaging of property, or the escape of a person deprived of liberty.

(...)

5. In justified circumstances it is permitted to use during the escort or transfer of a person deprived of liberty shackles, a restraining belt or fetters in order to prevent the person in question from escaping or behaving aggressively,

6. Measures of direct restraint shall not be used for longer than is necessary.”

269. Moreover, detailed rules on the use of measures of physical restraint in detention were laid down at the material time (until 13 August 2010) in the Cabinet Ordinance of 20 November 1996 on detailed rules on the use by officers of the Prison Service of measures of direct restraint, firearms or police dogs (Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów w sprawie szczegółowych warunków stosowania środków przymusu bezpośredniego oraz użycia broni palnej lub psa służbowego przez funkcjonariuszy Służby Więziennej oraz sposobu postępowania w tym zakresie), which entered into force on 12 December 1996.

270. Section 12 of the above ordinance read, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“1. Shackles or fetters shall be used in order to restrain the movement of a detainee’s limbs ...

2. Shackles or fetters shall be put on [the detainee’s] arms in front of his body. In the event that a detainee (...) is aggressive or dangerous, shackles may be put on [the detainee’s] arms behind his body and also on [his] legs ...”

271. Article 116 § 3 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences regulates the practice of personal checks.

“A personal check means an inspection of the body and checking of clothes, underwear and footwear as well as [other] objects in a [prisoner’s] possession. The inspection of the body, checking of clothes and footwear shall be carried out in a room, in the absence of third parties and persons of the opposite sex and shall be effected by persons of the same sex.”

E. Provisions pertaining to the organisation of penitentiary commissions, the classification of prisoners and the imposition and elements of high-security regime for special categories of prisoners

272. A prison penitentiary commission operates on the basis of Articles 75 and 76 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (“the Code”) and the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice of 25 August 2003 on the rules concerning the execution of prison sentences (Rozporządzenie w sprawie regulaminu organizacyjno-porządkowego wykonywania kary pozbawienia wolności). According to the relevant provisions of this Ordinance (Sections 36-38) the penitentiary commission is established and headed by the prison’s governor who decides on the composition of the commission and the mode of examination of cases. A penitentiary commission comprises at least three members chosen, in particular, among staff from the penitentiary and security sectors. The prisoner’s supervisor (wychowawca) takes part in the penitentiary commission’s meeting concerning the prisoner. The penitentiary commission delivers its decision and gives its opinion after hearing the prisoner concerned and in his presence. The decisions and opinions are reasoned and delivered in writing. They are filed in the prisoner’s personal records.

273. A decision to assign each convicted person to a particular prison type and imprisonment regime lies with the penitentiary commission if the trial court had not ruled to that effect in the judgment (Article 76 § 2 of the Code). Among a number of categories of prisoners, the penitentiary commission can classify a convicted person as a “prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to the security of a prison” within the meaning of Article 88 of the Code and order his or her placement in a closed-type prison or in a particular wing of such prison in conditions providing increased protection to society and the security of the prison (Article 76 § 7 of the Code). Such decision shall be reviewed at least once every three months (ibid.).

274. Article 88 enumerated situations which can give rise to a prisoner’s classification under a particular category. The relevant part of the provision as applicable at the relevant time (after the amendment of 1 September 2003 and before the amendment of 1 January 2012) read as follows:

Ҥ 3 A convicted person posing a serious threat to society or to the security of a prison shall be placed in a closed-type prison in conditions providing increased protection to society and the security of the prison.

§ 4 A person convicted of a criminal offence committed within an organised gang ..., shall be placed in a prison as described in § 3, unless extraordinary circumstances speak against such [regime of] detention.

§ 5 A person sentenced to life imprisonment or to 25 years’ imprisonment shall be placed in a closed-type prison.

§ 6 It is also permitted to commit to a closed-type prison, in view of a danger to society or to the security of the prison ...

(2) a convicted person who had, during his detention in remand centre or in prison, seriously breached discipline and order

...

(4) a convicted person who had committed an offence of a significant harm to the society, if his attitude and behaviour speak for his detention in a closed type prison”

275. Further rules concerning the category of a prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to the security of a prison are laid down in Article 88 (a) which at the material time read as follows:

“ § 1 A convicted person ... [posing a serious threat to society or to the security of a prison] shall be committed to a designated wing or cell of a closed-type prison [and] a penitentiary judge [shall be] informed about it.

§ 2 [The above paragraph] shall apply to a convicted person whose qualities, personal features, motivations [and] behaviour when committing the criminal offence, the type and degree of the negative effects of the offence [and his] behaviour and the extent of the lack of moral character during [his] detention, pose a serious danger to society or to the security of a prison and who:

1) had committed a criminal offence ...:

...

(b) with a particular cruelty

...

(e) with the use of arms ...

2) during his previous or current detention, posed a danger for the security of a prison or remand centre in that:

(a) [he] was an organiser or an active participant of a group rebellion in prison ...”

276. Other elements of detention under the special high-security regime were laid down at the relevant time in Article 88 (b) of the Code as follows:

“ ...

§ 4 The movement of convicted persons on the prison premises shall take place under increased supervision and shall be limited only to necessary needs,

§ 5 Convicted persons shall be subjected to a personal check each time they leave and return to their cells,

§ 6 The outdoor exercise shall take place in the designated areas under increased supervision,

...

§ 8 The visits of convicted persons shall take place in designated areas under increased supervision...

§ 9 It is possible that the visits of convicted persons be authorised [to take place] in a manner making it impossible to maintain a direct contact with the visitors, in the event of a serious danger to the security of the visiting persons. A decision [to that effect] shall be taken by a prison governor ...”

277. Moreover, the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice of 31 October 2003 on means of protection of organisational units of the Prison Service (Rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości z dn. 31 października 2003 r. w sprawie sposobów ochrony jednostek organizacyjnych Służby Więziennej) (“the 2003 Ordinance”), provides that prisoners requiring increased security measures can move on the prison premises only singly. In justified cases such prisoners may move in a group of three but under the increased supervision by the prison guards (Section 91 (1) and (2) of the 2003 Ordinance). Section 91 (4) states that, outside the cell and facilities designated for the above mentioned category of prisoners, an inmate must be permanently and directly supervised by at least two prison guards. This restriction can only exceptionally and in justified cases be lifted by the prison governor.

278. On 18 June 2009 subparagraph (c) was added to Article 88 of the Code (entered into force on 22 October 2009), allowing placing a prisoner who poses a serious threat to society or to the security of a prison under round-the-clock camera surveillance (monitorowanie) inside his cell including the toilet annex. The so obtained image or sound are to be recorded (podlega utrwalaniu). Moreover, the newly introduced Article 73 (a) provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“1. Detention facilities may be monitored through an internal system of devices recording images or sound, including close-circuit television.

2. Monitoring, ensuring the observation of a prisoner’s behaviour, may be used in particular in prison cells including parts designated for sanitary and hygienic purposes, in baths, in premises designated for visits, in places of employment of detainees, in traffic routes, in prison yards, as well as to ensure observation of the prison grounds outside buildings, including the lines of external walls.

3. Monitored images or sound may be recorded with the help of appropriate devices.

4. Monitoring and recording of sound may not include information subject to the seal of confession or secret protected by law.

5. Images from close-circuit television installed in the part of the prison cell designated for sanitary and hygienic purposes and in baths shall be transmitted to monitors or other devices referred to in paragraph 3 in a manner making it impossible to show [detainees’] private parts or their intimate physiological functions.

...”

279. Pursuant to Article 73 (a) §§ 6 and 7, if the recorded material is not relevant for the prison security or security of an individual prisoner it shall be immediately destroyed. The prison governor decides for how long the relevant recorded material should be stored and how it is to be used.

280. Before the 2009 amendments to the Code, the rules on monitoring prisoners were included in paragraph 81 § 2 of the 2003 Ordinance according to which a prison cell could be additionally equipped with video cameras and devices enabling listening.

THE LAW

I. COMPLAINTS UNDER ARTICLES 3, 5 § 3, 6 § 1 AND 10 OF THE CONVENTION

281. The applicant complained about the inadequate conditions of his detention, in particular overcrowding. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

282. The applicant also complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention about the unreasonable length of his detention on remand. The relevant part of this provision reads as follows:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

283. He also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the unreasonable length of the main criminal proceedings against him. The relevant part of this provision reads as follows:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

284. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 10 of the Convention about the interference by the prison authorities with his freedom to impart information about the European Court of Human Rights. The relevant part of that provision reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom ... to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority ...

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

285. By letter dated 8 March 2013 the Government informed the Court that they proposed to make a unilateral declaration with a view to resolving the issues raised by this part of the application. They further requested the Court to strike out the application in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention.

The declaration provided as follows:

“... Bearing in mind the specific circumstances of the present case, the Government hereby wish to express – by way of the unilateral declaration – their acknowledgement of:

1) the violation of Article 3 of the Convention by failure to afford the applicant adequate conditions of his detention,

2) the violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention due to unreasonable length of the applicant’s detention on remand,

3) the violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention due to unreasonable length of the judicial proceedings conducted in the applicant’s case,

4) the violation of Article 10 by interfering with the applicant’s freedom to impart information among his fellow prisoners.

Simultaneously, the Government declare that they are ready to pay the applicant the sum of 25,000 PLN which they consider to be reasonable in the light of the Court’s case law. The sum referred to above, which is to cover any pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage, as well as costs and expenses, will be free of any taxes that may be applicable. It will be payable within three months from the date of notification of the final ruling taken[1] by the Court pursuant to Article 37 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the event of failure to pay this sum within the said three-month period, the Government undertake to pay simple interest on it, from expiry of that period until settlement, as a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default periods plus three percentage points...”

286. As transpires from the Government’s unilateral declaration the Government accepted paying to the applicant the sum of PLN 25,000 in the event of the Court’s striking this part of the case out of its list.

287. In a letter of 6 May 2013 the applicant’s lawyers expressed the view that the sum mentioned in the Government’s declaration was unacceptably low and objected to the striking out of this part of the application.

288. The Court recalls that Article 37 of the Convention provides that it may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to one of the conclusions specified under (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 of that Article. Article 37 § 1 (c) enables the Court in particular to strike a case out of its list if:

“for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application”.

289. It also recalls that in certain circumstances, it may strike out an application under Article 37 § 1 (c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government even if the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued.

290. To this end, the Court examined the declaration in the light of the principles emerging from its case-law, in particular the Tahsin Acar judgment (Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, [GC], no. 26307/95, §§ 75-77, ECHR 2003-VI); WAZA Spółka z o.o. v. Poland (dec.), no. 11602/02, 26 June 2007; and Sulwińska v. Poland (dec.), no. 28953/03, 18 September 2007).

291. The Court has established in a number of cases, including those brought against Poland, its practice concerning complaints about the violation of Article 3 on account of overcrowding and inadequate detention conditions (see, for example, the pilot judgments in the cases of Orchowski v. Poland, no. 17885/04, 22 October 2009 and Norbert Sikorski v. Poland, no. 17599/05, 22 October 2009 and the leading follow-up decision in the case of Łatak v. Poland (dec.), no. 52070/08, 12 October 2010). The Court has also addressed, in numerous cases, its practice concerning complaints under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention about the length of pre-trial detention (see Kauczor v. Poland, no. 45219/06, 3 February 2009 with further references) and under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the violation of one’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time (see, for example, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII; Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 69-98, ECHR 2006-V; Majewski v. Poland, no. 52690/99, 11 October 2005; and Wende and Kukówka v. Poland, no. 56026/00, 10 May 2007).

292. Having regard to the nature of the admissions contained in the Government’s declaration, as well as the amount of compensation proposed – which is consistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases – the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 (c)).

293. The Court further notes that this decision constitutes a final resolution of this part of the application only in so far as the proceedings before the Court are concerned. It is without prejudice to the use by the applicant of other remedies before the domestic courts to claim further compensation in respect of the length of the impugned proceedings.

294. Moreover, in light of the above considerations, and in particular given the clear and extensive case-law on the topic, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of this part of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine).

295. Finally, the Court emphasises that, should the Government fail to comply with the terms of their unilateral declaration, the application could be restored to the list in accordance with Article 37 § 2 of the Convention (Josipović v. Serbia (dec.), no. 18369/07, 4 March 2008).

296. Accordingly, this part of the application should be struck out of the list.

II. COMPLAINT UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ABOUT THE APPLICANT’S DETENTION UNDER A HIGH-SECURITY REGIME IN 2004 AND 2010

297. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the imposition of the high-security regime in 2004 and 2010, entailing his solitary confinement, strip searches and surveillance, constituted inhuman and degrading treatment.

A. Admissibility

298. The Government submitted that this part of the application should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies on the ground that the applicant had not brought a relevant civil action for compensation.

299. The applicant disagreed.

300. The Court reiterates that although Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires that the complaints intended to be brought subsequently before the Court should have been made to the appropriate domestic body, it does not require that recourse should be had to remedies that are inadequate or ineffective (see Egmez v. Turkey no. 30873/96, ECHR 2000-XII, §§ 65 et seq). Nor can it be said that in cases where the national law provides for several parallel remedies in the sphere of both civil and criminal law, the person concerned, after a sustained but eventually unsuccessful attempt to obtain redress through one such remedy, must necessarily try all other means (see H.D. v. Poland (dec.), no. 33310/96, 7 June 2001).

301. In the present case, it is undisputed that the applicant pursued appeals with the penitentiary court against two out of four decisions on classifying him as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society and security of prison (see paragraphs 141 and 219 above). In consequence, the Court does not consider that, after these appeals were dismissed (see paragraphs 142 and 220 above), he should, in order to fulfil his obligation under Article 35 § 1, have also brought a civil action under Article 24 read in conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code (see Głowacki v. Poland, no. 1608/08, § 61, 30 October 2012).

302. Accordingly, the Court holds that the applicant is not expected in addition to have pursued the other remedy relied on by the respondent Government. It follows that the Government’s preliminary objection must be rejected (see Kawiecki v. Poland (dec.), no.15593/07, § 96, 23 October 2012).

303. The Court also notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ arguments

(a) The applicant

304. The applicant submitted that the imposition of the high-security regime in 2004 and 2010, entailing his placement in solitary confinement and subjecting him to strip searches and surveillance, constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

(b) The Government

305. The Government argued in essence that the imposition of high‑security regime in 2004 and 2010 and various security measures which that regime had entailed did not constitute a treatment which had attained the minimum level of severity required under Article 3. In particular, the alleged suffering involved in the application of the “dangerous prisoner” regime in respect of the applicant had not gone beyond the inevitable element of humiliation connected with the imposition of detention on a person considered to have posed a threat to prison security – a legitimate measure that had been fully justified under Polish law.

2. The Court’s assessment

306. A restatement of the general principles concerning the examination under Article 3 of the Convention of similar complaints concerning detention under high-security regime may be found in the Court’s recent judgment of a detainee classified as “dangerous” in the case of Piechowicz v. Poland (see Piechowicz v. Poland, no. 20071/07, §§ 158-165, 17 April 2012; and, recently, Prus v. Poland, no. 5136/11, § 27, 12 January 2016 and Paluch v. Poland, no. 57292/12, § 36, 16 February 2016).

307. Turning to the facts of the present case, it is to be noted that from 20 January until 5 October 2004 (ten months and a half) the applicant was classified as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to the security of a prison (see paragraphs 90 and 139-147 above). He was also placed under a similar regime of increased supervision from 12 to 20 January 2004 (see paragraphs 134-136 above).

308. The legal basis for the imposition and the extension of the “dangerous-detainee” status were the decisions of the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre taken on 20 January (upheld after appeal on 9 February 2004), 20 April and 5 July 2004 under Article 76 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (Kodeks karny wykonawczy) (“the Code”), in view of the gravity of the offences of which the applicant had been convicted, the opinions of prison wardens and the fact that the applicant had been heard uttering threats against judges involved in his criminal trial (see paragraphs 134, 139, 142 and 144 above).

309. At the material time the applicant was detained in Radom Remand Centre, from 20 January until 13 May 2004 and from 28 June until 5 October 2004; Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre, from 13 May until 1 June 2004 and in Sztum Prison, from 1 until 28 June 2004 (see paragraphs 85, 90, 133 and 204 above).

310. It is established on the basis of the material at hand, that the applicant’s high-security regime entailed the following measures.

311. During the total period of over five or six months (no data in respect of the applicant’s month of detention in Sztum Prison), the applicant was committed to solitary cells (see paragraphs 90, 149 and 204 above). In the remaining period of four months, he shared his cell in Radom Remand Centre with one or two other persons (see paragraph 149 above).

312. During the same period of time, the applicant was also in complete isolation from other prisoners. He had a daily one-hour outdoor exercise alone (see paragraphs 90, 149 and 204 above) and individual access to the day-room (with television, books and magazines) twice or three times per week for one hour at a time (see paragraphs 90 and 152 above). The applicant did not participate in sporting, education or leisure activities generally available in the detention facilities in question (see paragraphs 90 and 152 above).

313. During the entire ten and a half months of his detention under the high-security regime, the applicant was subjected to strip searches from two to eight times per day (see paragraphs 90, 153 and 204 above).

314. For the same period of time, he was under constant camera surveillance which, in at least one facility (Radom Remand Centre), required that the light in his cell be turned on at night (see paragraphs 90, 151 and 204 above). In Sztum Prison the camera surveillance also covered the toilet annex in the applicant’s cell, although the Government submitted that the picture of that area had been blurred (see paragraph 204 above).

315. From 13 May until 9 August 2010 (three months) the applicant was again, classified as a “prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to the security of a prison” (see paragraphs 217-221 above).

316. This time, the high-security regime was imposed on him on the basis of the decision taken by the Penitentiary Commission of Pińczów Prison on the ground that the applicant, who had been considered to seriously lack of moral character and to be vexatious, had been inciting prisoners to rebellion and had become a leader of the criminal underground. On 6 September 2010 the Kielce Regional Court upheld that decision after the applicant’s appeal (see paragraphs 218 and 220 above).

317. Under this regime the applicant was detained in Pińczów Prison, from 13 until 20 May 2010, and in Tarnów Prison, from 20 May until 9 August 2010 (see paragraphs 217 and 230 above).

318. In both of the above-mentioned prisons, the applicant was committed to solitary confinement cells (see paragraphs 222 and 231 above). He had a daily one-hour period of an outdoor exercise (presumably alone or with a small number of pre-selected fellow prisoners) (see paragraphs 222 and 232 above). His cells were under constant video‑surveillance including the toilet area, although the Government submitted that the image of the applicant’s private parts had been blurred (see paragraphs 223 and 233 above). The applicant was also subjected to strip searches each time he left and returned to his cell, from two to eight times per day. The applicant claimed that at times he had had to undress in the presence of several wardens or under video surveillance (see paragraphs 224 and 234 above). The Government submitted that the applicant’s personal checks had been conducted only by male officers, in Tarnów Prison – only one officer, and that the camera installed in the applicant’s cells had automatically blurred the image of his private parts (see ibid.). The applicant also submitted that his detention regime in Pińczów Prison also entailed his handcuffing on the way to the shower once a week and his surveillance by two guards during the shower (see paragraphs 225 above).

319. The Court notes that all decisions imposing the high-security regime on the applicant in 2004 and 2010 were legitimate measures, warranted by the fact that the applicant had been convicted of serious offences including, murder and attempted murder (see paragraph 38 above); that from August 2000 until the end of November 2004 he was tried on charges of uttering threats and inciting third person to kill the judge who had presided in his criminal case (see paragraphs 56-58 above); and that during his detention in Opole Lubelskie Prison in 2010 he had been caught inciting fellow prisoners to rebellion and leading the prison’s criminal underground (see paragraph 217 above).

320. It was not, therefore, unreasonable on the part of the authorities to consider that, for the sake of ensuring the security of the detention facilities in question, the applicant should be subjected to tighter security controls, involving some form of segregation from the prison community and constant supervision of his movement within and outside his cell, including via close-circuit television. The monitoring of a prisoner’s behaviour as in the present case, although certainly intrusive, is not per se incompatible with Article 3. This measure serves the purposes of both ensuring prison security and protecting the prisoner from the risk of pressure or even physical attack from the criminal community which, in the context of organised crime, cannot generally be excluded. As to the latter, the Court notes that in January 2004 the applicant informed the authorities that he had feared for his life because a certain convicted criminal who had been a prosecution witness during the applicant’s trial, had been committed to Radom Remand Centre at the same time as the applicant (see paragraph 138 above).

321. However, for the reasons stated below, the Court cannot accept that the continued and indiscriminate application of the full range of measures that were available to the authorities under the regime for “prisoners posing a serious threat to society and the security of a prison” for up to more than ten months in 2004 and for three months in 2010, was necessary for maintaining prison security and compatible with Article 3 of the Convention.

322. For the most part (over five or six months in 2004 and the entire three months in 2010) the applicant was detained in solitary cells and was subjected to almost complete social isolation (see paragraphs 311, 312 and 318 above). The only exceptions were that for the total period of four months he had one or two cellmates placed with him in Radom Remand Centre (see paragraph 149 above), that he maintained a minimum degree of daily contact with the prison staff when being escorted for a daily walk or to the shower (see paragraphs 152, 225, 311 and 318 above) and that he had restricted opportunities of communication with visitors from the outside (see paragraphs 155, 224 and 235 above; see Głowacki, cited above, § 87 with further references).

323. Moreover, the negative psychological and emotional effects of the applicant’s social isolation, even if not complete, were aggravated by the routine application of other special security measures, in particular the strip searches.

324. The Court agrees that strip-searches may be necessary on occasion to ensure prison security or to prevent disorder or crime (see Iwańczuk v. Poland, no. 25196/94, § 59, 15 November 2001). However, it is not persuaded that systematic, intrusive and exceptionally embarrassing checks performed on the applicant daily, especially if eight times per day, were necessary to ensure safety in prison (see Piechowicz, § 176; Głowacki, § 93, both cited above).

325. Having regard to the fact that the applicant was already under a constant camera surveillance inside his cell, under guards’ watch when outdoors or on the premises of each detention facility and for the most part, in isolation from fellow inmates, the Court considers that the practice of strip-searches conducted whenever he left or returned to his cell, at least twice per day and, in all probability, more often, over ten months in 2004 and three months in 2010 (see paragraphs 313 and 318 above), must have diminished his human dignity and caused him feelings of inferiority, anguish and accumulated distress which went beyond the unavoidable suffering and humiliation involved in the imposition of detention on remand (see Horych, § 101; Piechowicz, § 176 and Głowacki, § 94, all cited above).

326. In conclusion, taking into account the cumulative effect of the “dangerous detainee” regime on the applicant, the Court finds that the authorities did not provide sufficient and relevant reasons which could justify, in the circumstances of the case, the severity of the measures taken. In particular, the authorities failed to show that the impugned measures were necessary in their entirety to attain the legitimate aim of ensuring prison security.

327. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

III. COMPLAINT UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE MONITORING OF THE APPLICANT’S CORRESPONDENCE IN 2002

328. The applicant also complained (on 23 November 2004) under Article 8 of the Convention that in 2002 three letters from various domestic institutions and one letter from the Court had been monitored by the authorities (see paragraphs 66‑81 above).

The relevant part of this provision reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for ... his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

However, Article 34 of the Convention reads, in its relevant part, as following:

“The Court may receive applications from any person ... claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto...”

329. The Government argued that the applicant was no longer a victim of this interference because by virtue of the domestic courts’ judgments of 27 November 2006 and 28 June 2007 he had been awarded PLN 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,200) of compensation for the infringement of his personal right on account of the fact that three letters sent to him from the Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service, the Country Election Office and the Central Board of the Prison Service had been censored by mistake. In addition, by virtue of the judgment of the Warsaw Regional Court of 9 August 2007 he was awarded PLN 1,000 (approximately 250 EUR) on account of the monitoring of the letter from the ECHR.

330. The applicant submitted in substance that he still had victim status within the meaning of the Convention.

331. Following the line of reasoning in its inadmissibility decision in the very similar case of Sobolewski v. Poland (no. 1) ((dec.), no. 39655/05, 16 December 2008) and having regard to the circumstances of the case, in particular the fact that the applicant was awarded PLN 5,000 for the monitoring of the first three letters in question and PLN 1,000 for the monitoring of the remaining letter (see paragraphs 71-75 and 79-81 above), the Court finds that the national authorities acknowledged and afforded sufficient redress for the interference in question, therefore, depriving the applicant of his status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

IV. COMPLAINT UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE OPENING, READING AND SEIZING OF THE APPLICANT’S CORRESPONDENCE AND MONITORING OF HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AND VISITS IN 2004

332. The applicant also complained under Article 8 of the Convention about the practice of opening, reading and seizing of his correspondence, and of the monitoring of his telephone conversations and visits which had been put in place in Radom Remand Centre from February until December 2004 (see paragraphs 135-136 and 154-156; 160 - 165 above);

He submitted that, in 2004 he had sent approximately 4,000 private and official letters and all of them had been censored by the remand centres’ administration. The applicant enumerated 1228 censored letters which he had sent from Radom and Warszawa-Mokotów Remand Centres between 26 February and 31 December 2004 and 48 incoming letters which were also censored.

The applicant did not allege that in the monitored and censored correspondence, had been any letters to or from the institutions which were protected from the authorities control under the Polish law, such as the Court and the Ombudsman or because they had been recognised by the Court to merit special confidentiality, such as defendant.

Instead, the applicant put emphasis on the censorship and seizure of two private letters of 18 and 19 November 2004 which he had wished to send to his fellow prisoners K.S. and P.K. (see paragraphs 162-165 above).

333. He also submitted that when he had been detained in Radom Remand Centre in 2004 eleven visits had taken place, mainly with his brother K.K. and one, with a certain A.W. The applicant also had 180 telephone conversations in 2004 in Radom Remand Centre. They were all controlled (see paragraphs 155 above).

334. The Government stated that the remand centre’s 2004 register of prisoners’ mail had not been kept but they acknowledged that the opening, reading and, if necessary, stopping of the applicant’s mail and monitoring of his telephone conversations and visits had taken place in Radom Remand Centre in 2004 and submitted that it was justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.

335. The Court takes notice of the parties’ concordant submissions that during his detention from 13 January 2004 until an unspecified date, presumably in December 2004, all of the applicant’s incoming and outgoing mail was to be opened and read in the applicant’s presence by the staff of Radom and Warszawa-Mokotów Remand Centres and that his telephone conversations and visits were to be monitored and controlled (see paragraphs 135, 136, 139, 154-156, and 160-164 above). The applicant did not indicate, however, that in the period when he had been detained under increased supervision, from 12 until 20 January 2004, he had received or sent any letters, made any telephone calls or had any visits (see paragraph 136 above). It is clear, on the other hand, that a great number of letters, telephone calls and visits were indeed under the authorities’ scrutiny between February and December 2004.

This undoubtedly constitutes “interference” with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence under Article 8 of the Convention.

336. Any “interference by a public authority” with the right to respect for private life and correspondence will contravene Article 8 of the Convention unless it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 of that Article and is “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve them (see Piechowicz, cited above, § 232).

337. As to the requirements of lawfulness, it must be noted that the interference took place between February and December 2004, while the applicant was serving a prison sentence (see paragraph 38 above) and was regulated by Articles 90, 105 and 242 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraphs 262 - 266 above). The practice in question was put in place and maintained on the basis of the following decisions: the decisions of the Penitentiary Commission of 20 January, 20 April and 5 July 2004 (see paragraphs 140 and 144 above) and the decision of the Governor of Radom Remand Centre of 11 November 2004 (see paragraph 160 above).

The Court observes that the interference was, therefore in accordance with the law within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 8.

338. The Court has recognised that some measure of control over prisoners’ correspondence and communications is called for and is not of itself incompatible with the Convention, regard being paid to the ordinary and reasonable requirements of imprisonment (see, Piechowicz, cited above, § 232, with further references). It remains therefore to be ascertained whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society in line with the requirements of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.

339. From 20 January until 5 October 2004 the applicant was placed under a high-security regime because he was classified as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a detention facility. This status, in turn, was justified by the authorities on the following grounds: (1) The applicant had been convicted of a serious offence and sentenced to a long term in prison. (2) He was hostile towards the officers of the justice department in that he had been uttering threats against judge B.P and in consequence, he was considered as likely to pose a real threat to the security of the other judges of the bench and likely to abscond, in particular, during transport outside the remand centre. (3) He seriously lacked moral character. (4) Other features of the applicant’s character, together with the above-mentioned elements, made him a person who posed a serious threat to the society and to the security of the remand centre (see paragraphs 139, 142, 143 above).

340. From 11 November until 31 December 2004 or a later unspecified date, the applicant was no longer classified as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a prison but was considered by the Radom Remand Centre Governor to require treatment with particular precaution because of the threats he had uttered in the past against judge B.P. (see paragraphs 160 and 168 above).

341. The domestic authorities which later examined the applicant’s various complaints about the above mentioned measures found that the practice of opening, reading and, if necessary, seizing the applicant’s correspondence had been fully justified in the applicant’s situation (see paragraphs 166 - 175 above).

342. In the light of all the above elements, the Court observes that the domestic authorities had compelling reasons for putting in place and maintaining the practice of opening and reading of the applicant’s correspondence and of monitoring and controlling of his telephone conversations and visits. The Court does not find any reasons to doubt that the control of the applicant’s correspondence was carried out to ensure that it did not contain material which would be harmful to prison security or the safety of others or otherwise of a criminal nature. Lastly, the applicant did not provide any information, such as for example the nature or subject‑matter of the letters, capable of showing that the impugned interference was not “necessary in a democratic society” has not shown before the Court that the censorship of his correspondence lacked justification under Article 8 of the Convention.

343. It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

V. COMPLAINT UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE REFUSAL TO GRANT TWO VISITS IN 2006

344. The applicant also complained under Article 8 of the Convention that in June 2006 the authorities had refused to authorise his first cousin, P.W. and his friend, Z.W. to visit him in prison (see paragraph 195 above).

345. The Government argued that Article 8 of the Convention was inapplicable and, alternatively, that the interference was necessary in a democratic society.

346. The Court recalls that it has recently restated its case-law on the visiting rights of prisoners (Khoroshenko v. Russia [GC], no. 41418/04, §§ 116-126, ECHR 2015). It observes that detention entails inherent limitations on the prisoner’s private and family life, including restrictions on the number of people authorised to apply for visits. However, an extended prohibition on contact with family members is compatible with Article 8 only in so far as the authorities have not failed to fulfil their duty under this provision to enable, and assist, the applicant in maintaining contact with his close family and secured a fair balance between his rights and the aims of the special regime (see Piechowicz, cited above, § 129, with further references).

347. It must be noted that at the material time the applicant regularly met with his relatives and friends who were among the fifty persons authorised to apply for a visit (see paragraphs 195 and 201 above). In June 2006 the Radom Remand Centre Governor refused to authorise the visits of two additional persons (see paragraph 195 above). Those decisions were issued under Article 105 (a) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences and were, therefore, in accordance with the law (see paragraph 265 above). It was reasoned that one of the visitors in question had not been closely related to the applicant and the other one, had been a former detainee. Granting those visits would have posed some risk to the remand centre’s internal order and to the security of the applicant and his fellow inmates (see paragraphs 195, 201 and 202 above).

348. The Court is of the view that the facts of the present case show that the applicant had sufficient contact with the outside world and good opportunities to maintain family ties. In any event, leaving aside the issue of the applicability of Article 8 as raised by the Government, the Court accepts that, in the circumstances of the case, certain restrictions on the applicant’s contact with the family and friends were inevitable and that the interference complained of was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the remand centre’s internal order. It was also not disproportionate because it concerned only two persons whereas regular visits from among fifty other people who were on the list of authorised visitors were possible and indeed took place.

349. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

VI. COMPLAINT UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION ABOUT HIS DETENTION FAR FROM HIS HOMETOWN

350. Moreover, the applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention about the breach of his right for respect of his family life in view of the practice of placing him in detention facilities far from his hometown.

351. The Government argued that Article 8 of the Convention does not guarantee a right to serve a prison sentence in the facility close to one’s place if residence. In the alternative, it was submitted that there was no interference in the circumstances of the present case since the applicant received numerous visitors all through his detention, in particular in Radom Remand Centre and Włocławek Prison, which were situated respectively 100 and 160 km from his hometown. Lastly, the Government submitted that, should the Court consider that an interference had indeed taken place in the applicant’s case, it was in any event justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.

More recently, the Government submitted a copy of the first-instance judgment of 8 December 2014 in which the Warsaw Regional Court partly granted the applicant’s action for compensation for his detention far from his hometown between 1996 and 2010 and awarded him PLN 3,000 (approximately EUR 750). The Government argued that the applicant had withheld the information about this judgment from the Court and that, this part of his application should therefore be declared inadmissible for abuse of the right of application.

352. The applicant did not comment on any of the Government’s submissions.

353. The Court takes notice of the Government’s most recent submission regarding the applicant’s civil action and of the lack of the applicant’s comment in this regard. The Court will, nevertheless, refrain from examining the complaint at hand in view of this new development because it is not certain whether the impugned 2014 judgment is final and because the applicant’s complaint is in any event inadmissible for reasons which are stated below.

354. The Court reiterates that any detention which is lawful for the purposes of Article 5 of the Convention (and there is no doubt that the applicant’s detention following their conviction complied with Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention) entails by its nature various limitations on private and family life (see Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, § 98, Series A, no. 161). It would be fundamentally wrong to analyse each and every case of detention following conviction from the standpoint of Article 8, and to consider the “lawfulness” and “proportionality” of the prison sentence as such.

However, the Convention cannot stop at the prison gate (see Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 70, ECHR 2005-IX), and there is no question that a prisoner forfeits all of his Article 8 rights merely because of his status as a person detained following conviction (see Płoski v. Poland, no. 26761/95, 12 November 2002). The Court will not turn a blind eye to such limitations which go beyond what would normally be accepted in the case of an ordinary detainee. Thus, for example, it is an essential part of a prisoner’s right to respect for family life that the prison authorities assist him in maintaining contact with his close family (see Messina v. Italy (no. 2), no. 25498/94, § 61, ECHR 2000-X).

355. Placing a convict in a particular prison may potentially raise an issue under Article 8 if its effects for the applicant’s private and family life go beyond “normal” hardships and restrictions inherent to the very concept of imprisonment (Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, nos. 11082/06 and 13772/05, § 837, 25 July 2013 with further references).

The Commission already considered in Wakefield case (Wakefield v. the United Kingdom, no. 15817/89, decision of 1 October 1990, DR 66, p. 251) that the refusal to allow the applicant a permanent transfer from Yorkshire to Scotland (the distance of approximately 500 km) to be near his fiancée had constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for private life. A similar finding was made in the case of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev, in which the Court accepted that the applicants received fewer visits from their young children and other family members than they would have received had they not been detained in the Krasnokamensk colony or the Kharp colony located over 6,000 and 3,000 km from Moscow, respectively (see Khodorkovski, cited above § 838).

356. In contrast to the above-mentioned examples, the applicant in the instant case was detained in a number of detention facilities, out of which the most remote ones were located 300 and 343 km from Warsaw, where the applicant’s family lived (see paragraphs 85, 96, 97, 98, 100, 110, 111, 123, 133, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 216, 230, 238, 249 and 250 above). The applicant was committed to these most remote facilities for less than seven months (see paragraphs 204, 208 and 230 above), whereas his detention in his hometown or within a distance of 160 km from it, lasted roughly twelve years (see paragraphs 85, 100, 111, 123, 133, 206, 238 and 250 above).

Moreover, the applicant complained that his placement in the remote detention facilities caused a certain inconvenience to his visitors. It has not been shown, however, that the personal situation of any of the applicant’s visitors has or would have rendered their travel to the applicant’s place of detention impossible or particularly harsh. The case materials in fact show that the applicant has been regularly visited by a large number of people, including his mother, other relatives and lawyers (see paragraphs 155, 194 and 201 above).

357. In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that there was no interference with the applicant’s right to respect of his family life. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

VII. REMAINING COMPLAINTS

358. The applicant complains under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that:

(1) that he was arrested on 8 March 1996 when he went voluntarily to the police in connection with a matter unrelated to the proceedings in question (see paragraph 8 above); introduced on 25 August 2002;

(2) that from 7 March until 1 April 1996 he was in pre-trial detention by virtue of a decision given by a prosecutor and not a court (see paragraphs 7 and 9 - 12 above); introduced on 25 August 2002;

(3) that his pre-trial detention, in so far as it was effected under the bill of indictment and after the expiry of the detention decision of 7 February 1997 (namely, from 8 March until 19 May 1997), was not “lawful” (see paragraphs 20-23 above); introduced on 13 December 2000;

(4) that all the court decisions to extend his pre-trial detention for a period beyond three months had not been in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law (among others, decision of the Warsaw Regional Court of 3 June 1996; decision of the Supreme Court of 21 April 1998; decisions of the Warsaw Regional Court of 30 August 2000 and decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 11 April 2003) (see paragraphs 13, 25, 30 and 37 above); first introduced on 25 August 2002;

(5) that he had been held in pre-trial detention despite the fact that on several occasions a court decision authorising the preventive measure had expired and a new decision to extend the measure had not yet been issued; the periods in question were the following: from 8 March until 19 May 1997 (decision of 7 February 1997), 14 March until 21 April 1998 and from 31 August until 15 October 1998 (see paragraphs 19-23 and 25 above); introduced on 25 August 2002;

(6) that on 23 October 1998 his detention was extended until an unspecified date, when he would start serving his prison sentence (see paragraph 28 above); introduced on 11 September 2002.

359. The Court notes that an action for compensation for manifestly unlawful detention under Article 552 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which, in the applicant’s case, was dismissed in 2006 (see paragraphs 41-45 above), is not a remedy which has to be made use of, as it concerns Article 5 § 5 alone (see Nowicka v. Poland (dec.) no. 30218/96, 16 October 2001). It follows that the above-mentioned complaints have been introduced out of time.

It appears that the applicant justifies the delay in lodging the above complaints by arguing that he had not had access to the case-file in time (see paragraph 368 below). However, the Court finds that the applicant had knowledge of all the material facts relating to the complaints and that the alleged lack of access to the case-file could not prevent him from bringing these complaints before the Court within the time-limit set by the Convention.

360. The applicant also complains about his detention under:

(1) Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 2 that on the day of his arrest he was not served with the prosecutor’s decision to remand him in custody (see paragraph 8 above); lodged on 10 November 2004;

(2) Article 5 § 3 that after arrest he had not been brought promptly before a judge but, instead, before a prosecutor and as late as six days after his arrest (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above); introduced on 10 November 2004;

(3) Article 5 § 4 that: (a) between 1996 and 1998 the procedure for review of his pre-trial detention was not adversarial as it did not allow him or his lawyer to participate in sessions at which the trial court decided to apply for an extension of his detention beyond the statutory time-limit, or at which the Supreme Court decided to extend the measure (see paragraphs 10-24 above); introduced on 10 November 2004; (b) in the same period, his lawyer was not given access to the case file (see paragraphs 10-24 above); introduced on 10 November 2004; (c) his appeals for release in 1996 and 1997 had not been examined speedily (see paragraphs 12-23 above); introduced on 10 November 2004.

361. The Court finds that the above-mentioned complaints have been introduced out of time and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

362. The applicant raises other complaints namely, under:

(1) Article 3 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention had negatively effected his family and private life and that he had been persecuted by the authorities for alleged incitement of other prisoners to rebellion;

(2) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the unfairness and the outcome of: (a) the main criminal proceedings against him (see paragraphs 20 - 40 above); (b) all civil proceedings which he instituted against public authorities or private individuals (see paragraphs 41–45, 46–51, 52–55, 59‑65, 91–95, 103–106, 114–122, 158, 191, 192 and 197–203 above) (c) proceedings under Article 552 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for compensation for unlawful detention (see paragraphs 41-45 above);

(3) Article 6 § 1 (a) that the disciplinary sanction imposed on 23 November 2004 was arbitrary, as he had been unable to defend himself in person before the domestic authorities, had had no access to his personal file, the governor’s decision had been given in camera, a lawyer had not been appointed and witnesses had not been examined (see paragraphs 176‑185 and 188-192 above); (b) that the length of the disciplinary proceedings had been unreasonable (see paragraph 186 above) (c) that his complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings concerning his disciplinary punishment in Radom Remand Centre, which had been lodged under the 2004 Act, had not been examined in accordance with the applicable law because the Radom Regional Court had not been a competent court, acting as a “judge in its own case”; that the complaint had been examined by a single judge and not by a bench of three judges; and that the proceedings were not public (see paragraph 186 above); (d) that his disciplinary punishment in Opole Lubelskie and Czerwony Bór - Łomża Prisons had not been imposed in compliance with the domestic law, as under Article 144 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, only a prison governor, not a deputy governor, had the power to order detention in a solitary cell (see paragraphs 211-215 and 242-248 above);

(4) Articles 6 § 2 and 7 of the Convention that: (1) his disciplinary punishment in Radom Remand Centre had been enforced immediately although the decision had become final only after his appeal had failed (see paragraphs 176-185 above); (2) presumption of innocence had been breached as Radom Remand Centre administration had made statements to the effect that he was guilty of the offences charged while his criminal trial was ongoing (see paragraphs 56–58, 61–65, 134 and 142 above);

(5) Article 13 of the Convention that the civil remedies and the system of penitentiary supervision (see paragraphs 253-255 above); and the remedy provided by the 2004 Act were ineffective.

363. The Court notes that, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

364. Under Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that: (1) the letter sent by the Registry of the ECHR on 26 November 2004 had been opened by the prison staff; and (2) for one month (dates not specified) he had not been allowed to receive parcels from his family.

365. The Court notes that these complaints must be rejected for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies.

366. Under Article 3 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, the applicant complained that when detained in Warszawa - Mokotów Remand Centre after 14 January 1998 and after 13 January 2000 he had not been served vegetarian meals but meals with meat and animal protein (seeparagraph 89 above).

367. The Court observes that the applicant had claimed to be a vegetarian only during a short part of his detention. The facts show that during the remainder of his detention he had purchased in the prison canteen, or had received from his family, pork sausages (see paragraph 241 above). In any event, the applicant’s dietary choice at the relevant time was not supported by any religious or medical reasons and any distress which he might have experienced because it was not catered to, was below the threshold of minimum severity (see Krowiak v. Poland, no. 12786/02, § 34, 16 October 2007). It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded.

368. Under Article 34 of the Convention, the applicant complained that: (1) he had not been given access to the case-file which was the subject of the application to the Court in time to comply with the six-month rule; (2) the detention facilities lacked books and publications on the Court’s case-law and practice; (3) the books and documents obtained through his family, as well as stationery materials, were removed or destroyed; (4) the application form sent by him on 14 December 2001 had been withheld by the domestic authorities for three weeks; (5) on 20 May 2010 the prison staff seized private documents and notes concerning the Court.

369. These complaints are partly manifestly ill‑founded, whereas the remainder fall under Article 10 of the Convention and is covered by the Government’s unilateral declaration (see paragraph 285 above).

370. Under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained that he was not allowed to vote in the 2002 elections to municipal and district councils and provincial assemblies (see paragraphs 256-258 above). The Court finds that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) (see Mółka v. Poland (dec.), no. 56550/00, ECHR 2006‑IV).

371. In conclusion, the Court finds that the above complaints all fall to be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§1, 3 and 4 of the Convention respectively.

VIII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

372. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

373. The applicant claimed 120,000,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.

374. The Government submitted that the applicant’s claim was excessive.

375. The Court, having regard to its case-law and making its assessment on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 3,500 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage on account of the violation of Article 3.

B. Costs and expenses

376. The applicant who was granted legal aid also claimed EUR 150,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court by his lawyers and PLN 56,900 (approximately EUR 14,000) for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts in the course of the enumerated civil proceedings instituted by the applicant.

377. The Government did not make any comment on the claim.

378. Rule 43 § 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

“When an application has been struck out, the costs shall be at the discretion of the Court. ...”

379. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the fact that the applicant is represented before the Court by legal-aid lawyers, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and the proceeding before this Court.

C. Default interest

380. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Takes note of the terms of the respondent Government’s declaration in respect of the complaints under Articles 3, 5 § 3, 6 § 1 and 10 of the Convention and of the modalities for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein;

2. Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases in so far as it relates to the above complaints in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention;

3. Declares the complaint under Article 3 concerning the imposition of the high-security regime on the applicant admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in so far as the applicant was detained in 2004 and 2010 under a high-security regime;

5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,500 (three thousand five hundred euros), to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 October 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Marialena TsirliAndrás Sajó
RegistrarPresident

[1]. Rectified on 24 October 2016: the text was “the decision taken”.

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