SECOND SECTION
CASE OF KILIÇ AND OTHERS v. TÜRKİYE
(Applications nos. 356/18 and 16 others –
see appended list)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
23 June 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Kılıç and Others v. Türkiye,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Péter Paczolay, President,
Gediminas Sagatys,
Stéphane Pisani, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein;
the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 5 of the Convention concerning the alleged lack of reasonable suspicion regarding the commission of an offence, the alleged lack of relevant and sufficient reasons when ordering and extending the applicants’ pre-trial detention, the length of the pre-trial detention and the alleged ineffectiveness of the judicial review of the lawfulness of detention to the Turkish Government (“the Government”), represented by their then Agent, Mr Hacı Ali Açıkgül, former Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
the decision to reject the Government’s objection to the examination of the applications by a Committee;
Having deliberated in private on 2 June 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The present applications mainly concern the arrest and pre-trial detention of the applicants in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, on suspicion of their membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “Fetullahist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure” (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması – hereinafter referred to as “FETÖ/PDY”), which was considered by the authorities to be behind the coup attempt (further information regarding the events that unfolded after the coup attempt, including the details of the state of emergency declared by the Government and the ensuing notice of derogation given to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, as well as the legislative developments that followed the declaration of the state of emergency, may be found in Baş v. Turkey, no. 66448/17, §§ 6-14
and 109-10, 3 March 2020).
2. On various dates the applicants were arrested and placed in pre-trial detention, mainly on suspicion of membership of FETÖ/PDY, an offence punishable under Article 314 of the Criminal Code (see Baş, cited above, § 58). According to the case files, the applicants were either arrested in the vicinity of border crossings while allegedly attempting to cross the border, or failed to surrender to the competent authorities despite arrest warrants having been issued against them. Upon their arrest, the applicants in applications nos. 356/18, 16189/21, 20845/21, and 38126/21 were found to be in possession of false identity documents, while the applicant in application no. 50441/21 was found to be in possession of another person’s identity document. It further appears from the case files that the applicant in application no. 11281/19 attempted to flee from the balcony of his apartment when the police came to arrest him. Challenges brought by the applicants against their detention were dismissed by the competent courts.
3. On various dates in the course of the ensuing criminal investigations and trials the competent judicial authorities ordered the applicants’ continued detention. The applicants were held in pre-trial detention for periods ranging from one year to two years, six months and eight days.
4. It appears from the information and documents in the case files that when ordering and extending the applicants’ pre-trial detention, the competent judicial authorities relied on various evidential grounds, including but not limited to: witness statements indicating ties with FETÖ/PDY; social media posts; possession of pro-FETÖ/PDY publications; working for or being a member of institutions with ties to the organisation in question, or organisations shut down by the legislative decrees issued under the state of emergency; provision of financial support to FETÖ/PDY or to institutions with ties to FETÖ/PDY; attending or holding meetings (sohbet); communication with senior executives of the organisation; facilitating communication between FETÖ/PDY members; use of the Bylock application; staying in FETÖ/PDY houses; and carrying out various other activities on the orders of the organisation.
5. It further appears from the case files that in accordance with Articles 100 and 101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for the text of those provisions, see Kavala v. Turkey, no. 28749/18, §§ 71-72, 10 December 2019), the competent judicial authorities justified their decisions to deprive the applicants of their liberty not only on the basis of the existence of reasonable suspicion, but also on the risk of their absconding (see paragraph 2 above). Furthermore, the authorities relied on the nature and severity of the alleged offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, and the fact that that offence was among the “catalogue” offences listed in Article 100 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Without making an individualised assessment, they also relied on the state of the evidence and the risk of the applicants’ tampering with evidence and considered that detention would be a proportionate measure in the circumstances. Moreover, in the later stages of the proceedings, the competent judges took into account the time which the applicants had spent in pre‑trial detention when deciding to extend their detention, without explaining the relevance of that factor to their decision.
6. In the meantime, the applicants had lodged one or more individual applications with the Constitutional Court in respect of the detention orders, complaining, inter alia, of the lack of reasonable suspicion that they had committed an offence and the lack of reasons to justify the decision to remand them in pre-trial detention. All of those applications were declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court in a summary fashion.
7. According to the latest information provided by the parties, most of the applicants were convicted of membership of an armed terrorist organisation by courts of first instance on the basis of evidence that existed at the time of their detention or that appeared at a later stage in the proceedings. It further appears that, for the most part, the proceedings are still pending before the appellate courts or the Constitutional Court.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS8. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 §§ 1 and 3 OF THE CONVENTION9. The applicants complained that there had been no specific evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that they had committed a criminal offence necessitating pre-trial detention. They further argued that the domestic courts had not provided relevant and sufficient reasons in their decisions ordering their placement in detention and their continued detention. They also maintained that the domestic authorities had failed to consider alternative measures to detention. In that connection, they alleged that there had been a violation of Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention.
Admissibility10. The Government urged the Court to declare inadmissible the complaints of applicants who had not made use of the compensatory remedy under Article 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Government further requested that the Court declare the applications inadmissible as being an abuse of the right of application, in so far as the applicants had not informed the Court of the developments in their cases following the lodging of their applications. They lastly submitted that the applicants’ initial and continued pre-trial detention had complied with the domestic legislation and Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention.
11. The Court notes that similar objections raised by the Government have already been dismissed in other cases against Türkiye (see, for instance, Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, §§ 212-14, 22 December 2020; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, no. 12778/17, §§ 84-85, 16 April 2019; Baş v. Turkey, no. 66448/17, §§ 118-21, 3 March 2020; and Turan and Others v. Turkey, nos. 75805/16 and 426 others, §§ 57-64, 23 November 2021), and sees no reason to depart from those findings in the present case.
12. The Court therefore considers that the applicants’ complaints under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
MeritsAlleged lack of reasoning in the decisions ordering the applicants’ pre‑trial detention (Article 5 § 3 of the Convention)13. As regards the merits, the Court reiterates that according to its well‑established case-law under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the persistence of a reasonable suspicion that a detainee has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the validity of his or her continued detention. The Court must further establish whether the national authorities gave “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons for the detention from the time of the first decision ordering detention on remand onwards. Those other grounds may be a risk of flight, a risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses or of evidence being tampered with, a risk of collusion, a risk of reoffending, or a risk of public disorder and the related need to protect the detainee (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 87-88 and 101- 02, 5 July 2016). Those risks must be duly substantiated, and the authorities’ reasoning on those points cannot be abstract, general or formulaic (see Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, § 222, 28 November 2017).
14. The Court notes that when ordering the applicants’ initial and continued pre-trial detention, the judicial authorities cited, in a formulaic manner, numerous pieces of evidence in support of their findings that there were specific indications that the applicants had committed an offence (see paragraph 4 above). However, in the Court’s view, the national courts failed to demonstrate the link between the pieces of evidence they mentioned in the detention orders and the existence of a “reasonable suspicion” that the applicants had committed the offence of membership of an armed organisation of which they were suspected.
15. Even assuming that there was a “reasonable suspicion” that an offence had been committed, decisions ordering pre-trial detention must contain relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the necessity of the detention. In that connection, the Court observes that in Türkiye, as required by the Convention, domestic law provides that the competent judicial authorities must put forward “relevant and sufficient” reasons when considering the need to place and keep a suspect in pre-trial detention. This is a procedural obligation laid down in Articles 100 and 101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provide that decisions to place or keep a suspect in pre-trial detention must include legal and factual reasons (see Tuncer Bakırhan v. Turkey, no. 31417/19, §§ 23-24, 14 September 2021).
16. The Court notes in this regard that the competent courts relied on the following grounds for detention: the nature of the offence; the severity of the sentences prescribed by law for the offence concerned; the state of the evidence; the period spent in detention; the risk of the applicants’ absconding and tampering with evidence; and the finding that alternative measures to detention appeared insufficient (see paragraph 5 above).
17. In so far as the detention was justified on the basis of the “nature of the offence”, the Court notes that the domestic courts which ruled on the applicants’ detention considered that they were accused of offences listed in Article 100 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (also referred to as “catalogue” offences). As regards those “catalogue” offences, the Court observes that under Article 100 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Turkish law provides that for certain offences there is a statutory presumption of the existence of grounds for detention (risk of absconding, tampering with evidence, or putting pressure on witnesses, victims and other persons). In this connection, the Court reaffirms that any system of mandatory detention on remand is per se incompatible with Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Where the law provides for a presumption concerning the grounds for pre-trial detention, it must nevertheless be convincingly demonstrated that there are concrete facts warranting a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty. This is also the case where the judicial authorities justify the detention of a suspect by the nature of the offence in question or the severity of the potential sentence prescribed by law (compare also Tuncer Bakırhan, cited above, §§ 46-49). The Court therefore needs to examine whether the national courts carried out an individualised assessment of the other reasons justifying the necessity of the applicants’ initial and continued pre‑trial detention, such as the risk of the applicants’ absconding or tampering with evidence.
The applicants’ initial placement in pre-trial detention18. The Court observes that, in the circumstances of the applicants’ cases, the national courts relied on a largely formulaic enumeration of various grounds for detention under domestic law, expressed in general and abstract terms, such as the state of the evidence, the period spent in detention and the risk of tampering with evidence. However, it appears from the case files that in the initial detention orders, particular weight was attached to the risk of the applicants’ absconding (see paragraph 2 above).
19. In this regard, the Court notes that the domestic courts which ruled on the applicants’ initial detention in applications nos. 4722/18, 39888/18, 11281/19, 18708/20, 23785/20, 46018/20, 13288/21, 20845/21, 27480/21, 38126/21, 49041/21 and 50441/21 placed particular emphasis on the following facts, which applied to the applicants respectively: some could not be arrested for a long period of time despite arrest warrants having been issued; one was arrested in the vicinity of a border crossing while attempting to cross the border; one was arrested while physically trying to abscond from the law enforcement officers; and others had been arrested while using false identity documents. On that basis, they considered that there was a risk that the applicants might abscond and that alternative measures to detention would be insufficient in their cases.
20. The Court further notes that the detention orders in respect of the remaining applicants, the courts which ruled on their initial detention merely referred to the existence of a risk of absconding, without considering how the circumstances of the applicants’ arrest supported such a finding.
21. Against this background, the Court reiterates that it is not its task to replace the national authorities, which are better placed to examine all the circumstances of a case and to take all the necessary decisions, including those in respect of pre-trial detention (see Nenad Kovačević v. Croatia, no. 38415/13, § 65, 24 November 2015, and Kuc v. Slovakia, no. 37498/14, § 46, 25 July 2017). It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in those domestic courts’ detention decisions that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Kuc, cited above, § 46). That said, in the present case, in view of the particular circumstances surrounding the attempted coup, as well as the circumstances in which the applicants were arrested, the Court is prepared to accept that the domestic courts which ruled on the applicants’ initial detention had regard, in a sufficiently individualised manner, to the concrete risk that they might abscond, and that this risk could have constituted a “relevant” and “sufficient” reason for their detention in the initial phase of the criminal investigation.
The continued justification for the applicants’ pre-trial detention22. As regards the subsequent decisions extending the applicants’ detention, the Court observes that the domestic courts which decided on the applicants’ continued pre-trial detention largely repeated the very same reasoning adopted in the initial detention decisions. Accordingly, they also merely referred to the risk that the applicants might abscond, while enumerating other grounds in a formulaic manner. In this connection, the Court notes that some of the courts which decided on the applicants’ continued detention made explicit reference to the circumstances of their arrest once again and reiterated that those circumstances demonstrated the risk that they might abscond.
23. It is well established in the Court’s case-law that although the “risk of absconding” may initially suffice to warrant detention, that ground gradually becomes less “relevant” with the passage of time (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 112-15, ECHR 2000-XI). This is particularly so where the applicants concerned have been held in pre-trial detention for a period of time. According to the Court’s settled case-law, only very compelling reasons would be capable of persuading it that the applicants’ continued detention beyond a certain period of time could be justified under Article 5 § 3 (ibid., § 114).
24. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicants were held in pre-trial detention for periods ranging from one year to two years, six months and eight days. In their decisions extending the applicants’ detention, the domestic courts repeatedly referred to the risk of absconding. While the Court considers that that ground was relevant, it finds that the domestic courts failed to assess whether the risk of absconding actually persisted and remained capable of justifying the applicants’ continued detention at an advanced stage of the proceedings (compare Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 90 and 118, 5 July 2016).
25. Nor does it appear that any alternative security measures were duly considered by those courts beyond a mere formal statement in that regard, despite multiple requests by the applicants to this effect (compare and contrast, for instance, Shabani v. Switzerland, no. 29044/06, § 63, 5 November 2009, and Nenad Kovačević, cited above, § 68).
26. The Court notes that it has already examined many cases in which it found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention on account of the lack of “sufficient” reasoning in decisions ordering applicants’ continued pre-trial detention (see Tuncer Bakırhan, cited above, §§ 40‑58; see also Kolay and Others v. Türkiye [Committee], nos. 15231/17 and 283 others, §§ 11-19, 12 December 2023, and the cases cited therein). In the present case, having regard to its case-law on the subject and the above considerations, the Court sees no reason to depart from those findings.
27. The Court further considers that except for the applicants in applications nos. 356/18, 4722/18, 39888/18 and 11281/19, the periods during which the applicants were held in pre-trial detention mostly fell outside the scope of the state of emergency in Türkiye, which ended on 18 July 2018. In this connection, it notes that while the applicants in applications nos. 356/18, 4722/18, 39888/18 and 11281/19 were detained a short time after the coup attempt – which is undoubtedly a contextual factor that should be fully taken into account in interpreting and applying Article 5 of the Convention – it has not been established that the failure to comply with the requirements described above could be justified by the derogation notified by the Government of Türkiye under Article 15 of the Convention, and did not go beyond the “extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”. This is particularly so, having regard to the duration of the applicants’ pre‑trial detention, which lasted at least one year in each case. The Court points out in this connection that the considerations giving rise to the application of Article 15 of the Convention have gradually become less forceful and relevant as the public emergency threatening the life of the nation, while still persisting, has declined in intensity, at which point the “exigency” criterion must be applied more stringently (see Baş, cited above, § 224; compare also Kolay and Others, cited above, § 18; Taş and Others v. Türkiye [Committee], nos. 41527/17 and 212 others, § 20, 17 December 2024; and Çetin and Others v. Türkiye [Committee], nos. 30185/17 and 136 others, § 20, 14 October 2025, and the references therein).
28. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in respect of all the applicants regarding their continued pre-trial detention.
Alleged lack of reasonable suspicion that the applicants committed a criminal offence (Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention)29. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the present case (see paragraphs 14-15 above) and its findings under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 28 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to determine whether there was any objective information showing that the suspicion against the applicants was “reasonable” at the time of their detention (for a similar approach, see Tuncer Bakırhan, cited above, §§ 36‑39; see also Kolay and Others, cited above, § 20).
OTHER COMPLAINTS30. As regards any remaining complaints under Article 5 of the Convention, the Court decides not to examine the admissibility and merits of those complaints, in view of its findings under Article 5 § 3 above and its considerations in Turan and Others (cited above, § 98).
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
31. Some of the applicants did not submit a claim for just satisfaction or failed to do so within the prescribed time-limit. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award them any sum on that account (see the appended table indicating the applicants to whom no award is to be made).
32. The remaining applicants requested varying amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage, submitting their claims within the prescribed time‑limit. The majority of them also claimed compensation in respect of pecuniary damage, as well as the legal costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.
33. The Government contested the applicants’ claims as being unsubstantiated and excessive.
34. For the reasons set out in Turan and Others (cited above, §§ 102‑07), the Court rejects any claims in respect of pecuniary damage and awards each of the applicants who submitted claims a lump sum of 1,000 euros in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount (see the last column of the appended table).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Decides to join the applications;Declares admissible the complaints under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention of the lack of reasonable suspicion regarding the commission of an offence and the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons when ordering and extending the pre-trial detention;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention on account of the absence of sufficient grounds for keeping the applicants in pre-trial detention;Holds that there is no need to examine separately the merits of the complaints under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints under Article 5 of the Convention;Holds that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants who submitted a claim for just satisfaction (see the appended table), within three months, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 June 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Dorothee von Arnim Péter Paczolay
Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
List of cases:
No.
Application no.
Case name
Lodged on
Applicant
Year of Birth
Place of Residence
Nationality
Represented by
Just satisfaction
1.
356/18
Kılıç v. Türkiye
29/11/2017
Gürel KILIÇ
1973
Den Haag
Turkish
Mustafa NOYAN
Awarded
2.
4722/18
Yılmaz v. Türkiye
13/07/2017
Zekeriya YILMAZ
1976
Istanbul
Turkish
Mehmet ÇAVDAR
Awarded
3.
39888/18
Kuru v. Türkiye
10/08/2018
Mustafa KURU
1980
Balıkesir
Turkish
Fatma KURU
Not awarded
4.
11281/19
Akman v. Türkiye
12/02/2019
Cengiz AKMAN
1976
Samsun
Turkish
Yakup GÖNEN
Awarded
5.
18708/20
Karaduman v. Türkiye
27/03/2020
Sadullah KARADUMAN
1974
Denizli
Turkish
Gültekin AKKURT
Awarded
6.
23785/20
Şeker v. Türkiye
20/05/2020
Cihan ŞEKER
1988
İzmir
Turkish
n/a
Awarded
7.
41692/20
Önalan v. Türkiye
15/09/2020
Yahya ÖNALAN
1978
Manisa
Turkish
Emre ÖNALAN
Awarded
8.
46018/20
Altun v. Türkiye
01/10/2020
Abdulvaris ALTUN
1981
Osmaniye
Turkish
Ömer Faruk DÖNMEZ
Awarded
9.
46680/20
İmir v. Türkiye
08/10/2020
Hüseyin İMIR
1990
Düzce
Turkish
Coşkun TAŞKIN
Awarded
10.
13288/21
Aksoy v. Türkiye
19/02/2021
İrfan AKSOY
1977
Konya
Turkish
Leyla MESUTOĞLU
Awarded
11.
16189/21
Düz v. Türkiye
19/03/2021
Mehmet DÜZ
1974
Ankara
Turkish
Burhan DEMİRCİ
Awarded
12.
20845/21
Fındık v. Türkiye
02/02/2021
Dursun FINDIK
1985
Balıkesir
Turkish
Fatih IŞIK
Not awarded
13.
27480/21
Sönmez v. Türkiye
18/05/2021
Asım SÖNMEZ
1989
Ankara
Turkish
Abdullah GÖZÜKARA
Awarded
14.
38126/21
Yıldız v. Türkiye
24/06/2021
Yasir YILDIZ
1990
Malatya
Turkish
Elif Süeda ÖZDEMİR
Awarded
15.
49041/21
Bulut v. Türkiye
14/09/2021
Mehmet BULUT
1974
Hatay
Turkish
Dudu ERTUNÇ
Awarded
16.
50441/21
Cevheroğlu v. Türkiye
28/09/2021
Muhammed Burak CEVHEROĞLU
1991
Istanbul
Turkish
Meryem GÜNAY
Awarded
17.
3432/22
Şeker v. Türkiye
22/12/2021
Adnan ŞEKER
1980
Istanbul
Turkish
Mehmet ARSLAN
Awarded