FIRST SECTION
CASE OF KOLOSKOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 53051/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21 October 2010
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Koloskova v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Commitee composed of:
Nina Vajić, President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Khanlar Hajiyev, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 30 September 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 53051/08) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Tatyana Aleksandrovna Koloskova (“the applicant”), on 30 September 2008.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
3. On 8 April 2009 the President of the First Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Article 26 § 1 of the Convention as amended by Protocol No. 14, the application was assigned to a Committee of three Judges. It was also decided that the Committee would rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1 of the Convention).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Elektrostal, a town in the Moscow Region. Before retirement she used to work in hazardous industry. She had a dispute with a pension authority about the scope of her privileged pension and appealed to the Elektrostal Town Court.
5. On 30 October 2006 the court held for the applicant and ordered the pension authority to recalculate her pension. The court based its findings on the Law on Labour Pensions. The judgment became binding and was executed.
6. On the pension authority’s request, on 31 March 2008 the Town Court quashed its judgment due to discovery of new circumstances. The court found, in particular, that the judgment had ignored the interpretation of the Law on Labour Pensions given by the Supreme Court in December 2005 and March 2007.
7. The applicant’s case was remitted for a rehearing and eventually dismissed.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
8. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the quashing of the binding judgment was unjustified. Insofar as relevant, these Articles read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
9. The Government argued that the application was inadmissible. The Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Law on Labour Pensions revealed fundamental errors in the Town Court’s reasoning, and hence that judgment had had to be quashed. The quashing had been legitimate, lawful, and compliant with the principle of legal certainty. The quashing had been meant to ensure a uniform and coherent functioning of the State pension scheme and to protect the public purse from undue depletion.
10. The applicant argued that her application was admissible.
11. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
12. The Court reiterates that for the sake of legal certainty implicitly required by Article 6, final judgments should generally be left intact. They may be disturbed only to correct fundamental defects (see Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, §§ 51–52, ECHR 2003-IX). Quashing of judgments because of newly-discovered circumstances is not by itself incompatible with this requirement, but the manner of its application may be (see Pravednaya v. Russia, no. 69529/01, §§ 27–34, 18 November 2004).
13. In present case, the domestic court justified the quashing with the Supreme Court’s two interpretations of the Law on Labour Pensions.
As to the interpretation of 2005, the Court considers that differing judicial interpretations of a law represent a ground for an ordinary appeal, rather than a discovery warranting a quashing of a binding judgment (see Yerogova v. Russia, no. 77478/01, § 34, 19 June 2008).
As to the interpretation of 2007, the Court reiterates that newly-discovered circumstances are circumstances that exist during the trial, remain hidden from the court, and become known after trial. Since the interpretation of 2007 was posterior to the town courts’ judgments, it did not justify the quashing either (see Yerogova, cited above, § 33).
14. It follows that the quashing of the applicant’s judgment was unjustified, and that there has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
15. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage, costs, and expenses
16. The applicant has failed to submit a claim for just satisfaction at the appropriate stage of the proceedings, and the Government argued that therefore no award should be made.
17. The Court notes, however, that the application belongs to the series of cases where the Court has adopted a unified approach to just satisfaction (see Ryabov and 151 other “Privileged pensioners” cases v. Russia, nos 4563/07 et seq., §§ 21–22, 17 December 2009). To ensure parity between the applicant in the present case and the similarly placed applicants, the Court awards the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and costs and expenses.
B. Default interest
18. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and costs and expenses, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 October 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André WampachNina Vajić
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy