FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF KOMÁR v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no. 25951/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
26 October 2010
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Komár v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Lech Garlicki, President,
Ján Šikuta,
Vincent Anthony de Gaetano, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 5 October 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 25951/06) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Vladimír Komár (“the applicant”), on 21 June 2006.
2. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.
3. On 31 August 2009 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol 14, the application is assigned to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Košice.
5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
6. On 16 July 1985 the applicant lodged an action with the Vranov nad Topľou District Court seeking division of matrimonial property.
7. In the subsequent period two first-instance judgments of 30 June 1987 and 31 October 1989 were quashed by decisions of the Košice Regional Court of 30 December 1987 and 21 May 1990 an the case was remitted to the District Court.
8. On 20 November 1990 the Košice Regional Court decided that the first-instance judge was biased and on 17 December 1992 it transferred the case to the Prešov District Court for a decision.
9. On 21 October 1998 the applicant challenged the judges of the Prešov District Court.
10. On 5 November 1998 the Regional Court decided that, except for one judge, the judges of the Prešov District Court were not biased.
11. On 24 November 1998 the applicant challenged another first-instance judge. By a decision of the Regional Court of 6 October 1999 the judge was excluded from the case.
12. On 31 August 2001 the Prešov District Court decided to obtain an expert opinion on the value of a real estate.
13. On 17 July 2002 the Prešov Regional Court, following the defendant's and the applicant's appeal, upheld the above decision.
14. On 3 September 2003 the Prešov District Court delivered a judgment.
15. On 21 October 2003 the applicant appealed and challenged another first-instance judge.
16. On 9 February 2005 the Prešov Regional Court decided that the judge was not biased and overturned the first-instance judgment. The decision became final on 11 March 2005.
17. On 7 April 2005 the applicant appealed on points of law.
18. On 28 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
19. The applicant turned to the Constitutional Court complaining that the District Court and the Regional Court had violated his right to a hearing within a reasonable time.
20. On 1 March 2006 the Constitutional Court decided that the Prešov District Court had violated the applicant's right under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution to a hearing without unjustified delay. It also decided that the Prešov Regional Court had not violated the above right. The Constitutional Court awarded 100,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK)[1] to the applicant in just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It also ordered the District Court to reimburse the applicant's costs and expenses.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
21. The applicant complained about the outcome of the civil proceeding and claimed that the Constitutional Court had failed to award him an adequate satisfaction for the delays occurred. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”Admissibility
1. As regards the length of the proceedings
22. The Government concurred with the Constitutional Court in that the length of the proceedings in this case had been unreasonable. However, they expressed the view that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time. They argued that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged such a violation and the amount of just satisfaction awarded had not been manifestly inadequate in the circumstances of the case.
23. The applicant disagreed.
24. The Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began only on 18 March 1992, when the recognition by the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, to which Slovakia is one of the successor States, of the right of individual petition took effect. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the fact that, already at that time, the proceedings had been pending for six years and eight months. The Court notes that the applicant directed his length of proceedings complaint exclusively against the District Court and the Regional Court. The proceedings before the Regional Court ended on 11 March 2005 when the Regional Court's decision became final. It follows that the proceedings at the time of the Constitutional Court's judgment had lasted almost thirteen years at two levels of jurisdiction.
25. The Court further notes that the Constitutional Court awarded the applicant the equivalent of EUR 2,595 in just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage. As regards the relevant period of the proceedings examined by the Constitutional Court, as well as the state of the proceedings at the time when the Convention entered into force in respect of the respondent State, this amount cannot be considered to have provided adequate and sufficient redress to the applicant in view of the Court's established case-law (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006-V, and Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 69-107, ECHR 2006-V). In view of the above, it concludes that the applicant did not lose his status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention (see, for example, Bič v. Slovakia, no. 23865/03, § 37, 4 November 2008).
26. The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. As regards the applicant's right to a fair trial
27. The applicant further complained of a violation of his right to a fair trial in the proceedings concerning his action of 16 July 1985.
28. The Court finds that the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies since he failed to raise that complaint in a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution.
29. It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
B. Merits
30. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
31. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
32. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
33. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
34. The applicant also complained that his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions had been violated as a result of the outcome of the proceedings. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
35. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
36. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
37. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”Damage
38. The applicant had not specified the amount of damage inviting the Court to determine the appropriate amount on equitable basis.
39. The Government left the matter to the Court's discretion, pointing out that the just satisfaction granted already to the applicant at the domestic level should be taken into account.
40. The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, having regard to its case-law on the subject and to the fact that the applicant obtained partial redress at the domestic level, it awards the applicant EUR 3,200.
B. Costs and expenses
41. The applicant did not submit a claim for costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum under this head.
C. Default interest
42. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months EUR 3,200 (three thousand two hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 October 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş AracıLech Garlicki
Deputy RegistrarPresident
[1]. SKK 100,000 was equivalent of 2,595 euros (EUR) at that time.
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