CASE OF KOZYAK v. RUSSIA

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF KOZYAK v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 25224/04)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG 

13 January 2011

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Kozyak v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a committee composed of:

Elisabeth Steiner, President,
Anatoly Kovler,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 9 December 2010,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 25224/04) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Sergey Yeliseyevich Kozyak (“the applicant”), on 21 May 2004.

2. The applicant was represented by Ms T.V. Dvortsova, a lawyer practising in Vorkuta, Komi Republic. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

3. On 10 June 2009 the President of the First Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee. It was also decided that the Committee would rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1 of the Convention).

THE FACTS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Chelyabinsk.

5. The applicant receives disability allowance following health damage in his previous work in the mining industry.

6. On 8 September 1999 the applicant seized the Vorkuta Town Court of the Komi Republic (“the Town Court”) with a claim against the local branch of the Social Security Fund of Russia alleging incorrect calculation of his disability allowance and seeking the unpaid damages. On the same day the Town Court scheduled the first hearing for 8 September 2000.

7. The hearing scheduled for 8 September 2000 did not take place following the respondent’s representative’s default in appearance. The court adjourned the next hearing of 20 October 2000 after granting the respondent’s motion for obtainment of certain archive documents.

8. On 19 July 2001 the applicant’s representative motioned for adjournment of examination of the case to 16 September 2001 due to her vacation.

9. At the hearing of 18 September 2001 the applicant’s representative specified the claims and requested that the court join the Ministry of Energy of Russia to the proceedings as a co-respondent. The request was granted by the court, and the hearing was adjourned.

10. The hearing scheduled for 5 November 2001 did not take place due to the judge’s illness.

11. By letter of 28 December 2001 the applicant requested that the case be examined in his absence, with participation of his representative.

12. On 21 February 2002 the applicant’s representative renounced the claims against the Ministry of Energy.

13. The hearing scheduled for 22 February 2002 did not take place as the parties did not show. The applicant’s representative requested that the court examine the case in her absence as she was involved in different proceedings.

14. On 11 April 2002 the applicant again motioned for examination of the claims in his absence.

15. The court postponed the hearing of 16 April 2002 at its own initiative to obtain the applicant’s trade union membership records.

16. On 11 May 2002 the applicant’s representative specified the claims in writing. At this date the hearing did not take place due to the respondent’s default in appearance.

17. On 15 May 2002 both the respondent and the applicant’s representative motioned for examination of the case in their absence. The applicant’s claims were once again specified, and the claims against the Ministry of Energy were resumed.

18. On 16 May 2002 the court ordered an expert examination and adjourned the proceedings.

19. On 29 October 2002 the expert examination was completed. The next hearing was scheduled for 24 December 2002.

20. On 23 and 24 December 2002, respectively, the applicant’s representative and the respondent motioned for examination of the claims in their absence. The former once again specified the claims.

21. On 8 January 2003 the Town Court gave a judgment awarding the applicant 621,999 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages and legal expenses, and RUB 34,350 as monthly payments with further indexation in accordance with the minimum wage. Both parties appealed.

22. On 31 March 2003 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic acting as the appeal court remitted the case to the first instance for clarification of the judgment in the calculation part. On 22 May 2003 the trial court clarified the judgment as ordered.

23. The appeal hearing of 30 June 2003 was adjourned to obtain the documents referred to in the judgment, which were not included in the case-file.

24. On 17 July 2003 the appeal court again remitted the case to the first instance for correction of an arithmetical error made in the judgment. The error was corrected on 1 September 2003.

25. On 4 December 2003 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the judgment of 8 January 2003 on appeal.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

26. The applicant complained that the proceedings to decide his claims had been too long. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

A. Admissibility

27. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

28. The Government submitted that the case had been complex and that the applicant had delayed the proceedings by specifying his claims and not showing at the hearings on multiple occasions. They admitted that the authorities had been responsible for the period of inactivity of one year that had taken place after the applicant had brought his claims to the court.

29. The applicant countered that the length had been attributable to the trial court which had postponed scheduled hearings for the parties’ default in appearance despite their repeated requests to examine the case in their absence, obtained various documents and ordered an expert examination at its own initiative. He further argued that the “reasonable time” requirement had also been breached at the appeal stage of the proceedings.

30. The Court observes that the proceedings in the applicant’s case commenced on 8 September 1999 and ended on 4 December 2003, during which period the domestic courts considered his claims at two levels of jurisdiction. Their aggregate length thus amounts approximately to four years and three months.

31. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

32. The Court considers that the applicant’s case was not characterised by particular complexity.

33. As to the applicant’s conduct, it observes that the applicant amended his claims on four occasions and did not show at the hearing or requested adjournment of the proceedings on another four occasions. The Court notes, however, that these motions did not lead to a considerable delay in the proceedings. It further reiterates in respect of the claims alterations that an applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by the national law in defence of his interests (see, mutatis mutandis, Yağcı and Sargın v. Turkey, 8 June 1995, § 66, Series A no. 319‑A).

34. Turning to the conduct of the authorities, the Court’s attention is drawn to several significant periods of delay. Thus, it observes that the first hearing in the case was scheduled in one year from the date of lodging of the claims and that the court was inactive for nine months after adjourning the hearing of 20 October 2000 to allow the State respondent to collect certain documents. Furthermore, despite the relative simplicity of the case, its examination at the first instance was plagued by various defects which compelled the appeal court to remit it to the trial court on three occasions. In this respect the Court reiterates that the Convention and its Protocols must be interpreted as guaranteeing rights which are practical and effective as opposed to theoretical and illusory. The right to have one’s claim examined within a reasonable time would be devoid of all sense if domestic courts examined a case endlessly, even if at the end the length of proceedings per instance did not appear particularly excessive (see, mutatis mutandis, Svetlana Orlova v. Russia, no. 4487/04, § 47, 30 July 2009).

35. Although the Court is not in a position to analyse the juridical quality of the domestic courts’ decisions, it considers that multiple repetition of re-examination orders within one set of proceedings may disclose a deficiency in the judicial system (see Wierciszewska v. Poland, no. 41431/98, § 46, 25 November 2003; Matica v. Romania, no. 19567/02, § 24, 2 November 2006; and Falimonov v. Russia, no. 11549/02, § 58, 25 March 2008). The fact that the domestic courts heard the case several times did not absolve them from complying with the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 § 1 (see Litoselitis v. Greece, no. 62771/00, § 32, 5 February 2004; and Svetlana Orlova, cited above, § 50). The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the repeated referrals of the case to the first instance significantly contributed to the length at hand.

36. Finally, the Court bears in mind that the applicant was in a vulnerable position, given especially that the disability allowance at issue was his principal source of income. It thus considers that the authorities had an obligation to examine the applicant’s claims with special diligence.

37. Regard being had to the significant delays attributable to the authorities and the importance of the case for the applicant, the Court arrives at the conclusion that the length of the proceedings at hand did not comply with the “reasonable time” requirement.

38. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

39. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

40. The applicant claimed 1,612,158 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 41,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage resulting from alleged failure of the domestic courts to correctly calculate the award. He also claimed EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

41. The Government disputed the claims as unfounded and excessive.

42. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it accepts that the applicant suffered distress and frustration in connection with the unreasonable length of the proceedings and, deciding on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B. Default interest

43. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2011, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

André WampachElisabeth Steiner
Deputy RegistrarPresident

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