SECOND SECTION
CASE OF KIRANEL v. TURKEY
(Application no. 26964/09)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
2 April 2013
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Kıranel v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Dragoljub Popović, President,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 12 March 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 26964/09) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Akın Kıranel (“the applicant”), on 6 May 2009.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr M. Köksal, a lawyer practising in İstanbul. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.
3. On 2 November 2010 the application was communicated to the Government.
4. The Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee. After having considered the Government’s objection, the Court rejects it.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Istanbul.
6. His wife and daughter died in a traffic accident.
7. On 8 March 2005 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Istanbul Civil Court against the driver involved in the accident and the company holding the possession of the vehicle the driver had driven and requested compensation for damages he suffered.
8. On an unspecified date the Istanbul Civil Court declined jurisdiction in respect of the claims brought against the company and referred that part of the case to the Civil Court in Kartal, where the company’s headquarters was located.
9. On 4 April 2006 the Kartal Civil Court decided to wait for the finalisation of the criminal proceedings regarding the accident.
10. On 6 May 2008, after the criminal proceedings were finalised, the defendant company requested the Kartal Civil Court to await the finalisation of the other case against the driver which was before the Istanbul Civil Court.
11. The Kartal Civil Court granted this request. From that day onwards no action was taken on the civil case before the Kartal Civil Court.
12. On 27 February 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the Istanbul Civil Court against the driver.
13. The civil proceedings against the defendant company are still pending before the Kartal Civil Court.
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
14. The applicant complained that the length of the civil proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal...”
15. The Government contested that argument.
16. The period to be taken into consideration began on 8 March 2005, when the applicant instituted civil proceedings, and the proceedings are still pending. At the date of the adoption of the judgment, it has thus lasted seven years and eleven months before one level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
17. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
18. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities Daneshpayeh v. Turkey, no. 21086/04, § 28, 16 July 2009).
19. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see, for example, Sebahattin Evcimen v. Turkey, no. 31792/06, §§ 28-34, 23 February 2010).
20. Turning to the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that on 6 May 2008 the Kartal Civil Court decided to await the outcome of the proceedings before the Istanbul Civil Court. The Court reiterates that it is the role of the domestic courts to manage their proceedings so that they are expeditious and effective (see, Sebahattin Evcimen, cited above, § 32 and the cases cited therein). The Court thus cannot but conclude that the Kartal Civil Court did not act with due diligence, having regard to what was at stake for the applicant.
21. The Court further notes that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
22. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
23. The applicant claimed 69,079 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
24. The Government contested these claims.
25. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage. It therefore awards the applicant EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
26. The applicant also claimed EUR 7,029 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the court. In support of his claims, the applicant submitted copies of taxi receipts, postal receipts and referred to the Turkish Bar Association’s tariff of fees for attorneys.
27. The Government contested the claim.
28. The Court reiterates that an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. The Court reminds that the mere submission of the Turkish Bar Association’s tariff of fees for attorneys cannot suffice to establish such expense. It observes that three of the taxi receipts bear the same date of the hearings to which the applicant’s lawyer attended and that the postal receipts concern the communication with the Court. Having regard to these documents, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 50 under this head,
C. Default interest
29. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 50 (fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 April 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-PassosDragoljub Popović
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy