CASE OF KRÁTKY v. SLOVAKIA

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF KRÁTKY v. SLOVAKIA

(Application no. 35025/20)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

15 February 2024

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Krátky v. Slovakia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Péter Paczolay, President,
 Alena Poláčková,
 Gilberto Felici, judges,
and Attila Teplán, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 35025/20) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 7 August 2020 by a Slovak national, Mr Dávid Krátky, who was born in 1991 and lives in Leopoldov (“the applicant”), and who was represented by Mr M. Mandzák, a lawyer practising in Bratislava;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Slovak Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Bálintová;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 23 January 2024,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The application concerns an alleged violation of the presumption of innocence. It raises issues under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

2.  Criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant on account of several offences, in particular organising and leading a criminal group and engaging in drug trafficking. The applicant was arrested together with his co‑perpetrators.

3.  On 8 January 2019 the Specialised Criminal Court approved a plea‑bargain agreement between the Public Prosecution Service and one of the co-perpetrators, Mr V.N., and found the latter guilty of participating in a criminal group and of drug production and trafficking. The relevant parts of the court’s decision read as follows:

“The Specialised Criminal Court ... in the criminal case against Dávid Krátky and others... holds as follows:

... The accused D.K. and D.K. ... were members of the criminal group ‘Twins’, which was founded ... with the aim of conducting various criminal activities, in particular drug crime, including with the use of violence in order to deepen its influence and intimidate other members of the group and other criminal groups ... the accused D.K. and D.K. were at the top of the hierarchy; they headed the criminal group together and coordinated the members at the lower levels of the hierarchy in committing various crimes... The accused D.K. and D.K. ... regularly and unlawfully obtained narcotic and psychotropic substances ..., at the same time, they stored some precursors for the production of narcotic and psychotropic substances... and subsequently ... ensured the production of methamphetamine; they further distributed various narcotic and psychotropic substances ... D.K. and D.K. supplied narcotic and psychotropic substances to an established network of customers, people at the lower level of the hierarchy of the group, in particular, ..., the accused V.N., and other unidentified persons who were subordinate to them, complied with their orders and distributed drugs more widely at a price determined by them.”

4.  The plea-bargain agreement contained a similar description of the facts and the applicant’s full name.

5.  The judge read out the decision at a public hearing in the presence of the media. He used the applicant’s name in full but then corrected himself, stating that the applicant’s full name should be replaced by initials.

6.  On 31 October 2019 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, which was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 28 April 2020 as ill‑founded. It emphasised that while the judge had indeed referred to the applicant’s full name, he had subsequently corrected himself.

7.  On 25 September 2020 the Specialised Criminal Court convicted the applicant of several offences, including participating in a criminal group and drug trafficking.

8.  On 7 July 2021 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.

9.  The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the wording of the judgment concerning a co-perpetrator was prejudicial to his right to be presumed innocent.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION

10.  The applicant argued that he had been referred to as a criminal in front of the public, including journalists, and therefore his right to presumption of innocence had been violated. The Government submitted that the wording used in the judgment against the applicant’s co-defendant had not violated the principle of presumption of innocence and emphasised that the judge, when reading out the judgment, had mentioned the applicant’s name but then corrected himself.

11.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

12.  The present case concerns the question whether the principle of presumption of innocence may be infringed by statements made by a judge at a public hearing in the presence of the media where those statements are contained in a judgment concerning a co-perpetrator. The Court’s task is to determine whether, in such a situation, the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention were respected.

13.  The general principles concerning the presumption of innocence have been summarised in Lavents v. Latvia (no. 58442/00, § 125, 28 November 2002); Nešťák v. Slovakia (no. 65559/01, § 88, 27 February 2007); Karaman v. Germany (no. 17103/10, § 41, 27 February 2014); and Mucha v. Slovakia (no. 63703/19, §§ 57-58, 25 November 2021).

14.  In the present case, the judgment approving the plea‑bargain agreement of one of the applicant’s co-perpetrators (and the agreement itself) contained detailed references of the offences concerned, including the applicant’s role in them as one of the perpetrators and one of the criminal group’s leaders. This judgment, which was based on the description of those criminal actions including a precise factual account of the applicant’s role, was thus capable of raising concerns as to prejudging the question whether the applicant himself fulfilled all the criteria necessary for him to be held to have committed the offences. Referring to the applicant and his actions in such a way may in principle engage the protection of his right to be presumed innocent (see Mucha, cited above, §§ 55-56).

15.  In view of the organised‑crime-related nature of the offences of which the applicant’s co‑perpetrator stood accused, and given that the offence of establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal enterprise by its very nature could only be perpetrated together with others, it appears that it was indispensable for the assessment of the case to refer, in the factual description of the criminal actions, to third parties.

16.  In the decision, the applicant was described as an “accused” person throughout. The court thus appears to have used the impugned statements not to declare the applicant guilty but to substantiate its decision against his co‑perpetrator. However, the lack of intention to breach the right to the presumption of innocence cannot rule out a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (see Avaz Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 37816/12 and 25260/14, § 69, 22 April 2021).

17.  At the same time, the judge explicitly called the applicant a member of a criminal group engaged in criminal activities throughout the judgment. The applicant’s full name was also indicated in the plea-bargain agreement. The judge made no reference, in the text read out and issued after the hearing, to the fact that the applicant was being “separately prosecuted” or that the court’s only concern was assessing the criminal responsibility of his co‑perpetrator within the scope of the proceedings in issue (contrast Karaman, cited above, § 69). In the written version of the decision, the judge gave the applicant’s full name at the beginning (see the first line cited above, paragraph 3). The subsequent use of the initials does not therefore eliminate the impression that the applicant had committed the crimes described in the decision.

18.  The situation was aggravated by the fact that the judge read out the decision at a public hearing in the presence of the media. The judge initially used the applicant’s full name but subsequently remarked that the applicant’s name should be replaced by initials. However, even after that correction, the public remained aware of who those initials belonged to.

19.  Moreover, the Court has already held in a similar case – as to the level of detail contained in references in judgments against the applicant’s co‑perpetrators to another joint perpetrator with a particular status in the gang and a role in the specific actions or omissions giving rise to the prosecution – that it was questionable whether it was necessary to identify the applicant individually in such a situation (see Mucha, cited above, § 60).

20.  Statements made by judges are subject to stricter scrutiny than those made by other authorities (see Pandy v. Belgium, no. 13583/02, § 43, 21 September 2006). The Court considers that in the present case the impugned statements were not limited to describing a “state of suspicion” against the applicant but represented him as a person who had committed criminal offences. Therefore, the overall manner and context in which the statements were made risked leaving no doubt that the applicant had committed the criminal offences in question (see Maksim Savov v. Bulgaria, no. 28143/10, § 73, 13 October 2020, and Avaz Zeynalov, cited above, § 70).

21.  Finally, it does not seem that the courts made any subsequent attempt to correct the defect in issue (see Avaz Zeynalov, cited above, 71).

22.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

23.  The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 2,938 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic court and the Court.

24.  The Government submitted that the amount claimed in respect of non‑pecuniary damage was overstated, and that costs and expenses could only be reimbursed if they were demonstrably and necessarily incurred.

25.  On the basis of equity, the Court awards the applicant EUR 7,800 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

26.  Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the full sum claimed, that is to say, EUR 2,938 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:

(i)  EUR 7,800 (seven thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 2,938 (two thousand nine hundred and thirty-eight euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 February 2024, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Attila Teplán Péter Paczolay
 Acting Deputy Registrar President