CASE OF KRAYNYAK AND GUMENYUK v. UKRAINE

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF KRAYNYAK AND GUMENYUK v. UKRAINE

(Application no. 12971/19)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

6 November 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Kraynyak and Gumenyuk v. Ukraine,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Andreas Zünd, President,
 Mykola Gnatovskyy,
 Vahe Grigoryan, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 12971/19) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 28 February 2019 by two Ukrainian nationals, Mr Sergiy Vasylyovych Kraynyak and Mr Igor Volodymyrovych Gumenyuk (“the applicants”), who were both born in 1994 and were represented by Mr O.V. Zarutskyy, a lawyer practising in Kyiv;

the decision to give notice of the complaints set out in paragraph 1 below to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 9 October 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The case mainly concerns the applicants’ complaints under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that their pre-trial detention was unreasonably lengthy, under Article 5 § 4 that appeals against some of the orders extending their detention were not examined speedily, and under Article 5 § 5 that they had no effective right to compensation for those alleged violations.

2.  The background to the case is described in Kraynyak v. Ukraine ([Committee], no. 68353/17, §§ 2-9, 16 February 2023), which concerned the first applicant.

3.  The applicants were arrested on 31 August 2015 and remanded in custody on suspicion of involvement in a lethal terrorist attack near the Parliament in Kyiv.

4.  The domestic courts ordered and extended the applicants’ pre-trial detention on several occasions, on an approximately bi-monthly basis. They stated that although the applicants had strong social connections, it was likely that, given the severity of the punishment they were facing, they would abscond. Moreover, the courts noted that, in view of their military experience in the east of Ukraine, the applicants had acquired particular skills, making it possible that they would interfere with the investigation, notably by influencing victims and other witnesses. The acts of which they were suspected had caused mass casualties, which meant that there was a strong public interest in ensuring an orderly investigation.

5.  In some of the orders extending the applicants’ detention the courts also referred to the Bail Exclusion Clause.[1]

6.  The appeals lodged by the applicants and their defence lawyers against certain of the trial court’s orders extending detention were examined and dismissed on the following dates: (i) appeals against the order of 25 July 2019, lodged between 29 July and 1 August 2019, were examined by the Kyiv City Court of Appeal on 14 November 2019; (ii) appeals against the order of 6 September 2019, lodged on 11 and 13 September 2019, were examined on 4 February 2020; (iii) the first applicant’s appeal against the order of 24 October 2019, lodged on 28 October 2019, was examined on 17 February 2020.

7.  After the investigation was completed on 10 August 2016 the case was sent for trial. It has remained at the trial stage ever since.

8.  On 22 May 2020 the first applicant was released and placed under twenty-four‑hour house arrest, which ended on 22 July 2020.

9.  The second applicant remained in detention. On 5 July 2023 he died. According to media reports, his death was caused by an explosive device, detonated by him in the courthouse where he was standing trial.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

10.  The second applicant’s parents, Ms Liliya Volodymyrivna Gumenyuk and Mr Volodymyr Vasylyovych Gumenyuk, expressed their wish to pursue the proceedings in his stead.

11.  The Government objected, arguing that rights under Article 5 of the Convention were non-transferrable.

12.  The Court notes that the second applicant died after he had lodged the application, a situation which, in its case-law, is viewed differently from situations where the applicant has died beforehand. Where the applicant has died after the application was lodged, the Court has accepted that the next of kin or heir may in principle pursue the case, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 97, ECHR 2014, with further references). In such cases, the decisive point is not whether the rights in question are or are not transferable, but whether the heirs can in principle claim a legitimate interest in asking the Court to deal with the case on the basis of the applicant’s wish to exercise his or her personal right to lodge an application with the Court (see, for example, Singh and Others v. Greece, no. 60041/13, § 26, 19 January 2017).

13.  The Court considers that the second applicant’s parents have a legitimate interest in pursuing the application on his behalf. For practical reasons, the Court will continue to refer to Mr Igor Gumenyuk as “the second applicant”.

14.  The applicants complained that their pre-trial detention had been unjustified and excessively lengthy. The Government contested that claim.

15.  The first applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 3 is essentially the same as that examined in Kraynyak v. Ukraine ([Committee], no. 68353/17, §§ 2-9, 16 February 2023), and it must therefore be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§ 2 (b) and 4 of the Convention.

16.  The second applicant’s complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

17.  The Court considers that the circumstances of the second applicant’s case are, in all relevant respects, similar to those examined in Kraynyak (cited above, §§ 16-25), where the Court found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention on the following grounds:

“16.  The relevant period lasted four years and more than ten months (from 31 August 2015 to 22 July 2020 ...). Such a length of detention is already a matter of grave concern and requires the domestic authorities to put forward very weighty reasons to justify it (see, for example, Velečka and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 56998/16 and 3 others, §§ 98 and 99, 26 March 2019, with further references).

17.  The relevant principles of the Court’s case-law are summarised in Grubnyk v. Ukraine (no. 58444/15, §§ 110-15, 17 September 2020).

18.  In that judgment the Court held that, despite references to the Bail Exclusion Clause, the domestic courts had given relevant and sufficient reasons for Mr Grubnyk’s detention. The Court considers that similar considerations apply in the present case.

19.  Indeed, when the applicant was initially placed in pre-trial detention, the Bail Exclusion Clause was inapplicable to him ... Nevertheless, the domestic court found, referring to the specific circumstances of the case, that the relevant risks justified detention ... In a number of decisions extending detention the courts did invoke the Clause as an additional argument. However, for the courts the invocation of that Clause was not sufficient to extend the applicant’s detention. On the contrary, the courts found that there were specific circumstances which justified it ...

20.  Accordingly, the Court considers that the domestic courts did not use ‘general and abstract’ arguments for the applicant’s detention and that their reasons were relevant and sufficient.

21.  It remains to be ascertained whether the authorities displayed ‘special diligence’ in the conduct of the proceedings ...

22.  The Court recognises that the applicant’s case was complex, concerning an incident with more than a hundred victims.

23.  At the same time, the applicant alleged that there had been considerable delays in his case after the pre-trial investigation had been completed on 10 August 2016 ... The Government did not contest the applicant’s allegation that after that date the trial did not begin until at least 15 August 2017, that is, for more than a year. No good reason has been given for that delay. Afterwards, the applicant remained deprived of his liberty for almost three more years.

24.  The authorities did not show that there existed exceptional circumstances justifying the applicant’s detention for such a substantial period, such as, for example, the need to collect evidence abroad or to request international legal assistance (see Lisovskij v. Lithuania, no. 36249/14, § 80, 2 May 2017, with further references).

25.  The Court concludes, therefore, that the authorities failed to display special diligence in the period after completion of the pre-trial investigation. This consideration is sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.”

18.  The Court considers that those considerations are equally relevant in the second applicant’s case. Indeed, the second applicant’s detention lasted even longer, from 31 August 2015 to 5 July 2023, that is, more than seven years and ten months. The fact that the second applicant, unlike the first, was formally suspected of terrorism – an offence subject to the Bail Exclusion Clause – when he was initially remanded in custody on 2 September 2015 does not change the Court’s assessment.

19.  The Court finds that the domestic courts failed to display special diligence in the proceedings in the period after the completion of the pre-trial investigation (see para              graph 7 above). This consideration is sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in respect of the second applicant.

20.  The applicants complained that their appeals against the extension orders (see paragraph 6 above) had not been examined “speedily”, in alleged breach of Article 5 § 4. The second applicant also complained that he had no effective right to compensation for the alleged violations of Article 5 §§ 3 and 4, in alleged breach of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention. The Government contested those complaints.

21.  This part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. Accordingly, it must be declared admissible.

22.  The Court observes that the applicants’ appeals against the extension orders were examined with considerable delay (see paragraph 6 above) and that no adequate explanation has been provided for that delay. Having examined all the material before it, and in the light of its findings in the leading case of Kharchenko v. Ukraine (no. 40107/02, §§ 84-87, 10 February 2011) the Court finds that there has been: (i) a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the failure to examine speedily the applicants’ appeals against the extension orders of 25 July and 6 September 2019; and (ii) a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the failure to examine speedily the first applicant’s appeal against the extension order of 24 October 2019.

23.  Furthermore, having examined all the material before it, and in the light of its findings in the leading cases of Tymoshenko v. Ukraine (no. 49872/11, §§ 286-87, 30 April 2013), Kotiy v. Ukraine (no. 28718/09, § 55, 5 March 2015) and Korban v. Ukraine (no. 26744/16, §§ 193-202, 4 July 2019), the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention in respect of the second applicant.

24.  The Court finally considers that it has examined the main legal questions raised in the present application, and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the first applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention (see, for example, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania, cited above, § 156).

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

25.  The applicants claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 1,070.45 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the Court (corresponding to EUR 70.45 for postal expenses and EUR 1,000 for legal fees), the latter amount to be paid directly to the applicants’ representative.

26.  The Government contested that claim, arguing that it was unfounded and unsubstantiated.

27.  The Court considers that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non‑pecuniary damage sustained by the first applicant.

28.  The Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards the second applicant EUR 3,000, to be paid to the second applicant’s parents.

29.  The applicants failed to produce any documents showing that they had paid or were under a legal obligation to pay the fees charged by their representative (see Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, § 372, 28 November 2017). The Court therefore dismisses the claim for legal fees.

30.  Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 70 covering costs for the proceedings before the Court, to be paid directly to the applicants’ representative, Mr Zarutskyy.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) to the second applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid to the second applicant’s parents;

(ii)  EUR 70 (seventy euros) to the applicants jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses, to be transferred directly into the account of the applicants’ representative, Mr Zarutskyy;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 November 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Martina Keller Andreas Zünd
 Deputy Registrar President

[1] The Bail Exclusion Clause was a provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure that excluded the granting of bail and other non-custodial preventive measures to those accused of terrorism and certain national security offences (see Grubnyk v. Ukraine, no. 58444/15, §§ 40, 50, 53‑56, 116-30, 17 September 2020). It was declared unconstitutional on 25 June 2019.