FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF KRÓL v. POLAND
(Application no. 65017/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
28 September 2004
FINAL
28/12/2004
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Król v. Poland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrR. Maruste,
MrS. Pavlovschi,
MrL. Garlicki, judges,
and Mrs F. Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 7 September 2004,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 65017/01) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Mieczysław Król (“the applicant”), on 3 May 2000.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr L. Lachowicz, a lawyer practising in Komorów, Poland. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mr K. Drzewicki and Mr. J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. On 12 March 2002 the Court decided to communicate the application. to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Warsaw, Poland.
5. On 21 February 1994 the applicant sued a certain E.K. (“the defendant”) in the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy), seeking payment for works which he had carried out for her. On 17 March 1994 the applicant was partly exempted from the payment of court fees.
6. The first hearing was fixed for 26 January 1995, but was eventually adjourned since the defendant was ill.
7. On 22 February 1995 the defendant lodged a counterclaim. The trial court held hearings on: 2 March, 18 April, 6 June and 3 October 1995 and on 16 January and 16 April 1996. The court heard evidence from several witnesses and from the defendant.
8. On 16 April 1996 the court ordered that expert evidence be obtained. On 10 May 1996 the expert submitted his opinion to the court. On 24 September 1996 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from the expert. The applicant requested the court to take new expert evidence.
9. During the hearing held on 24 April 1997 the court heard several witnesses. The applicant asked the court to appoint another expert. On 16 June 1997 the applicant applied for an exemption from the costs involved in obtaining an expert opinion. His request was granted on 28 October 1997. On 28 October 1997 another expert submitted his opinion to the trial court.
10. On 17 July 1998 the applicant asked the court to set a date for a hearing. He stressed that the court had only held two hearings per year. The next hearing was fixed for 9 November 1998, but was adjourned at the parties' request.
11. On 16 April 1999 the applicant again asked the court to obtain new expert evidence and set a date for a hearing as soon as possible. He submitted that he had been suffering from various ailments and for that reason the court should give priority to his case.
12. On 8 October 1999 the court, sitting in camera, decided to obtain an opinion from another expert. On 14 December 1999 the expert submitted his opinion to the court.
13. On an unspecified later date the applicant complained to the Ombudsman about the length of the proceedings. On 22 October 1999 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that his complaint had been referred to the President of the Warsaw Regional Court.
14. During the hearing held on 15 March 2000 the court heard an expert and ordered the parties to state their position within two weeks. The applicant submitted his pleadings on 27 March 2000.
15. On 25 August 2000 the applicant complained to the Minister of Justice, maintaining that the court was particularly slow in dealing with the case. In a letter to the applicant of 29 September 2000 the Minister of Justice conceded that the length of the proceedings was excessive.
16. On 11 October 2000 the Regional Court held a hearing. On 7 November 2000 the court held a viewing of the site. On 8 January 2001 and 12 March 2002 the court held further hearings.
17. On an unknown later date the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal gave judgments. Upon the applicant's subsequent cassation appeal, the proceedings are pending before the Supreme Court.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
18. The applicant complained that the length of the civil proceedings in his case had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
19. The Government contested that argument.
20. The period to be taken into consideration began on 21 February 1994 and in the light of the material available to the Court at the date of the adoption of the present judgment has not yet ended. It thus has already lasted 10 years, 6 months and 10 days.
A. Admissibility
21. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The Government's submissions
22. The Government submitted that the case had been of some complexity. They stressed that the trial court needed to obtain four expert opinions.
23. They further maintained that in the proceedings in question special diligence had not been required on the part of the domestic courts, unlike in cases concerning employment, pensions and disability pensions.
24. The Government were also of the opinion that the applicant had contributed to the prolongation of the proceedings by lodging several procedural motions.
25. Lastly, they claimed that the domestic authorities had shown due diligence in the proceedings.
26. In conclusion the Government invited the Court to find that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
2. The applicants' submissions
27. The applicant generally disagreed with the Government's submissions.
28. He further claimed that the length of the proceedings had been excessive. Also, given his bad health the excessive length of the proceedings had put a severe emotional and physical strain on him.
29. Lastly, he maintained that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
3. The Court's assessment
30. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the criteria established by its case-law, particularly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII, Humen v. Poland [GC], § 60 GC], no. 26614/95, 15 October 1999, § 60).
31. In the present case the Court observes, that while the second instance proceedings were concluded rather speedily, the case was examined by the court of first-instance for a substantial period of more than 8 years (see paragraphs 5, 16, 17 above).
32. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
33. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
34. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 §1 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
35. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
36. The applicant claimed 274,432.09 PLN in respect of pecuniary damage. That amount corresponded to the applicant's principal claim in the domestic proceedings. He further claimed the sum 150,000 PLN for non‑pecuniary damage he had suffered as a result of the protracted length of the proceedings.
37. The Government submitted that the applicant's claims were excessive and that there had been no causal link between the length of the proceedings and the amount claimed.
38. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards award him EUR 4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros) under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
39. The applicant also claimed 115,965 PLN for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and 20,000 PLN for those incurred before the Court (lawyer's fees).
40. The Government contested these claims.
41. According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros) for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
42. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into Polish zlotys at the date of the settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 September 2004, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-PassosNicolas Bratza
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy