SECOND SECTION
CASE OF KULCSÁR v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 22434/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
25 March 2014
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Kulcsár v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Helen Keller, President,
András Sajó,
Egidijus Kūris, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 4 March 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 22434/08) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr Csaba Kulcsár (“the applicant”), on 15 May 2008.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr I. Barbalics, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
3. On 26 October 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Debrecen.
5. The applicant was party as creditor to liquidation proceedings which started before the Hajdú-Bihar-County County Regional Court on 12 March 1999. The case was terminated by the Debrecen Court of Appeal on 24 October 2007 (service: 29 November 2007).
THE LAW
6. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
7. The Government contested that argument.
8. The period to be taken into consideration began on 12 March 1999 and ended on 29 November 2007. It thus lasted almost eight years and eight months for two levels of jurisdiction.
In view of such lengthy proceedings, this complaint must be declared admissible.
9. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
10. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
11. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant also complained about the decisions of the courts given in the liquidation proceedings.
In so far as the applicant’s complaint may be understood to concern assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I). In the present case, there is no appearance that the courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary.
Moreover, as to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court notes that the domestic courts adjudicated a case of liquidation, in which both the applicant, a creditor, and the debtor were private entities. The court decisions, free of any appearance of arbitrariness, cannot be regarded as constituting an interference with the applicant’s property rights.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
12. Relying on Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant claimed 65,900 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 6,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
13. The Government contested these claims.
14. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it considers that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on the basis of equity, it awards him EUR 3,600 under that head.
15. The applicant also claimed EUR 2,170 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, billable by his lawyer.
16. The Government contested the claim.
17. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, the sum of EUR 1,000 under this head.
18. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 3,600 (three thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 March 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley NaismithHelen Keller
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy