SECOND SECTION
CASE OF LÁSZLÓ NÉMETH v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 30211/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9 December 2008
FINAL
09/03/2009
This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of László Németh v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens, President,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Nona Tsotsoria, judges,
and Sally Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 18 November 2008,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 30211/05) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr László Németh (“the applicant”), on 11 August 2005.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr I. Barbalics, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
3. On 13 February 2008 the President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Szomód.
5. In the context of a real estate dispute, on 13 August 1993 the applicant brought an action claiming partial ownership of a house.
6. After having held several hearings and obtained the opinions of two experts, on 27 August 1998 the applicant was granted one fifth of the property in question.
7. On appeal, on 17 March 1999 the Komárom-Esztergom County Regional Court quashed this decision.
8. In the resumed proceedings, the Tata District Court held several hearings and obtained the opinion of an expert. On 12 June 2003 it gave judgment, granting the applicant partial ownership. Simultaneously, it dissolved the common ownership thus created, gave the part allocated to the applicant to the respondent, and ordered the latter to compensate the former.
9. On appeal, on 4 February 2004 the Regional Court amended this decision and gave a final judgment.
10. The applicant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
11. On 31 January 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the petition in preliminary proceedings. In a reasoned decision, it held that the applicant’s petition was inadmissible because it did not disclose a breach of the relevant law, in particular the rules concerning the termination of common ownership. The Supreme Court’s order was served on him on 17 February 2005.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
12. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
13. The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
14. The Government submitted that final domestic decision in the case had been given by the Regional Court on 4 February 2004 and that the application had been introduced only on 11 August 2005, i.e. outside the six-month time-limit prescribed in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant’s petition for review, rejected by the Supreme Court in the admissibility phase, could not be regarded as an effective remedy and did not, in their view, influence the running of the time-limit.
The applicant contested that view.
15. The Court observes that, for the purpose of its examination of the reasonableness of the length of proceedings, it must take into account all instances which could have had an influence on the outcome of the case (see Maria de Lurdes Rosa Marques and Others v. Portugal (dec.), no. 48187/99, 7 June 2001). In this connection, it finds that the decision of the Supreme Court, served on the applicant on 17 February 2005, and which dealt with the merits of the applicant’s petition for review and adopted a reasoned decision in the matter, constituted the final domestic decision in the present application. The Government’s objection must therefore be rejected. Moreover, the Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
16. The period to be taken into consideration began on 13 August 1993 and ended on 17 February 2005. It thus lasted eleven and a half years, for three levels of jurisdiction.
17. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
18. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see Frydlender, cited above).
19. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court finds that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
20. The applicant also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the domestic courts had awarded him only money rather than actual partial ownership.
21. The Court observes that the domestic courts adjudicated a civil-law dispute between private parties and that no deprivation of property by a State body took place. In the absence of any appearance of arbitrariness, the Court considers that the applicant’s submissions do not disclose any indication of a violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
22. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
23. The applicant claimed 25,373 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
24. The Government contested these claims.
25. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it considers that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 8,000 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
26. The applicant also claimed EUR 13,350 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 1,650 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
27. The Government contested these claims.
28. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the entirety of the sum claimed in respect of the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
29. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Hungarian forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 8,000 (eight thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
(ii) EUR 1,650 (one thousand six hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 December 2008, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Sally DolléFrançoise Tulkens
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy