CASE OF LEGILLON v. FRANCE [Extracts]

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF LEGILLON v. FRANCE

(Application no. 53406/10)

JUDGMENT

(Extracts)

STRASBOURG

10 January 2013

FINAL

10/04/2013

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Legillon v. France,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Mark Villiger, President,
Angelika Nußberger,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Ann Power-Forde,
André Potocki,
Helena Jäderblom,
Aleš Pejchal, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 4 December 2012,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 53406/10) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a French national, Mr Olivier Legillon (“the applicant”), on 3 September 2010.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr P. Spinosi, of the Conseil d’Etat and Court of Cassation Bar. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Belliard, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of reasoning in a judgment of the Assize Court of Appeal.

4. On 25 August 2011 notice of the application was given to the Government.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and is currently in prison.

6. In March 2000, officers from the Pleine-Fougères gendarmerie station took a statement from one of the applicant’s daughters, M., born on 9 March 1986. She explained that she had been sexually and physically assaulted by her father since sharing a bedroom with him after her mother had left the family home. Her mother was interviewed but said that she was unaware of any such incidents and refused to lodge a criminal complaint. The investigation established, however, that she had reported incidents of violence and sexual abuse against her daughters to a high-school supervisor. M.’s sister, S., confirmed that she had heard friends of her sister mention obscene acts; the friends in question confirmed, as did the school bus driver, that M. had confided in them. M.’s half-brother, K.P., and half-sister, S.P., from their mother’s first marriage, were also interviewed. K.P. stated that he had received a letter from M. revealing that she had been raped. S.P., born on 8 August 1973, said that she had been raped by the applicant on several occasions while on holiday in Belgium aged only thirteen, and described the violent atmosphere the applicant had created within the family. She lodged a criminal complaint at the same time as making her statement. A., born on 20 June 1977, the applicant’s daughter from a previous marriage, stated that after her parents had separated, she had been raped on several occasions by her father, who had made her sleep in his bed when she had been just six years old. She also lodged a criminal complaint.

7. The applicant was arrested and taken into police custody. He initially denied the allegations before admitting that there had been involuntary contact of a non-sexual nature.

8. Having failed to reply to a summons from the investigating judge dealing with the case at the Saint-Malo tribunal de grande instance, the applicant was arrested and brought before the judge pursuant to a warrant.

9. On 1 February 2002, after initial questioning, the investigating judge placed the applicant under formal investigation and remanded him in custody.

10. By an order of 23 January 2003 the applicant was released subject to court supervision.

11. Following the investigation, the applicant requested that only the alleged offences concerning his daughter M. be taken into account and that the proceedings be discontinued in respect of the alleged offences of rape against his daughter A. and step-daughter S.P.

12. In an order of 28 May 2004 the investigating judge committed the applicant for trial in the Ille-et-Vilaine Assize Court on multiple counts of rape by an ascendant in respect of his daughter A., rape by a person exercising authority in respect of his step-daughter S.P. and sexual assault by an ascendant in respect of his daughter M., all three having been under the age of fifteen at the time of the alleged offences. He also remanded the applicant in custody. The applicant appealed on 3 June 2004.

13. In a judgment of 16 September 2004 the Investigation Division of the Rennes Court of Appeal, after outlining the facts and the statements taken during the police inquiry and the judicial investigation, upheld the order. The operative part of the judgment included the following passage:

“Upholds the order appealed against and holds that [the applicant] should be charged with the following:

- committing acts of sexual penetration against [A.] by violence, coercion or by taking the victim unawares, in La Morlaye ([département code] 60), between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 1983, or in any event within the département of Oise and outside the period to which the time-limit for prosecution applies,

* with the aggravating circumstances that [A.] was a minor under the age of fifteen on the date of the acts specified above, having been born on 20 June 1977, and that [the applicant] is her legitimate father;

- committing acts of sexual penetration against [S.P.] by violence, coercion or by taking the victim unawares, in La Panne, Kingdom of Belgium, between 1 January and 31 December 1986, or in any event as a French citizen and outside the period to which the time-limit for prosecution applies,

* with the aggravating circumstances that [S.P.] was a minor under the age of fifteen on the date of the acts specified above, having been born on 8 August 1973, and that [the applicant] exercised authority over her, as he was her mother’s husband and she lived with them;

- committing or attempting indecent assault on [M.], born on 8 March 1986 and thus a minor under the age of fifteen, in Vieux-Viel (35), between 1 March 1999 and 31 March 2000, or in any event within national territory and outside the period to which the time-limit for prosecution applies,

* with the aggravating circumstances that the acts specified above were committed by violence, coercion or by taking the victim unawares, and that [the applicant] is her legitimate father;

The above-mentioned serious crimes and related offence being defined by and punishable under Articles 222-22, 222-23, 222-24, 222‑27, 222-29, 222-30, 222-44, 222-45, 222-47 and 222-48-1 of the Criminal Code and former Articles 331 and 332 of the Criminal Code, repealed with effect from 1 March 1994, and falling within the jurisdiction of the Assize Court in accordance with Article 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...”

14. On 14 December 2004 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law.

15. On 23 April 2007 the trial began in the Ille-et-Vilaine Assize Court.

16. In a judgment of 25 April 2007 the court and jury found the applicant guilty of “rape of a minor under fifteen years of age by a legitimate ascendant, rape of a minor under fifteen years of age by a person exercising authority and sexual assault of a minor under fifteen years of age by a legitimate ascendant or a person exercising authority” and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. The court ordered the applicant’s immediate detention.

17. In a judgment of 13 June 2007 the Court of Cassation conferred jurisdiction on the Côtes d’Armor Assize Court to hear an appeal by the applicant and a cross-appeal by the prosecution.

18. On 27 July 2007 the applicant was released subject to court supervision.

19. On 24 March 2009 the oral proceedings began in the Côtes d’Armor Assize Court.

20. The following questions were put to the court and the jury:

“Question no. 1: Is the accused Olivier Legillon guilty of having committed acts of sexual penetration, of any nature whatsoever, against [A.], by violence, coercion or by taking the victim unawares, in La Morlaye (Oise), between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 1983?

Question no. 2: Was [A.], born on 20 June 1977, under fifteen years of age on the date of the acts specified above in question no. 1?

Question no. 3: Is the accused Olivier Legillon the legitimate father of [A.]?

Question no. 4: Is the accused Olivier Legillon guilty, as a French citizen, of having committed acts of sexual penetration, of any nature whatsoever, against [S.P.], by violence, coercion or by taking the victim unawares, in La Panne (Kingdom of Belgium), between 1 July 1985 and 15 September 1985?

Question no. 5: Was [S.P.], born on 8 August 1973, under fifteen years of age on the date of the acts specified above in question no. 4?

Question no. 6: Did the accused Olivier Legillon exercise authority over [S.P.] on the date of the acts specified above in question no. 4, as the husband of the mother of said minor, who lived with them?

Question no. 7: Is the accused Olivier Legillon guilty of having committed acts of indecent assault against [M.], born on 8 March 1986 and thus a minor under the age of fifteen, in Vieux-Viel, département of Ille-et-Vilaine, between 1 March 1999 and 31 March 2000?

Question no. 8: Were the acts of indecent assault specified above in question no. 7 committed by violence, coercion or by taking the victim unawares?

Question no. 9: Is the accused Olivier Legillon the legitimate father of [M.]?

Subsidiary question no. 1: Is the accused Olivier Legillon guilty of having committed acts of sexual assault not involving penetration against [M.], by violence, coercion or by taking the victim unawares, in Vieux-Viel, département of Ille-et-Vilaine, between 1 March 1999 and 31 March 2000?

Subsidiary question no. 2: Was [M.], born on 8 March 1986, under fifteen years of age on the date of the acts specified above in subsidiary question no. 1?

Subsidiary question no. 3: Is the accused Olivier Legillon the legitimate father of [M.]?”

21. The answer given to the first six questions and the three subsidiary questions was “yes, by a majority of at least ten”, the answer to question 7 was “no” and questions 8 and 9 were found to be “devoid of purpose”.

22. In a judgment of 27 March 2009 the applicant was found guilty and sentenced as follows:

“It follows from the verdict reached by the court and jury together, by a majority of at least ten, that [the applicant] is guilty of:

- having committed acts of sexual penetration, of any nature whatsoever, against [A.], by violence, coercion or by taking the victim unawares, in La Morlaye (Oise), between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 1983, with the aggravating circumstances that [A.], born on 20 June 1977, was under fifteen years of age on the date of the acts, and that he is her legitimate father;

- as a French citizen, having committed acts of sexual penetration, of any nature whatsoever, against [S.P.], by violence, coercion or by taking the victim unawares, in La Panne (Kingdom of Belgium), between 1 July 1985 and 15 September 1985, with the aggravating circumstances that [S.P.], born on 8 August 1973, was under fifteen years of age on the date of the acts, and that he exercised authority over her, being her mother’s husband and living in the same household;

- having committed acts of sexual assault not involving penetration against [M.], by violence, coercion or by taking the victim unawares, in Vieux-Viel, département of Ille-et-Vilaine, between 1 March 1999 and 31 March 2000, with the aggravating circumstances that [M.], born on 8 March 1986, was under fifteen years of age on the date of the acts, and that he is her legitimate father.

The above facts, found to have been established by the court and the jury, constitute the serious crimes of rape of a minor under fifteen years of age by an ascendant, rape of a minor under fifteen years of age by a person exercising authority and the related offence of sexual assault of a minor under fifteen years of age by an ascendant, defined by and punishable under Articles 121-1, 121-3, 131-26, 131-27, 131-31, 222‑22 § 1, 222-23, 222-24 § 2, 222-29 § 1, 222-30 § 2, 222-44, 222-45, 222-47 of the Criminal Code and former Article 332 of the Criminal Code, repealed with effect from 1 March 1994 ...

[The applicant] is SENTENCED to FIFTEEN YEARS’ IMPRISONMENT.”

23. The judges of the court ordered the applicant’s immediate detention.

24. The applicant appealed on points of law. The first ground submitted in his further pleadings in support of the appeal referred specifically to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the Court’s case-law, arguing that the indication “yes, by a majority of at least ten” in response to the questions constituted vague and abstract reasoning from which he was unable to discern why the questions had been answered in the affirmative or negative.

25. In a judgment of 3 March 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law against the Assize Court’s judgment of 27 March 2009. It held that the judgment convicting the applicant had included the answers which the judges and jury comprising the Assize Court of Appeal had given on the basis of their personal conviction, immediately after the oral proceedings, by a qualified majority of two-thirds following a secret vote, to the questions put to them, which had been the subject of adversarial argument. It held that since information had been provided in advance as to the charges forming the basis of the indictment, the rights of the defence had been freely exercised and the proceedings had been public and adversarial, the Assize Court’s judgment satisfied the statutory and Convention requirements that had been relied on.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

See Agnelet v. France, no. 61198/08, §§ 29-34, 10 January 2013.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

26. The applicant complained that he had been denied the right to a fair trial on account of the lack of reasoning in the Assize Court of Appeal’s judgment. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

27. The Government contested that argument.

...

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

36. The applicant noted, at the outset, that the French system had been reformed after the Court’s finding against Belgium in the case of Taxquet v. Belgium ([GC], no. 926/05, ECHR 2010); Law no. 2011-939 of 10 August 2011 had added a new Article 365-1 to the Code of Criminal Procedure, providing for a statement of reasons. This, in his submission, was an implicit acknowledgment of failure to observe the requirements of a fair trial, particularly as it had been preceded by considerable discussion and uncertainty among legal experts and in court judgments in France in the light of the Taxquet judgment (cited above). He noted in particular that, contrary to what the Government maintained, the drafting history of the new legislation demonstrated the intention to take the Court’s case-law into account, for example the impact assessment of 11 April 2011 published on the Senate’s website, which stated that “the bill makes it compulsory to state reasons for assize court judgments in order to address the implications of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights”.

37. The applicant submitted that the provision of reasons for court decisions was the only means of ensuring that the requirements of a fair trial had been properly complied with. The Grand Chamber’s judgment in the Taxquet case (cited above) served as a frame of reference and the clarifications it had added in relation to the Chamber judgment made no difference to the fact that a finding against France had to be reached where an accused person had not been afforded the necessary safeguards to be able to understand the verdict. The applicant contended that the differences between the Belgian and French systems were minor: in both systems, the accused was charged following an investigation, an indictment was drawn up and then read out at the trial, the questions to the jury had to derive from the indictment and meet certain formal requirements, questions were put to the jury by the president of the assize court at the end of the oral proceedings and the court had to give a reasoned judgment in the event of a dispute regarding the questions.

38. In France, the indictment was issued only if there was sufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial in the assize court, and it was read out at the start of the oral proceedings during which the members of the jury formed their personal conviction. Accordingly, while the indictment specified the evidence justifying a trial, it did not explain the reasons why the jury subsequently found the accused guilty. The reform resulting from the Law of 10 August 2011 made it clear, moreover, that the statement of reasons form appended to the question sheet consisted precisely of a “statement of the main items of evidence against the defendant which persuaded the assize court in respect of each of the charges against him” (Article 365-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

39. As regards the availability of a review, the applicant asserted that the possibility of an appeal and the requirement to state reasons were two completely separate safeguards. The possibility of appealing did not offset the risk of an arbitrary decision and did not allow the accused to understand the reasons for their conviction. The requirement to state reasons, which had been emphasised in the Court’s case-law, also ensured better supervision by the Court of Cassation of the lawfulness of domestic decisions.

40. The applicant further submitted that it was clear from an examination of the specific circumstances of his case that there had been a breach of the requirements of Article 6. Firstly, the indictment had related solely to the charges brought prior to the trial; accordingly, it could not contain any judgment as to his guilt and the sentence, or any information that might have emerged at the trial. It was far from certain that the members of the jury at the trial would have based their findings on the same considerations as the courts dealing with the investigation.

41. With regard to his particular case, the applicant noted that two of the nine questions had been devoid of purpose (nos. 8 and 9) in view of the negative answer to question no. 7; he had therefore been convicted on the strength of six answers in the affirmative, as the subsidiary questions had not clarified matters in any way. There was no indication that the positive answers to the questions amounted to an endorsement of the reasoning behind the decision to bring charges against him. Trials in assize courts were of crucial importance and it was not uncommon for them to bring to light new facts not referred to in the committal order.

42. The applicant also submitted that the questions should have made a distinction between the elements of violence, coercion, threat or taking by surprise, which nevertheless were defined differently in the case-law and had different effects on the victim; without this, the questions could not form a suitable framework for the verdict in the absence of a statement of reasons. The indictment and question sheet were especially inadequate in his case as he had always protested his innocence. He further noted that there had been changes in the classification of the alleged offences between the victim’s statements during the investigation, the charges brought in the committal order and the questions put to the jury; this showed that the jury’s decision was entirely separate from the indictment, making it all the more necessary for reasons to be given for the judgment convicting him.

43. The Government submitted, in the light of the criteria set forth in the Taxquet v. Belgium Chamber judgment of 13 January 2009, that the criminal procedure followed in the present case had satisfied the Convention requirements. They stated firstly that the requirement to give reasons for court decisions, which did not appear in the Convention, was to be seen as just one aspect of the proceedings, which needed to be examined as a whole. As a result, the Court had not criticised the fact that in French law, judgments of assize courts did not contain reasons; the finding by a Chamber to that effect in the Papon v. France decision of 15 November 2001 (no. 54210/00, § 26, ECHR 2001-XII) had thus been confirmed by the Grand Chamber in the Taxquet judgment (cited above, §§ 90 and 93). A statement of reasons was not the only means of understanding the decision, since the assize court’s finding as to guilt resulted from reasoning which the defendant could understand and reconstruct through a set of safeguards afforded during the trial (they cited Taxquet, cited above, § 92).

44. They noted that the applicant had appealed against the order committing him for trial in the Assize Court and that the judgment of the Investigation Division of the Court of Appeal had been read out in full by the clerk during the oral proceedings in the assize courts.

45. The Government added that all defendants were entitled to have not only the committal order or the Investigation Division’s judgment read out in court, but also, in proceedings before assize courts of appeal, the questions put to the first-instance assize court, its answers and its decision.

46. They pointed out that the charges were read out and were then the subject of adversarial argument. During the trial in the assize court, each item of evidence was examined and the defendant was assisted by counsel, whose role was also to inform and advise his or her clients.

47. The Government also emphasised that the judges and jury withdrew to deliberate immediately after the oral proceedings had ended and the questions had been read out. Since they did not have access to the case file, they could only discuss the evidence examined by the parties during the trial. Unlike the Belgian system, in which the jury deliberated on their own, the French system assigned a significant role to professional judges throughout the proceedings and during the deliberations.

48. Lastly, the Government observed that since the Law of 15 June 2000, decisions of assize courts were subject to review by an enlarged assize court of appeal, a stage that had been lacking in the Taxquet case (cited above, § 99).

49. With regard to the applicant’s specific circumstances, the Government submitted that the indictment, which had formed the basis for the referral of the case to the Assize Court and for the principal questions to be answered by the jury, had contained particularly thorough reasoning; it had included all the statements taken during the investigation (the applicant, the civil party, the victims, those close to the victims, witnesses), as well as the findings of psychiatric and psychological assessments of the victims, which had concluded that their statements were credible, before deciding that there was strong and consistent evidence that the applicant had sexually abused his two daughters and his step-daughter. The applicant, who had been assisted by counsel, had been free to present his defence and to comment on each item of evidence produced. The Government further submitted that, despite the applicant’s denials, the facts of the case had not been especially complex, and added that he had been the sole defendant.

50. As regards the aggravating circumstances of commission by an ascendant, the present case differed from the Taxquet case in that the relevant circumstances could hardly have been disputed, since the applicant was the father of two of the victims and had been married to the mother of another victim, and all the victims had been aged under fifteen at the material time.

51. Regarding the questions put to the jury, the Government pointed out that there had been nine of them, questions 1, 4 and 7 referring to the principal offences and mentioning a significant number of details (date and location of the offence, identity of the accused and the victim, constituent elements of the offences of rape and sexual assault). Quite apart from the fact that they had not been challenged, these questions, coupled with the indictment and the oral proceedings lasting three days, had enabled the applicant to understand the reasons for his conviction.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) General principles

52. The Court reiterates that the Convention does not require jurors to give reasons for their decision and that Article 6 does not preclude a defendant from being tried by a lay jury even where reasons are not given for the verdict. The absence of reasons in a judgment, owing to the fact that the applicant’s guilt has been determined by a lay jury, is not in itself contrary to the Convention (see Saric v. Denmark (dec.), no 31913/96, 2 February 1999, and Taxquet, cited above, § 89).

53. Nevertheless, for the requirements of a fair trial to be satisfied, the accused, and indeed the public, must be able to understand the verdict that has been given; this is a vital safeguard against arbitrariness. As the Court has often noted, the rule of law and the avoidance of arbitrary power are principles underlying the Convention (see Taxquet, cited above, § 90). In the judicial sphere, those principles serve to foster public confidence in an objective and transparent justice system, one of the foundations of a democratic society (see Suominen v. Finland, no. 37801/97, § 37, 1 July 2003; Tatishvili v. Russia, no. 1509/02, § 58, ECHR 2007-III; and Taxquet, cited above).

54. The Court further reiterates that in the case of assize courts sitting with a lay jury, any special procedural features must be accommodated, seeing that the jurors are usually not required – or not permitted – to give reasons for their personal convictions (see Taxquet, cited above, § 92). In these circumstances, Article 6 requires an assessment of whether sufficient safeguards were in place to avoid any risk of arbitrariness and to enable the accused to understand the reasons for his conviction. Such procedural safeguards may include, for example, directions or guidance provided by the presiding judge to the jurors on the legal issues arising or the evidence adduced, and precise, unequivocal questions put to the jury by the judge, forming a framework on which the verdict is based or sufficiently offsetting the fact that no reasons are given for the jury’s answers (ibid.; see also Papon, cited above). Lastly, regard must be had to any avenues of appeal open to the accused.

55. Seeing that compliance with the requirements of a fair trial must be assessed on the basis of the proceedings as a whole and in the specific context of the legal system concerned, the Court’s task in reviewing the absence of a reasoned verdict is to determine whether, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, the proceedings afforded sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness and made it possible for the accused to understand why he was found guilty (see Taxquet, cited above, § 93). In doing so, it must bear in mind that it is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391/02, § 54, ECHR 2008; and ibid.).

56. In the Taxquet judgment (cited above) the Court examined the combined impact of the indictment and the questions to the jury. It noted that although the indictment, which was read out at the start of the trial, indicated the nature of the offence and the circumstances determining the sentence, as well as containing a chronological sequence of the investigative measures and the statements taken from witnesses, it did not specify “which items of evidence the prosecution could use against” the accused. Above all, the Court observed that in practice this was of “limited effect” since it was filed “before the trial itself, which must serve as the basis for the jurors’ personal conviction” (ibid., § 95).

57. The questions put in the Taxquet case, totalling thirty-two for eight defendants, including only four that related to the applicant, had been succinctly worded and identical for all the defendants, making no reference to “any precise and specific circumstances that could have enabled the applicant to understand why he was found guilty”, in contrast to the Papon case, in which the Assize Court had referred to the jury’s answers to each of the 768 questions put by the court’s president (ibid., § 96).

58. It can be inferred from the Taxquet judgment (cited above) that a combined examination of the indictment and the questions to the jury must make it possible to ascertain which of the items of evidence and factual circumstances discussed at the trial ultimately caused the jury to answer the questions concerning the defendant in the affirmative, in order to be able to: distinguish between the co-defendants; understand why a particular charge was brought rather than another; determine why the jury concluded that the involvement of certain co-defendants had been limited, carrying a lesser sentence; and discern why aggravating factors were taken into account (ibid., § 97). In other words, the questions must be both precise and geared to each individual (ibid., § 98).

(b) Application of these principles in the present case

59. The Court observes at the outset that all defendants in French criminal proceedings, like the applicant, are provided with certain information and afforded certain safeguards: the indictment, or the judgment of the investigation division in the case of an appeal, is read out in full by the clerk at the trial in the assize court; the charges are read out and are then the subject of adversarial argument, each item of evidence being examined and the defendant being assisted by counsel; the judges and jury withdraw to deliberate immediately after the oral proceedings have ended and the questions have been read out, without having access to the case file; accordingly, their decision can only be based on the evidence examined by the parties during the trial. Furthermore, decisions of assize courts are subject to review by an enlarged assize court of appeal.

60. With regard to the combined impact of the indictment and the questions to the jury in the present case, the Court observes firstly that applicant was the only defendant and the alleged offences, irrespective of their seriousness, were not complex.

61. In addition, as the parties agreed, the effect of the indictment was limited since it was filed before the trial itself, which forms the crucial part of the proceedings. The Court nevertheless observes that it was particularly detailed and that the charges were subsequently examined for three days. As to the findings of fact set out in the indictment and their value in assisting an understanding of the verdict against the applicant, the Court cannot speculate as to whether such findings influenced the Assize Court’s deliberations and the judgment it ultimately delivered.

62. The Court considers that the fact that the offences were reclassified after the order committing the applicant for trial and before the questions to the jury emphasises that the jury’s decision was distinct from the indictment. It further considers that this change, resulting from the trial, must have helped the defendant understand part of the jury’s reasoning.

63. As regards the questions, they were all the more important in that, as the Government themselves noted, the judges and jury did not have access to the case file during the deliberations and reached their decision solely on the basis of the evidence examined by the parties at the trial, although in this particular case, in accordance with Article 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, they also had access to the indictment.

64. Twelve questions were put, which as a whole were clear and unambiguous as to the charges against the applicant.

65. Admittedly, the applicant also complained that no distinction had been made between the elements of violence, coercion, threat or taking by surprise, which denote different types of behaviour. The Court considers, however, that he cannot claim that this factor in itself prevented him from understanding the verdict, particularly in view of the fact that the acts in question were committed by an ascendant against victims within his immediate circle who were under the age of majority.

66. The Court further notes that there were specific questions concerning the aggravating circumstances linked to the victims’ age and the applicant’s status as an ascendant, thus enabling the jury to determine precisely his individual criminal responsibility (see Goktepe v. Belgium, no. 50372/99, 2 June 2005).

67. In conclusion, the Court considers that the applicant was afforded sufficient safeguards enabling him to understand why he was found guilty.

68. Lastly, the Court takes note of the reform implemented since the time of the events, following the enactment of Law no. 2011-939 of 10 August 2011 which, among other things, introduced a new Article 365-1 into the Code of Criminal Procedure providing that the reasons for the assize court’s judgment are now to be set out in a “statement of reasons form” appended to the question sheet. In the event of a conviction, the Law requires the statement of reasons to refer to the evidence examined in the course of the deliberations which persuaded the assize court in respect of each of the charges brought against the accused. In the Court’s view, this reform appears, on the face of it, to significantly strengthen the safeguards against arbitrariness and to help the accused understand why they were convicted, thus meeting the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

69. There has therefore been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the present case.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

...

2. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

Done in French, and notified in writing on 10 January 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

              Claudia WesterdiekMark Villiger
RegistrarPresident

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