CASE OF ILIEVSKA AND ZDRAVEVA v. NORTH MACEDONIA

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF ILIEVSKA AND ZDRAVEVA v. NORTH MACEDONIA

(Applications nos. 19689/21 and 42794/22)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

13 November 2025

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Ilievska and Zdraveva v. North Macedonia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

 Arnfinn Bårdsen, President,
 Jovan Ilievski,
 Péter Paczolay,
 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
 Gediminas Sagatys,
 Stéphane Pisani,
 Juha Lavapuro, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications (nos. 19689/21 and 42794/22) against the Republic of North Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Ms Silvana Ilievska (“the first applicant”) and Ms Suzana Zdraveva (“the second applicant”), Macedonians/citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia, on the dates indicated in the appended table;

the decision to give notice to the Government of North Macedonia (“the Government”) of the applicants’ complaints concerning their inability to appeal (after the remittal of their cases) against the decisions of the Judicial Council of the Republic of North Macedonia (hereinafter “the State Judicial Council” or “the SJC”) dismissing them from their posts as judges, as well as the second applicant’s complaint of a violation of the principle of legal certainty, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 14 October 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1.  The case concerns the applicants’ inability under domestic law to appeal against the decisions of the State Judicial Council to dismiss them from their posts as judges following the remittal of their cases by second‑instance panels formed within the Supreme Court. It also concerns the second applicant’s complaint regarding a violation of the principle of legal certainty.

THE FACTS

2.  The applicants were born in 1958 and 1963 and live in Bitola and Shtip, respectively. The first applicant was initially represented by Mr Lj. Ilievski, subsequently by Mr T. Domazetovski, and lastly by Ms S. Zaceska, lawyers all practising in Bitola. She was finally granted leave to represent herself. The second applicant was represented by Mr A. Godjo and Mr Z. Hadji-Zafirov, lawyers practising in Ohrid and Skopje, respectively.

3.  The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms D. Djonova.

4.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

5.  The first applicant is a former judge of the Bitola Court of First Instance.

6.  On 22 May 2019 D.G.K., a private individual, requested that the SJC initiate professional misconduct proceedings against the first applicant. On 18 June 2019 the SJC decided not to initiate such proceedings, as the proposal to consider the request complete and timely had not attained the requisite majority.

7.  On 17 June 2019 D.G.K. again submitted a request for professional misconduct proceedings against the first applicant. The request stated that the first applicant had acted unprofessionally and unconscientiously when she had validated a care agreement between D.G.K.’s mother and another person. D.G.K. had been present at the validation of the agreement and alleged that the first applicant had made reference to D.G.K.’s husband, Z.K., President of the SJC at that time.

8.  On 5 October 2019 copies of the request for professional misconduct proceedings and the supporting evidence were served on the first applicant. On 16 October 2019 she submitted a written reply to the request. On 4 December 2019 a commission established by the SJC (“the Commission of Rapporteurs”) heard D.G.K., the first applicant and her lawyer, and admitted documentary evidence, including that proposed by the first applicant.

9.  On 10 February 2020 the SJC dismissed the first applicant for professional misconduct. It found that she had validated the care agreement despite an extract from the land registry concerning D.G.K.’s mother’s apartment indicating that proceedings to deprive D.G.K.’s mother of her legal capacity had been pending. Moreover, the two witnesses present at the validation of the agreement had not known D.G.K.’s mother (as required by law), and the medical expert who had drawn up a report on the mother’s legal capacity had not been a psychologist or psychiatrist but a forensic doctor.

10.  On 2 March 2020 the first applicant, both personally and through her lawyer, appealed against the SJC’s decision.

11.  On 12 June 2020 a second-instance panel, formed within the Supreme Court specifically for the first applicant’s case pursuant to the SJC Act (“the Appeal Panel”, see paragraph 39 below), quashed the SJC’s decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It found that: (i) the SJC had not established the elements of section 74(3) of the Courts Act, namely whether the professional misconduct had been committed with intent or obvious negligence, without justified reasons, had been the first applicant’s fault, and had caused serious consequences (see paragraph 37 below); (ii) by a court decision, the request for the deprivation of legal capacity of D.G.K.’s mother had been considered withdrawn at the time the first applicant had validated the care agreement, and there had been no evidence that that decision had been appealed; (iii) the fact that the first applicant had validated the agreement despite the witnesses not knowing D.G.K.’s mother did not constitute a serious professional error; and (iv) the “professional capacity” (стручно својство) of the medical expert was immaterial. The Appeal Panel also stated that the legal opinion of a judge was not a statutory ground for establishing professional misconduct.

12.  On 25 August 2020 the Commission of Rapporteurs again heard the first applicant and her lawyer. It also heard D.G.K. and admitted documentary evidence.

13.  On 15 October 2020 the SJC dismissed the first applicant again. It reiterated its previous findings (see paragraph 9 above) and, having established additional facts, found inter alia that the first applicant had intentionally committed professional misconduct, without justified reasons, and that this had resulted in serious consequences. Publicly available material indicates that Z.K. was not a member of the SJC when it dismissed the first applicant.

14.  The first applicant, both personally and through her lawyer, appealed against the SJC’s decision. She argued, among other things, that Article 15 of the Constitution guaranteed her the right to appeal against the SJC’s dismissal decision and that, in the remitted proceedings, the SJC had not complied with the instructions of the Appeal Panel.

15.  By a decision dated 15 December 2020 the SJC rejected the first applicant’s appeals as inadmissible, referring to section 72(6) of the SJC Act, which provides that no appeal may be lodged against an SJC decision adopted after the remittal of a case (see paragraph 39 below). The first applicant, through her lawyer, appealed against the SJC’s decision of 15 December 2020. On 12 February 2021, referring to Amendment XXI to the Constitution and section 72(6) of the SJC Act (see paragraphs 29 and 39 below), the SJC notified the first applicant that no appeal could be lodged against a decision adopted under section 72(5) of the SJC Act.

16.  At the time of the events described below, the second applicant was a judge at the Shtip Court of Appeal and her son worked for a law firm.

17.  On 12 February 2019, N.G., the President of the Shtip Court of Appeal, adopted a decision stating that the fact that the children of two judges from that court (the second applicant and Judge S.J.) worked in a law firm or lawyer’s office did not require those judges to recuse themselves from cases where the parties were represented by that law firm or lawyer, provided that the judges’ children were not individually authorised to represent the parties and had not undertaken any procedural actions. The decision was adopted in the interests of expediency (целисходност) and procedural economy, following the dismissal of two recusal requests submitted by Judge S.J. She had stated that she would continue to submit individual recusal requests in similar cases.

18.  On 4 December 2020 company I. requested that the second applicant be recused from a set of civil proceedings to which it was a party, as her son worked for the law firm representing the opposing party in those proceedings.

19.  On 10 December 2020 the second applicant notified the then acting President of the Shtip Court of Appeal (Z.M.) that her son did indeed work for the law firm in question. However, she referred to the decision of 12 February 2019 (see paragraph 17 above) and confirmed that her son had not undertaken any procedural actions in the proceedings. She asked Z.M. to determine whether there were grounds for her recusal.

20.  On 14 December 2020 Z.M. dismissed the recusal request. Referring to the grounds for recusal in section 64(1)(3) and (6) of the Civil Proceedings Act (see paragraph 40 below), he held that the mere fact that the second applicant’s son was employed by the law firm representing a party in the proceedings could not raise doubts as to her impartiality.

21.  On 25 February 2021 company I. requested that the SJC dismiss the second applicant and Z.M., arguing that the second applicant had failed to request her own recusal and Z.M. had not recused her from the above‑mentioned civil proceedings (see paragraphs 18-20 above).

22.  On 14 July 2021 the SJC dismissed the second applicant and Z.M. from their posts as judges. It found that the second applicant had been aware of the grounds for her recusal but had failed to request it when the case in question had been assigned to her. The decision of 12 February 2019 had not absolved her of the obligation to seek recusal. The SJC referred, inter alia, to section 64(1)(3) and (6) and section 65(2) of the Civil Proceedings Act, section 75(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (see paragraphs 40-42 below), the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (see, for example, Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, no. 16812/17, § 224, 18 July 2019) and the Court’s case-law (including Koulias v. Cyprus, no. 48781/12, 26 May 2020). The SJC held that the second applicant’s actions had caused serious consequences, most notably damaging the reputation of the judiciary and casting doubt on the court’s impartiality.

23.  On 5 August 2021 the second applicant appealed against the SJC’s decision. She argued, among other things, that in the period following the decision of 12 February 2019, Z.M., in his capacity as acting President of the Shtip Court of Appeal, had continued the practice established with that decision and that any individual attempt by her to seek recusal would have had no prospect of success. She further argued that before the decision of 12 February 2019 and after Z.M. had ceased to be President of the Shtip Court of Appeal, she had repeatedly submitted recusal requests in similar situations. She referred to ten decisions adopted in 2017, 108 decisions adopted in 2018 and fifteen decisions adopted in 2021, all upholding her recusal requests.

24.  On 29 November 2021 a second-instance panel, formed within the Supreme Court specifically for the second applicant’s case pursuant to the SJC Act (“the Appeal Panel”, see paragraph 39 below), upheld her appeal and quashed the SJC’s decision. It established, inter alia, that the SJC had failed to conduct separate proceedings and adopt separate decisions in respect of the second applicant and Z.M. The Appeal Panel also held that the SJC had not clearly established intent or obvious negligence on the second applicant’s part or demonstrated the serious consequences of her actions – both of which were required to establish professional misconduct under section 74(3) of the Courts Act. The SJC had not established the relevant facts, such as when the case in question had been assigned to the second applicant, whether she had undertaken any actions in those proceedings at that time, and whether and how the decision of 12 February 2019, the second applicant’s notification of 11 December 2020 and Z.M.’s decision of 14 December 2020 had affected the outcome of the proceedings.

25.  On 16 February 2022 a commission formed pursuant to the SJC Act (“the Commission of Rapporteurs”) held a hearing, at which it heard the second applicant and Z.M. and admitted material evidence. On 2 March 2022 the Commission of Rapporteurs submitted its report to the SJC.

26.  By a decision dated 18 April 2022 the SJC again dismissed the second applicant for professional misconduct. It established that, upon receiving the case file in question, she had learnt that the law firm employing her son had been representing one of the parties in the proceedings but had intentionally not notified Z.M. of the grounds for her recusal. Following company I.’s recusal request, she had intentionally, in order not to be recused, invoked the practice introduced by the decision of 12 February 2019, despite it not being a positive example of practice to be followed. Furthermore, the second applicant could have initiated proceedings before the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (“the Anti-Corruption Commission”) to determine whether a conflict of interest existed (section 76(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, see paragraph 42 below). The SJC again relied on the documents referred to in its previous decision (see paragraph 22 above), as well as on the Court’s judgments in, among other cases, Nicholas v. Cyprus (no. 63246/10, 9 January 2018) and Ramljak v. Croatia (no. 5856/13, 27 June 2017). Once more, it held that the second applicant’s actions had resulted in serious consequences, notably a violation of the right to an impartial tribunal and damage to the reputation of the judiciary.

27.  On 6 May 2022 the second applicant appealed against the SJC’s decision. She argued that her inability to appeal against that decision would violate her right to appeal and right to judicial protection, as guaranteed under Articles 15 and 50 of the Constitution, and would amount to a violation of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. She further argued that the Supreme Court and the Appeal Panel could apply the Constitution and the Convention directly and assess her appeal on the merits. In her view, her dismissal, despite the decision of 12 February 2019, had violated the principle of legal certainty. She also asserted that the Court’s case-law referred to by the SJC was incomplete and concerned different facts from those in her case. Lastly, she argued that the SJC had not complied with the Appeal Panel’s instructions.

28.  On 6 March 2023 the Supreme Court requested the second applicant’s case file from the SJC. On 15 March 2023 the SJC declined to provide it. On 27 March 2023 the Supreme Court, at a plenary session, adjourned the selection of members of a further second-instance panel (Appeal Panel) to decide the second applicant’s appeal for an undetermined period of time.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

29.  Amendment XXI, which replaced Article 15 of the Constitution, guarantees the right to appeal against first-instance court decisions and provides that the right to appeal or to another type of remedy (правна заштита) against individual decisions adopted at first instance by an administrative authority or another body performing public functions (јавни овластувања) is regulated by law.

30.  Article 50 § 2 guarantees judicial protection of the lawfulness of individual acts of the State administration and other institutions which perform public functions.

31.  Amendment XXV, which replaced Article 98, provides, inter alia, that the courts are autonomous and independent, and that they adjudicate on the basis of the Constitution, laws and international agreements ratified in accordance with the Constitution. Extraordinary courts are prohibited.

32.  Article 99 and Amendment XXVI, which partly replaced it, provide that a judge’s term of office is unlimited in duration and ceases if the judge requests it, if the SJC decides that the judge is permanently unable to perform judicial functions, if the judge retires, if the judge is convicted and sentenced to at least six months’ imprisonment, and (under certain conditions) if he or she is elected to another public office. A judge may be dismissed from judicial office if he or she commits a serious disciplinary violation, as provided for by law, which renders him or her unfit to perform judicial functions, or if he or she exercises the functions of a judge in an unprofessional and unconscientious manner, under the conditions provided for by law.

33.  Under Article 100 § 3 and Amendment XXVII, judicial office is incompatible with membership in a political party or the exercise of another public function or profession as determined by law. Article 100 § 4 forbids political organisations and activities in the judiciary.

34.  Under Article 101, the Supreme Court is the highest court providing uniformity in the implementation of laws by the courts.

35.  Amendment XXVIII, which replaced Article 104, reads as follows:

“[The SJC] is an autonomous and independent institution of the judiciary. [It] ensures and guarantees the autonomy and independence of the judiciary.

[The SJC] is composed of fifteen members.

The President of the Supreme Court ... and the Minister of Justice are ex officio members of [the SJC].

Eight members of [the SJC] are elected by judges from among their peers ...

Parliament elects three members of [the SJC] with a majority of all members of Parliament (мнозинство гласови од вкупниот број пратеници), which must include a majority of members of Parliament belonging to the non-majority communities (заедниците кои не се мнозинство)...

Two members are proposed by the President [of the State] ... and elected by Parliament...

The members of [the SJC] elected by Parliament, and those proposed by the President [are] university law professors, lawyers or other prominent jurists.

The members of [the SJC] are elected for a term of six years, with the possibility of re-election.

...

The functions of a member of [the SJC] are incompatible with membership in a political party and with the exercise of another public function or profession, as determined by law.”

36.  The relevant parts of Amendment XXIX, which replaced Article 105, read as follows:

“[The SJC]:

- elects and dismisses judges and lay judges;

- establishes the termination of a judge’s functions;

- elects and dismisses court presidents;

- monitors and assesses the work of judges;

- decides on judges’ disciplinary liability;

- decides whether to strip judges of their immunity;

- proposes two judges of the Constitutional Court ...

...

[The SJC] submits an annual report on its work to Parliament ...”

37.  Under section 74(1), a judge may be dismissed if he or she commits a serious disciplinary offence, as provided for by law, which renders him or her unfit to perform judicial functions, or if he or she performs judicial functions in an unprofessional and unconscientious manner, under the conditions provided for by law. Under section 74(3), a judge may be dismissed if the professional misconduct was committed with intent or obvious negligence, was the judge’s fault, and was without justified reasons, and if it caused serious consequences.

38.  Section 75(1)(4) provides that an obvious breach of the rules for recusal in a situation in which a judge knew or should have known that there was a reason for his or her recusal, constitutes a serious disciplinary offence. Under section 76(1)(7), an intentional and unjustified serious mistake at work (крупна професионална грешка) may constitute unprofessional and unconscientious performance of judicial functions. A different interpretation of the facts and law cannot be grounds for establishing a judge’s professional misconduct.

39.  The relevant provisions of the SJC Act read as follows:

Political activities (политичко дејствување)

Section 3

“(1) Political organisation[s] and activities in [the SJC] are prohibited.

(2) [The SJC’s] members, in the performance of its functions, shall not take part in partisan activities.

(3) Through its work, [the SJC] shall prevent political influence over the judiciary.

...”

Composition of [the SJC]

Section 6

“(1) [The SJC] is composed of fifteen members, out of which:

- the President of the Supreme Court ... and the Minister of Justice are ex officio members...;

- eight members ... are elected by judges from among their peers ...

- three members ... are elected by Parliament with a majority of all members of Parliament, which must include a majority of members of Parliament belonging to the non-majority communities ... and

- two members ... are proposed by the President [of the State] and elected by Parliament ...

(2) The ex officio members of [the SJC] shall participate in [its] work, without the right to vote.

(3) The ex officio members of [the SJC] shall not participate in [the SJC’s] work at the sessions at which professional misconduct proceedings (постапка за утврдување на одговорност) or the appointment or dismissal of a judge or court president are being discussed and decided.”

Term of office of members of [the SJC]

Section 7

“(1) The term of office of members of [the SJC] elected by judges shall be six years, with the possibility of re-election after at least six years following the termination of the previous term of office.

(2) The term of office of members ... elected by Parliament ... shall be six years, with the possibility of re-election.

(3) The term of office [in the SJC] of the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice shall cease upon the termination of their functions.

...”

Election and term of office of the president of [the SJC]

Section 8

“(1) The work of [the SJC] is directed by its President.

(2) The President ... has a Deputy, who acts in his or her stead during his or her absence.

(3) The President ... and his or her Deputy shall be elected from among the voting members of [the SJC], who have been appointed by Parliament ...

(4) The President ... and his or her Deputy shall be elected by a minimum of eight votes of the members entitled to vote.

(5) The term of office of the President ... and the Deputy ... shall be two years, without the possibility of re-election.”

Conditions for electing [or appointing] a member of [the SJC]

Section 11

“(1) Any judge ... fulfilling the following conditions may apply to the vacancy notice for the election of a member of [the SJC] from among the judges:

- [he or she] has at least six years’ experience as a judge;

- [his or her] performance of judicial functions has been positively appraised; and

- [he or she] has not, in a final decision in disciplinary proceedings, been subjected to a 15-30% decrease in salary that remains in effect at the time of the vacancy notice.

(2) Any person fulfilling the following conditions may apply to the vacancy notice for the election of a member of [the SJC] on the proposal of Parliament:

- ...

- [he or she is a] lawyer with at least fifteen years’ experience in the legal profession, who has passed the bar exam and who ... has distinguished [him or herself] through scientific or professional work or ... public activity;

...

- [he or she] has [the requisite] reputation and integrity for the performance of the functions of a member of [the SJC].

(3) At the proposal of the President of [the State], Parliament ... may elect a person as member of [the SJC] who ...:

...

- [is a] lawyer with at least fifteen years’ experience in the legal profession, who has passed the bar exam and who ... has distinguished [him or herself] through scientific or professional work or ... public activity;

...

- has [the requisite] reputation and integrity for the performance of the functions of a member of [the SJC].

...

(4) In the cases referred to in subsections (2) and (3) above, a person who ... in the past four years has been a member of parliament or the government, or who has performed functions within a body of a political party, shall not be elected as a member of [the SJC].

(5) Members of [the SJC] elected by Parliament ... as well as those elected by Parliament on the proposal of the President [of the State], shall be selected from among university law professors, lawyers, former judges of the Constitutional Court, international judges and other prominent jurists.”

Termination of the term of office of a member of [the SJC]

Section 31

“(1) The term of office of a member of [the SJC] shall end:

1) upon the expiry of the term for which he [or she] is elected;

2) at his [or her] own request;

3) if he [or she] is dismissed from judicial office in accordance with the law; and

4) if he [or she] is [convicted and] sentenced ... to at least six months’ imprisonment, rendering him [or her] unfit to perform the functions of an [SJC member];

5) if it has been established that he [or she has] permanently lost the ability to perform his [or her] functions; or

6) if he [or she] is elected to perform another public function or profession.

...”

Grounds for submitting a request for disciplinary proceedings against a member of [the SJC]

Section 34

“(1) A reasoned request for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a member of [the SJC] may be submitted to [the SJC] by at least twenty judges or by any member of [the SJC] with the right to vote, if a member of [the SJC]:

- influences the independence of judges and exerts pressure in relation to the adjudication of certain cases;

- neglects and does not perform his [or her] functions in the work of [the SJC];

- refuses to submit a declaration of assets and interests in accordance with the law or if the data contained in the declaration are largely inaccurate; or

- breaches the rules for recusal in situations in which the member of [the SJC] knew or ought to have known that there was a reason for recusal provided for by law.

(2) A member of [the SJC] shall be dismissed from his [or her] functions on the grounds referred to in subsection (1) if the breach was committed:

- with intent or obvious negligence on the part of the member of [the SJC] without justified reasons; and

- the breach caused serious consequences.”

Proceedings for deciding a request for disciplinary
proceedings against a member of [the SJC]

Section 35

...

“(6) [The SJC] shall adopt a decision to dismiss [its] member with at least eight votes from the members with the right to vote, with at least two members elected by Parliament ... voting in favour of the dismissal.

(7) The ex officio members [of the SJC], the member whose liability is being decided and the member who has submitted the request for disciplinary proceedings shall not participate in the adoption of the decision referred to in subsection (6).

...”

President of [the SJC]

Section 40

“The President ... shall:

- represent [the SJC];

- chair and direct its sessions;

- participate in the work and decision-making of [the SJC];

- sign the ... acts of [the SJC] and ensure their enforcement;

- ensure the enforcement of [the SJC’s] Rules of Procedure;

- perform other duties as prescribed by law and the Rules of Procedure.”

Equality of the members of [the SJC]

Section 41

“The members of [the SJC] with a right to vote are equal in their rights and obligations in the performance of the function of a member of [the SJC].”

Rights, duties and responsibilities of a member of [the SJC]

Section 43

“(1) A member of [the SJC] with voting rights shall have the following rights, duties and responsibilities:

- to participate in the work and decision-making of [the SJC];

- to submit initiatives, proposals and opinions on matters within [the SJC’s] competence;

- to take part in the work of [the SJC’s] working bodies to which he or she has been appointed;

- upon a decision of [the SJC], to inspect (остварува увид) a judge’s work and undertake other actions, and to report thereof to [the SJC];

- to be liable for any violation of the Constitution or law in connection with the performance of his or her function within [the SJC]; and

- to perform other tasks as prescribed by this law.

(2) The Minister of Justice and the President of the Supreme Court, as ex officio members ... , shall have the same rights, duties and responsibilities as the voting members referred to in subsection (1) ... , except in cases provided for by this law.”

Grounds for dismissal of a judge

Section 60

“A judge shall be dismissed from judicial office:

1) for a serious disciplinary breach (потешка дисциплинска повреда), as provided for by law, which renders him [or her] unfit to perform judicial functions; and

2) for unprofessional and unconscientious performance of judicial functions, as prescribed by law.”

Proceedings for establishing professional misconduct (утврдување на одговорност) on the part of a judge or court president

Section 61

“(1) Professional misconduct proceedings concerning a judge or court president shall be initiated within six months from the date of discovery of the [misconduct] (од денот на осознавање на сторената повреда), but no later than three years from the date on which [it] was committed.

(2) The proceedings shall be urgent and confidential, [and shall be] conducted without the presence of the public and by respecting the reputation and dignity of the judge or court president...

(3) At the request of the judge or court president, [the SJC] shall decide that the proceedings shall be conducted in public.

(4) At the request of the judge or court president, a representative of the Judges’ Association may also attend the session.”

Commission of Rapporteurs

Section 63

“(1) Upon receiving a request [for] professional misconduct proceedings ... [the SJC], by drawing lots from among its members with the right to vote, shall establish a commission of rapporteurs (hereinafter “the Commission”), composed of three members, two of whom shall be from among the members elected by judges, and one of whom shall be from among the members elected by Parliament ... The president of the Commission shall be selected by lot from among [its] members.

(2) [The SJC] member who submitted the request [for professional misconduct proceedings] ... may not be a member of the Commission.

...

(4) The Commission shall reject the request ... if it is:

- lodged out of time;

...”

Gathering data and evidence

Section 64

“(1) The Commission shall gather data and evidence ... for establishing the matters (состојбата) relating to the request.

...”

Service

Section 65

“(1) The Commission shall serve the request and evidence personally on the judge or court president, through the [registry] of [his or her] court ... or by registered mail to the home address.

...

(3) The judge or court president may reply in writing to the allegations in the request or give an oral statement ... within eight days from the date of receiving the request.

(4) The judge or court president ... shall have the right to be defended by a lawyer ...

(5) Together with the reply to the request, the judge or court president shall submit all evidence in support of the reply.

...”

Hearing ...

Section 66

“(1) The Commission shall schedule a hearing within seven days of receiving the judge’s or court president’s reply to the request ...

(2) The judge or court president shall be summoned to the hearing.

(3) If the judge or court president duly summoned does not appear at the hearing and does not justify [his or her] absence, the hearing shall be held.

(4) Evidence proposed by the person who has submitted the [request for professional misconduct proceedings] and by the judge or court president, as well as evidence obtained by the Commission, shall be presented at the hearing.

(5) The judge or court president shall have the right to comment on all evidence presented at the hearing, orally ... or in writing within three days.

(6) Minutes shall be drawn up of the actions taken at the hearing ... by a member of [the SJC registry].

(7) The minutes shall contain, in particular, information on: the date, time and place of the hearing, the president and members of the Commission ... the names of the persons present, the statement of the judge or court president or his [or her] counsel and the evidence presented. The minutes shall be signed by the applicant, the judge or court president, his or her counsel, the Commission and the person taking the minutes.

(8) If any of the persons ... does not sign the minutes, [this] shall be noted therein.

(9) During... the hearing ... an audio-recording shall be made.

...”

Report of the Commission

Section 67

“(1) The Commission shall submit a report ... to [the SJC] within fifteen days from the date of the hearing.

(2) The report shall contain all files and documents that the Commission had at its disposal in the course of the proceedings, as well as the statement of the judge or court president and the description of the actions taken.

(3) All files shall be made available to [the SJC’s] members.”

[The SJC’s] deliberations (расправа пред Советот)

Section 68

“(1) The president of the Commission shall present its report at [the SJC’s] deliberations.

(2) The president and members of the Commission shall participate in the deliberations and vote on the decision.

(3) If the request [for professional misconduct proceedings] was submitted by a member of [the SJC], he [or she] shall not participate in [the SJC’s] deliberations and shall be exempted from voting on the final decision.

...”

Proceedings for deciding upon a draft decision [regarding professional misconduct]

Section 69

“(1) At its session, [the SJC] shall deliberate on the report of the Commission ... and ... with at least seven votes from the total number of members with the right to vote, shall stay the proceedings if it determines that there are no grounds for [establishing professional misconduct].

...

(3) If [the SJC] does not stay the proceedings [and] establishes [professional misconduct] on the part of the judge or court president ... it shall dismiss [him or her] ... with at least eight votes from the total number of members with the right to vote.

...”

Service of the decision

Section 71

“(1) The decision [establishing professional misconduct] shall be prepared within ten days from its adoption and shall include an introduction, operative provisions, reasoning and a legal instruction.

...”

Right to appeal

Section 72

“(1) Only the judge or court president [against whom the professional misconduct proceedings were conducted] has the right to appeal against the decision of [the SJC] before a panel of the Supreme Court ... (hereinafter “the Appeal Panel”), within eight days from the date of service of the decision.

(2) The Appeal Panel shall be composed of nine members, three of whom shall be judges of the Supreme Court ... one judge from each of the appellate courts and two judges from the court where the judge against whom the [professional misconduct] proceedings were conducted sat as a judge. The members shall be selected publicly by drawings lots at a plenary session of the Supreme Court, and of the [other] relevant court, within ten days from the date of receipt of the appeal.

(3) The Appeal Panel shall decide the appeal no later than thirty days after being formed, assessing the legality of the proceedings (законитоста на постапката).

(4) ... the Appeal Panel may confirm or quash [the SJC’s] decision in the event of a gross breach of the provisions concerning [professional misconduct] proceedings (груба повреда на одредбите за постапката за одговорност).

(5) If the Appeal Panel quashes [the SJC’s] decision, the [latter] shall conduct the proceedings anew, in strict compliance (задолжително почитувајќи ги) with the instructions of the Appeal Panel. [It] shall adopt a decision and publish it on its website.

(6) No appeal or [other claim] may be brought against the decision referred to in subsection (5).

(7) The President of the Supreme Court and a judge participating in the proceedings before the SJC may not be members of the Appeal Panel ...”

Reopening of proceedings following a final judgment of [the Court]

Section 73

“(1) When [the Court] finds a violation of human rights or fundamental freedoms guaranteed by [the Convention] and its Additional Protocols... ratified in accordance with its Constitution..., a judge or court president whose rights have been violated may, within 30 days, but no later than three years from the finality of the judgment of [the Court], submit a request to [the SJC] for the reopening of the proceedings.

...

(3) In the reopened proceedings, [the SJC] must respect the legal positions expressed in the final judgment of [the Court] finding the violation.

(5) Within 15 days, [the SJC] shall form a Commission ...

...

(8) If the Commission finds that the request is timely, complete and admissible, ... [the SJC]..., shall forward the file to [the Appeal Panel]... within three days.

(9) The Appeal Panel must act within 15 days from the receipt of the file, quash its own decision and that of [the SJC] in line with the legal positions expressed in the final judgment of [the Court]... and remit the case to [the SJC]...

...”

Right to a fair trial

Section 74

“In the course of the proceedings before [the SJC], the judge or court president against whom the proceedings are being conducted has the right to a fair trial in accordance with the guarantees of Article 6 of the [Convention].”

40.  Under section 64, a judge cannot adjudicate a case, inter alia, if he or she is related to a party or a party’s representative to a certain degree (section 64(1)(3)) or if there is some other reason which casts doubt on the judge’s impartiality (section 64(1)(6)).

41.  Under section 65(1), if a judge learns that there is a reason for his or her recusal, including under section 64(1)(3) (family relations), he or she must stop working on the case and notify the court president, who appoints a replacement. Under section 65(2), if a judge considers that there is reason for recusal under section 64(1)(6), he or she must notify the court president, who decides whether the judge is to be recused.

42.  Section 75(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act obliges a public official to request his or her recusal and immediately cease to act if he or she becomes aware of circumstances which may indicate an actual or potential conflict of interests. Under section 76(1), the Anti-Corruption Commission conducts proceedings to establish a conflict of interest, which, in accordance with section 76(2), may be initiated at the request of, inter alia, a public official.

43.  On 23 February 2023 the Supreme Court adopted a general position stating that, in deciding an appeal against a decision of the SJC issued after remittal, the Appeal Panel – the second-instance panel set up specifically for that purpose – could directly apply Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, as well as Amendment XXI (which amended Article 15, guaranteeing the right to appeal; see paragraph 29 above) and Article 50 of the Constitution (guaranteeing right to judicial protection of rights and freedoms, see paragraph 30 above). It found that the inability to appeal against decisions of the SJC issued after remittal directly impacted the effectiveness of the appeal to the Appeal Panel and limited the right of access to a court. The reasoning of the general position referred, inter alia, to the international materials described in paragraphs 47, 49 and 55-56 below.

44.  By decision U. br. 137/2019 of 25 March 2021 the Constitutional Court decided not to initiate constitutionality review proceedings concerning parts of section 72(3) and (4) of the SJC Act. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:

“... the statutory rules provide that[:] the right to appeal of a dismissed judge ... be exercised in proceedings at two instances; [that] at the second instance a judicial body decides [the appeal]; [that] the decision of the second-instance body is binding; [and that] within the framework of the legality of the proceedings conducted by [the SJC], the [Appeal Panel] may assess questions related to [the facts of the case] and the application of substantive law.”

By decision U. br. 42/2022 of 7 September 2022 the Constitutional Court decided not to initiate constitutionality review proceedings concerning section 72(6) and parts of section 72(5) of the SJC Act. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:

“The right to appeal (and its intensity) stem from Amendment XXI to the Constitution, [in view of] the constitutional authority granted to [the SJC] to decide on the dismissal of a judge or court president[. It] presupposes that the right to a real and effective appeal ... must also be ensured [in the proceedings] before that body of the judiciary, without thereby violating the constitutional authority of [the SJC] to decide on the dismissal of a judge or court president.

...On multiple occasions the Constitutional Court has analysed the substance of Amendment XXI to the Constitution and taken the position that the guarantee of the right to appeal established therein concerns only a first-instance court decision, and [that] the right to appeal against individual decisions adopted in proceedings before a body of the State administration or a ... body performing public functions, is in a certain way relativised, that is, it is no longer a constitutional guarantee as it used to be, but the constitution-maker (уставотворецот) leaves space for that right to appeal to be regulated by law, such as in ... section 72(6) in the [present] case.

... The [Constitutional] Court finds that the [claimant before it] wrongly considered that [the SJC’s] decision to dismiss a judge ... is a court decision against which the right to appeal is guaranteed ...”

45.  By decision U. br. 46/2023 of 14 November 2023 the Constitutional Court decided not to initiate constitutional review proceedings concerning section 72(2) of the SJC Act, dismissing the claimant’s arguments that the Appeal Panel was an “extraordinary court”. Referring to its previous decisions (see paragraphs 44 above), the court rejected, as substantially the same, the request to assess the constitutionality of, inter alia, section 72(3), (4), (5) and (6) of the SJC Act. By decision U. br. 66/2023 of 5 December 2023, the Constitutional Court rejected as substantially the same the Supreme Court’s request to assess the constitutionality of section 72(6) of the SJC Act.

46.  By decision U. br. 233/2020 of 7 March 2023 the Constitutional Court struck down section 8(3) of the SJC Act in its part providing that only a member of the SJC elected by Parliament (that is, a lay member of the SJC) could be elected its President.

47.  The United Nations (UN) Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary were adopted by the Seventh UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. The relevant parts read as follows:

Discipline, suspension and removal

“17. A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing ...

...

20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.”

48.  In Report (A/HRC/38/38) of 2 May 2018 the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Diego García-Sayán, made, inter alia, the following recommendations:

Disciplinary proceedings

“101. The responsibility for disciplinary proceedings against judges should be vested in an independent authority composed primarily of judges, such as a judicial council or a court.

102. ...

103. These authorities may include members from outside the judicial profession (lawyers, academics, members of civil society), but in no case should such persons be members of the legislative or executive branches.

104. ...

105. Decisions of the disciplinary body should be reasoned and subject to appeal before a competent court.

...”

Composition of judicial councils and selection of their members

“107. ... Active politicians and members of the legislative or executive branches of power cannot simultaneously serve on a judicial council ...

111. When members of the executive branch, for example the Minister of Justice, participate in the work of a council as ex officio members, appropriate measures should be developed to ensure their independence from any potential interference.”

49.  In Opinion (CDL-AD(2018)022), adopted in October 2018, the Venice Commission assessed certain parts of the previous version of the SJC Act, in force until 30 May 2019 and replaced by the SJC Act currently in force (paragraph 39 above). The relevant part of the Opinion reads as follows (footnote omitted):

“39. The second question concerns the effects the determination of the [Appeal Panel] might have ... the law should explain what happens if [the SJC], following the re‑opening of the case, insists on its original position and disregards the guidelines of the [Appeal Panel].”

50.  The subsequent Opinion (CDL-AD(2019)008), adopted in March 2019, concerned the draft of the SJC Act currently in force. The relevant parts read as follows (footnotes omitted):

“34. The Venice Commission has consistently asserted that there should be the possibility of an appeal to an independent court against decisions of disciplinary bodies ... the present draft leaves simply the final decision up to [the SJC] without any obligation for the latter to take into consideration the decision (or guidelines) of the [Appeal Panel]. This solution makes the right of appeal ineffective for the person who introduced the appeal. The Venice Commission is of the opinion that once the [Appeal Panel] has found in favour of the judge/court president, this decision should be final and implemented accordingly by [the SJC] which might eventually necessitate reopening the disciplinary proceedings (e.g. in the event of violation of procedural rights of the judge/court president during the previous proceedings).

35. That being said, the [Appeal Panel] should not substitute [the SJC]. In a recent opinion, the Commission stressed that ‘Judicial Councils should have a certain discretion, which must be respected by the appellate body’, and that ‘in exercising its appellate review the appellate body should act with deference to [the SJC] as regards the establishment of the factual circumstances and interpretation of the relevant rules of conduct’. The [Appeal Panel] should be able to annul decisions of [the SJC] only in cases of gross errors in the application of procedural and substantive law.

...

60. On 6 March 2019 the Venice Commission received a revised text of the draft law amended by the authorities of North Macedonia in the light of the above recommendations ... The Commission is pleased to observe that the revised draft law addressed most of its recommendations.

61. Inter alia, the following improvements deserve to be mentioned: ... the [Appeal Panel] has the power to annul a decision of [the SJC] regarding the disciplinary liability of judges/court presidents only in cases of gross errors in the application of law, and its decisions are final ...”

In June 2025 the Venice Commission adopted its Opinion CDL‑AD(2025)026 concerning a new draft Act on the SJC, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

“28. ... The Minister of Justice is an ex officio member of [the SJC]. The European Court of Human Rights considers that the presence of a member of the government in [the SJC], even if passive, is very problematic from the point of view of the separation of powers [with reference to Catană, cited above, § 75]. The Venice Commission has also taken a critical stance on such arrangement [reference omitted], as has the GRECO [reference omitted]. The Venice Commission therefore recommends that the Minister of Justice should not be any more a member of [the SJC]; it must be noted that in practice, according to the information obtained during the online meetings, Ministers of Justice have not taken part in the meetings of [the SJC] for at least twelve years, so that the revision of the law would thus make it consistent with practice. It is noted that there remains a constitutional obstacle to that change. Article 43(2) includes a general limitation according to which the Minister and the President of the Supreme Court are assumed to be in the same position as all other members of [the SJC] except in matters prescribed by this law. It would be suitable that the legislation be clearer as to what differences apply to those two members. A cross reference in Article 43(2) would help to clarify this issue.”

...

“53. Article 72 (in two versions) provides for the right to appeal. In Alternative 1, the appeal would be filed to a Special Appeals Council, which would have the power to confirm or annul the decision of [the SJC]. The draft does not specify the composition and the nature (judicial or administrative) of this Special Appeals Council, nor the manner of appointment of its members, their term of office or responsibilities. Alternative 2 provides for an appeal to two levels of administrative courts against the dismissal decision: first to the Administrative Court and then to the High Administrative Court.

54. Alternative 2 of Article 72 can be considered as a legitimate choice, even if the administrative judges, like all judges apart from those of the Constitutional Court, are not fully independent from [the SJC].

55. In the absence of more precise provisions on the Special Appeals Council, the Venice Commission cannot assess version 1. At any rate, this provision should be clarified. The Venice Commission recommends addressing in detail the composition of this Council, as well as the manner of appointment of its members, their term of office, and responsibilities. It reminds that, in a series of judgments related to the operation of a judicial council in North Macedonia (“The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” at the time of the judgments), the European Court of Human Rights made it clear that when deciding on disciplinary matters resulting in the dismissal of a judge, a judicial council had to meet the conditions foreseen by Article 6 of the ECHR [reference omitted]. Every system in accordance with these conditions would be acceptable.”

...

“60. ... the Venice Commission makes the following key recommendations:

A. Removing the Minister of Justice from the Judicial Council...

...

G. Addressing in detail the composition of the Special Appeals Council, as well as the manner of appointment of its members, their term of office, and responsibilities ...”

51.  In its Report on the Independence of the Judicial System, Part I: the Independence of Judges (CDL-AD(2010)004) of 16 March 2010, the Venice Commission, among other things, stated as follows:

Conclusions

“...

4. It is an appropriate method for guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary that an independent judicial council have decisive influence on decisions on the appointment and career of judges. While respecting the variety of legal systems existing, the Venice Commission recommends that states not yet having done so consider the establishment of an independent judicial council. In all cases the council should have a pluralistic composition, with a substantial part if not the majority of the members being judges.

...

6. Judicial councils, or disciplinary courts, should have a decisive influence in disciplinary proceedings. The possibility of an appeal to a court against decisions of disciplinary bodies should be provided for.”

52.  The relevant parts of Opinion no. 10 (2007) of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) on the Council for the Judiciary at the service of society (Strasbourg, 23-27 November 2007) read as follows:

“23.  Prospective members of the Council for the Judiciary, whether judges or non‑judges, should not be active politicians, members of parliament, the executive or the administration. This means that neither the Head of the State, if he/she is the head of the government, nor any minister can be a member of the Council for the Judiciary. Each state should enact specific legal rules in this area.

...

63.  A judge who neglects his/her cases through indolence or who is blatantly incompetent when dealing with them should face disciplinary sanctions. Even in such cases, as indicated by CCJE Opinion no. 3(2002), it is important that judges enjoy the protection of a disciplinary proceeding guaranteeing the respect of the principle of independence of the judiciary and carried out before a body free from any political influence, on the basis of clearly defined disciplinary faults: a Head of State, Minister of Justice or any other representative of political authorities cannot take part in the disciplinary body.”

53.  The relevant parts of Opinion no. 24 (2021) of the CCJE on the evolution of the Councils for the Judiciary and their role in independent and impartial judicial systems (CCJE(2021)11, 5 November 2021) read as follows (reference omitted):

“12. ... Every Council for the Judiciary and the judiciary it represents must earn the trust of the public and its support through excellent, transparent work and accountability. In times of conflict with other powers, the support of the public will depend at least to a large extent on this perceived legitimacy of a Council.

...

28. The CCJE is aware that in some member states, Councils for the Judiciary include ex officio members. Ex officio membership is not acceptable, except in a very small number of cases, for example the president of the supreme court but should not include members or representatives of the legislature or the executive. An ex officio member who is not a judge should not participate in disciplinary decisions.”

54.  Opinion no. 27 (2024) on the disciplinary liability of judges (CCJE(2024)5, 6 December 2024) states, inter alia, as follows (reference omitted):

“38. The CCJE reiterates its position that judges should be granted the right to appeal against disciplinary decisions and sanctions.”

55.  In Opinion no. 3 (2002) on the principles and rules governing judges’ professional conduct, in particular ethics, incompatible behaviour and impartiality, the CCJE made, inter alia, the following observations:

“72. In some countries, the initial disciplinary body is the highest judicial body (the Supreme Court). The CCJE considers that the arrangements regarding disciplinary proceedings in each country should be such as to allow an appeal from the initial disciplinary body (whether that is itself an authority, tribunal or court) to a court.”

56.  The relevant parts of the Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles) (CCJE (2010)3 Final, 17 November 2010) are set out in, for example, Jakšovski and Trifunovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (nos. 56381/09 and 58738/09, § 28, 7 January 2016).

57.  In December 2013, in its Evaluation Report on the respondent State, adopted within the Fourth Evaluation Round (Prevention of corruption in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors), GRECO recommended that, in order to strengthen the independence of the judiciary from undue political influence, the ex officio membership of the Minister of Justice in the SJC be abolished.

58.  In its Compliance Report, adopted in July 2016, GRECO considered the above recommendation to have been partially implemented, given that constitutional amendments removing the Minister of Justice from the composition of the SJC had been prepared but not yet adopted.

59.  In its Second Compliance Report, adopted in June 2018, GRECO noted as follows (emphasis in the original, footnote omitted):

“34. GRECO ... regrets the fact that the intended constitutional amendments have been abandoned and that there are thus no more prospects of removing the participation of the Minister of Justice from [the SJC]. The authorities now refer to the recent adoption of legislation which has removed his/her right to vote. In GRECO’s views, this does not fundamentally change the situation and the Evaluation Report (para. 100) had already noted that the Minister lost his voting right concerning the appointment of judges. In GRECO’s views, a risk of political influence always exists without formal voting rights or even formal attendance of the Minister in person at meetings (see also paragraph 118 of the Report which refers to actual problems observed in practice). Given that there are no more concrete projects aimed at implementing the present recommendation, GRECO cannot maintain its earlier assessment.

35. GRECO concludes that recommendation v has not been implemented.”

60.  In the Addendum and Second Addendum to the Second Interim Compliance Report, issued in July 2022 and December 2023 respectively, GRECO similarly concluded that the recommendation had not been implemented, as the Minister of Justice was still an ex officio member of the SJC. It pointed out the potential for political influence by the Minister of Justice even without voting rights or formal attendance at SJC meetings.

61.  On 13 November 2019 the Committee of Ministers closed the examination of the judgments in Gerovska Popčevska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (no. 48783/07, 7 January 2016), Jakšovski and Trifunovski (cited above) and Poposki and Duma v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (nos. 69916/10 and 36531/11, 7 January 2016). In these cases, the Court had found violations of Article 6 of the Convention on account of the fact that members of the SJC, who had acted as complainants in professional misconduct proceedings against judges, had subsequently taken part in the SJC’s decisions dismissing those judges (see Jakšovski and Trifunovski, § 44, and Poposki and Duma, § 48, both cited above) or, among other issues, on account of the participation of the Minister of Justice in the dismissal decision taken by the SJC (see Gerovska Popčevska, cited above, §§ 53 and 55).

62.  The relevant part of the European Charter on the Statute for Judges (DAJ/DOC (98) 23, Strasbourg, 8-10 July 1998) reads as follows:

5.    LIABILITY

“5.1.   The dereliction by a judge of one of the duties expressly defined by the statute, may only give rise to a sanction upon the decision, following the proposal, the recommendation, or with the agreement of a tribunal or authority composed at least as to one half of elected judges, within the framework of proceedings of a character involving the full hearing of the parties, in which the judge proceeded against must be entitled to representation. The scale of sanctions which may be imposed is set out in the statute, and their imposition is subject to the principle of proportionality. The decision of an executive authority, of a tribunal, or of an authority pronouncing a sanction, as envisaged herein, is open to an appeal to a higher judicial authority.”

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Charter further clarifies as follows:

“5.1. ... the Charter provides for a right of appeal to a higher judicial authority against any decision to impose a sanction taken by an executive authority, tribunal or body, at least half of whose membership are elected judges.”

63.  The relevant parts of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)/12 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities (17 November 2010) read as follows:

“46. The authority taking decisions on the selection and career of judges should be independent of the executive and legislative powers. With a view to guaranteeing its independence, at least half of the members of the authority should be judges chosen by their peers.

...

69. Disciplinary proceedings may follow where judges fail to carry out their duties in an efficient and proper manner. Such proceedings should be conducted by an independent authority or a court with all the guarantees of a fair trial and provide the judge with the right to challenge the decision and sanction ...”

64.  In its 2023 and 2024 Progress Reports in respect of the respondent State (Brussels, 8 November 2023, SWD(2023) 693 final and 30 October 2024, SWD(2024) 693 final respectively), the European Commission recommended, inter alia, that the respondent State revise the legislative framework and overall functioning of the SJC to enhance its transparency and independence. Other relevant parts of the 2023 Progress Report read as follows:

“... Both [the SJC] and the [Council of Public Prosecutors] need to act decisively to promote and safeguard the independence, integrity and professionalism of judges and prosecutors. Further efforts are needed to increase transparency and prevent any attempt to exert undue influence or intimidation.”

65.  A document entitled “Corruption Risk Assessment of the Judiciary in North Macedonia” was published on 12 June 2023 by the OSCE Mission to Skopje. It was produced, inter alia, on the basis of an anonymous survey among judges and found, among other issues, that approximately 72% of the judges surveyed disagreed that the SJC safeguarded judicial independence (as opposed to only 26% who agreed), and that the majority of judges (57%) did not believe that disciplinary proceedings initiated by the SJC were conducted objectively. Furthermore, 62% of the judges surveyed did not perceive the SJC as an independent entity in practice.

THE LAW

66.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

67.  The applicants complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that they had been unable to challenge the SJC’s decisions to dismiss them following remittal by the Appeal Panel formed for each of their cases. They also complained that the SJC had not complied with the instructions of the Appeal Panel in both sets of remitted proceedings. Additionally, the second applicant complained under Article 6 that the SJC had dismissed her from office contrary to the well-established practice of the Shtip Court of Appeal, in violation of the principle of legal certainty.

The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 110-26, 20 March 2018, and Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 90, 1 June 2023) considers it appropriate to examine the above complaints solely under Article 6.

The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

68.  The Government did not raise any objections as to the admissibility of this complaint.

69.  However, the issue whether a particular Article of the Convention or a Protocol thereto is applicable or not is a matter that goes to the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae. Accordingly, the Court has to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it, and is therefore obliged to examine the question of its jurisdiction of its own motion (see (see Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 107, 1 June 2023).

70.  The Court observes that it has not been argued by the parties that Article 6 § 1 is applicable in its criminal aspect. The Court also considers that the proceedings at issue did not concern the determination of a criminal charge and therefore the criminal limb of that Article is not engaged (compare Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, no. 76521/12, § 58, 9 March 2021, and Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, § 80, 23 January 2025).

71.  The parties did not contest the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil limb. The Court reiterates that for Article 6 § 1 in its “civil” limb to be applicable, there must be a dispute (“contestation” in the French text) over a “right” which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, irrespective of whether it is protected under the Convention. The dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and, finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play (see, among many other authorities, see Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, § 44, 25 September 2018; Grzęda v. Poland [GC], no. 43572/18, § 257, 15 March 2022; and Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], nos. 6319/21 and 2 others, § 76, 24 September 2024). Lastly, the right must be a “civil” right (ibid.).

72.  The Court has previously summarised its approach as to the scope of the “civil” concept in Article 6 in, for example, Eminağaoğlu (cited above, § 60). Furthermore, according to its case-law, disputes between civil servants and the State may fall outside the civil limb of Article 6 provided that two cumulative conditions are fulfilled. In the first place, the State in its national law must have excluded access to the courts for the post or category of staff in question. Secondly, the exclusion must be justified on objective grounds in the State’s interest (see Grzęda, cited above, §§ 261 and 292; and Eminağaoğlu, cited above, § 61, both with reference to the criteria established in Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, ECHR 2007‑II). Article 6 § 1, under its civil head, has been applied to proceedings relating to the dismissal of judges on account of the fact that judges had access to the national courts to challenge their dismissal (see Xhoxhaj v. Albania, no. 15227/19, § 237, 9 February 2021, and the cases cited therein).

73.  Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicants could arguably claim to have an entitlement under domestic law to serve an unlimited term of office, which would only cease in certain expressly enumerated circumstances set by the Constitution (see Article 99 and Amendment XXVI thereof, cited at paragraph 29 above). Furthermore, the outcome of the professional misconduct proceedings against the applicants was directly decisive for the manner of the exercise of that right (compare Sturua v. Georgia, no. 45729/05, § 24, 28 March 2017). The Court therefore finds that in both applicants’ cases there was a genuine and serious dispute over a “right” which the applicants could claim on arguable grounds under domestic law (compare ibid., and Suren Antonyan, cited above, § 82). It remains to be determined whether the nature of the right in question was civil.

74.  In this connection, the Court notes that the applicants were dismissed by the SJC in decisions made during proceedings following the Appeal Panel’s remittal of their cases. Given that the Court has to determine whether the SJC and the Appeal Panel in both applicants’ cases were “tribunals” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 and whether the applicants had access to a court for the purposes of the Eskelinen test, it considers that the question of the applicability of that provision under its civil head must be joined to the merits of these complaints (compare Suren Antonyan, cited above, § 84).

75.  The Court further considers that these complaints are neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. They must therefore be declared admissible.

(a)   The parties’ submissions

(i)      The applicants

76.  The first applicant submitted that she had not had access to a court in the proceedings for her dismissal. She argued that the SJC was a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention and that therefore Article 15 of the Constitution (in the part guaranteeing the right to appeal against court decisions) was applicable. The SJC had not been impartial, as it had fulfilled the wishes of its member Z.K., the husband of D.G.K., the complainant. This lack of impartiality was illustrated by the fact that, of the two requests for professional misconduct proceedings against her, only the second request, which had referred to Z.K., had been accepted. It was irrelevant that Z.K. had not participated in the SJC’s work on her case. Lastly, she submitted that, in the remitted proceedings, the SJC had not complied with the instructions of the Appeal Panel.

77.  In her application, the second applicant submitted that she had been unable to appeal against the SJC’s decision after the remittal of her case, and that in the remitted proceedings, the SJC had not complied with the instructions of the Appeal Panel when it had remitted the case for fresh consideration. This had rendered even the first appeal against the SJC’s decision ineffective.

(ii)    The Government

78.  The Government submitted that the SJC was an independent and autonomous judicial body established by the Constitution and the SJC Act, tasked with ensuring the independence and autonomy of the judiciary in line with Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)/12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. In their view, it was a “tribunal” established in full compliance with the institutional requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The SJC had the exclusive competence to appoint and dismiss judges, lay judges and court presidents, in proceedings regulated by law which ensured the protection of a judge’s rights and interests, including the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. The fact that the Constitutional Court had found the SJC not to constitute a “court” under domestic law (see paragraph 44 above) did not mean that it was not a “tribunal” within the autonomous meaning of the Convention. Furthermore, the SJC was independent and impartial. The Minister of Justice and the President of the Supreme Court were its ex officio members. However, they and the member of the SJC who submitted the request for professional misconduct proceedings did not have the right to vote, nor did they participate in the sessions of the SJC at which the requests were deliberated upon and decided. The SJC had a balanced structure in which the judges outnumbered the lay members, in line with, inter alia, the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers and the Venice Commission. The independence of the SJC’s members was ensured by their manner of appointment and term of office, and the incompatibility of their functions with membership in a political party or with another public function or profession. The first applicant’s allegations that the SJC had lacked impartiality owing to Z.K.’s wife requesting that professional misconduct proceedings be initiated against her had not been substantiated with any evidence. In any event, Z.K. had no longer been President of the SJC at the time of the events in question and had not acted in the case subject to the present application. The second applicant had made no allegations of a lack of impartiality on the part of SJC members. The SJC Act provided for specific procedural guarantees, which had duly been applied in the applicants’ cases. In both sets of remitted proceedings, the SJC had complied with the Appeal Panel’s instructions, which had been procedural in nature.

79.  The Government further submitted that the Appeal Panel was a judicial body established by law with exclusive competence to decide appeals lodged by judges. The proceedings before it were regulated by law and, as found by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 44 above), could encompass a review of the facts and procedural and substantive law, as had been done in the applicants’ cases. The fact that the Appeal Panel’s composition was not permanent did not mean that it was an “extraordinary court”. Its decisions were binding. It was composed of sitting judges, who were autonomous, impartial and selected by drawing lots. The fact that some of them could have theoretically been subject to appraisal by the SJC did not automatically cast doubt on their impartiality, in the absence of specific indications to that effect.

80.  The Government submitted that the applicants had had access to a court, notably before the SJC, which they contended was a “tribunal” within the meaning of the Convention. In addition, domestic law went beyond the minimum guarantees of Article 6 by ensuring the right to appeal before the Appeal Panel. The specific modalities of regulating the right to appeal were within the margin of appreciation of the State, which took into account considerations such as the special status of judges, the nature of the proceedings for professional misconduct in respect of a judge, the constitutional position of the SJC, the scope of review of the Appeal Panel and the right of access to a court as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. The Constitutional Court had found that the SJC was not a “court” within the meaning of domestic law, and therefore Amendment XXI to the Constitution did not require that the SJC’s decisions be amenable to appeal. In adopting its general position, the Supreme Court had not taken into consideration the criteria applied by the legislator in regulating the right to appeal or the Constitutional Court’s decisions, instead focusing on international materials which went beyond the minimum guarantees of Article 6. The Constitutional Court had exclusive competence to assess the constitutionality of the relevant legislation. The Supreme Court’s general position did not provide for procedural rules for appeal proceedings after remittal and therefore created legal uncertainty. The relevant legislation pursued the legitimate aim of safeguarding the exclusive competence of the SJC to decide on judges’ liability. The Appeal Panel had assessed both the facts and law and had remitted the case to the SJC for fresh consideration. In doing so, it had provided the SJC with clear instructions, with which the latter had complied. The decisions on the merits, however, remained in the SJC’s hands, in accordance with the Constitution and the recommendations of international bodies. The Government concluded that the fact that the applicants could not lodge a second appeal had not adversely affected their right to access to a court. The Appeal Panel had performed an effective review of the SJC’s decisions in both applicants’ cases.

(a)   The Court’s assessment

(i)      Preliminary remarks

81.  The Court notes that the applicants’ complaints regarding their inability to lodge a second appeal against the SJC’s dismissal decision, rendered after the case had been remitted by the Appeal Panels in their respective cases, mainly concerns an alleged infringement of their right of access to a court. It reiterates that in cases concerning disciplinary proceedings against judges, the Convention requires the establishment of at least one of the following two mechanisms: either the professional disciplinary bodies themselves meet the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, or the proceedings before them are subject to subsequent review by a judicial body with full jurisdiction which itself offers the guarantees of Article 6 (see, for example, Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 43237/13, § 61, 21 February 2023). When considering this complaint, the Court must first determine whether the SJC that dismissed the applicants was a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. If the answer to that question is negative, it must then establish whether the Appeal Panel in each of the applicants’ cases was a “tribunal” (compare Eminağaoğlu, cited above, §§ 95-96, and Xhoxhaj, cited above, § 280, in the context of a complaint regarding the impartiality of vetting bodies in Albania).

82.  In this connection, in the cases of Mitrinovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (no. 6899/12, 30 April 2015), Gerovska Popčevska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (no. 48783/07, 7 January 2016), Jakšovski and Trifunovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (nos. 56381/09 and 58738/09, § 28, 7 January 2016) and Poposki and Duma v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (nos. 69916/10 and 36531/11, 7 January 2016), the Court found that Article 6 was applicable under its civil head on the basis of the Eskelinen test, thereby accepting the status of the SJC as a “tribunal” within the meaning of the aforementioned provision. However, since the delivery of those judgments, the Court has adopted a more nuanced approach in assessing whether a domestic body can be regarded as a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1.

The domestic legislation governing the establishment and functioning of the SJC has also changed (see paragraph 39 above, and compare Mitrinovski, § 20; Gerovska Popčevska, §§ 25-27; Jakšovski and Trifunovski, § 21; and Poposki and Duma, §§ 24-25, all cited above). In the light of developments in its case-law and domestic legislation, the Court must therefore conduct a fresh review to determine whether the SJC that dismissed the applicants was a “tribunal” that complied with the requirements of Article 6 § 1.

(ii)    Whether the SJC was a “tribunal”

(α)     General principles

83.  The Court reiterates that an authority which is not classified as one of the courts of the State may, for the purposes of Article 6 § 1, fall within the concept of a “tribunal” in the substantive sense of this expression (see, for example, Xhoxhaj, cited above, § 282; Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey, nos. 30226/10 and 4 others, § 195, 28 January 2020; and Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, nos. 40575/10 and 67474/10, § 139, 2 October 2018).

84.  A tribunal, within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, is characterised, in the substantive sense of the term, by its judicial function, that is to say, to determine matters within its competence on the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner. A power of decision is inherent in the very notion of “tribunal”. The procedure before it must ensure the “determination of the matters in dispute” as required by Article 6 § 1. In addition, only an institution that has full jurisdiction and satisfies a number of requirements, such as “independence, in particular of the executive; impartiality; duration of its members’ terms of office; ...”, merits the designation “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see, for example, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 219, 1 December 2020, and Bilgen v. Turkey, no. 1571/07, § 73, 9 March 2021, with further references).

(β)      Application of those principles to the present case

85.  The Court notes at the outset that the Constitutional Court considered the SJC not to be a “court” within the meaning of Amendment XXI to the Constitution (see paragraph 44 above). However, this does not mean that it cannot be considered a “tribunal” within the autonomous meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, if it complies with the requirements described in paragraph 84 above.

86.  The Court observes that the SJC is a specialised full-time body established by law, namely the Constitution and the SJC Act (see paragraphs 35 and 39 above, and compare Cotora v. Romania, no. 30745/18, § 37, 17 January 2023). Under the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, the SJC has the jurisdiction and power to decide matters concerning judges’ appointment, career and disciplinary proceedings, including their dismissal (see Amendment XXIX to the Constitution, paragraph 36 above, and compare Bilgen, cited above, § 74 ab initio, and Donev v. Bulgaria, no. 72437/11, § 84, 26 October 2021). Professional misconduct proceedings against judges, such as those which are the subject of the present case, are regulated by the SJC Act and include a set of procedural guarantees, including the principle of adversarial proceedings, the right to be heard and to be represented by a lawyer, and the right to submit evidence (see, in particular, sections 65 and 66 of the SJC Act, cited at paragraph 39 above). The SJC Act contains a specific provision stating that, in professional misconduct proceedings, a judge enjoys the fair trial guarantees enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention (ibid., section 74 of the SJC Act). In such circumstances, the Court accepts that the SJC performs a judicial function in professional misconduct proceedings relating to judges, to which the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 apply (compare and contrast, for instance, Eminağaoğlu, cited above, § 99, and Bilgen, cited above, § 74).

87.  Turning to the guarantees of independence and impartiality required of a “tribunal”, the Court observes that the SJC is composed of fifteen members, the majority of whom are judges. These include the President of the Supreme Court, who sits ex officio, and eight other judges who are elected by their peers.

88.  The five non-judicial members of the SJC are elected by Parliament, with two of them being proposed by the President of the State (see Amendment XXVIII to the Constitution, paragraph 35 above). In this connection, the Court reiterates that although the notion of the separation of powers between the political organs of government and the judiciary has become increasingly important in its case-law, the election or appointment of judges by the executive or the legislature is permissible under the Convention. However, once elected or appointed, judges must be free from influence or pressure, and must exercise their judicial activities with complete independence (see, for example, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson, cited above, § 207, and Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, no. 4907/18, § 252, 7 May 2021).

89.  The members of the SJC are elected for a term of six years, which can be renewed under certain circumstances (see section 7 of the SJC Act, cited at paragraph 39 above). Furthermore, they can only be removed from office in cases expressly provided for by law (see section 34 of the SJC Act, ibid.; compare Xhoxhaj, cited above, § 298). Both the Constitution and the SJC Act include provisions guaranteeing the independence and impartiality of the SJC (see, in particular, Amendment XXVIII to the Constitution, and section 3 of the SJC Act, cited at paragraph 39 above).

90.  The Minister of Justice is also an ex officio member of the SJC. The Court observes that the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers recommended that when members of the executive branch, for example the Minister of Justice, participate in the work of a council as ex officio members, appropriate measures should be developed to ensure their independence from any potential interference (see paragraph 48 above). In the respondent State, the Minister of Justice is expressly prevented from participating in disciplinary proceedings against judges and does not have the right to vote not only in respect of appointments or dismissals of judges but also in respect of any other issues decided by the SJC (see section 6(2) and (3) as well as section 35(6) and (7) of the SJC Act, cited at paragraph 39 above).

91.  The Court has previously considered that even the passive presence of a member of government in a body competent to conduct disciplinary proceedings against judges is, in itself, extremely problematic in the light of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention and, in particular, the requirement of independence of the disciplinary body (see Catană, cited above, § 75). The relevant international materials (see paragraphs 48, 52 and 53 above) similarly indicate that the participation of a politician or a member of the executive in the work of a body in charge of disciplinary proceedings against judges could call into question its independence. Having regard to GRECO’s concerns that the risk of political influence may persist even in the absence of formal voting rights or the Minister’s actual attendance at the SJC’s sessions (see paragraph 59 above), as well as to the Venice Commission’s Opinion CDL-AD(2025)026 (see paragraph 50 in fine above), the Court notes that these considerations could raise doubts as to the SJC’s independence. However, in the absence of a specific complaint by the applicants on this point, it is not called upon to assess the issue of the Minister of Justice’s ex officio membership in the SJC.

92.  In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the SJC, which dismissed the applicants from their judicial posts was a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Consequently, the applicants had access to a national court in respect of their dismissal, and Article 6 § 1 is applicable to both sets of proceedings at issue.

93.  Given this conclusion, the Court considers that the applicants’ complaints about their inability to appeal against the SJC’s second decisions should be assessed as complaints concerning access to a higher court.

94.  The Court reiterates that Article 6 does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or of cassation. However, where such courts are in place, the guarantees enshrined in that provision must be complied with. For instance, it guarantees to litigants an effective right of access to the courts for the determination of their civil rights and obligations (see Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, § 80, 5 April 2018). The Court will therefore assess whether a court of appeal existed in the context of the present case. In other words, it will consider whether, in view of its features, the Appeal Panel formed for each of the applicants’ cases could be considered a higher court. If so, the Court will next assess whether the applicants’ access to it was limited in contravention of Article 6 of the Convention.

(iii)   Whether the Appeal Panel was a higher court

95.  Referring to the general principles summarised in paragraph 84 above, the Court notes that, under section 72 of the SJC Act, the Appeal Panel, formed within the Supreme Court for each specific case, has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals against SJC decisions regarding professional misconduct by judges. While it appears from the wording of section 72(4) that its jurisdiction is limited to assessing the SJC’s compliance with procedural law, the Constitutional Court found that the Appeal Panel can also assess the facts of the case as established by the SJC, as well as compliance with substantive law (see paragraph 44 above). Furthermore, the Appeal Panel may quash the decision of the SJC, which is then obliged to conduct the proceedings anew (contrast Denisov, cited above, § 74, in the context of an assessment of whether a body had the power of sufficient review of a disciplinary decision). Moreover, the Appeal Panel is composed of nine professional judges, who are selected by drawing lots. The fact that the Appeal Panel is composed on an ad hoc basis does not affect its independence, given that the judges have a permanent term of office and can only be dismissed under certain clearly defined circumstances (see Article 99 of the Constitution and Amendment XXVI to it, in paragraph 32 above). Lastly, for similar reasons as those advanced in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá (cited above, §§ 157-65), the sole fact that members of the Appeal Panel are subject to the SJC’s disciplinary jurisdiction cannot cast doubt on their impartiality.

96.  The Court therefore concludes that the Appeal Panel formed for both applicants’ cases was a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It remains to be assessed whether the applicants had an effective right of access to it.

(iv)  Whether the applicants’ right of access to the Appeal Panel was effective

(α)     General principles

97.  The Court refers to the general principles on access to a court (see Grzęda, cited above, §§ 342-43; and Zubac, cited above, §§ 76-79), and the principles relating access to superior courts (see Zubac, cited above, §§ 80-82 and 84; see also paragraph 94 above). In particular, it reiterates that the right of access to a court must be “practical and effective”, not “theoretical or illusory”. However, that right is not absolute but may be subject to limitations; these are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and in place according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals. In laying down such regulation, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. Whilst the final decision as to observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court, it is not the Court’s role to substitute the national authorities’ assessment of the best policy in this area with its own. Nevertheless, any limitations applied must not restrict access for individuals in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.

The manner in which Article 6 § 1 applies to courts of appeal or of cassation depends on the special features of the proceedings concerned and account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings conducted in the domestic legal order and the court of cassation’s role in them (ibid., §§ 77, 78 and 82, with further references).

98.  In addition, the Court has emphasised the special role in society of the judiciary which, as the guarantor of justice, a fundamental value in a State governed by the rule of law, must enjoy public confidence if it is to be successful in carrying out its duties. It has already held that this consideration also applies in cases concerning the right of access to a court for members of the judiciary in matters concerning their status or career. Given the prominent place that the judiciary occupies among State organs in a democratic society and the growing importance attached to the separation of powers and to the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, the Court must be particularly attentive to the protection of members of the judiciary against measures affecting their status or career that can threaten their judicial independence and autonomy (see Bilgen, cited above, § 58, and Gumenyuk and Others v. Ukraine, no. 11423/19, § 52 and 71, 22 July 2021).

(β)      Application of those principles to the present case

99.  The Court notes at the outset that Amendment XXI to the Constitution guarantees the right to appeal against first-instance court decisions, and provides that the right to appeal against decisions adopted by administrative authorities and other bodies performing public functions is subject to further statutory regulation (see paragraph 29 above).

100.  There is no dispute between the parties that domestic law, in particular section 72(1) of the SJC Act, provides for the possibility to appeal against a decision of the SJC in professional misconduct proceedings against a judge (contrast Suren Antonyan, cited above, §§ 19 and 84). Both applicants resorted to such a possibility and lodged appeals against the SJC’s initial decision to dismiss them, which were considered on the merits by the Appeal Panel formed for each of their cases. Turning to the proceedings after remittal, the Court observes that, under section 72(5) of the SJC Act, when the Appeal Panel quashes a first-instance decision of the SJC and remits the case for reconsideration, the SJC is required to comply with the Appeal Panel’s instructions in the remitted proceedings. Once the SJC adopted a new decision in the remitted proceedings, section 72(6) of the SJC Act expressly precludes any judge from appealing against that decision. Referring to this provision, the SJC rejected the first applicant’s appeal against its second dismissal decision as inadmissible (see paragraph 15 above). The SJC refused to forward the second applicant’s appeal to the Supreme Court (see paragraph 28 above). The Court therefore concludes that both applicants’ access to the Appeal Panel was restricted.

101.  In this connection, the Court notes that the Constitutional Court found section 72(6) of the SJC Act to be in conformity with the Constitution (see paragraph 44 above), particularly in terms of its relationship with Amendment XXI to the Constitution, which regulates the right to appeal against first-instance court decisions and administrative decisions. The Constitutional Court’s finding, as also argued by the Government, implies that Amendment XXI allows for the limitation of the right to appeal against a second decision of the SJC through statutory provisions. However, in its general position of 23 February 2023, the Supreme Court referred to the constitutional guarantees of the right to judicial protection and the right of appeal, as guaranteed by Article 50 and Amendment XXI to the Constitution and concluded that these rights can be applied directly in professional misconduct proceedings against a judge (see paragraph 43 above). The Supreme Court’s reasoning implies that these constitutional provisions guarantee the right to appeal against a SJC decision after remittal.

102.  It is not the Court’s role to express a view on or resolve disputes over the interpretation of domestic law on the application of the constitutional right of appeal in professional misconduct proceedings against a judge, but to assess whether the application of the relevant domestic law in the applicants’ cases produced consequences that are in conformity with the Convention. The Court notes in this connection that the Appeal Panel formed for both applicants’ cases upheld their respective appeals and quashed the SJC’s dismissal decisions, identifying shortcomings in the SJC’s findings (see paragraphs 11 and 24 above). In its fresh consideration of the applicants’ cases, the SJC was required, under section 72(5) of the SJC Act, to strictly comply with the instructions of the Appeal Panel. Since there was no possibility for a subsequent review of the SJC’s decisions taken after remittal, neither the Appeal Panel nor any other judicial body could assess whether the SJC had, in fact, adequately responded to the findings of the Appeal Panel in each of the applicants’ cases. The Court is concerned that this impossibility for a subsequent review practically rendered even the first appeal before the Appeal Panel devoid of any meaning. In particular, the absence of any judicial mechanism capable of verifying whether the SJC had duly complied with the binding instructions of the Appeal Panel undermined the effectiveness of the appeal process and weakened the practical guarantees of judicial protection inherent in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court has already found that, in assessing any justification for excluding access to a court with regard to membership of judicial governance bodies, it is necessary to take into account the strong public interest in upholding the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law (see Grzęda, cited above, § 346, and Kartal v. Türkiye, no. 54699/14, § 93, 26 March 2024). It considers that the same applies with regard to disciplinary proceedings concerning judges. In the present case, the strong public interest in upholding the rule of law and ensuring public confidence in the judiciary required an assessment of whether the SJC had complied with the instructions of the Appeal Panel in each of the applicants’ cases.

103.  The Government argued that restricting the applicants’ right of access to a court was intended to ensure that the SJC had the final decision. The Court is mindful of the recommendations of the Venice Commission to the effect that judicial councils should have a “decisive influence” in disciplinary proceedings and “a certain discretion, which must be respected by the appellate body” (see paragraph 50 above). However, when deciding the applicants’ appeals, the Appeal Panel formed for each of their cases could not replace the SJC’s decision with its own, but could quash it and remit the case to the SJC for reconsideration. Furthermore, the Court notes that, under sections 72(2) and (3) of the SJC Act, the Appeal Panel must decide an appeal within forty days of its introduction, which is a rather short period. The Court is also mindful of the importance of deciding promptly in cases involving professional misconduct by judges. However, this interest does not outweigh the benefit of an independent review to establish whether the SJC complied with the Appeal Panel’s instructions.

104.  At this juncture, the Court considers it noteworthy that the relevant international materials (see paragraphs 47, 48, 51 and 55 above) emphasise the importance of an independent review of, or a right of appeal against, disciplinary decisions concerning judges. The Court reiterates that either the professional disciplinary bodies themselves must meet the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, or the proceedings before them must be subject to subsequent review by a judicial body with full jurisdiction (see paragraph 81 above). In other words, the Convention does not require that grievances relating to disciplinary proceedings against judges to be addressed at two levels of jurisdiction. However, as stated above, where such courts exist, the guarantees of an effective right of access to them must be complied with (see Zubac, cited above, § 80).

105.  In view of the considerations set out in paragraphs 102-103 above, and in particular the Appeal Panel’s inability in both applicants’ cases to ascertain whether the SJC had complied with its earlier instructions in the remitted proceedings, the Court considers that the applicants’ right of access to the Appeal Panel, even in proceedings before remittal, was practically deprived of any substance. The Court therefore concludes that the applicants’ right of access to a court was restricted to such an extent that the very essence of that right was impaired.

106.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

107.  The second applicant further complained that she had been dismissed on grounds contrary to the established practice of the Shtip Court of Appeal, in violation of the principle of legal certainty.

108.  Having regard to the facts of the case, the parties’ submissions and its finding of a violation of the applicants’ right of access to a court (see paragraph 106 above), the Court considers that it has examined the main legal question raised in the present application, and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the above-mentioned complaint by the second applicant (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).

109.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

110.  The first applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

111.  The Government contested the claim as excessive and argued that, in view of the possibility to have the domestic proceedings reopened, the finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.

112.  The Court considers that the events leading to the violation found in the present case caused the first applicant non-pecuniary damage that cannot be remedied by the mere finding of a violation. The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, awards the first applicant EUR 3,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

113.  The first applicant also claimed EUR 1,250 for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court, notably for the lawyer’s fees for the application and a subsequent submission to the Court.

114.  The Government argued that the claim corresponded to the tariff list of the Bar of the respondent State, but that the first applicant’s reply to the Government’s observations had been submitted by her personally, not through a lawyer.

115.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see, among many authorities, Vlaisavljevikj v. North Macedonia, no. 23215/21, § 54, 25 June 2024). In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 975 for costs and expenses incurred by the first applicant in the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

116.  The second applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction in compliance with Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award her any sum on that account.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 3,600 (three thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 975 (nine hundred and seventy-five euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, for costs and expenses incurred by the first applicant in the proceedings before the Court;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 November 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Dorothee von Arnim Arnfinn Bårdsen
 Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of cases:

No.

Application no.

Case name

Lodged on

Applicant
Year of Birth
Place of Residence

1.

19689/21

Ilievska v. North Macedonia

08/04/2021

Silvana ILIEVSKA
1958
Bitola
 

2.

42794/22

Zdraveva v. North Macedonia

26/08/2022

Suzana ZDRAVEVA
1963
Shtip