SECOND SECTION
CASE OF L.L. AND P.L. v. NORWAY
(Application no. 31423/22)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9 June 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of L.L. and P.L. v. Norway,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Péter Paczolay, President,
Gediminas Sagatys,
Stéphane Pisani, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 31423/22) against the Kingdom of Norway lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 16 June 2022 by two Norwegian nationals, L.L. and P.L. (“the applicants”), who were born in 1974 and 1962 respectively and were represented by Ms R. Arnesen, a lawyer practising in Bergen;
the decision not to have the applicants’ names disclosed;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 8 and Article 6 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention to the Norwegian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms H. Busch, of the Attorney General’s Office (Civil Affairs), assisted by Mr I.G. Nyhus, a lawyer at the same office, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 19 May 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns proceedings in which foster care in respect of the applicants’ child was replaced with adoption. The applicants complained that the domestic decisions had been in violation of their right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. They further complained of a breach of Article 6 of the Convention in the proceedings at issue.
Background to the case2. The applicants are the parents of Y, a girl born in 2014. Following concerns raised during L.L.’s pregnancy with Y, primarily owing to her medical history and misuse of medication during the initial stage of her pregnancy, a care team was established prior to the birth. The team comprised the parents, L.L.’s general practitioner, a neuropsychologist, a midwife, a representative from the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration and representatives from the child welfare services.
3. Prior to the birth of Y, the applicants were offered a place at a family centre, as it was considered that Y was at high risk; however, the parents later declined the offer. As a result of the above concerns and subsequent ones from hospital staff after Y was born, the child welfare services appointed two psychologists to carry out evaluations, including via home visits, and observe interactions between Y and the applicants. The psychologists submitted a joint expert report on 12 October 2014. The scope of their evaluation included an assessment of Y’s care needs and the applicants’ caregiving abilities. It was concluded that Y exhibited signs consistent with neglect and lack of stimulation. In 2014, at the age of five months, a care order was issued in respect of Y, and she was placed with foster parents, initially on an emergency basis.
4. On 3 June 2015 the District Court upheld the care order. It was assumed that the foster home arrangement would be long term. The applicants were granted supervised contact visits of one hour, three times per year. Leave to appeal was refused.
5. On 5 April 2016 the County Governor, having previously opened a supervisory case, concluded that the child welfare services had not fulfilled their obligations to provide guidance and follow-up to the parents after the care order had been issued.
6. The applicants challenged the care order, but it was again upheld by the County Social Welfare Board (“the Board”) on 23 August 2016. The Board found that the parents could not provide Y with adequate care and that moving Y would cause serious problems for her. Contact visits were increased to one and a half hours, three times per year.
7. On 23 June 2017 the District Court also upheld the care order, after hearing a court‑appointed psychologist. The psychologist had submitted a report dated 22 May 2017 which had been drawn up on the basis of observations of the foster home, interviews with the applicants, and observations of their interactions with Y.
8. The District Court noted that, when placed in foster care, Y had tolerated physical contact very poorly and was described by all professionals involved as highly sensitive. She had had disproportionately strong reactions to unfamiliar situations, and it was noted how she had required a prolonged period of adjustment to her kindergarten; at the outset, she would only spend one hour there, accompanied by her foster father. It had taken weeks before the time she spent in kindergarten could gradually be increased – a process which, at the material time, was still ongoing. By the age of three, Y had been behind in her language development and mostly spoke in single words. The court assessed that Y would have ongoing special care needs for several years. The High Court and the Supreme Court denied the applicants leave to appeal.
The proceedings at issue9. During the first half of 2019 an expert was appointed by the child welfare services to assess the possibility of Y’s foster parents adopting her. The expert submitted a report dated 11 June 2019, concluding that Y was particularly vulnerable and had special care needs. The applicants once again challenged the care order and asked for its revocation.
10. On 4 November 2019, having assessed that any disruption to the foster care arrangement would result in irreversible relational harm to Y, the Board decided to withdraw the applicants’ parental responsibilities in respect of Y and to authorise her adoption by her foster parents.
11. With respect to the question of parental rights, the Board noted that several witnesses had testified that the parents were now more receptive to assistance, and that there had been positive developments in respect of L.L. However, it also noted that the expert had assessed L.L. as being vulnerable, owing to her previous health issues, and that her capacities were at their best in the absence of caregiving responsibilities. Before the Board, L.L. maintained that, if Y were not returned to her care, she should be placed with another foster family, and she disputed that Y had special care needs. The expert concluded – and the Board agreed – that L.L. struggled to attune herself to Y’s care needs. While the Board assessed P.L. as being more nuanced in his understanding of Y’s situation and determined that the parents could meet Y’s material care needs, it concluded that they were unable, either individually or collectively, to meet Y’s cognitive care needs, or to adequately address her particular care needs. On account of Y’s needs, contact between Y and her parents had been limited following the care order.
12. With respect to the question of adoption, the Board noted that Y’s need for predictability and stability would be more readily met by way of adoption, which would confirm her placement with those whom she experienced as her parents. While it was clear that the applicants loved Y, their interest in maintaining formal parental ties could not outweigh her best interests. Adoption would only affect Y’s relationship with the applicants and her cultural origins to a limited degree, as compared to the foster care arrangement. Post-adoption contact visits with Y were set at two hours, twice per year.
13. On 7 July 2021, having heard testimony from 18 witnesses (including a psychology expert newly appointed by the court and an expert on Roma culture), the District Court upheld the Board’s decision. The psychology expert had conducted interviews with all relevant persons, including the applicants and their general practitioner, psychologist, and neighbours, and observed interactions between Y and her foster parents and between Y and her biological parents. Those assessments had resulted in a report dated 8 June 2021. The court found that the foster parents had become Y’s de facto parents, and that Y needed the security of having the same formal status as her foster sister. The court also referred to a 2021 assessment from the Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Outpatient Clinic concerning Y, which indicated that further evaluations would be detrimental to her. The assessment highlighted that the repeated investigations, the involvement of new professionals, and the ongoing proceedings had already caused her considerable anxiety and insecurity. In respect of the mother L.L., the District Court noted that the expert assessments of her caregiving abilities differed. Two psychologists considered her capacity to care for the child to be very limited. Others believed that, with guidance and support – particularly from the father – the mother could manage care, especially for a child with ordinary needs. While her practical and material care was generally seen as satisfactory, several experts noted limitations in her cognitive resources, affecting her ability to meet Y’s cognitive and emotional needs. One expert, however, expressed no concern about the mother’s mental health or cognitive functioning and highlighted positive developments since Y’s placement, concluding that with guidance the mother could provide good care. In respect of the father, the District Court, noted that two experts had assessed that he had greater resources than the mother when it came to providing care, however, the experts had found he had an unrealistic expectation of the mother’s caregiving capacity and a somewhat limited understanding of Y’s challenges and that he trivialised the family’s overall situation. The District Court found that it was not in Y’s best interest that the care order be revoked. The District Court further found that there were exceptionally strong reasons for Y to be adopted. It noted in that context that, between 2014 and 2018, the parents had received guidance both before and after contact sessions and had been invited to participate in an educational counselling program – an invitation which they had declined. The court considered that the applicants were not receptive to guidance from the child welfare services.
14. The District Court did not arrange for Y to express her views directly before it, noting that the process could be distressing for her and that there was already well‑documented evidence of her particular vulnerabilities. It further found that additional pressure could heighten Y’s reluctance towards seeing the applicants, given her adverse reactions following an increase in contact sessions in 2020. The court noted that the risk of new disputes was also relevant to Y’s best interests, particularly given that repeated proceedings would undoubtedly be harmful to the child.
15. The District Court did not find that L.L.’s Roma ethnicity had been a factor in the child welfare services’ evaluation of the applicants’ caregiving abilities, nor had it been used at any stage as justification for the care order. The District Court had assessed that the detrimental effects of Y’s being returned to her biological parents far outweighed her need to establish her cultural origin on her mother’s side. The amount of the applicants’ post‑adoption contact with Y was set at two hours, twice per year.
16. Alongside the domestic proceedings, the applicants also complained to the County Governor about the child welfare services. In a decision of 3 September 2021, the County Governor found that although the parents had received adequate support, Y had not been given sufficient exposure to her minority background and could have been introduced to her Roma heritage earlier.
17. On 29 October 2021 the High Court refused the applicants leave to appeal, finding that the District Court’s judgment had not amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It noted that, since 2014, five different experts had been involved in Y’s case and that the question of the applicants’ caregiving abilities had been assessed via domestic proceedings three times. Furthermore, the District Court had recognised Y’s need to maintain and develop her cultural identity and had had a solid basis for concluding that reunification was not possible. The High Court acknowledged that the amount of contact set at the time of the care order had been very limited and had not been consistent with the objective of reunifying Y with the applicants; indeed, it had been set on the basis that the foster care arrangement would be long term. However, the High Court emphasised that, both in 2017 and in the proceedings at hand, the courts had, in determining the applicants’ contact rights, referred to Y’s very limited capacity to tolerate contact with them. Reference had also been made to the fact that Y had reacted adversely after the expert appointed by the District Court had recommended implementing a more extensive contact schedule. The High Court considered that any potential errors made earlier when setting the amount of contact could not at the material time have a bearing on the assessment in respect of adoption or the amount of post‑adoption contact.
18. On 16 December 2021 the Supreme Court refused the applicants leave to appeal, whereupon the District Court’s judgment concerning Y became final.
Complaints19. Relying on Article 8, the applicants argued that the authorities had failed in their duty to facilitate family reunification and that earlier proceedings had incorrectly assessed that Y’s foster care arrangement would be long term. No real support measures with the aim of reuniting the applicants with Y had been put in place. The expert reports had been one‑sided and had wrongly evaluated the capacities of the applicants. The applicants asserted that open adoption with two contact sessions a year was incapable of allowing a meaningful relationship to develop with Y or for Y to be exposed to her Roma heritage.
20. Under Article 6, in conjunction with Article 8, the applicants argued that it had not been appropriate for the District Court to emphasise the potential for further legal proceedings when deciding on the question of adoption. Moreover, the applicants argued that Y’s rights under Article 6 had been violated as she had not been heard before the District Court.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8 and 6 OF THE CONVENTION
21. The applicants complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the domestic decisions withdrawing the applicants’ parental responsibilities in respect of Y and authorising Y’s adoption by her foster parents had breached their right to respect for family life. They further complained of a breach of Article 6 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention in the proceedings as a result of the District Court’s decision not to hear Y directly and its emphasis on the risk of potential future legal proceedings. The Court has previously held that whilst Article 8 of the Convention contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision‑making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by Article 8. It considers that the complaint raised by the applicants under Article 6 of the Convention is closely linked to their complaint under Article 8 and shall accordingly be examined as part of the latter complaint only (see, among other authorities, Eberhard and M. v. Slovenia, nos. 8673/05 and 9733/05, § 111, 1 December 2009, and J.M.N. and C.H. v. Norway (dec.), no. 3145/16, § 22, 11 October 2016).
22. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
23. While the Court will assess the adoption measure in the context of the case as a whole, its examination is confined to the adoption proceedings initiated by the child welfare services in 2019 and the judicial proceedings that followed.
24. The Court finds that the decisions to withdraw the applicants’ parental responsibilities in respect of Y and to authorise Y’s adoption entailed interferences with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life for the purposes of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. It finds that the interferences were in accordance with the law – namely the 1992 Child Welfare Act, which was applicable at the material time – and that they pursued the legitimate aim of protecting Y’s “health” and “rights”. The remaining question is whether the interferences were “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2.
25. The general principles relevant to the necessity test were extensively set out in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway ([GC], no. 37283/13, §§ 202‑13, 10 September 2019) and have since been restated in, inter alia, Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway ([GC], no. 15379/16, § 145, 10 December 2021). From those principles, it follows that the Court must determine whether, in the light of the entirety of the case, the reasons adduced to justify the measures in question were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 and whether the parents were adequately involved in the decision‑making process seen as a whole (see Strand Lobben and Others, cited above, §§ 203 and 212). As regards replacing a foster home arrangement with a more far‑reaching measure such as deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption, with the consequence that the biological parents’ legal ties with the child are definitively severed, the Court reiterates that such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests (ibid., § 209).
26. In determining whether the domestic authorities provided relevant and sufficient reasons for the decision to replace Y’s foster care with adoption, the Court observes that the District Court, in its judgment of 7 July 2021 – which became the final decision on the merits in the application pertaining to Y – found that there were exceptionally strong reasons for Y to be adopted, which was in her best interests (see paragraphs 13-14 above). Y was a child with particularly extensive care needs and kept being vulnerable to changes. However, the Court notes that, although certain objective circumstances, such as reported challenges in the kindergarten setting and a need for special educational support, indicated that Y experienced difficulties, the material before the Court does not describe her vulnerabilities with sufficient precision to clarify their scope or severity. Furthermore, the Court notes that the High Court found that the applicants’ caregiving abilities had been thoroughly assessed over several years prior to the adoption decision, including through the involvement of numerous witnesses and of five different experts who had in turn based their findings on comprehensive studies including interviews with all pertinent family members (see paragraph 17 above). Having assessed all the material before it, the Court nonetheless finds that the expert evidence does not clearly identify or define the parents’ concrete caregiving deficiencies. While assessments point to some limitations – particularly relating to the mother’s cognitive resources and the parents’ understanding of Y’s needs – the findings are somewhat inconsistent and imprecise. The Court notes that, at the same time, several experts indicated that, with guidance and support, the parents were capable of providing adequate care for a child with ordinary needs (see paragraph 13 above).
27. The Court’s task is not limited to scrutinising solely the reasons advanced by the domestic authorities to justify the decision to replace Y’s foster care with adoption. The Court must assess the case and the proceedings as a whole (see Strand Lobben and Others, cited above, §§ 203 and 212). Where the authorities are responsible for a situation of family breakdown because they have failed in their obligation to take measures to facilitate family reunification, in particular by imposing a very strict visiting regime, they may not base a decision to authorise adoption on the grounds of the absence of bonds between the parents and the child (ibid., §§ 208 and 221; see also, for example, Abdi Ibrahim, cited above, § 152; Pedersen and Others v. Norway, no. 39710/15, § 68, 10 March 2020; and M.L. v. Norway, no. 64639/16, §§ 92 and 97, 22 December 2020).
28. In the present case, the Court takes note of the very limited contact rights given to the applicants following the placement of Y into foster care at the age of five months only, a fact that had been acknowledged also by the domestic authorities and courts and which made family reunification difficult. It was assumed that the foster home arrangement would be of long term (see paragraphs 4 and 17 above). Although the experts had assessed Y at the material time as a particularly sensitive child, highly vulnerable to change and with a limited capacity to tolerate contact, and noted adverse reactions to subsequent attempts to increase such contact, the Court observes that, in light of the unclear scope of Y’s vulnerabilities and the imprecise identification of the parents’ caregiving difficulties, it remains insufficiently explained why contact was authorised to such a limited extent from the outset. The Court would note, in respect of the domestic courts’ approach and reasoning in this regard, that the facts of the present case largely predate the important developments in the domestic courts’ practice that followed the Court’s judgment in the case of Strand Lobben (cited above; see for the leading judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 March 2020 Abdi Ibrahim, cited above, §§ 62-66).
29. The Court further observes that consideration was given to the possibility of additional proceedings being initiated. It is noted that the District Court – whose judgment became the final decision on Y’s adoption – appears to have placed some emphasis on the risk that the applicants might institute future proceedings if Y was to continue as a foster child (see paragraph 14 above). The Court reiterates in that context its reservations to any emphasis placed in the reasoning of the domestic courts on the need to pre-empt a biological parent from resorting at some future point to legal remedies to contest a care order or any arrangements for visiting rights. Biological parents’ procedural rights, including their right to have access to proceedings in order to have a care order lifted or restrictions on contact with their child relaxed, form an integral part of their right to respect for their family life afforded by Article 8 of the Convention (see, for example, M.L. v. Norway, cited above, § 95, and Abdi Ibrahim, cited above, § 154). Biological parents’ exercise of judicial remedies with a view to obtaining family reunification with their child may not therefore as such be held against them (see Strand Lobben and Others, cited above, § 212).
30. As regards the decision-making process, the Court observes that the applicants themselves were heard and represented at all stages of the proceedings and thus adequately involved in the decision‑making process.
31. Turning to the adequacy of Y’s participation in the proceedings, the Court reiterates that whether the decision-making process sufficiently protects the parents’ interests depends on the particular circumstances of each case. As regards the issue of hearing the child concerned in court, it would be going too far to say that domestic courts are always required to hear a child in court, but this issue depends on the specific circumstances of each case, having due regard to the age and maturity of the child concerned (compare Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943/96, §§ 70-73, ECHR 2003-VIII). It observes that the District Court, while noting that Y had turned seven years old at the relevant time and was thus legally capable of expressing her views directly before the court, found that involving her in the process in such a way risked causing her distress, given her vulnerability (see paragraph 14 above). The Court observes that the proceedings at issue, on her adoption, concerned an essential aspect of her private and family life. It notes, however, that the District Court carefully considered the matter and that Y’s views were reflected throughout the proceedings by way of the observations made by many experts regarding her interactions, play, and relational dynamics. The Court can accept that this procedural approach was reasonable in the circumstances and provided sufficient material to reach a reasoned decision on Y’s views on the question of adoption in the particular case.
32. Having regard to the above considerations, in particular the very early placement of Y in foster care, the limited contact rights granted to the applicants at the outset, the lack of precision – despite the involvement of numerous experts – in the description of both Y’s vulnerabilities and the applicants’ caregiving challenges, as well as the domestic courts’ emphasis on the risk of potential future disputes, the Court considers that the domestic authorities have not advanced reasons that were sufficient to demonstrate that, in the case of Y, there were exceptional circumstances in which the decision to replace her foster care with adoption was necessary in the light of an overriding requirement pertaining to her best interests. The interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life was therefore not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and, accordingly, not “necessary in a democratic society” for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.
33. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
DamagE34. The applicants claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
35. The Court considers that the applicant parents must have experienced anguish and distress on account of the violation found. It accordingly awards them jointly EUR 25,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
Costs and expenses36. The applicants claimed EUR 15,247 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. They referred to a fees agreement with their counsel and submitted an itemised time sheet detailing the hours the representative worked on the case. The Government submitted that the lawyer’s fees could only be awarded in so far as they related to the violations found.
37. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants jointly EUR 5,000 covering costs and expenses for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Declares the application admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention; Holds that the respondent State is to pay jointly to the applicants, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses; that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 June 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Dorothee von Arnim Péter Paczolay
Deputy Registrar President