FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF L.P. v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 19376/23)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9 April 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of L.P. v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Gilberto Felici,
Diana Sârcu, judges,
and Sophie Piquet, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 19376/23) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 9 May 2023 by a Chinese national, Mr L.P. (“the applicant”), who was born in 1955, lives in China and was represented by Ms E. Kadlót, a lawyer practising in Budapest;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, of the Ministry of Justice, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the decision to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court);
the decision to grant anonymity to the applicant;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 19 March 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the decision to expel the applicant from Hungary on national security grounds, allegedly without any reasons being given.
2. The applicant had been residing in Hungary since 1995. He got married in 2008 with a Hungarian national and has two children.
3. In 2004 the applicant was issued a residence permit for employment purposes and in 2009 a residence card on the basis of his family relationship. In 2011 he was granted permanent residency and issued a permanent residence card, which was valid until 10 March 2021. The validity of the card was prolonged owing to the state of emergency declared during the COVID‑19 pandemic.
4. On 5 February 2021, prompted by changes in the relevant legislation, the applicant applied for a national settlement permit. On 6 September 2021 his request was rejected by the National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing (hereinafter “the NDGAP”) based on a report of the Constitution Protection Office (hereinafter “the CPO”) stating that the applicant represented a threat to national security.
5. On 6 October 2021 the NDGAP revoked the applicant’s permanent residence card based on the CPO’s report.
6. On 2 September 2021 the applicant submitted a request for a residence permit for the purposes of family reunification. On 29 November 2021 the CPO issued a new report, in which they reiterated that the applicant represented a threat to national security. Based on that report, on 6 December 2021 the NDGAP refused the applicant’s request and ordered his expulsion to China. On 24 March 2022 the NDGAP upheld the decision at second instance.
7. On 6 September 2022 the Budapest High Court dismissed the applicant’s administrative action. It held that the NDGAP had been bound by the CPO’s recommendation. Since the underlying CPO report was classified, the NDGAP could not have referred to it. Although the NDGAP’s decision had given no reasons as to why the applicant posed a threat to national security, the file to which the court had had access clearly indicated that that was the case. The applicant had not proved that there was a close relationship of dependence between him and his family members.
8. The applicant’s petition for review was declared inadmissible on 2 March 2023 by the Kúria.
9. The applicant alleges a violation of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION10. The applicant complained that his expulsion had been ordered in a decision based on classified information to which he had had no access, in violation of his rights under Article 8 of the Convention.
11. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
12. Procedural safeguards are an integral feature of the lawfulness of deportation and exclusion decisions under Article 8 of the Convention. The Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions. In keeping with this principle of harmonious interpretation of the Convention, in cases concerning measures affecting an alien’s residence permit in a manner that may potentially lead to his or her expulsion, procedural safeguards under Article 8 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of those provided by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, in so far as relevant (see Mirzoyan v. the Czech Republic, nos. 15117/21 and 15689/21, § 82, 16 May 2024).
13. The general principles under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 were summarised in the case of Muhammad and Muhammad v. Romania [GC] (no. 80982/12, §§ 126-57, 15 October 2020).
14. The Court will first examine whether there were limitations of the applicant’s procedural rights that needed to be counterbalanced by appropriate safeguards and, secondly, whether the applicant’s ties in Hungary were given sufficient consideration (see Mirzoyan, cited above, § 86).
15. As to the first issue, the administrative authorities justified their decision referring to the opinion of the CPO. Although under section 87/B(1) of the Immigration Act the NDGAP was under an obligation to provide reasons for its decisions – including the specialised agency’s assessment, the ascertained facts of the case, the available evidence and an explanation of the specialised agency’s assessment – in practice the decisions did not specify why the applicant was considered a danger to national security, nor did they cite the specific factual elements on the basis of which those findings had been made by the CPO.
16. The opinions of the CPO were contained in a classified document and thus not made available to the applicant or to his lawyer. The allegations against the applicant were of an undisclosed nature, making it impossible for him to challenge the CPO’s assertions before the NDGAP by providing exonerating evidence or an explanation.
17. The foregoing resulted in a significant limitation of the applicant’s procedural rights, which had to be mitigated by appropriate counterbalancing safeguards.
18. Following a request for a judicial review by the applicant, the impugned decisions of the NDGAP were reviewed in judicial proceedings held before the Budapest High Court and the Kúria. Nonetheless, the applicant lacked even an outline of the facts which served as a basis for the conclusion of the NDGAP that his presence in Hungary constituted a threat to or a breach of national security. It is thus doubtful whether he was able to present his case adequately in the subsequent judicial review proceedings.
19. The Budapest High Court ruled from the outset that the NDGAP was bound by the CPO’s opinion, leaving the authorities no latitude as regards the question whether the applicant was a threat to national security or as regards the necessity of his expulsion. It also held that since the NDGAP’s decision had been based on confidential information, the administrative authority had not been in a position to reveal that information in its decision.
20. The High Court only briefly stated that it had reviewed the documents produced by the CPO, from which it was clear to it that the applicant’s presence in Hungary constituted a threat to national security. The court’s access to the classified information on which the administrative authorities’ decisions were based was an important safeguard counterbalancing the restrictions on the applicant’s procedural rights. However, the Budapest High Court did not make any reference to the evidential basis for its finding about the conclusiveness of the confidential information. Nor did it provide an explanation as to whether and how the CPO was able to demonstrate the existence of the specific facts serving as a basis for its opinion. In the absence of any factual elements in the court judgment, the applicant was not given so much as an outline of the national security case or any other allegations against him (compare and contrast Mirzoyan, cited above, § 94).
21. While it is true that the applicant was represented by a lawyer of his own choosing, the legal representative also had no access to the classified information or to the content of the CPO’s opinion. It cannot therefore be said that the applicant’s legal representation was sufficiently effective to be able to counterbalance, in a significant manner, the limitations affecting him in the exercise of his procedural rights in the present case.
22. In conclusion the applicant, despite having the formal possibility of seeking judicial review of the expulsion order, was not able to challenge, in an effective manner, the allegation that he represented a risk to national security, nor did he enjoy the requisite degree of protection against arbitrariness on the part of the authorities. The domestic proceedings were not attended by appropriate and sufficient procedural guarantees.
23. As to the question whether the applicant’s ties in Hungary were given sufficient consideration, the Court refers to the judgment of the Budapest High Court, according to which his personal circumstances were irrelevant as they were outweighed by the public interest in national security (see paragraph 7 above). In that sense, any reference to the applicant’s circumstances was reduced to a mere formality.
24. In view of the procedural deficiencies, the Court concludes that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life has not been shown to have been necessary in a democratic society.
25. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
OTHER COMPLAINTS26. The applicant asserted that, contrary to Article 1 § 1 (a) of Protocol No. 7, he had not been informed of the reasons underlying his expulsion.
27. The Court reiterates that the scope of application of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 extends to aliens “lawfully resident” in the territory of the State in question.
28. The applicant’s request for a national settlement permit was not granted and his residence card was revoked on 6 October 2021, prior to the expulsion order. The applicant has not submitted any information as regards the legal basis for his stay in Hungary following the revocation of his residence card. Thus, it appears from the case file that he was not lawfully residing in Hungary at the time of his expulsion.
29. Consequently, that provision is not applicable in the instant case and the complaint must be rejected for being incompatible ratione materiae in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
30. Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, the applicant also complained that he had been denied an effective remedy. However, he did not pursue that complaint further.
31. The Court considers that the applicant may not be regarded as wishing to pursue this complaint, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. In accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the continued consideration of the complaint. It is no longer justified to continue the examination of this part of the application and, accordingly, it should be struck out of its list of cases (see M. v. Ukraine, no. 2452/04, § 93, 19 April 2012).
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION32. The applicant claimed 1,400 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage corresponding to the cost of medical treatment he had received following his expulsion. In his observations, he indicated that he maintained his claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage, without specifying the amount. He also claimed 300,000 Hungarian forints (HUF – approximately EUR 730), plus value-added tax (VAT), for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts, and EUR 4,800 and HUF 500,000 (approximately EUR 1,200), plus VAT, for those incurred before the Court.
33. The Government contested those claims.
34. The Court reiterates that the general principles and established practice on the existence of a “claim” for just satisfaction are summarised in the case of Nagmetov v. Russia ([GC], no. 35589/08, §§ 57-59, 30 March 2017).
35. It is true that the applicant did not claim a specific amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage. However, in his observations submitted before the requisite deadline, when expressly invited to formulate his just satisfaction claims, he clearly asked the Court to make an award to him in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It cannot therefore be said that he failed to submit any claims for non-pecuniary damage within the requisite deadline in line with Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, it being reiterated that non-pecuniary damage does not lend itself to precise calculation and that any such claim need not always be quantified by the applicant. The Court thus accepts that the applicant must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards him EUR 5,200 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
36. As regards the applicant’s claim for pecuniary damage, the Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged by him; it therefore rejects that claim.
37. As regards costs and expenses, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 4,000 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Decides to strike the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention out of its list of cases; Declares the complaint concerning Article 8 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention; Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: EUR 5,200 (five thousand two hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses; that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 April 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Sophie Piquet María Elósegui
Acting Deputy Registrar President