FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF MARTIKÁN v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no. 30036/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 January 2009
FINAL
20/04/2009
This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Martikán v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Ján Šikuta,
Mihai Poalelungi,
Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 16 December 2008,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 30036/06) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Ján Martikán (“the applicant”), on 14 July 2006.
2. The Slovak Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.
3. On 3 April 2008 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Snežnica.
A. Proceedings concerning the applicant’s action
5. On 13 March 1998 the applicant filed an action with the Čadca District Court. He claimed compensation in a labour dispute. On 11 September 1998 the case was transferred to the Považská Bystrica District Court.
6. In the period following the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 14 February 2006 (see below) the Považská Bystrica District Court held three hearings. It also requested the Čadca District Court to hear witnesses and twice urged it to do so.
7. On 15 March 2007 the Považská Bystrica District Court granted the applicant’s claim. The judgment became final on 12 May 2007.
B. Constitutional proceedings
8. On 14 February 2006 the Constitutional Court found that the Považská Bystrica District Court had violated the applicant’s right under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution to a hearing without unjustified delay and his right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing within a reasonable time.
9. The Constitutional Court held that the case was not complex. Although the applicant had to a certain extent contributed to the length of the proceedings through insufficient cooperation, that had not influenced the overall length of the proceedings. Delays imputable to the Považská Bystrica District Court had amounted to a total of 4 years.
10. The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant SKK 40,000 (the equivalent of 1,066 euros at that time) as just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It ordered the reimbursement of the applicant’s legal costs and ordered the Považská Bystrica District Court to avoid any further delay in the proceedings.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
11. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
12. The Government did not contest that argument but argued that the application was inadmissible for the reasons set out below.
A. Admissibility
13. The Government objected that, in respect of the proceedings examined by the Constitutional Court, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time. They argued that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged such a violation and the amount of just satisfaction awarded and paid without undue delay was not manifestly inadequate in the circumstances of the case. They further argued that the Constitutional Court’s finding had a preventive effect as no further delays had occurred in the subsequent period. In any event, the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as it had been open to him to lodge a fresh complaint with the Constitutional Court in that respect.
14. The applicant disagreed and argued that the amount of just satisfaction granted by the Constitutional Court was disproportionately low in the circumstances of the case. He further argued that he was not obliged to have recourse again to the constitutional remedy.
15. The Court notes that at the time of the Constitutional Court’s judgment the proceedings had been pending for 7 years, 11 months and 5 days. The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant the equivalent of EUR 1,066 as just satisfaction in respect of the proceedings examined by it and ordered the District Court to avoid any further delay in the proceedings.
16. The amount awarded by the Constitutional Court cannot be considered as providing adequate and sufficient redress to the applicant in view of the Court’s established case-law (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006-..., and Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 65-107, ECHR 2006-...).
17. In view of the above, in respect of the proceedings up to the Constitutional Court’s judgment, the Court concludes that the applicant did not lose his status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.
18. Since the compensatory effect produced by the decision of the Constitutional Court did not satisfy the criteria applied by the Court, the applicant was not required, for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, to use again the remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution in respect of the proceedings subsequent to the Constitutional Court’s judgment (see the recapitulation of the relevant principles in Becová v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 23788/06, 18 September 2007).
19. In this context the Court also considers it relevant that the present application was introduced without substantial delay after the Constitutional Court’s judgment (see Španír v. Slovakia, no. 39139/05, § 47, 18 December 2007, and Weiss v. Slovakia, no. 28652/03, § 33, 18 December 2007). The application, accordingly, cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
20. The period to be taken into consideration began on 13 March 1998 and ended on 15 March 2007. The proceedings have thus lasted for more than 9 years and 2 months for one level of jurisdiction.
21. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
22. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). The Court reiterates that special diligence is necessary in employment disputes (Ruotolo v. Italy, judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A no. 230-D, p. 39, § 17).
23. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, ibid.).
24. Having examined all the material submitted to it and having regard to its case-law on the subject and the nature of the dispute, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. In particular, at the time of the Constitutional Court’s judgment the proceedings had been pending for almost 8 years before a single instance. Following the Constitutional Court’s judgment the proceedings continued for 1 year and almost 3 months but no substantial delay occurred during that period.
25. The Court concludes that the overall length of the period under consideration was incompatible with the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time.
26. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
27. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
28. The applicant claimed 2,900 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
29. The Government considered the claim exaggerated and left the matter to the Court’s discretion.
30. The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, and having regard to its case-law on the subject, the particular circumstances of the case and the fact that the applicant obtained partial redress in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, it awards EUR 2,700.
B. Costs and expenses
31. The applicant also claimed EUR 119 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
32. The Government had no objection to the award of a demonstrably incurred sum for translation costs and requested the Court to dismiss the remainder as the applicant failed to support his claim by any evidence.
33. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer, the sum claimed in full, i.e. EUR 119 for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
34. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 2,700 (two thousand seven hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 119 (one hundred and nineteen euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 January 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence EarlyNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy