SECOND SECTION
CASE OF MÁTRAINÉ TÖRŐ v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 47070/10)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
11 March 2014
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Mátrainé Törő v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Helen Keller, President,
András Sajó,
Egidijus Kūris, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 11 February 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 47070/10) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Ms Ildikó Mátrainé Törő (“the applicant”), on 3 August 2010.
2. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
3. On 6 March 2013 the application was communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Budapest.
5. The applicant was a professional staff member of the Hungarian Police since 1994.
6. In early 1997 she was warned that her employment might be terminated in a few months; therefore, on her initiation, she was interviewed at another police department.
7. As a ‘top executive’ (kiemelt főelőadó), she was found suitable for a new position within the counter-terrorism unit.
8. From 1998 onwards, she was ordered to undergo, annually, a medical aptitude test of a kind different from what she had formerly been subjected to. This test was meant for the position of a ‘member of counter-terrorism unit’ (terrorelhárító beosztású).
9. On 13 February 2001 she commenced her regular annual medical examination but, by the order of her supervisor, she interrupted the test. However, there were still two particular examinations outstanding.
10. Subsequently, the applicant was ordered to take part, afresh, in another medical examination on 27 May 2001. It appears that the reason for this was that the change in her aptitude test regime back in 1997 had not been correctly applied.
11. As a result of this latter examination, she was qualified as ‘unfit’ for the position she held and dismissed from service.
12. On 28 February 2002 the applicant lodged an action with the labour court claiming that her employment had been unlawfully terminated and seeking damages.
13. The Budapest Labour Court found for the applicant on 21 September 2005 and ordered the employer to pay compensation.
14. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case to the Labour Court on 14 April 2006.
15. In the resumed proceedings, the Labour Court rejected the applicant’s action on 16 January 2008. The court relied on the parties’ and other witnesses’ testimonies, a medical expert’s report and other documentary evidence and was satisfied that the applicant’s service had been justifiably and lawfully terminated.
16. On appeal, the Regional Court upheld this decision on 15 October 2008.
17. The Supreme Court confirmed the second-instance decision on 7 April 2010.
THE LAW
18. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. She also relied on Article 13 of the Convention in the context of the protraction of the case.
19. The Government did not contest that argument.
20. The period to be taken into consideration began on 28 February 2002 and ended on 7 April 2010. It thus lasted over eight years for three levels of jurisdiction.
21. In view of such lengthy proceedings, this complaint must be declared admissible.
22. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). It reiterates that special diligence is necessary in employment disputes (see Ruotolo v. Italy, 27 February 1992, § 17, Series A no. 230-D).
23. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
24. The applicant further complained that the allegedly erroneous interpretation of the law by the domestic courts gave rise to a violation of the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 of the Convention.
The Court considers that there is no appearance that the applicant was subjected to treatment different from that applied to any other person in a similar situation. To the extent that this complaint may be understood to challenge the outcome of the litigation, the Court reiterates that the assessment of evidence and the interpretation of domestic law is primarily the task of the national authorities (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I).
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
25. Relying on Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant claimed 35,540 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage combined.
26. The Government contested the claim.
27. The Court finds no causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. It considers, however, that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on the basis of equity, it awards her EUR 2,300 under this head.
28. The applicant made no costs claim.
29. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 2,300 (two thousand three hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 March 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley NaismithHelen Keller
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy