CASE OF INSTITUTE FOR AUTOMOTIVE ROAD DESIGN S.A. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF INSTITUTE FOR AUTOMOTIVE ROAD DESIGN S.A. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

(Application no. 72034/14)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

4 December 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Institute for Automotive Road Design S.A. v. the Republic of Moldova,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Gilberto Felici, President,
 Diana Sârcu,
 Sébastien Biancheri, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 72034/14) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 30 October 2014 by Institutul Pentru Proiectări Drumuri Auto S.A. (“the applicant company”), incorporated in the Republic of Moldova in 1995, which was represented by Mr N. Leşan, a lawyer practising in Chișinău;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their former Agent, Mr D. Obadă;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 13 November 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The application concerns the allegedly insufficient and arbitrary reasoning of decisions rendered by civil courts and their allegedly divergent conclusions reached in proceedings relating to the same facts and parties, leading to a breach of the principle of legal certainty. The applicant company relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

2.  Following a dispute between the applicant company and two of its former employees, R.F. and N.D. (“the creditors”), the latter obtained court judgments in their favour ordering the applicant company to pay them salary arrears. Corresponding writs of execution were issued to R.F. and N.D. on 7 October 2005 and 20 January 2006 respectively and were submitted for enforcement to the Botanica Office of the Department of Execution of Judicial Decisions. Those writs were returned to the creditors on 30 June 2007 on account of the impossibility of enforcing them. A new three‑year period for the submission of the writs of execution started running on that day.

3.  On 29 May 2008 the creditors submitted the writs of execution to the bailiff. By two rulings delivered on the same day, the bailiff refused to initiate the execution of the writs since they lacked the specific details necessary for the proper identification of the debtor. He explained that the writs of execution could be submitted anew at a later stage. The bailiff further noted that his refusal to accept the writs for enforcement did not, however, interrupt the running of the statutory three-year time-limit. The creditors did not challenge those rulings.

4.  On 20 January 2011, after rectifying the shortcomings referred to in the rulings of 29 May 2008, the creditors submitted the writs of execution to the bailiff. The latter accepted them and instituted enforcement proceedings on the same date. The applicant company challenged the bailiff’s actions in court, relying on the expiry of the three-year limitation period for submitting the writs of execution.

5.  By a judgment of 6 July 2011, the Buiucani District Court dismissed a complaint lodged by the applicant company against the bailiff’s rulings of 20 January 2011. It considered that the bailiff’s rulings of 29 May 2008 (see paragraph 3 above) had interrupted the running of the limitation period and thus the writs of execution had not been submitted out of time. The applicant company appealed, reiterating its interpretation of the statutory limitation period. By a final decision of 18 October 2011, the Chișinău Court of Appeal set aside that judgment. It admitted the applicant company’s appeal on points of law and its complaint against the bailiff’s rulings of 20 January 2011. It held that the limitation period had not been interrupted by the bailiff’s refusal to initiate the execution of the writs in question and therefore decided that the writs of execution had been submitted to the bailiff outside the statutory three‑year time-limit. On 28 November 2011 the bailiff discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the creditors’ writs of execution.

6.  On 28 January 2012 the creditors requested that the Buiucani District Court set aside the bailiff’s rulings of 28 November 2011 to discontinue the enforcement proceedings. By a judgment of 25 January 2013, the Buiucani District Court admitted the creditors’ request and set aside the bailiff’s rulings. It considered that the creditors had not submitted their writs of execution after the expiry of the limitation period. It relied on the same reasons as in its judgment of 6 July 2011 (see paragraph 5 above). The applicant company appealed, maintaining its previous position. By a final decision of 12 April 2013, the Chișinău Court of Appeal admitted the applicant company’s appeal on points of law, set aside the lower court’s judgment of 25 January 2013 and dismissed the creditors’ complaint. It held that the creditors had requested the enforcement of the writs after the expiry of the three-year statutory time-limit. It stated that the return of a writ of execution enabled a creditor to resubmit it within a new three-year limitation period which would start to run on the day of the return. It further explained that a bailiff’s refusal to initiate the enforcement of a writ of execution, as in the creditors’ case on 29 May 2008, did not interrupt the running of the limitation period. The creditors’ request to have the bailiff’s rulings set aside in order to discontinue the enforcement proceedings was therefore dismissed.

7.  In another set of proceedings, the creditors requested that the Buiucani District Court reinstate their writs of execution within the statutory three‑year time‑limit. They argued that a new limitation period had started to run on 29 May 2008 (see paragraph 3 above). The applicant company disagreed with the creditors’ position, relying on the existence of two previous final decisions on the same matter. By a ruling of 24 December 2013, the District Court noted that the previous final decisions had referred to the bailiff’s actions, whereas the core question of the case before it was different and concerned the reinstatement of the writs of execution within the time‑limit for enforcement. It considered that the bailiff’s rulings of 29 May 2008 had reset the three-year limitation period necessary for the enforcement of the creditors’ writs of execution. The applicant company appealed, relying on the breach of the principle of legal certainty. By a final decision of 30 June 2014, the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company’s appeal on points of law and upheld the lower court’s ruling to reinstate the writs of execution within the statutory time-limit. It did not rule on the applicant company’s arguments regarding an alleged breach of the principle of legal certainty. It merely noted that the writs of execution had not been properly submitted for enforcement and that such conclusion sufficed for the reinstatement of the writs in question.

8.  Subsequently, the bailiff eventually secured the execution of the writs concerning the payment of the sums to the creditors, which was finally accepted by the applicant company on the basis of a friendly settlement agreement within the enforcement proceedings.

9.  Relying on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant company complained that the decisions delivered in the third set of proceedings had been reasoned in an arbitrary manner and had breached the principle of legal certainty. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, it alleged that the decision to reinstate the time-barred writs of execution followed by payments in that respect had constituted disproportionate interference with its right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

10.  The Government raised a preliminary objection as to the loss of victim status of the applicant company, relying on the fact that the latter had concluded a friendly settlement agreement with its creditors. The applicant company argued that it had chosen to comply with the bailiff’s order, based on the allegedly erroneous final decision of 30 June 2014 (see paragraph 8 above), rather than to have its assets seized by a bailiff. The Court observes that the writs of execution were enforced against the applicant on the basis of the impugned judicial decisions, allegedly in breach of the principle of legal certainty. The friendly settlement at issue only concerned the manner in which the enforcement of the writs of execution would take place, without the applicant company obtaining any recognition of unlawfulness or an advantage in compensation therefor. In these circumstances, no issue regarding the applicant company’s victim status arises.

11.  The Government further argued that the application was an abuse of the right of application under Article 35 § 3 of the Convention because the applicant company had failed to inform the Court of the friendly settlement agreement concluded with, or the payment made to the benefit of its creditors. The applicant company argued that such information had not been crucial for the determination of the matter complained of. The Court observes that the information that the writs of execution were enforced – whether directly or following a settlement on the modalities thereof – could only reinforce the applicant company’s complaint that it was a victim of a breach of its Convention rights resulting from judicial decisions breaching the principle of legal certainty. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the omission to mention this fact may serve as grounds for considering the application abusive.

12.  In view of the above considerations, the Court rejects the Government’s objections. The Court further notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

13.  The applicant company argued that, in the last set of proceedings, the domestic court had failed to observe the principle of legal certainty and had not provided any plausible reasons for reversing the previous final decisions in its favour. It further contended that, consequently, its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions had been breached on account of the enforcement of the writs of execution, which had allegedly been reinstated in abuse of that right. The Government objected and upheld the position expressed in the Chișinău Court of Appeal’s decision of 30 June 2014.

14.  The general principles concerning legal certainty in civil proceedings and the reasoning of judgments have been summarised in Baroul Partner‑A v. Moldova (no. 39815/07, §§ 36-37, 16 July 2009), García Ruiz v. Spain ([GC], no. 30544/96, § 26, ECHR 1999-I) and Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal ([GC] nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 185, 6 November 2018, with further references).

15.  The Court notes that the creditors’ writs of execution were returned on 30 June 2007 (see paragraph 2 above) and a new three-year limitation period started to run. On 29 May 2008 the creditors resubmitted the writs, but the bailiff refused to initiate enforcement proceedings and the creditors failed to challenge the bailiff’s decisions in court. The Court observes that the domestic proceedings resulted in contradictory conclusions. While the first two sets of proceedings found that the writs of execution submitted on 20 January 2011 were time-barred, the Chișinău Court of Appeal, in its decision of 30 June 2014, reached the opposite conclusion and reinstated the writs, thereby enabling their resubmission for enforcement.

16.  The Court reiterates that it is not called upon to determine which interpretation of domestic law was correct, as that task falls primarily within the competence of the national courts. Its role is confined to examining whether the manner in which the divergent interpretations were reached and applied gave rise to a situation incompatible with the principle of legal certainty, which constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII). In this regard, the Court observes that the last set of proceedings did not provide reasoning capable of distinguishing, in a manner free from arbitrariness, the conclusions reached in the earlier decisions in which detailed reasons were given. As a result, the applicant company was confronted with conflicting judicial outcomes on the same matter, without adequate justification for such divergence. The Court considers that this state of affairs undermined the principle of legal certainty, which requires that when differing solutions are adopted to the same legal issue, such differences be convincingly explained (see Beian v. Romania (no. 1), no. 30658/05, § 39, ECHR 2007-V (extracts), and Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 13279/05, § 58, 20 October 2011).

17.  As a result, since the applicant company was compelled to pay to the creditors the sums specified in the writs of execution – reinstated in the latest court proceedings contrary to the principle of legal certainty – it follows that the applicant company also suffered a breach of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions.

18.  There has accordingly been violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and of Article 1 of its Protocol No. 1.

19.  The applicant also complained under Article 13 of the Convention. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaint (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

20.  The applicant company did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award any sum on that account.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 December 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Martina Keller Gilberto Felici
 Deputy Registrar President