FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF O.A.G. v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 21480/16)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18 June 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of O.A.G. v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Andreas Zünd,
Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 21480/16) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 20 April 2016 by a then Ukrainian national, O.A.G. (“the applicant”), who was born in 1974, lives in Moscow and was represented by Mr M. Tarakhkalo, a lawyer practising in Kyiv;
the decision to give notice of the complaints summarised in paragraph 1 below to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 28 May 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case mainly concerns the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention that the material conditions of her detention were inadequate, that the medical care received by her in detention was poor, and that she was shackled while in hospital. The applicant also complained under Article 5 § 3 that her pre‑trial detention had not been justified by any relevant and sufficient reasons. Lastly, she complained that she had been temporarily separated from her newborn baby in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
The applicant’s arrest and pre-trial detention2. On 29 April 2015 an investigator of the Security Service of Ukraine (“the SBU”) arrested the applicant, the director of a local radio station in Odesa, on suspicion of preparing an attack on the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine and incitement to national hatred. More specifically, she was suspected of having tried, as part of a conspiracy with certain persons from Russia, to create a separatist movement aimed at proclaiming an independent entity comprising several districts in the Odesa region. The applicant was arrested after a police search at her home had discovered various materials pertaining to the organisation of the above-mentioned movement. Those materials related to, in particular, attempts to disseminate allegations that the central authorities were incapable of fulfilling their functions and that it was necessary for the local communities to create their own republic of “Bessarabia”, with a parliament empowered to independently regulate such issues as, for example, conscription into the armed forces of Ukraine. The police discovered evidence of the applicant’s involvement in the organisation of various protests and public events to that effect.
3. On 1 May 2015 the Odesa Prymorskyy District Court (“the Prymorskyy Court”) remanded the applicant in custody, until 28 June 2015, as a preventive measure pending trial. The court noted, in particular, that in March 2015 the applicant had identified a potential candidate for presiding over the so‑called “People’s Council of Bessarabia”; had found a venue for carrying out a “Congress” of that “Council”; had received via an email from unidentified persons “the Manifesto of the People’s Council of Bessarabia”, the “Congress” programme, a list of participants and other relevant documents; and had started to organise the practical elements of the event. Even though on 2 April 2015 the SBU had warned her that she would be punished for carrying out any unlawful actions, the applicant had continued her activities aimed at the proclamation of an independent entity in the Odesa region. The Prymorskyy Court referred in that connection to the materials seized in the applicant’s apartment following the search on 29 April 2015 (see paragraph 2 above). It stated that, in the light of all the collected evidence, there was a reasonable suspicion against her. The court further took note of the severity of the sentence which the applicant faced (from five to ten years’ imprisonment), the information about her conduct as described above and the fact that many essential investigative measures had yet to be carried out. It considered that there were risks that the applicant might abscond, influence witnesses or otherwise obstruct the investigation if at liberty. Lastly, the court noted that, pursuant to Article 176 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 43 below), it was impossible to apply a non-custodial preventive measure in the applicant’s case given the charges against her.
4. On 26 June 2015 the Prymorskyy Court extended the applicant’s pre‑trial detention until 25 August 2015. It took into account the investigator’s argument that more time was required for the pre-trial investigation to be completed owing to its particular complexity, including the need for numerous forensic expert examinations, the “multi-layered” nature of the criminal activities in question, and the considerable volume of case‑file materials. In particular, none of the required forensic criminal expert examinations of the computer hardware and software had been completed. Furthermore, the investigator had not yet identified and questioned all the persons involved in the criminal activities concerned. Some other relevant investigative measures that had yet to be carried out were also listed. The Prymorskyy Court also referred to a forensic linguistic expert examination report in respect of certain materials seized at the applicant’s home (see paragraph 2 above). According to the expert findings, those materials were clearly aimed at obstructing the work of local authorities in the Odesa region, creating public resistance to the central authorities, conducting ideological indoctrination and propaganda activities among young people, persuading conscripts to refuse to comply with mobilisation orders from the armed forces of Ukraine, and, ultimately, bringing about public disorder and violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine. In deciding to extend the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the court noted that the risks previously established continued to exist. It considered, in particular, that if released she might destroy or distort the relevant electronic documents and information on the internet or otherwise obstruct the investigation or influence witnesses. The Prymorskyy Court referred in that connection to the fact that the applicant had insisted on pursuing her criminal activities even after the SBU’s warning and that she had well-established connections with numerous accomplices who still remained at liberty.
5. The subsequent extensions of the applicant’s pre-trial detention were mainly based on the continued existence of the risks previously established under Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 44 below), with an additional reference to the impossibility of applying a non‑custodial preventive measure under Article 176 § 5 of that Code (see paragraph 43 below). Furthermore, when ordering another such extension during the applicant’s pregnancy, the Prymorskyy Court also noted that she was being provided with adequate medical care in detention. As regards the last extension, which was ordered after the applicant had given birth to her baby (see paragraph 30 below), the Prymorskyy Court noted, in reply to her argument that it was necessary for her and the baby to stay together, that the boy was undergoing inpatient medical treatment in a special hospital setting – a situation which prevented the applicant from being present. Regard being had to the child’s undisputed need for intensive medical care, the court considered that his interests prevailed over the mother’s right to keep the baby with her (see paragraphs 30-36 below for the relevant factual details).
6. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged her pre-trial detention and its extensions before the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal, arguing that there was no reasonable suspicion of her involvement in any criminal activities and that she had a permanent place of residence and employment, positive character references, no criminal record, and two minor children and elderly parents to care for.
7. On 13 June 2016 the applicant was released and moved to Moscow as part of an exchange of detainees agreed through negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.
conditions of detention in the Odesa SIZO8. The applicant was detained in the Odesa Pre-Trial Detention Facility (“the Odesa SIZO”) from 5 May 2015 until 13 June 2016, with the exception of several brief periods when she was hospitalised or accompanied her newborn baby in hospital (see paragraphs 20, 25 and 29-36 below).
Material conditions of detention9. According to the applicant, during the period from 5 until 15 May 2015 she was detained in a cell measuring 22 sq. m and accommodating 16 inmates. Subsequently, until 30 July 2015, she was detained in four different cells measuring from 6.9 to 7.9 sq. m and accommodating three inmates. After that, the applicant was transferred to a cell of 7.4 sq. m, in which she stayed, together with another inmate, until 24 November 2015. The material conditions of detention in all those cells were allegedly unacceptable, in particular owing to: overcrowding, poor light and lack of natural or artificial ventilation, high humidity, cockroach infestations, extremely cold temperatures in the late autumn and unbearable heat in the summer, deficient sewage systems and a lack of privacy.
10. Starting from 24 November 2015, the applicant was detained in one of the cells in the SIZO medical unit, which measured 22 sq. m and which she shared with two other inmates. The applicant did not in any way criticise the material conditions of her detention there.
11. According to the Government, the applicant was held in the SIZO in six different cells measuring from 6.9 to 22 sq. m, in adequate material and sanitary conditions. The Government did not specify the number of inmates accommodated in those cells.
Medical care in detentionPrior to the birth of the applicant’s baby on 27 April 201612. On 30 April 2015 (that is, on the day after her arrest – see paragraph 2 above) the applicant underwent a medical examination in Odesa City Clinical Hospital No. 1. According to a medical certificate issued on the same date, she did not require hospitalisation and her lungs and heart showed no abnormalities.
13. On 5 May 2015, upon her arrival at the SIZO, the applicant underwent another medical examination, which did not reveal any injuries or health concerns. The examination report noted, in so far as it concerned her medical history, that in 2010 she had undergone surgery for malignant coccygeal melanoma.
14. According to the applicant, on 25 September 2015 she requested a gynaecological examination on account of delayed menstruation.
15. On 29 September 2015 a gynaecologist examined the applicant and found her to be six weeks pregnant[1].
16. On 5 October 2015 laboratory tests of the applicant’s blood and urine were performed.
17. After complaining of abdominal pain and bleeding (allegedly on 20 October 2015), on 21 October 2015 the applicant was taken to Odesa City Maternity Hospital No. 5 (“the maternity hospital”), where she was examined by a gynaecologist and underwent an ultrasound examination. She was found to be about 11 or 12 weeks pregnant. Furthermore, it was concluded that there was a high risk of the baby having chromosomal abnormalities and a risk of the applicant miscarrying.
18. On 18 November 2015 the applicant underwent another ultrasound examination. It was found that she was 15 weeks pregnant and that another such examination would be required at the twentieth week.
19. On 24 November 2015 she was transferred from a regular cell to the SIZO medical unit.
20. On 15 December 2015, after the applicant complained about a deterioration in her health, an ambulance was called for her. She was hospitalised at the maternity hospital, where she underwent inpatient medical treatment until 18 December 2015, on account of marginal placental abruption and the threat of miscarriage.
21. On 18 December 2015, after being discharged from the maternity hospital, the applicant was taken to Women’s Health Clinic No. 1 (“the women’s health clinic”), where a gynaecologist examined her and opened a pregnancy medical record. It was found that the applicant risked going into premature labour and required monitoring in the SIZO medical unit.
22. As indicated by the applicant, on 4 January 2016 she was examined by a gynaecologist in the SIZO.
23. On 21 January 2016 a gynaecologist from the women’s health clinic examined the applicant in the SIZO. It was recommended that she undergo ultrasound examinations of her foetus and kidneys.
24. On the following day, 22 January 2016, the applicant was taken to the maternity hospital, where the above-mentioned examinations were carried out. It was found that she had polyhydramnios (an abnormally high volume of amniotic fluid) and kidney stone disease. She was prescribed medications and a further ultrasound examination at a later stage.
25. On 2 February 2016 an ambulance was called for the applicant and she was hospitalised at the maternity hospital. Medical staff estimated that she was between 26 and 27 weeks pregnant, and took note of her complicated obstetric and gynaecological history and risk of going into premature labour. The applicant underwent inpatient medical treatment there until 4 February 2016.
26. On 26 February 2016 a gynaecologist from the women’s health clinic examined the applicant in the SIZO and recommended that she undergo a further ultrasound examination in the maternity hospital. This was done on the same day. The applicant’s medical treatment was adjusted in accordance with the examination results.
27. On 1 April 2016 the applicant was taken to the women’s health clinic for a routine gynaecological and ultrasound examination. She was diagnosed, in particular, with placental dysfunction and a risk of going into premature labour. It was recommended that she be referred to the maternity hospital as soon as there were any signs of the onset of labour.
28. On 21 April 2016 the Court indicated to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the Government should “secure the applicant’s immediate and high-quality medical examination and provide her with appropriate medical care, including transfer to a maternity hospital”.
29. On 26 April 2016 the applicant was transferred to the maternity hospital.
After the birth of the applicant’s baby on 27 April 201630. On 27 April 2016 the applicant gave birth to a boy. The newborn was immediately placed in the maternity hospital’s neonatal intensive care unit on account of various health concerns (namely, congenital infection, pneumonia‑caused third-degree (severe) respiratory failure, haemorrhagic syndrome, and multiple congenital anomalies suggestive of abnormal embryonic development). His condition was estimated as extremely severe.
31. On 6 May 2016 the applicant’s son was transferred to the neonatal critical care unit of Academician Reznik City Paediatric Hospital (“the city paediatric hospital”). On the same day that hospital informed the SIZO administration, in reply to an enquiry from the latter, that in accordance with the applicable sanitary regulations, babies stayed in the neonatal critical care unit without their mothers. It was also noted that, in any event, the hospital did not have the available space to accommodate the applicant and her guards, and that the neonatal pathology department was closed for routine disinfection.
32. On 6 May 2016 the applicant was discharged from the maternity hospital and taken back to the SIZO.
33. On 13 May 2016 the applicant underwent a routine examination by a gynaecologist. She did not raise any complaints and her health was found to be satisfactory.
34. On 23 May 2016 the applicant’s son was transferred from the city paediatric hospital to the neonatal pathology department of the Odesa Regional Paediatric Clinical Hospital (“the regional paediatric hospital”). The SIZO was informed about that transfer on the same date.
35. On 25 May 2016 the regional paediatric hospital replied to an enquiry of 24 May 2016 from the SIZO administration, stating that it had the capacity to accommodate the applicant and her guards.
36. It appears from certain documents in the case file that on 26 May 2016 the applicant was placed in the regional paediatric hospital, where she stayed with her son until her release on 13 June 2016. The applicant’s submissions in that regard were, however, contradictory. On the one hand, she stated that she had been “in close contact with [her son]” until 6 May 2016 and after 26 May 2016. On the other hand, she alleged that she had not been transferred from the SIZO to the regional paediatric hospital even after the latter had confirmed its ability to accommodate her on 25 May 2016.
37. On 22 August 2016 the President of the Section to which the case had been allocated decided to lift the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 28 above).
Alleged shackling of the applicant38. According to the applicant, she was shackled, either to one of her guards[2] or to a piece of furniture, each time she was taken outside the SIZO for a gynaecological examination. She referred in that connection to her examinations in the maternity hospital on 18 November 2015 and in the women’s health clinic between 15 and 18 December 2015 and on 1 April 2016. The applicant specified that she had been handcuffed immediately upon her arrival at the medical facilities and that on 1 April 2016 she had had to wait for about two hours in the clinic’s lobby while shackled to a chair.
39. According to the Government, no shackling or other restraint measures had been applied to the applicant, since such measures were prohibited in respect of women who exhibited obvious signs of pregnancy.
Other facts40. In June 2016, after their arrival in Moscow, the applicant’s baby underwent complex medical examinations. He was diagnosed with intrauterine brain damage, congenital heart disease, Down syndrome, hepatitis and a blood infection.
41. On 2 October 2019 he died.
42. In August 2021 the applicant changed her name and surname. By that time, she had obtained Russian nationality.
Relevant legal framework and practice
Code of Criminal Procedure (2012)43. Article 176 § 5 (also referred to as “the Bail Exclusion Clause”), as well as its legislative history and the related decision of the Constitutional Court, can be found in Grubnyk v. Ukraine (no. 58444/15, §§ 40, 50 and 53, 17 September 2020).
44. Article 177 and other relevant provisions are also summarised in Grubnyk (cited above, §§ 41-44).
Pre-Trial Detention Act (1993)45. Section 18 prohibits, in particular, applying physical force or special means to women who exhibit obvious signs of pregnancy, except in cases of a group attack or armed resistance.
46. Other relevant provisions concerning the conditions of detention in SIZOs are summarised in Sukachov v. Ukraine (no. 14057/17, §§ 66-67, 30 January 2020).
Relevant international material
47. Some of the relevant Council of Europe and other international documents are summarised in Korneykova and Korneykov v. Ukraine (no. 56660/12, §§ 89-93, 24 March 2016).
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
Scope of the case48. In her submissions of 24 November 2021 made in reply to the Government’s observations, the applicant complained for the first time that there had been a violation of Article 18 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 5.
49. The Court notes that this new, belated complaint does not constitute an elaboration or elucidation of the applicant’s original complaints, on which the parties have commented. The Court considers, therefore, that it is not appropriate now to take up these matters in the context of the present case (see Korneykova and Korneykov v. Ukraine, no. 56660/12, §§ 95-96, 24 March 2016, and contrast Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 122 and 129, 20 March 2018).
ALLEGED VIOLATIONs OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTIONMaterial conditions of detention50. The applicant complained that the material conditions of her detention in the Odesa SIZO had been incompatible with the standards of Article 3.
51. The Government contended the opposite.
52. The Court notes that the relevant principles of its case-law have been set out in, for example, Muršić v. Croatia ([GC], no. 7334/13, §§ 137-41, 20 October 2016).
53. In the present case, the Government did not specify how many inmates had actually occupied cells with the applicant and did not refute her allegations in that regard or those in respect of the cells’ size (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above). In these circumstances, the Court cannot but give weight to the applicant’s submissions and concludes that, during her detention in the Odesa SIZO between 15 May and 30 July 2015, she was confined in a cell providing her with 1.4 sq. m to 2.6 sq. m of personal space, which is below the minimum standard of 3 sq. m in multi‑occupancy accommodation (see Muršić, cited above, § 110).
54. The Court also observes that, in Malchenko and Others v. Ukraine ([Committee], nos. 3001/06 and 6 others, §§ 7-11, 6 April 2017), it found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of poor material conditions of detention (namely, pest infestation, poor hygiene standards, and the lack of fresh air and ventilation) in the Odesa SIZO during the period when the applicant was detained there.
55. The Court finds the foregoing considerations sufficient for reaching a similar conclusion in the present case. That being so, there is no need for it to analyse all the additional arguments raised by the applicant.
56. It follows that the applicant’s complaint is admissible and that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of inadequate material conditions of detention in the Odesa SIZO.
Medical care in detention57. The applicant also complained that she had not been provided with adequate medical care while in detention. She alleged, in particular, that there had been no comprehensive medical supervision of her pregnancy and that her health concerns had been addressed on a symptomatic basis only, often with delays. The applicant also blamed the domestic authorities for the serious health problems of her baby. Lastly, she complained that, in spite of her past cancer-related surgery, she had never been able to consult a cancer specialist in detention.
58. The Government submitted that the applicant had been under constant medical monitoring and that she had been provided with timely medical assistance from qualified professionals.
59. The general principles concerning medical care in detention have been summarised in, for example, Blokhin v. Russia ([GC], no. 47152/06, §§ 137‑40, 23 March 2016), and Rooman v. Belgium ([GC], no. 18052/11, §§ 141‑48, 31 January 2019).
60. It is not in dispute in the present case that the applicant’s difficult pregnancy warranted regular medical monitoring and specialised treatment whenever necessary. The Court notes in this connection that the applicant spent more time during her pregnancy (the last 24 weeks of the 40-week period) in the SIZO medical unit than in a regular cell. Although there was no gynaecologist among the SIZO staff, the applicant was regularly examined by gynaecologists from either the maternity hospital or the women’s health clinic, often in a hospital setting and without any major delays (see paragraphs 14-29 above). In the cases where a gynaecologist examined her in the SIZO and recommended further specialised examinations, those recommendations were implemented either on the same day or on the following day (see paragraphs 23-24 and 26 above). The risk of the baby having chromosomal abnormalities, as well as the risk of miscarriage and, subsequently, premature labour, were diagnosed and managed in so far as possible, in particular through the applicant’s permanent monitoring in the SIZO medical unit and her hospitalisation and inpatient medical treatment on several occasions (see paragraphs 19-20 and 25 above). In spite of the applicant’s allegations to the contrary, the Court does not discern any serious delays or other deficiencies in the medical care afforded to her in detention. Nor does it find any reasons for blaming the authorities for the grave health concerns of her baby. In so far as the applicant alleged that it had been impossible for her to consult a cancer specialist, she did not state that she had ever asked for such an examination.
61. In sum, the Court considers that this complaint should be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded under Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
Alleged shacklingThe parties’ arguments62. Referring to her account of the relevant events (see paragraph 38 above), the applicant complained that, although being particularly vulnerable and not presenting any security-related risks, she had been subjected to shackling during her medical examinations outside the SIZO. She submitted that she had not been able to collect any evidence in support of that allegation owing to both “obvious limitations” and “constant pressure from the administration of the Odesa SIZO”. The applicant underlined, however, that the handcuffing of detainees to their hospital beds remained widespread. She further noted that the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) had stated, in 2000, that it had encountered “from time to time ... examples of pregnant women being shackled or otherwise restrained to beds or other items of furniture during gynaecological examinations and/or delivery”.
63. The Government submitted that it was legally prohibited to apply any means of restraint to women who exhibited obvious signs of pregnancy and that there was no indication that that prohibition had not been complied with in the applicant’s case. The Government pointed out the absence of any complaints from the applicant in that regard at the domestic level.
64. The applicant submitted in reply that she had addressed numerous complaints to the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, the Representative Office of the United Nations in Ukraine, the UN Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, but that the SIZO administration had not sent those complaints to the addressees under the pretext that the SBU had not given it permission to do so.
The Court’s assessment65. The Court has held on many occasions that the handcuffing or shackling of an ill or otherwise weak person is disproportionate to the requirements of security and implies an unjustifiable humiliation, whether or not intentional (see Korneykova and Korneykov, cited above, § 111, and the case‑law references therein).
66. In the present case the parties are in dispute as to whether the handcuffing or shackling was applied to the applicant at all.
67. The Court accepts that it might be difficult for an applicant in detention to collect evidence in support of his or her allegation of ill‑treatment. That said, applicants are expected to submit at the very least a detailed account of the facts complained of and provide – to the greatest possible extent – some evidence in support of their complaints (see, for example, Kushnir v. Ukraine, no. 42184/09, § 102, 11 December 2014, with further references). In so far as allegations of the handcuffing or shackling of a detainee in a hospital environment are concerned, in previous cases the Court has taken into account, for example, eyewitness evidence submitted by an applicant (see Korneykova and Korneykov, cited above, §§ 107 and 109‑10) and photographs (see Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005/08, §§ 35 and 150, 14 March 2013).
68. The Court cannot but observe the absence of any evidence whatsoever submitted by the applicant in support of her allegation in the present case. Even assuming that she had indeed had no possibility of collecting any evidence while in detention, nothing prevented her representative from trying to obtain some witness evidence from the staff of the medical facilities concerned after the applicant’s departure from Ukraine (see paragraph 7 above). The Court also finds it difficult to understand why the applicant never brought the matter to the attention of the domestic authorities even though it was obvious that the alleged restraint measure had been legally prohibited in her situation. Instead, for unknown reasons, she rather sought – according to her own submissions (see paragraph 64 above) – to raise that complaint before certain non-governmental organisations. Furthermore, the Court takes note of the vagueness of the applicant’s allegation. The only factual detail provided by her concerned one alleged episode of her being shackled to a chair while waiting in the lobby of the women’s health clinic on 1 April 2016. Had she been shackled to a gynaecological examination chair while in a particularly vulnerable state, it would have been logical to clearly specify that in her submissions to the Court. Lastly, the Court cannot accept the applicant’s argument that the handcuffing or shackling of pregnant detainees could be considered widespread merely because, some 15 years prior to the events in the present case, the CPT had noted some occasions when that restraint measure had been applied in similar situations (see paragraph 62 above).
69. It follows that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected under Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
ALLEGED VIOLATION of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention70. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that her continued pre-trial detention had been unjustified and that the Code of Criminal Procedure had barred the use of any preventive measures other than pre-trial detention in her case.
71. The Government contested those arguments and submitted that the domestic courts had duly reasoned their decisions ordering and extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention.
72. The Court notes that the relevant period lasted about one year and one and a half months (from 29 April 2015 until 13 June 2016 – see paragraphs 2 and 7 above).
73. The applicable general principles of the Court’s case-law concerning the justification for and reasonableness of a person’s detention were summarised in Grubnyk v. Ukraine (no. 58444/15, §§ 110-15, 17 September 2020). The Court held in that judgment that, despite references to the Bail Exclusion Clause, the domestic courts had given relevant and sufficient reasons for the applicant’s detention (ibid., §§ 116‑30).
74. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that, in its initial decisions ordering and extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the Prymorskyy Court did analyse in detail all the specific circumstances of the case and the risks justifying that measure, and invoked the Bail Exclusion Clause as an additional argument only (see paragraphs 3‑4 above). The same could not be stated, however, with regard to the subsequent extensions, given that their justification was limited to the reference to the continued existence of the risks previously established (see paragraph 5 above).
75. The Court has often found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in cases against Ukraine on the basis that the reasoning given in justification of the applicant’s pre-trial detention did not evolve with the passage of time (see, for example, Kharchenko v. Ukraine, no. 40107/02, §§ 80-81 and 99, 10 February 2011; Komarova v. Ukraine, no. 13371/06, §§ 77-81, 16 May 2013; and Makarenko v. Ukraine, no. 622/11, §§ 91-94, 30 January 2018).
76. The Court considers that the circumstances of the present case disclose a similar problem.
77. It follows that the applicant’s complaint is admissible and that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention78. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that she had been arbitrarily separated from her newborn son on 6 May 2016, as a result of which he had been deprived of the opportunity to be fed with breast milk, which had been essential for the normal development of his immune system and his healthy growth. According to her, the neonatal critical care unit had refused to accommodate her there with her child, most probably as a result of pressure from the SIZO administration.
79. The Government submitted that the only reason for the applicant’s separation from her newborn child from 6 until 26 May 2016 had been the boy’s placement in the neonatal intensive care unit of the city paediatric hospital, where sanitary considerations prevented mothers from being present. In other words, the Government maintained that the applicant’s separation from her son for 20 days had been necessary in the interests of the newborn. The Government further observed that, as soon as the baby’s health had improved and he had been transferred to the regional paediatric hospital, the SIZO administration had arranged for the applicant’s transfer there.
80. According to the Court’s well-established case-law, there is an obligation on States to place the best interests of the child, and also those of children as a group, at the centre of all decisions affecting their health and development (see Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], nos. 47621/13 and 5 others, §§ 287-88, 8 April 2021).
81. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did not allege any unlawfulness or arbitrariness in respect of the medical arrangements concerning her newborn child, who had grave health problems and whose life was in danger. The impossibility for a mother to accompany her child to a neonatal intensive care unit does not appear to have been a frivolous restriction in the context.
82. The Court does not discern any evidence in support of the applicant’s allegation that the SIZO administration might have put pressure on the city paediatric hospital and that this resulted in the latter’s refusal to accommodate her there. Had this been so, the same pattern would have been observed in respect of the other medical facilities. This was not, however, the case, and the applicant was allowed to stay with her baby in hospital whenever possible.
83. In sum, the Court considers this complaint to be manifestly ill‑founded and rejects it under Article 34 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
REMAINING COMPLAINT84. The applicant additionally complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the administration of the Odesa SIZO had been routinely monitoring her correspondence and that her “open letters” addressed to the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, the Representative Office of the UN in Ukraine, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union had been withheld by the SBU and joined to her case file instead of being sent.
85. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of this remaining complaint (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
86. The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 12,600 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, to be paid directly into Mr Tarakhkalo’s bank account.
87. The Government contested the above claims as unsubstantiated and exorbitant.
88. The Court awards the applicant EUR 8,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
89. Furthermore, having regard to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 3,000 for costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to her. At the applicant’s request, the amount awarded under this head should be paid directly into the bank account of Mr M. Tarakhkalo (see, for example, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 288, 15 December 2016).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Declares the complaints concerning the allegedly poor material conditions of detention and the lack of justification for the applicant’s continued pre-trial detention admissible;Declares the complaints concerning the allegedly inadequate medical care in detention, the alleged shackling of the applicant, and her allegedly arbitrary temporary separation from her baby inadmissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the poor material conditions of detention in the Odesa SIZO;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaint;Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: EUR 8,000 (eight thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid directly into the bank account indicated by Mr M. Tarakhkalo; that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 June 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Registrar President
[1] At the relevant time the applicant was 41 years old and already a mother of two.
[2] According to the applicant, her guards always consisted of two men and one woman.