FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF OMAROV v. GEORGIA
(Application no. 25967/23)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7 April 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Omarov v. Georgia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Anja Seibert-Fohr, President,
Ana Maria Guerra Martins,
András Jakab, judges,
and Simeon Petrovski, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 25967/23) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 15 June 2023 by a Georgian national, Mr Vugar Omarov (“the applicant”), who was born in 1985, lives in Tbilisi and was represented by Mr N. Legashvili, a lawyer practising in Rustavi;
the decision to give notice of the complaints under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention to the Georgian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr B. Dzamashvili of the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 17 March 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns, under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention, the alleged excessive length of a labour dispute instituted by the applicant, and the absence of an effective remedy in that regard.
2. On 20 June 2016 the applicant lodged a civil claim against a private construction and industrial investment company challenging the lawfulness of the termination of his employment contract and seeking reinstatement to his position as financial director, and the payment of salary arrears. On 13 November 2018 the Tbilisi City Court partly allowed his claim. Both parties lodged appeals against that judgment with the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeals on 3 December 2019.
3. On 16 April 2020 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was admitted for examination on admissibility on 28 September 2020.
4. On 25 April 2024 the applicant’s appeal on points of law was declared admissible.
5. On 21 February 2025 the Government informed the Court that on 24 October 2024 the Supreme Court of Georgia had allowed the applicant’s claim in full, ordering his reinstatement to his previous position and the payment of salary arrears, and imposing a daily penalty for any further delay.
6. The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention, that the civil proceedings were excessively long and that he lacked any domestic remedy in that regard.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENTALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 and article 13 OF THE CONVENTION
7. With regard to the Government’s objection that the applicant did not suffer a significant disadvantage given that his civil claim had been allowed in full, the Court notes that the award which the applicant eventually obtained was granted more than eight years after his employer had unlawfully terminated his contract. It cannot, therefore, be said that the applicant suffered no significant disadvantage on account of the delay in obtaining the award in question (see I.B. v. Georgia [Committee], no. 4639/23, § 19, 11 July 2024). The Court further refers to its consistent case‑law concerning the lack of a specific preventive remedy capable of expediting proceedings in the Georgian legal system and the absence of a compensatory remedy (see Schrade v. Georgia [Committee], no. 15016/07, §§ 41-42, 11 March 2021, and I.B., cited above, § 18). The applicant was not, accordingly, required to pursue the disciplinary complaint proposed by the Government.
8. As regards the Government’s challenge to the applicant’s due diligence, noting that the applicant’s complaint concerned a continuing situation and that the application was lodged while the domestic proceedings were still pending, the Court does not consider it unreasonable for the applicant to have waited for the proceedings to advance before lodging his application with it (see Zaalishvili v. Georgia [Committee], no. 45681/22, § 8, 11 February 2025, and Tordia and Others v. Georgia [Committee], no. 24060/23, § 11, 9 December 2025).
9. As far as potential abuse is concerned, the Court notes that, notwithstanding the applicant’s assertion to the contrary, the operative part of the Supreme Court’s final decision, without stating the reasoning of the judgment, was served on his lawyer representing him at domestic level on 25 November 2024. Nevertheless, the Court observes that by then the relevant civil proceedings had been pending for more than eight years. In such circumstances, having particular regard to the timeline of the events and noting that the domestic proceedings concluded on 24 October 2024 and that the Government informed the Court of that development in February 2025, there is no basis to conclude that the applicant intended to mislead the Court (see Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810/10, § 28, ECHR 2014, with further references). It therefore finds the Government’s plea of abuse of the right of application to be ill‑founded (see Tordia and Others, cited above, § 10 in fine). It also considers that the applicant’s complaints are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
10. The general principles concerning the length of proceedings have been summarised in Pélissier and Sassi v. France ([GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II) and Frydlender v. France ([GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000‑VII). It is for the Contracting States to organise their judicial systems in such a way that the courts are able to meet the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 142, 29 November 2016). The Court also reiterates that reinstatement proceedings are of “crucial importance” to plaintiffs and must be dealt with “expeditiously” (see Novović v. Montenegro and Serbia, no. 13210/05, § 51, 23 October 2012, with further references).
11. The applicant maintained that the overall duration of the proceedings had not been justified, emphasising in particular the stagnation of the proceedings in the Supreme Court. The Government contested that claim, arguing that the civil case in question had been both legally and factually complex, involved a respondent company based abroad, and that the COVID‑19 pandemic had also contributed to the length of the proceedings.
12. In the present case, the civil proceedings commenced on 20 June 2016 and ended on 24 October 2024. They therefore lasted eight years and four months at three levels of jurisdiction. The Court is ready to accept the Government’s argument that the Supreme Court’s examination of the case was protracted because of the procedural difficulties faced in corresponding with the respondent company abroad. The COVID‑19 pandemic and related anti‑COVID sanitary measures also contributed to the delay. However, the proceedings before the Supreme Court took place entirely in writing and the applicant, throughout the relevant period of time, did not make any requests before the Supreme Court that could have contributed to their length. The case represented no particular factual or legal complexity and yet, of the four years during which time it remained pending in the Supreme Court, three years were marred by total inactivity (see Tordia and Others, § 14, and I.B., § 24, both cited above).
13. The Court thus considers that the length of the proceedings in the present case was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
14. As regards the question whether the applicant had an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention at his disposal in respect of his length‑of‑proceedings complaint, the Court has already found that the remedy relied on by the Government was not effective (see paragraph 7 above; see also Schrade, §§ 41-42; Tordia and Others, §§ 11 and 16; and I.B., §§ 18 and 26, all cited above). The Court sees no reason to depart from its case‑law and therefore concludes that the applicant was not provided with an effective remedy, as required under Article 13 of the Convention, in respect of that complaint (ibid.).
15. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION16. The applicant claimed 358,583.65 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 250,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. He also claimed EUR 1,472 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 3,677 for those incurred before the Court.
17. The Government contested those claims.
18. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it awards the applicant EUR 1,100 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
19. Having regard to the documents in its possession and the applicable principles (see Editions Plon v. France, no. 58148/00, § 64, ECHR 2004-IV), the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 1,200 for costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and EUR 1,200 for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Declares the application admissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: EUR 1,100 (one thousand one hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage; EUR 2,400 (two thousand four hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses; that from the expiry of the above‑mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 April 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Simeon Petrovski Anja Seibert-Fohr
Deputy Registrar President