SECOND SECTION
CASE OF ORAVECZ v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 15481/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
27 October 2009
FINAL
27/01/2010
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Oravecz v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens, President,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Kristina Pardalos, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 6 October 2009,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 15481/05) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr László Oravecz (“the applicant”), on 11 April 2005.
2. The applicant was represented by Ms O. Federits, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
3. On 10 February 2009 the President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Budapest.
5. Dismissed from the civil service, the applicant brought an action against the Budapest Municipality in August 1996. He sought reinstatement and compensation.
6. After several hearings, on 3 March 2004 the Budapest Labour Court partly found for him. On 20 October 2004 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed his appeal. On 16 February 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for review.
THE LAW
7. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government contested that argument.
8. The Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration lasted almost eight and a half years for three levels of jurisdiction. In view of such lengthy proceedings, this complaint must be declared admissible.
9. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances, especially since special diligence is necessary in employment disputes (Ruotolo v. Italy, judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A no. 230-D, p. 39, § 17). Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
10. Relying on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant also complained of the unfairness and the outcome of the case. However, an examination of the case file does not disclose any evidence whatsoever of a violation of these provisions. In particular, there are no elements to suggest that the courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or that the applicant was arbitrarily deprived of his possessions. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
11. Relying on Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant claimed 1.5 million Hungarian forints in respect of pecuniary damage and 30,000 euros (EUR) plus accrued interest in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The Government contested these claims. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it considers that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 4,000 under that head, having regard to what was at stake in the litigation.
12. The applicant also claimed EUR 1,500 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court. The Government did not express an opinion on the matter. According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. The Court notes that the applicant's costs claim has not been substantiated by any relevant documents and must therefore be rejected.
13. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Hungarian forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 October 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-PassosFrançoise Tulkens
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy