CASE OF PATRICOLO AND OTHERS v. ITALY

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF PATRICOLO AND OTHERS v. ITALY

(Applications nos. 37943/17 and 2 others)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

23 May 2024

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Patricolo and Others v. Italy,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

 Marko Bošnjak, President,
 Alena Poláčková,
 Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
 Péter Paczolay,
 Ivana Jelić,
 Erik Wennerström,
 Raffaele Sabato, judges,
and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications (nos. 37943/17 and 2 others – see appended table) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four Italian nationals and an Italian limited liability company (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table;

the decision to give notice to the Italian Government (“the Government”) of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the decisions of the Court of Cassation to declare the applicants’ appeals inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 16 April 2024,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1.  The applications concern the Court of Cassation’s decisions to declare the applicants’ appeals on points of law inadmissible for failure to file with the registry a notice of service of the decisions they wanted to appeal against in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits set out in the law. The applicants complained that the decisions of the Court of Cassation amounted to excessive formalism and unjustifiably restricted their right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

THE FACTS

2.  The applicants’ personal details, the names of their representatives and the dates on which their respective applications were lodged are set out in the appendix.

3.  The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr L. D’Ascia.

4.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

5.  On 8 March 2011 the applicants in application no. 37943/17 commenced civil proceedings in the Verona District Court against G.A., who had been their lawyer in a set of criminal proceedings brought against them. In a judgment of 7 June 2013, the Verona District Court found that G.A. had been negligent in carrying out his professional activities, partially allowed the applicants’ claim and ordered G.A. to pay 17,600 euros (EUR), plus interest and sums arising from revaluation of the claim, and EUR 1,380 for legal costs and expenses.

6.  On 10 June 2015 the Verona Court of Appeal reversed that judgment and rejected the applicants’ claim for damages.

7.  The applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation on points of law. In their appeal they stated that the judgment of the Court of Appeal had been served on them on 30 June 2015. Together with their appeal they filed with the registry a copy of the contested judgment certified as a true copy by the registrar of the Court of Appeal. They did not file a copy of the notice of service of the judgment.

8.  On 15 September 2016 the Court of Cassation sent the applicants a direction scheduling the hearings of the case in private together with a proposal of the judge rapporteur to declare the appeal inadmissible for failure to comply with the requirements set out in Article 369 § 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 25 below).

9.  With their observations of 3 October 2016, the applicants filed a paper copy of the contested judgment and its notice of service, together with an attestation that it was a true copy of the original electronic documents which had been served on them by certified email (posta elettronica certificata (PEC) – an email which complies with special formal requirements set out by law and which is admissible evidence of when the email was sent and received).

10.  Following the proposal of the judge rapporteur, the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible (improcedibile) (order of 30 November 2016, no. 24481). The Court of Cassation stated the following:

“The applicants did not comply with the obligation to file at the registry, together with the appeal, a copy of the contested judgment with its notice of service, as set out in Article 369 § 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, failing which an appeal will be declared inadmissible...

[T]he applicants did not file any copy of the contested judgment as served, but only a copy certified by the registrar on 16 September 2015 which lacked the notice of service.

... the first section of this court, by means of interlocutory order no. 1081 of 21 January 2016, sent to the First President, for possible referral to the plenary Court of Cassation, the issue of the admissibility of an appeal when a copy of the contested judgment as served is not filed at the registry by the applicant ... [but] has been filed by another party to the proceedings.

However, there is no need to wait for the decision of the plenary since, in the present case, the defendant has not participated in the proceedings and therefore there is no copy in the case file of the decision which includes a notice of service.”

11.  In the context of enforcement proceedings brought against it, the applicant company in application no. 54009/18 challenged in the Milan District Court a garnishee order issued on 3 June 2013 by the Milan enforcement judge. In a judgment of 16 September 2016, the Milan District Court allowed the challenge, stated that the garnished sums were to be assigned to the enforcing creditor, R.G.I. S.r.l., and not to the intervener pledgee, M.I. S.p.A., and ordered the applicant company to pay the legal costs and expenses of the proceedings of both R.G.I. S.r.l. and M.I. S.p.A.

12.  By a certified email of 23 September 2016 R.G.I. S.r.l. served the judgment of the Milan District Court of 16 September 2016 on the applicant company.

13.  On 22 November 2016 the applicant company appealed to the Court of Cassation on points of law. It filed two copies of the contested judgment with the registry together with the appeal. The first copy was certified by the registrar of the Milan District Court as a true copy of the original. The second one was a paper copy of the judgment as served by certified email together with the notice of service.

14.  On 30 December 2016 R.G.I. S.r.l. filed a cross-appeal in the proceedings in the Court of Cassation. This included a confirmation of the date of service of the contested judgment.

15.  The Court of Cassation agreed with the proposal of the judge rapporteur and declared the appeal inadmissible (order of 9 May 2018, no. 11022). It stated:

“This court has repeatedly held that – in order to comply with the obligation set out in Article 369 § 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and failing which the appeal will be declared inadmissible – a lawyer lodging an appeal in the Court of Cassation against a decision served on him by electronic means must file at the registry a paper copy of the certified email and of the notice of service of the contested judgment attached to it, together with an attestation certifying it as a true copy pursuant to section 9(1-bis) and (1-ter) of Law no. 53 of 1994 ... In the present case it is decisive that the attestation certifying that it is a true copy is missing in relation to the notice of service of the contested judgment as sent by certified email.”

16.  F.M. brought an action against the applicants in application no. 20655/19, asking the Bologna District Court to declare ineffective a contract whereby A.S., a debtor of F.M., had sold an apartment to the applicants, so prejudicing the likelihood of F.M. being able to recover the sums owed by A.S. In a judgment of 5 February 2009, the Bologna District Court dismissed the action.

17.  On 9 March 2017 the Bologna Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the court of first instance, declared the contract of sale and purchase between A.D. and the applicants ineffective and ordered the applicants to pay part of F.M.’s legal costs and expenses.

18.  By certified email of 14 March 2017 F.M. served the judgment of the Bologna Court of Appeal of 9 March 2017 on the applicants.

19.  On 12 May 2017 the applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation on points of law. Together with their appeal they filed with the registry a paper copy of the judgment as served on them by certified email, with the notice of service.

20.  As stated in the Court of Cassation’s order of 5 October 2018, no. 24568 (p. 3-bis, § 2), F.M. participated in the proceedings.

21.  On18 July 2017 the applicants filed another copy of the contested judgment, including an attestation by their lawyer that it was a true copy of the original electronic judgment.

22.  The Court of Cassation agreed with the proposal of the judge rapporteur and declared the appeal inadmissible (order of 5 October 2018, no. 24568). The Court of Cassation stated the following:

“... the applicants, while alleging that the contested judgment was served on them by a certified email of 14 March 2017, failed to provide an attestation certifying that they had provided a true copy of the electronic documents concerning service ... in the parties’ case file, the paper copy of the certified email whereby the contested judgment was served lacks an attestation (including the lawyer’s handwritten signature) that the copy was a true one. Nor was this documentation filed by the respondent, who might have rectified the omission and therefore made the appeal admissible ... the applicants had to comply strictly with the formalities required by Art. 369 § 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure ...”

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

23.  Pursuant to Articles 325 and 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal to the Court of Cassation must be served on respondents within sixty days of the date of service of the contested judgment (the so-called short time limit for filing an appeal (termine breve)).

24.  Under Article 327 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if the contested judgment has not been served, the parties have six months to challenge it in the Court of Cassation (the so-called long time limit for filing an appeal (termine lungo)).

25.  The relevant parts of Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide:

“1. The appeal shall be filed with the registry within twenty days from the last service of the appeal on respondents, failing which it will be declared inadmissible.

2. Together with the appeal the following shall be filed, failing which the appeal will be declared inadmissible:

...

(2) a certified copy of the contested judgment or decision together with the notice of service, if the contested judgment or decision was served ...”

26.  Under Article 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the other party may lodge a cross-appeal within forty days of the date of service of the appeal. The relevant documents concerning the cross-appeal should be filed at the registry within the same time-limit.

27.  Article 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the parties to file documents relating to the admissibility of the appeal at the registry of the Court of Cassation, separately from the filing of the appeal, provided that they file them no later than fifteen days before the hearing in the case.

28.  Law no. 53 of 21 January 1994 (“Law no. 53 of 1994”, makes provision for “Lawyers’ and legal representatives’ powers to serve civil, administrative and extrajudicial documents”. The relevant part of section 9 reads as follows:

“...

1-bis. If it is not possible to file a document which has been served [by certified email] with the registry by electronic means, the lawyer shall make a paper copy of the certified email, its attachments, and the acceptance and delivery receipts thereof, and shall attest that they are true copies of the electronic documents from which they are drawn pursuant to Article 23 § 1 of Legislative Decree no. 82 of 7 March 2005.

1-ter. In all cases where the lawyer must provide proof of service and it is impossible to do so by electronic means, he shall act pursuant to subsection 1-bis.”

29.  Legislative Decree no. 82 of 7 March 2005 sets out a “Digital Administration Code”. Article 23 contains the following provisions on paper copies of electronic documents:

“1. Paper copies of electronic documents ... shall have the same evidential value as the originals from which they are drawn if an authorised public official attests that they are true copies of the original in all respects.

2. Paper copies and extracts of an electronic document that comply with current technical regulations shall have the same evidential value as the original if their genuineness is not expressly denied. The obligation to keep the electronic original, when provided for by law, shall not be affected ...”

30.  According to the settled case-law of the Court of Cassation, the obligation to file at the registry a copy of the contested judgment together with the notice of service within the deadline set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the Court of Cassation to check that the appeal has been lodged within the short time limit set out in Articles 325 and 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When an appeal is lodged more than sixty days after the publication of the contested judgment, the date referred to in the notice of service is used to check that, at the moment when the appeal was lodged, the contested judgment had not yet become final. That procedural rule therefore allows to verify compliance with the principle of res judicata (see, for example, judgments of the plenary Court of Cassation nos. 9005 of 2009 and 21349 of 2022).

31.  At first the Court of Cassation ruled that an applicant could file a copy of the contested judgment together with the notice of service separately from filing the appeal, under Article 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure, provided that this was done within the deadline set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under that line of case-law, failure by the applicant to comply with this rule could not be cured by asserting external factors such as the other party’s failure to object to the appeal being heard, the other party’s filing of the required copy of the contested judgment, or the presence of that copy in the case file transmitted by the registry of the court that had given the contested judgment (see, among many other authorities, judgment of the plenary Court of Cassation no. 11932/1998, and judgments of the Court of Cassation nos. 19654 of 2004 and 888 of 2006).

32.  The plenary Court of Cassation confirmed the same interpretation in judgment no. 9005 of 2009. It noted that the rule which made an application inadmissible for failure to comply with the deadline set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure was justified by the nature of proceedings before the Court of Cassation and, in particular, by the need to carry them out expeditiously and directly and for them to be almost entirely directed by the court itself. The rule allowed the Court of Cassation to decide on the admissibility of the appeal without any further steps and without delay, and was also in compliance with the principle that the length of proceedings should be reasonable.

33.  The approach described above gradually evolved as the Court of Cassation accepted that some external factors might be relevant in declaring an appeal admissible, even though the applicant had failed to file a copy of the contested judgment together with the notice of service within the deadline set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

34.  Referring also to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the case-law of the Court (Mazzoni v. Italy, no. 20485/06, 16 June 2015, and Trevisanato v. Italy, no. 32610/07, 15 September 2016), the plenary Court of Cassation held that an application which failed to comply with the procedural rule at issue could still be admissible if the contested judgment together with the notice of service (i) had been transmitted to the Court of Cassation by the registry of the court which had given the decision and had been served on the parties by the court (judgment no. 25513 of 2016), or (ii) had been filed by the other parties with their cross-appeals within the deadline set out in Article 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure (judgment no. 10648 of 2017). In the first case, the Court of Cassation stated that it would be able to check the date of service by merely consulting the case file, which could be transmitted to it at the applicant’s request by the registry of the court which had given the contested judgment. In the second case, since the adjudication of an appeal would in any event take place only after the deadline set out in Article 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure had expired, the Court of Cassation would have access to the date of service of the contested judgment in time to be able to decide without any delay on the admissibility of the appeal (see also the judgment of the plenary Court of Cassation no. 30421 of 2018).

35.  In other situations, the Court of Cassation confirmed it would retain its original approach and find an appeal inadmissible if the application failed to comply with the time-limit set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It considered this to be proportionate since the absence of the notice of service in the case file at an early stage of the proceedings would preclude it from checking – without taking any further steps and without delay – whether the short time limit for filing an appeal set out in Articles 325 and 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been complied with (see, for example, the plenary Court of Cassation no. 21349 of 2022).

36.  A different issue concerning the application of Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure arose in cases where the decision against which applicants intended to appeal to the Court of Cassation was served on them by certified email and electronic filing was not yet technically possible in the Court of Cassation.

37.  In judgment no. 17450 of 14 July 2017, the Court of Cassation held that, pursuant to the combination of Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 9(1-bis) and (1-ter) of Law no. 53 of 1994, in order for an appeal to be admissible applicants had to (i) file paper copies of the certified email together with its attachments, namely the contested judgment and the notice of service, at the registry of the Court of Cassation, and (ii) attest that the paper copies were true copies of the electronic originals.

38.  This approach was confirmed in, among other authorities, judgment no. 30765 of 2017. The Court of Cassation clarified that the rule on evidential value according to which paper copies of electronic documents were presumed to be genuine unless the other party expressly denied that they were true copies (see paragraph 29) did not apply in this case, as upholding the principle of res judicata involved public-interest considerations. It therefore could not be left to the parties to check that the copies were true copies.

39.  Also in judgment no. 30765 of 2017, the Court of Cassation further explained:

“The authentication of the certified email is necessary as only this makes it possible to ascertain the date and time of service on the recipient. The authentication of the attachments to the certified email is also necessary ... to comply with Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure ...

An appeal must be declared inadmissible if the lawyer fails to file paper copies of the above-mentioned documents together with an attestation that they are true copies within the time-limit of twenty days from service of the appeal or where those copies have not been filed by another party together with an attestation that they are true copies ...

Inadmissibility cannot be avoided by filing the missing documents after the time-limit of twenty days from service has expired, for the reasons stated by the plenary Court of Cassation in 2009 and 2017.”

40.  The same interpretation was at first also applied to the filing of the hard copy of an appeal originally drafted as an electronic document (judgment of the Court of Cassation no. 30918 of 2017). However, in judgment no. 22438 of 24 September 2018, the plenary Court of Cassation reconsidered that approach and stated:

“There are valid reasons to partially reconsider the above-mentioned interpretation of the admissibility of an appeal to the Court of Cassation where it was originally served as an electronic document. Those reasons relate to the need to afford the highest possible level of protection to the right to a fair hearing ...

This interpretation will be particularly attentive to the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality that must guide any interferences with the right of access to a court (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; see, among other authorities, Mazzoni v. Italy, cited above, and Trevisanato v. Italy, cited above ...) ...”

41.  On the basis of the above considerations, the Court of Cassation stated that the principles established by its case-law on the application of Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the context of paper-based proceedings should be adapted to the specific characteristics of “e-justice” and, in particular, to a situation where an electronic procedure had been introduced at first and second instance but had not yet been implemented in the Court of Cassation. Since the service by certified email of an appeal drafted as an electronic document allowed other parties to receive the original appeal document, the other parties were able to check the paper copy the applicant had filed with the registry against the original received by certified email. The other parties would therefore be in a position to assert that the appeal documents were not true copies. If they failed to do that, the paper copy filed with the registry by the applicant would be treated as having the same evidential value as the original under Article 23 § 2 of the Digital Administration Code. Moreover, if another party asserted that the documents were not true copies or did not take part in proceedings in the Court of Cassation, the applicant could still avoid the appeal being found inadmissible by filing the missing attestation that the documents were true copies, under Article 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure, up until a hearing of the case took place.

42.  In judgment no. 8312 of 25 March 2019 the plenary Court of Cassation applied this new approach to the applicant’s failure to file with the registry an attestation that the certified email by which the respondent had served the contested judgment on him was a true copy of the original. The Court of Cassation held that Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure contained rules which referred to paper-based proceedings. Their application to the filing of hard copies of electronic documents meant that they had to be interpreted in the light of the right to a fair hearing, avoiding pointless formalism in assessing the admissibility of an appeal. The Court of Cassation found that, since the service of the contested judgment by certified email was carried out by another party, the principle of a fair trial meant that the court could not declare an appeal inadmissible when the other party had not asserted that the paper documents were not true copies of the electronic originals he himself or she herself had sent to the applicant. In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Cassation also referred to the existence of severe criminal and disciplinary sanctions that ensured the integrity of paper copies filed at court and thus ensured protection for the public interests pursued by Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

43.  On the basis of the above, the Court of Cassation held that the submission of a paper copy of the contested judgment served by certified email together with the notice of service should not necessarily entail the inadmissibility of the appeal if the applicant failed to file an attestation that they were true copies of the electronic originals within the deadline set by Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal should only be declared inadmissible if the other party asserted that the documents were not true copies of the originals or did not take part in the proceedings in the Court of Cassation. In such cases, however, the applicant could still avoid a declaration of inadmissibility by filing the missing attestation under Article 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure, up until a hearing of the case.

44.  The relevant passages of Opinion no. 14 (2011) of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) on justice and information technologies (IT) read as follows.

“5. IT should be a tool or means to improve the administration of justice, to facilitate the user’s access to the courts and to reinforce the safeguards laid down in Article 6 ECHR: access to justice, impartiality, independence of the judge, fairness and reasonable duration of proceedings.

...

7. The Magna Carta of Judges entrusts judges with co-responsibility for access to swift, efficient and affordable dispute resolution. Judges must identify the advantages and disadvantages of IT and identify and eliminate any risks to the proper administration of justice. IT must not diminish parties’ procedural rights. Judges must be mindful of such risks as they are responsible for ensuring that parties’ rights are protected.”

45.  In the Guidelines on electronic court filing (e-filing) and digitalisation of courts (CEPEJ (2021)15) the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) stated the following.

“8. While legislation should provide for procedural uniformity and standardisation, it should also provide to a certain extent for flexibility to facilitate the various exceptions and specific use cases that might occur while transforming judicial procedures.

...

46. An e-filing system should also serve the needs of its users, providing the highest level of flexibility to both facilitate the creating and reading of e-documents and limit their administrative burdens (e.g., performing inconsistency checks, validating legal references, generating indexed PDF bundles of case materials in electronic form, etc.)”.

46.  The relevant extracts from Opinion no. 26 (2023) of the CCJE on “Moving forward: the use of assistive technology in the judiciary” read as follows.

“28. E-filing and proceedings are a basic prerequisite for the effective use of technology in judiciaries. They underpin judicial support systems. Such processes are used widely, whether as part of mixed systems (physical and e-files and procedures) or as part of e-only systems. They also include the use of digital, e-signatures or e-time stamps on documents and processes carried out electronically.

29. This technology can be used at all stages of proceedings. Proceedings can be initiated online through e-filing. Service can be effected electronically either through e-mail, a web-based application (App) or other forms of technology. Case tracking and management systems are facilitated through e-procedures and digital case management files.

...

91. The CCJE considers that the following principles should guide the future design, implementation and use of technology to support judges ...

(iv) Judicial oversight: to maintain its consistency with judicial independence, impartiality and autonomy, judges whether through Councils of the Judiciary or otherwise, ought to be involved in the purchase, design and control of technology. They ought also to concur in its introduction and implementation.

...

(v) Accessibility and quality: technology should enhance and improve effective and practical access to justice for all members of society. It ought to promote access to both adjudicative justice, consistently with article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as consensual settlement. Promoting accessibility necessarily requires technology to be of a high quality. Where access to technology is impractical, an appropriate equivalent alternative must be made available.”

THE LAW

47.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment (Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court).

48.  Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and, as to application no. 37943/17, also on Article 13 of the Convention, the applicants complained that the decisions of the Court of Cassation to declare their appeals on points of law inadmissible for failure to comply with the formal requirements and time-limits set out in Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 9 of Law no. 53/1994 amounted to excessive formalism and unjustifiably restricted their right of access to a court.

49.  The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

50.  The Court notes that the applications are neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. They must therefore be declared admissible.

(a)   Application no. 37943/17

51.  The applicants in application no. 37943/17 complained that the interpretation of the relevant provisions by the Court of Cassation had been excessively formalistic and had prevented their appeal from being assessed on the merits.

52.  They acknowledged that the interference had been based on the law and on the settled case-law of the Court of Cassation, and that it had pursued a legitimate aim. However, they submitted that it had been disproportionate having regard to the serious consequences that the decision to declare their case inadmissible had had for their right of access to a court – preventing them from lodging a new appeal with the Court of Cassation – and to the fact that they had not been given a chance to remedy their procedural error by filing the missing notice of service at a later stage of the proceedings.

(b)   Application no. 54009/18

53.  The applicant company in application no. 54009/18 submitted that the interference with its right of access to a court had been disproportionate. It complained that Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not establish an obligation to file an attestation that the paper copies filed were true copies of the original electronic documents, but only an obligation to submit a certified copy of the contested judgment and the relevant notice of service. It contested the interpretation of the Court of Cassation according to which such an obligation stemmed from the combination of Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 9(1-bis) and (1-ter) of Law no. 53 of 1994. In the applicant company’s submission, the latter provision did not apply to the filing of the contested judgment served by other parties but only to documents which lawyers could download from the electronic case file of the registry of national courts.

54.  The applicant company also submitted that the same Court of Cassation had reconsidered the rigid interpretation of Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure which had led to its appeal being declared inadmissible; it relied on judgment no. 8312 of 2019 of the plenary Court of Cassation (see paragraph 42 above).

(c)   Application no. 20655/19

55.  The applicants in application no. 20655/19 complained that the obligation to file with the Court of Cassation an attestation that a certified email was a true copy of its original did not pursue any legitimate aim. It only constituted an attempt to adapt procedural rules made in the context of paper‑based proceedings to the transitional situation in the Court of Cassation, where the submission of electronic documents had not yet been implemented.

56.  The applicants also submitted that the declaration that their appeal was inadmissible had amounted to excessive formalism, in breach of their right of access to a court. They complained that the restrictive interpretation of Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure – which the Court of Cassation had maintained from 14 July 2017 to 24 September 2018 (see paragraphs 37 and 40) – had not existed at the time they had lodged their appeal. The contested rule had therefore not been foreseeable to them.

57.  They further submitted that the arguments put forward by the Government in their attempt to justify the interference were the very same arguments that the Court of Cassation itself had meanwhile abandoned in the above-mentioned judgment no. 8312 of 2019 (see paragraph 42 above) and subsequent case-law.

58.  They argued that they had filed with the registry a copy of the contested judgment together with an attestation that it was a true copy and that the Court of Cassation had declared their appeal inadmissible on the basis of the absence of such an attestation only in relation to the notice of service. They further submitted that the other parties had not disputed the date of service. As to the Government’s claim that the applicants had not tried to remedy their procedural error by filing an attestation that the notice of service was a true copy even at a later stage of proceedings, the applicants argued that the Court of Cassation had declared their appeal inadmissible without giving them any real opportunity to submit the missing document.

59.  The Government submitted that the procedural rules at issue had pursued the aim of legal certainty and the proper administration of justice. They relied on Walchli v. France (no. 35787/03, § 29, 26 July 2007), Cañete de Goñi v. Spain (no. 55782/00, § 36, ECHR 2002-VIII) and Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain (nos. 38366/97 and 9 others, § 36, ECHR 2000-I).

60.  In the Government’s view, requiring applicants to file a certified copy of the contested judgment with the Court of Cassation together with the notice of service within the deadline set out in Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure was instrumental in enabling the court to check that the appeal had been lodged with the time-limit and in upholding the principle of res judicata. Moreover, since it allowed the Court of Cassation to decide whether the appeal was admissible without taking any further steps and without delay, it ensured the expeditious conduct of the proceedings.

61.  As to the requirement to submit an attestation that the paper copies were true copies of the original electronic documents served by certified email, the Government argued that the rule pursued the same aims as those referred to above, while at the same time ensuring a smooth transition from paper to electronic proceedings and the integrity of documentation filed with the Court of Cassation. According to them, requiring a specific attestation that the documents were true copies avoided possible abuse, engaging lawyers’ criminal responsibility.

62.  As to the proportionality of the procedural requirements, the Government submitted that the relevant domestic law and the settled case-law of the Court of Cassation expressly set out the rules at issue. They had a solid legal basis, with clear wording and a foreseeable application. The Government also stressed that, in the Italian legal system, lawyers registered with the supreme courts Bar had to comply with special requirements of professionalism and expertise. Moreover, the procedural formalities were not excessively burdensome, having regard to the fact that the Court of Cassation carried out a review of last resort limited to issues of legality.

63.  As to the developments in case-law in which the Court of Cassation had reconsidered some of the principles applied in the present case, the Government argued that even under the new interpretation the applicants’ appeals would still have been declared inadmissible.

64.  In relation to application no. 37943/17, the Government argued that the applicants had failed to file the notice of service of the contested judgment within the deadline set out in Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since the other party had not taken an active part in the proceedings, the Court of Cassation was not in a position to check that the time-limits for appeal set out in Articles 325 and 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been complied with.

65.  With respect to application no. 54009/18, the Government submitted that the applicant company had not filed an attestation that the documents filed were true copies within the deadline set out in Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the Government’s view, the applicant company should at least have filed the required attestation at a later stage in the proceedings, and in particular after receiving the notice from the Court of Cassation containing the proposal of the judge rapporteur to declare the appeal inadmissible.

66.  As to application no. 20655/19, in their observations the Government argued that the applicants had failed to file an attestation that the documents filed were true copies within the deadline set out in Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure or even at a later stage in the proceedings. Since the attestation had not been filed by the other parties either, there was no evidence in the case file that the appeal had been lodged within the short time limit set out in Articles 325 and 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In their additional observations, the Government contested that compliance with that deadline could be inferred from the fact that the other parties had not asserted that the date of service was incorrect and argued that, since some of the other parties, namely F.M. and A.S., had not taken part in the proceedings in the Court of Cassation, the applicants’ appeal would have been declared inadmissible even under the current and more favourable case-law of the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 42 above).

(a)   General principles

67.  The Court recently reiterated the general principles on limitations to the right of access to a court in Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal (nos. 55997/14 and 3 others, §§ 108-17, 31 March 2020).

68.  With regard to access to courts of appeal or of cassation, the Court reiterates that the application of Article 6 § 1 depends on the special features of the proceedings concerned and that account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings in the domestic legal context and the role of the court of cassation. Moreover, the conditions of admissibility for an appeal on points of law may be stricter than for an ordinary appeal (see Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, § 82, 5 April 2018). The Court has assessed the compliance with Article 6 § 1 of several kinds of formalities governing the lodging of an appeal with the Court of Cassation (see, among other authorities, Levages Prestations Services v. France, 23 October 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V; Miessen v. Belgium, no. 31517/12, 18 October 2016; Trevisanato, cited above; Succi and Others v. Italy, nos. 55064/11 and 2 others, 28 October 2021; and C.N. v. Luxembourg, no. 59649/18, 12 October 2021). In a case concerning denial of access to a court because an appeal was submitted on paper instead of through an electronic platform, the Court recognised the importance that the digitalisation of justice has for Contracting States and found that digital technologies may contribute to the better administration of justice. However, it stressed that the imposition of requirements to lodge documents electronically must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (Xavier Lucas v. France, no. 15567/20, §§ 46-47, 9 June 2022).

69.  It is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the right of access to the courts is not absolute but may be subject to limitations; these are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard. Whilst the final decision as to observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court, it is no part of the Court’s function to substitute for the assessment of the national authorities any other assessment of what might be the best policy in this field. Nonetheless, the limitations applied must not restrict the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Zubac, cited above, § 78; Dos Santos Calado and Others, cited above, §§ 109-10).

70.  In order to determine the proportionality of restriction of access to superior courts, the Court has taken account of three factors, namely (i) the foreseeability of the restriction, (ii) whether it is the applicant or the respondent State who should bear the adverse consequences of the errors made during the proceedings that led to the applicant’s being denied access to the supreme court, and (iii) whether the restrictions in question could be said to involve “excessive formalism” (see Zubac, cited above, § 85; Dos Santos Calado and Others, cited above, §§ 113-16; and Xavier Lucas, cited above, § 43).

(b)   Application of the above principles in the present case

71.  The Court’s task in the present case is to assess whether the declaration of inadmissibility of an appeal to the Court of Cassation has restricted the very essence of their right of access to a court. In order to do so, the Court firstly assesses whether the requirements for the submission of an appeal to the Court of Cassation in the case at issue pursued a legitimate aim and, secondly, whether they were proportionate to that aim.

(i)      Legitimate aim

72.  The assessment of the legitimate aim pursued by the application of Article 369 § 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to the applicants’ appeals can be dealt with jointly in relation to all three applications.

73.  According to the Government (see paragraph 60 above) and the case-law of the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 30, 32 and 35 above), the submission of the notice of service within the deadline set out in Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure allowed the Court of Cassation to check that the time-limits for appeal had been complied with and to uphold the principle of res judicata. Moreover, it ensured the expeditious conduct of proceedings, since the Court of Cassation could decide on the admissibility of the appeal without taking any further steps and without delay.

74.  The Government submitted (see paragraph 61 above), and the applicants in application no. 20655/19 denied (see paragraph 55 above), that the rule requiring the filing of an attestation that the documents filed were true copies of the original pursued the same aims as the first rule. In particular, the Government submitted that it would allow a smooth transition from paper to electronic proceedings and was necessary to ensure the integrity of the documentation filed with the court and to avoid possible abuse. According to the case-law of the Court of Cassation, the attestation that the documents were true copies was necessary to guarantee respect for the principle of res judicata (see paragraphs 37-39 above).

75.  Having regard to these elements, the Court agrees with the Government’s submission that the rules at issue pursued a legitimate aim, namely legal certainty and the proper administration of justice.

76.  It therefore needs to be ascertained whether, in the light of all the relevant circumstances of the three cases, there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between that aim and the means employed to attain it.

(ii)    Proportionality of the interference

(α)     Application no. 37943/17

77.  It is undisputed between the relevant parties that the applicants in application no. 37943/17 failed to file the notice of service of the contested judgment within the deadline set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding the fact that this obligation had been clearly established in the law and in the case-law of the Court of Cassation. They complained that declaring their appeal inadmissible amounted to excessive formalism, having regard to the serious consequences of the interference for their right of access to a court and to the fact that they had remedied their procedural error by filing the notice of service at a later stage of the proceedings.

78.  The Court notes that this case does not raise any issue about the foreseeability of the contested measure or any question of who should bear the adverse consequences of the errors made during the proceedings. It will therefore limit itself to determining whether, in the light of the circumstances of the present case, the application of Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure – even though it was foreseeable – represented excessive formalism restricting the applicants’ access to the Court of Cassation (see Zubac, cited above, § 85).

79.  The Court observes that, under Article 325 and 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure, appeals to the Court of Cassation must comply with a time-limit of sixty days from the date of service of the contested judgment. The obligation to file the notice of service of the contested judgment at the registry allows the Court of Cassation to assess whether this deadline has been complied with and, ultimately, to check that the judgment against which the appeal was brought has not yet become final.

80.  With regard to the obligation to submit the notice of service within twenty days from the last service of the appeal, pursuant to Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court notes that compliance with this rule allows the Court of Cassation to take a decision on the admissibility of an appeal at the earliest stage of proceedings and by means of an accelerated procedure. In fact, as soon as the appeal has been lodged and by merely consulting the case file, the Court of Cassation is able to check that the time-limit for appealing has been complied with, schedule a hearing in private and give a decision on the case without requiring any further steps.

81.  The Court notes that it appears from the case-law cited by the parties (see paragraphs 31-32 above) that, at least until judgments nos. 25513 of 2016 and 10648 of 2017, the Court of Cassation showed a tendency to apply this rule in a rather formalistic manner. In particular, the first tranche of case-law indicated that an appeal would have been inadmissible for failure to comply with the deadline set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure even in cases where the notice of service of the contested judgment was already included in the case file, having been transmitted by the registry of the court which had given the contested judgment, or as a result of its submission by another party within the deadline set out in Article 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court observes that the Court of Cassation reconsidered that approach and established that appeals whose compliance with time-limits could be immediately and directly assessed should not be declared inadmissible, irrespective of the applicant’s failure to submit the notice of service in time. In doing so, the Court of Cassation also relied on the principle that interferences with the right of access to a court should be proportionate, as set out in the case-law of the Court (see paragraph 34).

82.  While the Court welcomes the recent interpretations of the Court of Cassation, it also notes that none of the circumstances described in the paragraph above was present in the instant case. In fact, the notice of service had not been included in the case file transmitted by the registry of the court which had given the contested judgment, nor had it been filed by the other party. Failure by the applicants to comply with Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure therefore resulted in the Court of Cassation being prevented from assessing whether the time-limits for filing appeals had been complied with at the earliest stage of the proceedings. Moreover, the Court is not convinced by the applicants’ argument that they should have been able to remedy their procedural error by filing the notice of service at a later stage. The Court observes that accepting late submissions would have frustrated the aim of ensuring the expeditious conduct of proceedings and prevented the Court of Cassation from deciding on the admissibility of the appeal without requiring further steps and without delay. The contested measure therefore was adequate to achieve the legitimate aim pursued.

83.  As to the seriousness of the consequences for the applicants’ right of access to a court, the Court reiterates that, given the special nature of the Court of Cassation’s role, which is limited to reviewing whether the law has been correctly applied, it is able to accept that the procedure followed by the Court of Cassation may be more formal, especially in proceedings such as those of the case at issue, where the applicants were represented by a specialist lawyer who was a member of the supreme courts Bar (see paragraph 62 above). Moreover, the appeal to the Court of Cassation in the present case was made after the applicants’ claims had been heard by both a first-instance court and a court of appeal, both of which had had full jurisdiction (see Levages Prestations Services, cited above, § 48; Succi and Others, cited above, §§ 105 and 113; and C.N. v. Luxembourg, cited above, § 55).

84.  In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Court of Cassation’s decision amounted to a disproportionate hindrance impairing the very essence of the applicants’ right of access to a court as guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention or overstepped the national margin of appreciation.

85.  On the basis of the above, the Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in application no. 37943/17.

(β)      Applications nos. 54009/18 and 20655/19

86.  It can be seen from the case file that the applicants in applications nos. 54009/18 and 20655/19 had filed within the deadline set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure a paper copy of the contested judgments together with the notice of service sent to them by certified email. Moreover, the applicant company in application no. 54009/18 also filed a certified copy of the decision appealed against together with its appeal, whereas the applicants in application no. 20655/19 submitted a paper copy of the contested judgment together with an attestation that the document was a true copy of the electronic original (paragraph 13 and paragraphs 19 and 21 above, respectively) at a later stage of the proceedings. It is undisputed, however, that the applicants also failed to file with the registry an attestation that the paper copy of the notice of service was a true copy of the original and that on that basis the Court of Cassation declared their appeals on point of law inadmissible.

87.  In order to determine the proportionality of the interferences with the applicants’ right of access to the Court of Cassation, the Court will take account of the three factors developed in its case-law (see paragraph 70 above).

‒    The requirement that restrictions be foreseeable

88.  The applicants in both applications complained that the restrictions on their right of access to a court were not foreseeable. They contested the Court of Cassation’s interpretation of the rules, according to which the obligation to file an attestation that the documents were true copies arose from the combination of Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 9 (1‑bis) and (1-ter) of Law no. 53 of 1994. Moreover, the applicants in application no. 20655/19 complained that the restrictive interpretation of Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not existed at the time they had lodged their appeal, since the Court of Cassation had stated it for the first time in a judgment of 14 July 2017 (see paragraph 37).

89.  The Court observes that Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an obligation to submit a “certified” copy of the contested judgment together with the notice of service. While in paper-based proceedings this provision requires submission of the original notice of service, the fact that electronic submission was not possible in the Court of Cassation at the time created a need to interpret the provision to allow submission of hard copies of original electronic documents that had been created in proceedings in the lower courts.

90.  Having regard to the public nature of the interest in upholding the principle of res judicata and, therefore, to the idea that the true nature of a copy should be attested by an authorised public official rather than being left to assurances given by the other parties, the Court of Cassation had construed Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure in combination with section 9 (1‑bis) and (1-ter) of Law no. 53 of 1994. Pursuant to the latter provision, in order to provide proof of service lawyers had to attest that the documents they were filing were true hard copies of the electronic documents from which they were drawn. In these circumstances, the Court sees no reason to depart from the conclusion of the Court of Cassation that in order to comply with Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure an attestation as to the genuineness of the copy of the notice of service was necessary. The Court observes that the Court of Cassation’s reasoning was clear. The fact that this combination of provisions was upheld for the first time in September 2017 does not render the contested restriction unforeseeable or arbitrary with regard to the applicants, who were furthermore represented by specialised lawyers (see Xavier Lucas, cited above, § 50, and the case-law cited therein).

‒    The question who should bear the adverse consequences of the errors made during the proceedings

91.  The Court notes that at the time the appeals were lodged electronic submission had not yet been implemented in the Court of Cassation. Therefore, in cases where the decision to be appealed against had been served by certified email, lawyers had to make hard copies of the electronic documents in order to file them with the registry of the Court of Cassation.

92.  The Court observes that the applicants did not claim that it had been materially impossible for them to make hard copies. Moreover, the Court agrees with the Government that submitting an attestation that the documents were true copies was not overly burdensome, as it merely required the lawyers to write and sign such an attestation on the paper copies before filing them with the registry.

93.  Against this background, it appears that the procedural error could easily have been avoided, and given that it is mainly and objectively the fault of their lawyers, the Court considers that the adverse consequences of this error should rest on the applicants.

‒      The criterion of “excessive formalism”

94.  While it is not for the Court to call into question the legal reasoning followed by the Court of Cassation in interpreting domestic law (see paragraph 90 above), the Court reiterates that, in applying procedural rules, national courts must avoid excessive formalism that can run counter to the requirement of securing a practical and effective right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court further reiterates that the right of access to a court is impaired when the rules cease to serve the aims of legal certainty and the proper administration of justice and form a sort of barrier preventing the litigant from having his or her case determined on the merits by the competent court (see Zubac, cited above, § 98). The Court has also held that domestic courts should avoid excessive formalism by taking into account the practical obstacles that applicants may face in using new technologies (see Xavier Lucas, cited above, § 57). In the context of the rise of digitalisation of justice within the Contracting States, the Court takes note of the views expressed by the CCJE (see paragraphs 44 and 46 above) in respect of the use of digital technologies in the administration of justice. The CCJE considered that new technologies should be used as a tool to improve effective and practical access to justice and that there should be judicial oversight of their implementation to ensure parties’ procedural rights.

95.  The Court has already noted that Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure was originally designed to apply to paper-based proceedings (see paragraph 87 above). Applicants were required to file the original of the notice of service signed by an authorised public official or by the lawyer of another party acting as an authorised public official under Law no. 53 of 1994.

96.  In the present cases, the original documents were electronic. Filing them in electronic form was technically impossible because the Court of Cassation was not then equipped for electronic submission. Under these circumstances, for the notice of service to have the form of a document executed by an authorised public official, the applicants’ lawyers had to put in place an additional formality, namely attesting that the paper copy was a true copy of the original electronic document pursuant to section 9 (1-bis) and (1-ter) of Law no. 53 of 1994.

97.  The Court considers that the decision to ensure the integrity of paper copies of electronic documents by using the procedures set up for documents signed by public officials (see paragraph 61 above) falls in principle within the margin of appreciation allowed to national authorities. It notes however that the consequences of the interpretation adopted by the domestic courts in reaching the contested judgments were particularly severe for the applicants, as their appeals were declared inadmissible for failing to provide the attestation within the deadline set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court will therefore assess whether in the circumstances of this case a sanction of inadmissibility was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by that provision (see paragraphs 73-75 above).

98.  The Court observes that the applicants filed a paper copy of the decisions to be appealed against together with their notice of service within the deadline set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, contrary to the situation observed by the Court in relation to application no. 37943/17 (see paragraph 82 above), the date of service of the contested judgments was included in the case file from the earliest stage of the proceedings. The Court of Cassation was thus able to check without taking any further steps and without delay that their appeals had been lodged with the time-limits set out in Articles 325 and 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

99.  As to the risk that the paper copies might be inconsistent with the electronic originals, the Court notes at the outset that, under national law, the integrity of documents filed with a court is generally ensured by the criminal and disciplinary sanctions available in case of a breach of duty (see paragraph 42). Moreover, whether paper copies are true copies of electronic originals can easily be checked by inviting the applicants to file the appropriate attestation at a later stage in the proceedings. This is particularly true in the context of the transition from paper-based to electronic proceedings, where the need to adapt formal requirements designed for paper documents calls for some flexibility in their application to electronic ones. A similar view was expressed in the Guidelines on electronic court filing (e‑filing) and digitalisation of courts (CEPEJ (2021)15) where the CEPEJ recommended that States should ensure some flexibility and limit the administrative burdens on users when transforming judicial procedures and implementing e-filing systems (see paragraph 45 above).

100.  The Court further observes that in 2019 the Court of Cassation itself reconsidered the interpretation followed in the contested judgments and established that a failure to file an attestation that paper copies were true copies of the electronic original within the deadline set out in Article 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not entail the inadmissibility of an appeal if the other party to the proceedings did not assert that the paper copies were not true copies of the originals or if the applicant filed the missing attestation at any point up until a hearing of the case (see paragraphs 42 and 43 above).

101.  Turning back to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that by the time the Court of Cassation was able to take a decision (that is, after the time-limit set out in Article 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure had expired; see paragraphs 26 and 34 above), the parties who had served the contested judgments on the applicants had appeared in the proceedings in the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 14 and 20 above) and confirmed (as to application no. 54009/18) or, at least, not disputed (as to application no. 20655/19) the date of service. Moreover, as to the opportunity for the applicants to submit an attestation at a later stage of proceedings, the Court observes that at the relevant time the settled case-law of the Court of Cassation did not permit this outside the time-limits set out in Article 369 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraphs 37-39). Under this case-law, the failure to comply with that deadline was sufficient for the appeal to be declared inadmissible under that provision. That being so, the Court agrees with the applicants in application no. 20655/19 that they had no real opportunity to avoid their appeal being declared inadmissible by submitting an attestation at a later stage in the proceedings.

102.  Under these circumstances, the Court considers that the absence of an attestation that the paper copies of the notice of service were true copies did not prevent the Court of Cassation from assessing compliance with the short time limit for filing an appeal at the earliest stage of the proceedings. Declaring the appeals inadmissible, moreover without giving the applicants a fair chance to submit the attestation at a later stage – especially in a transitional phase from paper-based to electronic proceedings – therefore went beyond the aim of ensuring legal certainty and the proper administration of justice and created a barrier preventing the applicants from having their case determined on the merits by the Court of Cassation.

103.  In conclusion, the Court considers that the declaration that the applicants’ appeals were inadmissible impaired the very essence of their right of access to a court.

104.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in applications nos. 54009/18 and 20655/19.

105.  The applicant company in application no. 54009/18 further complained that it had no effective remedies in respect of the decision of the Court of Cassation declaring inadmissible its appeal on points of law. It relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

106.  The Court notes that Article 13 of the Convention does not, as such, guarantee a right of appeal or a right to a second level of jurisdiction, and the mere fact that the judgment of the highest judicial body is not subject to further judicial review does not infringe in itself the said provision (see Yuriy Romanov v. Russia, no. 69341/01, § 55, 25 October 2005, and case-law cited therein).

107.  It follows that the applicant company’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 thereof.

108.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

109.  The applicant company in application no. 54009/18 made no claim under this head. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award it any sum on that account.

110.  The applicants in application no. 20655/19 claimed 55,513.50 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

111.  The Government argued that those claims were disproportionate and criticised the parameters chosen by the applicants, which it considered arbitrary. In the Government’s submission, the finding of a violation would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants.

112.  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it awards the applicants in application no. 20655/19 EUR 6,000 jointly in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, and rejects the rest of the claim.

113.  The applicant company in application no. 54009/18 also claimed a total of EUR 22,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts (EUR 17,000 for the first-instance proceedings and EUR 5,000 for the proceedings in the Court of Cassation), plus 4% for the required contribution to the lawyers’ pension fund.

114.  The applicants in application no. 20655/19 claimed EUR 7,387.71 for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court of Cassation and EUR 20,875.63 for those before the Court. They also claimed EUR 27,759.39 in relation to other sums that they had had to pay in the enforcement proceedings that followed the Court of Cassation’s order no. 24568 of 2018.

115.  The Government contested the claims.

116.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant company in application no. 54009/18 the sum of EUR 5,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts. As to application no. 20655/19, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants the sum of EUR 9,000 jointly, covering costs under all heads. The Court dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims under this head.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:

(i)  to the applicant company in application no. 54009/18, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant company, in respect of costs and expenses;

(ii)  to the applicants in application no. 20655/19, EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros) jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 9,000 (nine thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to those applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 May 2024, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Ilse Freiwirth Marko Bošnjak
 Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of cases:

No.

Application no.

Case name

Lodged on

Applicant
Year of birth
Place of residence

Represented by

1.

37943/17

Patricolo and Brutti v. Italy

18/05/2017

Mario PATRICOLO
1953
Caprino Veronese

Milvia BRUTTI
1945
Lazise

Augusto DE BENI

2.

54009/18

Immobiliare il Castelletto S.r.l. v. Italy

08/11/2018

IMMOBILIARE IL CASTELLETTO S.R.L.
Casarile

Fabio ZANATI

3.

20655/19

Angeloni and Roda v. Italy

05/04/2019

Marcella ANGELONI
1950
San Lazzaro di Savena

Fausto RODA
1949
San Lazzaro di Savena

Dario FORASASSI