CASE OF RARANI AND OTHERS v. ALBANIA

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF RARANI AND OTHERS v. ALBANIA

(Application no. 19017/18)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

14 October 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Rarani and Others v. Albania,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Úna Ní Raifeartaigh, President,
 Darian Pavli,
 Mateja Đurović, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 19017/18) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 13 April 2018 by seven Albanian nationals, relevant details listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), who were represented by Mr E. Hicka, a lawyer practising in Tirana;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Albanian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent Mr O. Moçka, General State Advocate;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 23 September 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  In 1933 the applicants’ ancestors had bought a house and the adjoining plot of land of approximately 3 dynym (unit of measurement used at the time) which were subsequently nationalised on an unspecified date by the former communist regime.

2.  On 12 December 1994 the Commission for the Restitution and Compensation of Property (“the Commission”) decided, among other things, to restitute a plot of land measuring 4,150 sq. m to the K. family.

3.  On 17 April 1997 the Tirana District Court (“the District Court”) recognised as a legal fact the applicants’ inherited property rights over the house and the plot of land (vendim vërtetim fakti).

4.  On 30 September 1997 the Commission recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over the plot of land bought by their ancestors in 1933, measuring 3,950 sq. m. Of that plot, the Commission restituted the applicants 2,020 sq. m, and awarded them compensation for 1,930 sq. m. The applicants claimed further 1,244 sq. m, but the Commission did not accept that claim, on the grounds that it overlapped with the plot already restituted to the K. family (see paragraph 2 above).

5.  In 2008 the Agency for the Restitution and Compensation of Property (the Commission’s successor), dismissed the applicants’ request for the restitution of the 1,244 sq. m plot, on the grounds of the overlap with the K. family’s plot, and because the plot had not been accurately mapped. It therefore stated that the issue could only be solved through judicial proceedings.

6.  In 2008 the applicants lodged a civil claim with the District Court, requesting the annulment of the Commission’s decision of 1994 concerning the recognition of the K. family’s rights, and seeking to be recognised as the owners of the plot of 1,244 sq. m. The defendants brought a counter claim seeking to be recognised as the owners of the plot based on adverse possession. A report by an expert, commissioned by the District Court, concluded that the applicants’ ancestors had property rights over a plot of 5,194 sq. m, within which the 1,244 sq. m plot was located. The District Court found that the plot had been owned by the applicants’ ancestors since 1933. It furthermore found that the plot appeared in the cadastral maps of 1937, 1965, 1971 and 1978, and that the District Court’s decision of 17 April 1997 had recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over it. Despite these findings, on 27 September 2011 the District Court dismissed the applicants’ claim and accepted the counter claim on the grounds that the K. family had acquired ownership through adverse possession.

7.  On 27 June 2012 the Tirana Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) reversed the District Court’s latest judgment, ruling in favour of the applicants on the grounds that adverse possession in good faith applied only to legal acts, not administrative acts, as in this case. On 23 July 2012 the respondents lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court arguing that, before the 1945 nationalisation, the property had belonged to their family and in any event, they had acquired ownership through adverse possession.

8.  On 12 April 2017 the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and dismissed both the claim and the counterclaim. It held, inter alia, that the applicants had already received recognition and restitution of their ancestors’ property and that the remaining plot could not be restituted as it had not been owned by their ancestors at the time of expropriation. The Supreme Court stated that the lower courts had acknowledged the applicants’ ancestors’ property rights over a plot of land consisting of approximately 3 dynym and the sale of part of that land. The Supreme Court did not specify when that partial sale had occurred and which part of the plot was concerned, nor did it make reference to any relevant documents. It concluded that by recognising ownership beyond 3,950 sq. m, the Commission had awarded the applicants more land than their ancestors had owned at the time of expropriation, and their claim of the 1,244 sq. m plot was baseless.

9.  On 6 October 2017 the applicants’ constitutional complaint was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it was manifestly ill-founded.

10.  Article 141 provides:

Article 141

“1.  The Supreme Court adjudicates cases concerning the interpretation and application of the law so as to ensure the unification or development of the judicial practice, in accordance with the law.

2.  For changing the judicial practice, the Supreme Court examines in Joint Benches specific judicial issues decided by the chambers, in accordance with the law.”

11.  The relevant part provides:

Article 472

“The Court of Appeal and the District Court’s judgments may be appealed to the Supreme Court if:

(a) the law has not been respected or has not been correctly applied;

(b) there have been serious breaches of procedural rules;

...”

Article 485

“The Civil Bench or the Joint Benches of the Supreme Court may decide to:

a) uphold the judgment;

b) quash the appeal court’s judgment and uphold the first-instance court’s judgment;

c) quash the appeal court’s judgment and remit the case for re-hearing by a different bench of the appeal court;

ç) quash the appeal court’s and the first-instance court’s judgments and remit the case for re-hearing by a different bench of the first-instance court;

d) reverse the appeal court and the first-instance court’s judgments;

e) quash all judgments and discontinue the proceedings.”

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

12.  The Court notes at the outset that two of the applicants, Mr Shaban Rarani and Ms Fiqirete Rarani, died in the course of the proceedings (see the appended table). Their heirs expressed the wish to continue the proceedings before the Court. The Government did not object, and the Court considers that the above-mentioned heirs have a legitimate interest in pursuing the application on behalf of the late applicants. However, reference will still be made to the applicants throughout the present text (see Horváthová v. Slovakia, no. 74456/01, §§ 25-27, 17 May 2005).

13.  The Government argued that the applicants lacked victim status and that their complaint was abusive, without further substantiating. In addition, they argued that the applicants’ complaint was of a fourth-instance nature and therefore inadmissible.

14.  The Court dismisses the Government’s objection concerning the applicants’ victim status and the application being abusive as unsubstantiated. The Court also notes that the applicants’ complaint concerns a right protected by the Convention and that they were directly affected by the outcome of the proceedings, which involved alleged violations of their property rights and the right to a fair trial.

15.  As to the Government’s contention that the applicants had abused their right of application, the relevant principles are set out in, for example, Gross v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 67810/10, § 28, ECHR 2014). An applicant’s intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty (idem., § 28). However, there is no such indication in the present case, therefore, this objection by the Government must also be rejected.

16.  Therefore, it concludes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds and has to be declared admissible.

17.  The applicants complained of the proceedings before the Supreme Court and argued that, in its judgment of 12 April 2017, it had provided a completely different assessment of the facts compared to that of the lower courts, and that that assessment was not based on evidence presented by the parties. The Supreme Court had questioned the expert report’s conclusions, while the applicants had been unable to provide any counterarguments. They contended that the proceedings in the Supreme Court were unfair, thus entailing a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

18.  The Government submitted that the Supreme Court had assessed the evidence in the same manner as lower courts. It had endorsed the facts as they had been set out by the lower courts, but had applied the law differently, thereby providing adequate reasoning for quashing the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

19.  As regards the question of compliance with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 in the present case, the Court observes that the applicants’ unfairness complaint was directed specifically against the reasoning the Supreme Court provided in its judgment of 12 April 2017.

20.  The Court has repeatedly held that it is generally not its task to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as such errors are manifest and infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I; Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 82, ECHR 2004-I; and De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 170, 23 February 2017). A domestic judicial decision cannot be qualified as arbitrary to the point of prejudicing the fairness of proceedings unless no reasons are provided for it or if the reasons given are based on a manifest factual or legal error committed by the domestic court, resulting in a “denial of justice” (see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, no. 76730/12, §§ 76-77, 22 June 2021, with further references).

21.  In the present case the District Court and the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusions on the applicants’ ancestors’ property rights over the plot, based on the expert report and other evidence. They found that the applicants’ ancestors had owned the plot of land of 1,244 sq. m at the moment of nationalisation, despite the different approaches they took as to the outcome of the claim (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). These courts made no findings about any partial sale of the property by the applicants’ ancestors.

22.  Contrary to those findings, the Supreme Court concluded that the applicants had been restituted more than what their ancestors had owned at the moment of nationalisation (see paragraph 8 above). The facts set out in the Supreme Court’s judgment appear thus to differ from those established by the lower courts, and to be at odds with the evidence presented in the case. The Supreme Court does not cite any evidence in support of its summary conclusion that the applicants’ ancestors had sold part of their original plot or provide any details as to the date and terms of such transaction (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above). While the applicants’ opponents had alleged in their appeal on points of law that such a sale had taken place at an unspecified time, they did not present any evidence in support thereof.

23.  In the present case the Supreme Court neither explained why the conclusions of the report drafted by the court-appointed expert – and endorsed by two courts of fact - were deemed irrelevant or incorrect, nor on what grounds it reached a different conclusion. In the Court’s view, the Supreme Court’s reasoning does not amount to a merely different interpretation of evidence, but to an arbitrary overturning of the factual findings of the lower courts without adequate explanations and while relying on facts in respect of which no evidence had been presented by either party before the Supreme Court (compare Anđelković v. Serbia, no. 1401/08, § 27, 9 April 2013).

24.  Furthermore, in the Albanian system the Supreme Court principally acts as a court of questions of law: an appeal to the Supreme Court might have been lodged at the relevant time where substantive law was not respected or was wrongly applied by the lower courts, or where serious procedural breaches had occurred (see paragraph 11 above). However, as noted above, in the present case the Supreme Court, without engaging with the relevant legal considerations, has essentially reassessed previously established facts (compare Sokurenko and Strygun v. Ukraine, nos. 29458/04 and 29465/04, § 27, 20 July 2006).

25.  In such circumstances, the Court cannot but conclude that the Supreme Court failed to ensure, through a properly reasoned judgment, the applicants’ right to a fair trial as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

26.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

27.  The applicants also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that their right to adversarial proceedings and the principle of legal certainty had been violated. They further complained of interference with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

28.  Having regard to its finding concerning the applicants’ right to a reasoned judgment under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 23 above), the Court notes that the applicants now have an opportunity to seek the reopening of the proceedings before domestic courts (see paragraph 31 below). That would allow, in principle, for an examination of the applicants’ remaining complaints under the Convention through a properly reasoned judgment of the Supreme Court. In these circumstances, and in line with its subsidiary role, the Court considers that it is not necessary to consider the applicants’ remaining complaints at this time. It is open to them to lodge a new application with the Court, as the case may be, following a fresh determination of their complaints at the national level.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

29.  The applicants claimed 1,538,709 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage; 15,000 EUR in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.

30.  The Government deemed the sums claimed unfounded and excessive.

31.  The Court reiterates that a judgment in which it finds a breach of the Convention imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences. Given the nature of the applicants’ complaints and of the violation found, the Court considers that the most appropriate form of reparation for the violation found would be the reopening of the domestic proceedings should the applicants so request, given that it is capable of providing restitutio in integrum as required under Article 41 of the Convention (compare Shkalla v. Albania, no. 26866/05, §§ 77-79, 10 May 2011, and Meli and Swinkles v. Albania, nos. 41373/21 and 48801/21, § 83, 16 July 2024).

32.  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged by the applicants. It therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, the Court considers that the applicants must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage as a result of the violation found. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, it awards jointly to the applicants EUR 3,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

33.  Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award 2,000 EUR covering costs for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay jointly to the applicants, within three months , the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 3,600 (three thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 October 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Olga Chernishova Úna Ní Raifeartaigh
 Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of applicants:

Application no. 19017/18