FIRST SECTION
CASE OF RASIŃSKI v. POLAND
(Application no. 42969/18)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
28 May 2020
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Rasiński v. Poland,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Tim Eicke, President,
Jovan Ilievski,
Raffaele Sabato, judges,
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 24 March 2020,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 42969/18) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Artur Rasiński (“the applicant”), on 31 August 2018.
2. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Sobczak, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. On 7 February 2019 the Government were given notice of the complaint concerning the applicant’s detention in overcrowded cells and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.
THE FACTSTHE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Łowicz Prison.
5. The applicant and the Government gave partly different statements in respect of the conditions of the applicant’s detention (see paragraphs 6‑8).Conditions of the applicant’s detentionThe applicant
6. The applicant submitted that during his detention in the Łowicz Prison he had been held in cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 sq. m.
7. From the reasoning of the domestic courts’ judgments it is clear that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells during his stay in the Łowicz Prison from 18 July 2013 to 16 April 2015 (one year, eight months and twenty‑eight days). The cells had been poorly equipped, not properly ventilated and there had been mold on the walls.The Government
8. In their observations of 11 June and 6 September 2019 the Government contested the national court’s findings. In particular they stressed that the applicant had not been kept in overcrowded and inadequately furnished cells (see paragraphs 9‑12 below). They submitted that the national courts had not been provided with sufficient information by the State Treasury’s representative and had based their findings solely on the applicant’s submissions and general statistics. The Government also submitted a statement from the Prison Service providing information on the surface of the applicant’s cells and the number of persons incarcerated with him. According to that document, the applicant did not serve his sentence in overcrowded cells.Civil proceedings against the State Treasury
9. On 1 July 2016 the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation for his detention in overcrowded cells in the Łowicz Prison. He claimed 300,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) – approximately 75,000 euros (EUR) in damages.
10. On 13 April 2017 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) awarded the applicant PLN 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,250) in compensation and dismissed the remainder of his action. The court found that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells during his detention in the Łowicz Prison and that all the applicant’s complaints in this regard had been dismissed by the prison authorities. It concluded that this situation had violated the applicant’s personal rights. The court exempted the applicant from the costs of proceedings for the part in which his action was dismissed.
11. On 23 February 2018 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed appeals lodged by the applicant and the State Treasury. The court dismissed evidence submitted by the State Treasury, i.e. the Prison Service’s information on the surface of the applicant’s cells and the number of persons incarcerated with him as filed out of time. In the written reasoning the court fully upheld all the factual and legal findings of the Łódź Regional Court. It also exempted the applicant from the costs of the appellate proceedings.
12. On 7 May 2018 a court-appointed lawyer prepared an opinion informing the applicant of the lack of grounds to lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
13. A detailed description of the relevant domestic law and practice concerning general rules governing the conditions of detention in Poland and domestic remedies available to detainees, who allege that the conditions of their detention are inadequate, are set out in the Court’s pilot judgments in the cases of Orchowski v. Poland (no. 17885/04) and Norbert Sikorski v. Poland (no. 17599/05), delivered on 22 October 2009 (see §§ 75‑85 and §§ 45‑88, respectively). More recent developments are described in the Court’s decision in the case of Łatak v. Poland (no. 52070/08), delivered on 12 October 2010 (see §§ 25-54).
THE LAWALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
14. The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention and the overcrowding in the Łowicz Prison, where he had been held between 18 July 2013 and 16 April 2015 (one year, eight months and twenty‑eight days) had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
15. The Government contested the fact that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells (see paragraph 8). Furthermore they submitted that the applicant had lost his victim status because he had been awarded PLN 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,250) in compensation by the Łódź Regional Court. The Government also invited the Court to declare the application inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 4 as manifestly ill‑founded because the treatment complained of had not reached the minimum level of severity under Article 3 due to various mitigating factors. In particular, the applicant served his sentence in a semi-open penitentiary institution; his cell was open during the day and could have been opened during the night; he enjoyed freedom of movement outside his cell. He had the opportunity to attend various out-of-cell activities and between 17 July 2014 and 16 April 2015 he had a job and stayed outside of his cell during working hours. However, these submissions were not confirmed by any evidence.Admissibility
16. The Court reiterates that it falls first to the national authorities to redress any alleged violation of the Convention. In this regard, the question as to whether an applicant can claim to be the victim of the alleged violation is relevant at all stages of the proceedings under the Convention (see Karahalios v. Greece, no.62503/00, § 21, 11 December 2003, and Malama v. Greece (dec.), no. 43622/98, 25 November 1999).
17. It is the established case-law of the Court that the word “victim” in the context of Article 34 of the Convention denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission in issue, the existence of a violation of the Convention being conceivable even in the absence of prejudice; prejudice is relevant only in the context of Article 41. Consequently, a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his victim status unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 115, ECHR 2010, Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 50, ECHR 1999‑VII; Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑III, p. 846, § 36; and Association Ekin v. France (dec.), no. 39288/98, 18 January 2000).
18. The Court considers that the Government’s allegation that the applicant lost his victim status requires examination whether the Łódź Regional Court’s judgment of 13 April 2017 provided the applicant with sufficient redress. Furthermore, the Government were of the opinion that the circumstances of the case had not reached the minimum level of severity as required by Article 3 of the Convention.
19. The Court considers that the arguments relied on by the Government are closely linked to the merits of the applicant’s complaint. The Court therefore considers that they should be examined under the substantive provision of the Convention relied upon by the applicant (see, in particular, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32; Gnahoré v. France, no. 40031/98, § 26, ECHR 2000‑IX; and Isayeva v. Russia, no.o57950/00, § 161, 24 February 2005). It accordingly joins the Government’s objection to the merits of the case.Merits
20. A restatement of the general principles concerning the examination of conditions of detention under Article 3 may be found in the Court’s pilot judgments against Poland (see Orchowski, cited above, §§ 119-31, Norbert Sikorski, cited above, §§ 126-41) as well as in Muršić v. Croatia ([GC], no.o7334/13, §§ 102-41, ECHR 2016).
21. The Court has already found that a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 arises when the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m in multi-occupancy accommodation, a presumption which can be rebutted only where the following requirements are cumulatively met: where short, occasional and minor reductions of personal space are accompanied by sufficient freedom to move outside the cell and adequate out‑of‑cell activities and that confinement is generally in an appropriate detention facility (see, Muršić, cited above, §§ 137‑38).
22. The Court notes that the domestic courts established that the applicant’s detention in the Łowicz Prison had been marked by overcrowding for a period of one year, eight months and twenty‑eight days.
23. The Government contested that finding but did not provide the Court with any evidence to the contrary except for a statement of the Prison Service (see paragraph 8 above). It seems that a statement of a similar nature was available to the national courts and was not admitted into evidence for procedural reasons (see paragraph 11 above). In these circumstances and in the absence of any other evidence supporting the Government’s submissions, the Court does not find sufficient reasons to conclude that the Prison Service’s statement should take precedence over the national courts findings.
24. The Court finds that the reduction of the required personal space for more than one year and eight months cannot be considered “short, occasional and minor” within the meaning of the Court’s case‑law (see Muršić, cited above, § 130). On the contrary, even in the presence of mitigating factors relied upon by the Government, the Court considers that such a period of detention in a cell where the space per person was below the statutory 3 sq. m. is sufficient to establish that the strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 has not been rebutted.
25. Having regard to the above findings, the Court considers that the distress and hardship endured by the applicant exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and went beyond the threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention.
26. The Government further argued that the results of the civil proceedings had constituted sufficient redress for the applicant and consequently that he had lost his victim status.
27. The Court, referring to its case-law stated above (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above) finds as follows.
In the present case, the applicant sued the State Treasury demanding just‑satisfaction for his detention in overcrowded and not properly ventilated cells in the Łowicz Prison. The Łódź Regional Court found for the applicant and acknowledged that there had been a breach of the applicant’s personal rights. The Regional Court’s judgment was confirmed on appeal (see paragraphs 7 and 9-12 above).
Therefore, the Court is satisfied that the national authorities acknowledged a breach of the applicant’s Convention rights as regards his detention in overcrowded cells.
28. It remains to be determined whether the authorities provided the applicant with sufficient redress. The Court notes in that respect that the Łódź Regional Court awarded the applicant the equivalent of EUR 1,250 and that the amount awarded by the Regional Court is considerably below the awards made by the Court in comparable cases (see, mutatis mutandis, Olszewski v. Poland, no. 21880/03, § 124, 2 April 2013, and the strike out decisions following friendly settlements or unilateral declarations in Szpoton v. Poland, no. 27209/14, 5 January 2016; Stelmaszyk v. Poland, no. 3754/11, 15 November 2011; and Szafraniak v. Poland, no. 29591/11, 15 November 2011).
29. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the sum awarded to the applicant by the Łódź Regional Court was not sufficient to deprive the applicant of his victim status. The Government’s objection in this respect (see paragraph 19 above) should be therefore dismissed.
30. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
31. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”Damage
32. The applicant claimed 75,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
33. The Government contested the claim as exorbitant.
34. The Court considers that the applicant suffered damage of a non‑pecuniary nature as a result of his detention in conditions contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 30 above). Making an assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, and in view of the award which has already been made by the domestic courts, the Court awards the applicant EUR 8,350 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.Costs and expenses
35. The applicant did not make any claim for costs and expenses for the proceedings before the Court or the domestic courts.Default interest
36. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Decides to join to the merits the Government’s preliminary objection and dismisses it;Declares the application admissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months EUR 8,350 (eight thousand three hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5.Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 May 2020, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Renata Degener Tim Eicke
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy