CASE OF REDNIKOV v. RUSSIA

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF REDNIKOV v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 18072/04)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

6 December 2011

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Rednikov v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 15 November 2011,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 18072/04) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Valeriy Vasilyevich Rednikov (“the applicant”), on 26 April 2004.

2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

3. On 4 September 2008 the President of the First Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 3).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Moscow.

A. First set of proceedings

5. On 1 February 2001 the applicant brought proceedings against a private company for breach of his patent rights.

6. By a judgment of 10 November 2002 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) dismissed his claim.

7. On 28 November 2003 the Moscow City Court (“the appeal court”) upheld the above judgment on appeal.

B. Second set of proceedings

8. On 4 November 2000 the applicant instituted another set of proceedings against two private companies for breach of his patent rights.

9. The first hearing was scheduled by the District Court for 4 April 2001. However, the first hearing and the next four hearings did not take place because the judge was involved in different proceedings or was on vacation, or due to the respondents’ failure to appear. In the meantime the court sent inquiries to various State agencies for information about the respondents’ place of registration.

10. At the hearing of 13 December 2001 the applicant requested to change the names of the respondents, and the court repeatedly sent inquiries for information about their place of incorporation.

11. The next two hearings were cancelled due to the respondent’s default in appearance and because of the judge’s involvement in different proceedings.

12. At the hearing of 8 April 2002, following lack of information about the respondents’ exact whereabouts, the court suggested that the applicant notify them himself based on the information available to him.

13. At the hearing of 23 May 2002 the applicant relinquished his claims against one of the respondents and asked the court to invite a third party to join the proceedings.

14. On 7 August 2002 the applicant motioned to replace the initial respondents with a new set of five companies and specified his claims. On 11 September 2002 he relinquished his claims against one of the respondents.

15. The next three hearings were cancelled as the judge was involved in different proceedings.

16. The hearing of 1 November 2002 was postponed to allow a respondent to study the case.

17. The hearing of 10 November 2002 did not take place as the court did not have information about due notification of the respondents.

18. The next three hearings took place as scheduled.

19. On 9 December 2002 the court accepted the applicant’s relinquishment of his claim against two respondents and severed his claims against two other respondents into a separate case to avoid delay in the proceedings. By a judgment of the same date the District Court dismissed his claims against the remaining respondent.

20. On 16 December 2002 the applicant filed preliminary grounds of appeal and specified that he would submit reasoned grounds of appeal upon receipt of the reasoned judgment. On the same day the District Court left the appeal without consideration for failure to substantiate it and suggested that the applicant remedy this defect until 30 December 2002.

21. The applicant submitted copies of his complaints concerning failure of the District Court to produce the final text of the judgment of 9 December 2002 to the Zamoskvoretskiy District prosecutor’s office of 14 August 2003, to the appeal court of 8 September 2003 and 30 September 2004 and to the Judicial Qualifications Board of 8 April 2004. According to the applicant, in May and June he came to see the judge in his case, inquiring about the date of filing of the final text of the judgment at the registry.

22. The applicant submitted a copy of the cover of the case file with a handwritten note by a member of the court’s registry according to which he had received a copy of the judgment on 23 June 2005.

23. On 29 June 2005 the applicant submitted reasoned grounds of appeal of the judgment of 9 December 2002. The heading of the document includes a mention that the final text of the judgment had been obtained by the claimant on 23 June 2005.

24. On 30 June 2005 the District Court returned the applicant’s appeal as submitted outside the procedural time-limit. This decision was set aside by the appeal court on 27 October 2005. The court did not give any reasons for its decision.

25. On 14 March 2006 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 9 December 2002 on appeal.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

26. Article 199 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Russia (in force since 14 November 2002) provides that drafting of the final reasoned text of the judgment may be postponed for no longer than five days after termination of the proceedings in the case.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

27. The applicant complained that the length of the second set proceedings had breached the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in the relevant part reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

A. Admissibility

28. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

29. The Government firstly pointed out that most of the delay had been caused by the applicant’s failure to amend in due time his grounds of appeal lodged on 16 December 2002 and his submission of such an appeal only two years and six months after pronouncement of the first-instance judgment. According to them, the fact that the reasoned judgment had been filed in the case-file after the operative version and before the applicant’s preliminary appeal served as evidence of the judge’s timely actions. They did not submit an extract from the case-file in support of their argument. They further argued that on several occasions the applicant had changed the respondents and amended his claims which had made it necessary for the trial court to start hearing the case from the beginning. It had been the applicant’s responsibility to indicate the respondents’ addresses at which they could be notified of the hearings but he had failed to do so. The trial court had also spent some time helping the applicant establish the respondents’ whereabouts and had severed the claims against unidentified respondents into a separate case to expedite the proceedings.

30. The applicant drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the Government had failed to present any evidence that the final text of the judgment of 9 December 2002 had been filed by the judge prior to June 2005. He also emphasised that if the Government’s version of the events had been true and he had indeed missed the time-limit through his own fault, his reasoned grounds of appeal would have been rejected by the appeal court as time-barred.

31. The Court observes that the proceedings in the applicant’s case lasted between 4 November 2000 and 14 March 2006. Accordingly, it took the domestic courts approximately five years and four months to examine the applicant’s case at two levels of jurisdiction.

32. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

33. The Court accepts that during the time when the case was pending consideration at the trial court, a significant number of hearings did not take place due to the judge’s involvement in other proceedings. However, it also notes that many hearings were cancelled because of lack of proper identification of the respondents’ addresses which was ultimately the applicant’s responsibility as a claimant. Finally, some delay stemmed from the applicant’s decisions to replace the respondents and to alter his claims. With this in mind, the Court considers that both the authorities and the applicant equally contributed to the delay during the examination of the case.

34. The Court notes, however, that the applicant’s case was not pending consideration between 9 December 2002, the date of the trial court’s judgment, and 29 June 2005 when the applicant filed his reasoned grounds of appeal. This period amounted approximately to two years and six months. It further notes that the parties disagree as to the reasons for the void, with the applicant insisting that the judge procrastinated in submission of the final text of the judgment and the Government arguing that the applicant languished in amending his appeal.

35. The Court observes that in support of his position the applicant submitted copies of his complaints to various domestic instances in 2003 and 2004 concerning failure of the judge to file the final text of the judgment, as well as a copy of the case-file cover indicating that he had received a copy of the judgment on 23 June 2005, and a copy of his grounds of appeal with the same information. It also takes cognisance of the fact that the first-instance court’s decision returning the applicant’s grounds of appeal as time-barred was overturned by the appeal instance. At the same time, the Government did not buttress their stance with any evidence. The Court is not convinced that the position of the judgment in the case-file served as proof of the timeliness of its drafting. In these circumstances, the Court lends more credence to the applicant’s version and finds that the State was responsible for the delay.

36. Regard being had to the above, in particular the lengthy failure of the trial court to produce a reasoned judgment, the Court concludes that the authorities breached the “reasonable time” requirement.

37. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

38. The applicant also complained about the outcome of the first set of the proceedings, bias of the judges and violation of his property rights by the courts that had dismissed his claims.

39. Having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in these provisions in that respect. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

40. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

41. The applicant claimed 10,500 United States dollars (7,290 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

42. The Government did not provide any comments on the claims.

43. As regards the claim for pecuniary damage, the Court recalls that it found inadmissible the applicant’s complaint of a breach of his property rights above. It therefore rejects this claim in full.

44. On the other hand, the Court accepts that the applicant suffered distress and frustration following the courts’ failure to examine his case in an expeditious manner. Deciding on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 2,400 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

45. The applicant also claimed EUR 50 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

46. The Government made no comments on this claim.

47. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.

48. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did not substantiate his claim and therefore rejects it in full.

C. Default interest

49. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the complaint concerning length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 2,400 (two thousand four hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 December 2011, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

              André WampachMirjana Lazarova Trajkovska
Deputy RegistrarPresident

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