FIRST SECTION
CASE OF RUBTSOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 22554/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 January 2011
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Rubtsova v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Elisabeth Steiner, President,
Anatoly Kovler,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 9 December 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 22554/04) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Lyubov Ivanovna Rubtsova (“the applicant”), on 27 May 2004.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr A. Savenkov, former acting Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and then by Mr G. Matyushkin.
3. On 12 March 2008 the President of the First Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in St Petersburg.
5. Between 1989 and 2001 the applicant initiated several sets of civil proceedings.
A. Alimony dispute
6. By judgment of 17 January 1989, the Vyborg Town Court ordered the applicant’s former husband to pay alimony. A writ of execution was issued.
7. In August 2000 the bailiff service notified the applicant that the writ had been lost and advised her to obtain a new one.
B. Housing dispute
8. On 12 October 1999 the applicant brought proceedings in the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg against her husband R. seeking judicial recognition of her and her children’s right to use a room in a certain flat. The case was assigned to judge K.
9. The applicant submitted that hearings had been scheduled for 27 February 2000, which fell on a weekend, and then for an unspecified date in March 2000 when the respondent had failed to appear.
10. The next hearing scheduled for 19 April 2000 did not take place due to the parties’ default in appearance. The summons sent to the respondent whose address had been indicated by the applicant in her statement of claim had returned to the court upon expiry of the time-limit for its storage at the post office.
11. The hearing of 16 May 2000 did not take place due to the respondent’s failure to appear. The summons returned to the court for the same reason as before.
12. The hearing of 19 September 2000 did not take place as the judge was on vacation. On account of judge K.’s heavy workload, the case was transferred to the newly appointed judge Ch.
13. The next hearing scheduled for 15 November 2000 was adjourned at the applicant’s request to give her time to specify her claims and obtain legal assistance. On the same date the court granted her motion for an injunction order.
14. At the hearing of 24 January 2001 the applicant supplemented her claims by asking the court to declare unlawful an exchange of the contested room for a house carried out by R. Following involvement of a third party P., the hearing was adjourned, the parties were summoned to a new date, and the court sent an inquiry to some State bodies for evidence.
15. The respondent and the third party did not appear at the next hearing of 17 April 2001. The summons sent to P. returned to the court upon expiry of the time-limit for its storage at the post office. The hearing was adjourned. To ensure the correct address of the summonses, the court suggested that P. be summoned by the housing authorities of the respective city district, and R. by the town council of the village where he resided.
16. At the next hearing of 1 August 2001 the applicant supplemented her claims seeking to declare all of the transactions with the room unlawful. Three other individuals who had been parties to these transactions were involved by the court as co-respondents. On the same day the court stayed the proceedings pending outcome of another dispute at the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg which involved the applicant’s claim for annulment of her marriage to R. The applicant did not challenge this decision.
17. The proceedings were resumed on 12 May 2003, three months after the Frunzenskiy District Court gave a judgment. The next hearing was scheduled for 3 February 2004; however it had to be postponed to 15 September 2004 following the request of the applicant and one of the respondents, as well as the other parties’ default in appearance. In response to the applicant’s complaint of lengthy proceedings, on 21 August 2003 the president of the St Petersburg City Court acknowledged that the workload in the District Court had considerably exceeded the maximum level, in particular due to the shortage of judges.
18. On 15 September 2004 the court dismissed the applicant’s claims. The reasoned judgment was submitted to the court’s registry on 13 May 2005. On 20 July 2005 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment on appeal.
C. Marriage annulment dispute
19. On 12 July 2001 the applicant brought proceedings in the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg for annulment of her marriage to R.
20. On 4 April 2002 the judge in charge of her case decided to prepare the case for examination and required certain evidence from a State body. A hearing was scheduled for 7 October 2002. However, it did not take place due to the judge’s illness. At the next hearing of 19 February 2003 the court granted the applicant’s claim.
21. On 23 January 2003 the applicant complained to the Higher Judicial Qualifications Board of the District Court’s procrastination in dealing with her case. As a result of an internal investigation, on 26 November 2004 the judge who had sat in the applicant’s case was dismissed.
D. Parental rights dispute
22. In April 2001 the applicant brought proceedings in the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg for alimony arrears and sought to deprive her former husband of his parental rights. On 24 April 2002 the District Court declined jurisdiction in favour of another court. On 7 August 2002 the St Petersburg City Court set aside this decision. By judgment of 19 February 2003, the District Court granted the applicant’s claims.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
23. Federal Law № 68-ФЗ of 30 April 2010 (in force as of 4 May 2010) provides that in case of a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time or of the right to enforcement of a final judgment, the Russian citizens are entitled to seek compensation of the non-pecuniary damage. Federal Law № 69-ФЗ adopted on the same day introduced the pertinent changes in the Russian legislation.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
24. The applicant relied on Article 7 and 13 of the Convention to complain that the domestic courts had taken too long to consider her claims in the disputes concerning housing and marriage annulment. The Court considers it appropriate to examine these complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
25. The Government argued that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
26. The Court notes that this complaint does not appear to be manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
27. As to the proceedings concerning a housing dispute, the Government submitted that the case had been complex due to its nature and the involvement of third parties, amendments of the applicant’s claims and her motions, and the parties’ failure to appear in court. They also pointed out that the applicant had not complained about the decision to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of another case. The Government conceded that the Oktyabrskiy District Court had breached the procedural time-limits twice, after resumption of the proceedings and when submitting the reasoned judgment to the registry. However, they argued that this delay had been justified by the court’s excessive workload per judge.
28. The Government did not provide any specific comments as to the length of the marriage annulment dispute.
29. The applicant maintained her complaints.
30. The Court observes that the proceedings concerning the housing claims commenced on 12 October 1999 and ended on 20 July 2005, during which the applicant’s claims were considered at two levels of jurisdiction. As for the marriage annulment proceedings, they lasted between 12 July 2001 and 19 February 2003 for one level of jurisdiction. The two sets of proceedings lasted, respectively, five years and nine months and one year and seven months.
31. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
32. The Court deems it best to examine separately the two sets of proceedings.
33. Insofar as the housing dispute is concerned, it considers that it bore a certain degree of complexity due to the number of the involved parties.
34. As to the applicant’s conduct, it observes that the applicant failed to appear in court once; she also supplemented her claims and requested adjournment of the proceedings for collection of evidence on four separate occasions. The overall delay caused by the applicant’s actions amounted approximately to one year and one month. However, the Court’s constant approach has been that an applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by the national law in defence of his interests (see, mutatis mutandis, Yağcı and Sargın v. Turkey, 8 June 1995, § 66, Series A no. 319‑A).
35. Regarding the authorities’ behaviour, apart from a two-month delay resulting from a judge’s vacation, the Court is satisfied that they had not exhibited any particular negligence or procrastination until resumption of the proceedings in March 2003. It recalls, however, that after that moment the trial court was incapable of handling the case with the same efficiency and allowed delays which held the proceedings back for approximately one year and five months. In particular, the Court notes the trial court’s lengthy failure to hold a hearing after resumption of the proceedings and to submit a reasoned judgment to the registry to enable the applicant to lodge her appeal. As to the Government’s argument concerning the judges’ excessive workload, it reiterates that it is the States’ duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet the requirements of Article 6 § 1 (see Muti v. Italy, 23 March 1994, § 15, Series A no. 281-C).
36. With regard to the above, it finds that the authorities did not comply with the “reasonable time” requirement in dealing with the applicant’s housing claims.
37. As to the marriage annulment proceedings, the Court observes that the trial court appears to have idled for most of its length, having conducted one hearing and undertaken one inquiry to collect evidence in one year and seven months. The fact that the judge sitting in the applicant’s case was later found to be in breach of time-limits for examination of cases and dismissed on this ground supports the conclusion that the length of these proceedings was also excessive.
38. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of both sets of proceedings.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
39. The applicant also complained that her attempts to speed up the proceedings had been futile. She relied on Article 13, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
40. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
41. The Court takes cognisance of the existence of a new remedy introduced by the federal laws № 68-ФЗ and № 69-ФЗ in the wake of the pilot judgment adopted in the case of Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) (no. 33509/04, ECHR 2009‑...). These statutes, which entered into force on 4 May 2010, set up a new remedy which enables those concerned to seek compensation for the damage sustained as a result of unreasonable length of the proceedings (see para. 23 above).
42. The Court observes that in the present case the parties’ observations in respect of Article 13 arrived before 4 May 2010 and did not contain any references to the new legislative development.
43. The Court recalls that in the pilot judgment cited above it stated that it would be unfair to request the applicants whose cases have already been pending for many years in the domestic system and who have come to seek relief at the Court, to bring again their claims before domestic tribunals (Burdov (no. 2), cited above, § 144). In line with this principle, the Court decided to examine the present application on its merits and found a violation of the substantive provision of the Convention.
44. Finally, on 23 September 2010 the Court decided that all new cases introduced after the Burdov pilot judgment and falling within the scope of the new domestic remedy had to be submitted in the first place to the national courts (see Fakhretdinov and Others v. Russia (dec.), no. 26716/09, § 32, 23 September 2010). The Court also stated that its position may be subject to review in the future, depending in particular on the domestic courts’ capacity to establish consistent practice under the new law in line with the Convention requirements (ibid, § 33).
45. Having regard to these special circumstances, the Court does not find it necessary to continue a separate examination of the complaint under Article 13 in the present case.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
46. The applicant also complained about the outcome of all sets of proceedings, the length of the proceedings for deprivation of parental rights and of the authorities’ failure to compel her former husband to pay alimony.
47. The Court recalls that it is not its task to act by calling into question the outcome of the domestic proceedings. The domestic courts are best placed for assessing the relevance of evidence to the issues in the case and for interpreting and applying rules of substantive and procedural law (see Pekinel v. Turkey, no. 9939/02, § 53, 18 March 2008). Therefore, this complaint should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
48. In respect of the complaint regarding enforcement of the right to alimony, the applicant did not complain to court about the bailiffs’ actions or inaction and thus failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies. As to the complaint about the length of the proceedings for deprivation of parental rights, it is lodged out of time. It follows that these complaints should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
49. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
50. The applicant requested that the Court award her just satisfaction in accordance with Article 41 of the Convention and in line with its case-law, without supplying a specific figure.
51. The Government argued that the applicant had not effectively submitted her claims for just satisfaction and stated that a finding of a violation would be sufficient in this respect.
52. The Court accepts that, having waited for years for the domestic courts to examine her claims, the applicant suffered certain frustration and distress. Deciding on an equitable basis, it awards her 2,900 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Default interest
53. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaints about undue length of the proceedings concerning housing and annulment of marriage and lack of effective remedies in that respect admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need for separate examination of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 2,900 (two thousand nine hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2011, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André WampachElisabeth Steiner Deputy Registrar President
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy