FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF RUDYCH v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 48874/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 February 2011
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Rudych v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, President,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
Julia Laffranque, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 18 January 2011,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 48874/06) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Mykola Vasylyovych Rudych (“the applicant”), on 25 November 2006.
2. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Yuriy Zaytsev.
3. On 24 June 2009 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol no. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Byshiv.
5. On an unspecified date in April 1998 he lodged an action against a collective farm B., seeking damages for a discrepancy in the calculation of compensation for his professional illness that had been paid since 1982. On 9 April 1998 the Makariv District Court (“the District Court”) opened proceedings.
6. In a judgment of 28 December 1998 it dismissed the applicant's action. On 6 April 1999 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed that judgment and ordered a fresh hearing.
7. On 20 April 2000 the District Court ordered an accounting expert examination. It held the next hearing on 2 June 2003.
8. On 4 July 2003 the Makariv Department of State Insurance Fund for Industrial Accidents and Diseases (“the Fund”) joined the proceedings as a second respondent and B. was replaced by its legal successor, private company L.
9. On 21 October 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicant's claim for damages that after a modification amounted to UAH 16,018 (EUR 2,563[1]). On 9 January 2004 the Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. On 9 February 2004 the applicant appealed in cassation.
10. On 17 May 2006 the Supreme Court rejected his appeal in cassation.
11. According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings, the applicant filed one procedural request and three appeals, one of which did not meet procedural requirements. Out of the sixteen hearings scheduled between April 1998 and May 2006, six were adjourned for unknown reasons, two were adjourned either at the applicant's request or due to his failure to attend, one was adjourned due to one of the respondents' failure to attend, one was adjourned for the parties to reach a friendly settlement, and two were adjourned for other reasons beyond parties' control.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
12. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
13. The Government contested that argument.
14. The period to be taken into consideration began on 9 April 1998 and ended on 17 May 2006. It thus lasted more than eight years and one month for three level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
15. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
16. The Government maintained that the parties to the proceedings had protracted the length of the proceedings by having filed their procedural requests and appeals. In particular, the applicant had requested an expert examination that had extended the consideration of the case for three years. According to the Government, the domestic courts had regularly scheduled the hearings and had caused no substantial delays attributable to the State.
17. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, e.g., Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
18. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant claimed damages for the discrepancy in the calculation of compensation that had been paid for his professional illness. The proceedings were therefore of some importance for him. Nonetheless, the Court does not find any ground for the domestic courts to deal with this case with particular urgency vis-à-vis other cases pending before them.
19. It further considers that the subject matter of the litigation was not complex.
20. With regard to the applicant's conduct, the Court admits that there were certain delays attributable to him (see paragraph 11 above): he requested the adjournment or failed to appear at two hearings and lodged one appeal that did not meet procedural requirements, which resulted in a delay of about four months. However, in respect of his procedural requests and properly filed appeals, the Court notes that he merely exercised his procedural rights and cannot be blamed for using the avenues available to him under the domestic law in order to protect his interests (see, Silin v. Ukraine, no. 23926/02, § 29, 13 July 2006).
21. As to the conduct of the national courts, the Court notes that the main delay in the proceedings took place after the expert examination was ordered. During that time, the first-instance court remained completely inactive for more than three years (see paragraph 7 above). The Court does not accept the Government's argument that the applicant was responsible for the delay. It further finds unusual and lacking due diligence the fact that the examination of the applicant's appeal in cassation lasted two years and three months, while one-month delay is attributable to the applicant (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). The Court reiterates that it is the role of the domestic courts to manage their proceedings so that they are expeditious and effective. It also finds that a remittal of the applicant's case for re-examination (see paragraph 6 above) significantly affected the length of the proceedings.
22. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above). Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
23. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER COMPLAINTS
24. The applicant further complained under Article 2 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of lack of compensation for his disability. He also alleged a violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention in respect of the courts' assessment of evidence and interpretation of the national law and challenged the outcome of the proceedings.
25. Having carefully examined the applicant's submissions in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.
26. It follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
27. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
28. The applicant submitted a claim for just satisfaction outside the time-limit fixed for this purpose. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the length of the proceedings;
3. Holds that there is no call to award the applicant any sum by way of just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 February 2011, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen PhillipsMirjana Lazarova Trajkovska
Deputy RegistrarPresident
[1]1. 1 UAH = 0.16 EUR.
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