FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF RUSNAKOVA v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 7575/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 January 2011
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Rusnakova v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Rait Maruste, President,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 14 December 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 7575/05) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Ms Mariya Pavlovna Rusnakova (“the applicant”), on 14 February 2005.
2. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev, of the Ministry of Justice.
3. On 24 November 2009 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Nikopol, the Dnipropetrovsk Region.
A. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
5. On 22 December 1987 the Nikopol Court found the applicant guilty of violating road traffic rules and sentenced her to a fine and withdrawal of her driving licence for three years. It allowed the civil claim of the victim R. and obliged the applicant to pay him a certain amount in compensation.
6. On 16 February 1988 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court quashed the judgment of 22 December 1987 as regards a part of R.’s claim for compensation, which did not concern the damaged parts of his car (see paragraph 7 below). It found that that part of the claim could be determined within the framework of civil proceedings. The remainder of the judgment of 22 December 1987 was upheld.
B. Civil proceedings instituted by the applicant
7. In July 1990 the applicant lodged a claim with the Nikopol Court for recovery of property from R. She sought recovery of the parts of the R.’s car (the damaged car body) which had been replaced by new ones at her expense.
8. Between July 1990 and September 1997 the case was re-examined on four occasions.
9. On 2 September 1997 the Nikopol Court ordered R. to pay the applicant 1,260.85 Ukrainian hryvnias[1] (UAH) in compensation for the value of the property claimed and court expenses.
10. In the course of the proceedings the car maintenance service joined the case as a co-respondent.
11. On 20 October 1997 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court quashed the judgment of 2 September 1997 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration.
12. On 7 December 1999 the Nikopol Court ordered an expert examination in the case.
13. On 12 June 2000 the Nikopol Court allowed the applicant’s claims against R. On 17 July 2000 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court quashed the judgment of 12 June 2000 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration.
14. On 28 January 2003 the Nikopol Court allowed the applicant’s claims against R.
15. On 22 May 2003 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court quashed the judgment of 28 January 2003 and discontinued proceedings in the case. It found that the issue of compensation for damage caused to the vehicle had been determined in the course of the criminal proceedings and that the applicant should have raised the claim within those proceedings. On 30 September 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of 22 May 2003.
16. In the course of the civil proceedings the applicant once requested the court to postpone a hearing. She also lodged requests for an expert examination, for experts to be summoned and for certain documents to be joined to the case. The respondent in the applicant’s case failed to appear before the court on twelve occasions.
THE LAW
I. THE COMPLAINT ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
17. The applicant complained that the length of the civil proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
18. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
19. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been excessive.
1. Period to be taken into consideration
20. The Government stated that the Court’s competence in the instant case extended only to the events which had taken place after 11 September 1997, the date of the entry of the Convention into force in respect of Ukraine.
21. The Court notes that the proceedings at issue began in July 1990, so part of the proceedings about which the applicant complains falls outside its jurisdiction ratione temporis. However, the Court may take note of the state of the proceedings on 11 September 1997 when examining the complaint as a whole (see, mutatis mutandis, Baggetta v. Italy, 25 June 1987, § 20, Series A no. 119, and Timotiyevich v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 63158/00, 18 May 2004).
22. As to the period after 11 September 1997, the Court notes that it lasted seven years and twenty one days (until 30 September 2004).
2. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
23. The Government submitted that the case had been examined without any substantial delays that could be attributed to the State. They further maintained that the civil proceedings had been complicated by the fact that they had been linked to the criminal proceedings against the applicant and involved several expert examinations. The Government argued that the delays in the proceedings had been caused by the parties’ behaviour.
24. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
25. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that, although it involved two expert examinations and there were a number of requests lodged by the applicant, the proceedings were eventually discontinued without any decision given on the merits. The Court further notes that the proceedings had been pending before the domestic courts for about seven years before 11 September 1997. In these circumstances, the alleged complexity of the case and the applicant’s behaviour alone cannot explain the lengthy period it took the domestic courts of three instances to come to the conclusion that the proceedings in the case were to be discontinued.
26. The Court also observes that the protraction of the proceedings was mainly caused by the repeated reconsideration of the case (see paragraphs 8, 11 and 13 above). The Court reiterates that, since remittal is usually ordered because of errors committed by lower courts, the repetition of such orders within one set of proceedings discloses a serious deficiency in the judicial system (see Wierciszewska v. Poland, no. 41431/98, § 46, 25 November 2003).
27. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above; Goncharov v. Ukraine, no. 7867/06, § 29, 10 December 2009; and Shastkiv and Valitska v. Ukraine, no. 3638/04, § 41, 30 July 2009).
28. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER COMPLAINTS
29. The applicant complained of a violation of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the outcome of the criminal and civil proceedings.
30. In the light of the materials in its possession, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
31. It follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
32. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
33. The applicant requested the Court to award her just satisfaction in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. She however did not specify her claims.
34. The Government submitted that there were no grounds to award just satisfaction to the applicant.
35. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage on account of the excessive length of the civil proceedings in her case. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards her 1,200 euros (EUR) under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
36. Without specifying the amount of her claim, the applicant requested the Court to award her compensation for the costs and expenses.
37. The Government agreed that the applicant must have incurred some expenses in corresponding with the Court.
38. The Court notes that the applicant provided relevant supporting documents for the amount of EUR 10 she had paid for corresponding with the Court. It therefore awards the applicant this amount for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
39. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant EUR 1,200 (one thousand two hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 10 (ten euros) for costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts, to be converted into national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 January 2011, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen PhillipsRait Maruste
Deputy RegistrarPresident
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