THIRD SECTION
CASE OF RUIZ-VILLAR RUIZ v. SPAIN
(Application no. 16476/11)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 December 2016
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Ruiz-Villar Ruiz v. Spain,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Helen Keller, President,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Alena Poláčková, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 29 November 2016,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 16476/11) against the Kingdom of Spain lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Spanish national, Mr Aníbal Ruiz-Villar Ruiz (“the applicant”), on 1 March 2011. The applicant died on 19 August 2013. Subsequently, the application was pursued on his behalf by his daughters, Ms Begoña Ruiz-Villar Fernández-Bravo and Ms. Carmen Ruiz-Villar Fernández-Bravo, and by his son Mr Aníbal Ruiz-Villar Fernández-Bravo.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr J.M. Pajares Villarroya, a lawyer practising in Madrid. The Spanish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr R.A. León Cavero, a State Attorney.
3. On 8 November 2013 the complaint concerning the length of proceedings was communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. On 8 July 1991 the Spanish State instituted proceedings before the Ciudad Real Judge of first instance No. 1 to obtain an order that the Ruidera Lakes (Lagunas de Ruidera), located on part of the land which belonged, partly, to the applicant’s mother (and which he inherited after her death), should be considered the source to the Guadiana River and was therefore in the hydraulic public domain.
5. On 27 March 2002 the Ciudad Real Judge ruled in favour of the applicant’s mother (and several other defendants) and declared that the Ruidera Lakes fell into the private domain. However, on 6 November 2003 the Ciudad Real Audiencia Provincial quashed that judgment and declared that the Ruidera Lakes had to be classified as being in the public domain.
6. The applicant’s mother, along with the other co-defendants, lodged an appeal on points of law (recurso de casación) with the Supreme Court. On 2 July 2004 the Ciudad Real Audiencia Provincial sent the complete file, along with the appeals lodged by the parties, to the Supreme Court. On 22 June 2009 the Supreme Court issued a judgment ruling against all the appellants and upholding the judgment of the Ciudad Real Audiencia Provincial.
7. On 4 September 2009 the applicant (as his mother’s heir with locus standi) lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court complaining, inter alia, of the excessive length of the proceedings. By a decision of 28 July 2010, served on the applicant on 2 September 2010, the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it had no constitutional relevance.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
8. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
9. The Government contested that argument.
10. The period to be taken into consideration began on 8 July 1991 when the Spanish Government lodged the complaint and ended on 2 September 2010 when the final decision by the Constitutional Court was dispatched and served to the applicant. It thus lasted for nineteen years over four levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
11. The Government contended that the applicant could have brought a claim regarding malfunctions in the Spanish administration of justice in accordance with section 292 et seq. of the Judicature Act of 1 July 1985 and section 139 et seq. of Law no. 30/1992 of 26 November 1992 on the rules governing public authorities and the common administrative procedure, and that therefore the Court should not award him any compensation, in line with the principle of subsidiarity in the Convention system.
12. The Court reiterates that the principle of subsidiarity set forth in Article 35 of the Convention is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity to prevent or put right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Convention institutions (see, for example, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 74, ECHR 1999 V).
13. Additionally, according to the Court’s case-law, an applicant must have made normal use of domestic remedies which are likely to be effective and sufficient and, when a remedy has been pursued, use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required (see Günaydin v. Turkey (dec.), no. 27526/95, 25 April 2002; and Anagnostopoulos v. Greece, no. 54589/00, § 32, 3 April 2003).
14. In the instant case, the Court observes that the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court, complaining of the excessive length of the proceedings. The amparo appeal was declared inadmissible by a decision of 28 July 2010. The Court notes that the amparo appeal was the main legal avenue available to the applicant to obtain the redress sought.
15. The Court further observes, as it found in the judgment in the case of García Mateos v. Spain (no. 38285/09, 19 February 2013), that it would be excessive to ask the applicant to pursue yet another set of proceedings in order to be able to be awarded compensation for the excessive length of proceedings (ibid., § 31).
16. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
17. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
18. The Government asserted in particular that the proceedings at issue in the present case were, by their very nature, complex. In particular, they argued that the complexity of the proceedings had been made even greater by the large number of parties involved (which included several third parties), the fact that several expert opinions had been requested and that the case file was voluminous.
19. The Court, while acknowledging the complexity of proceedings such as the present ones, has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising similar issues (see, in particular, Walder v. Austria, no. 33915/96, § 28, 30 January 2001, and Klug v. Austria, no. 33928/05, § 37, 15 January 2009, both relating to land consolidation proceedings which took twenty-two years and twenty years respectively).
20. The Government were also of the opinion that the length of the proceedings had been partly attributable to the behavior of some of the defendants, who had been over-exploiting the aquifer and thus hindering the work of several expert witnesses in charge of analysing and issuing their opinion on the matter. However, the Court observes that the alleged behaviour of some of the defendants and their influence on the length of the proceedings has not been sufficiently proved by the Government.
21. Additionally, the Court finds that from April 1994 to January 2000 the proceedings were suspended and that those lengthy periods of inactivity were not attributable to the applicant or any other party. Indeed, the Court finds no justification – nor has any been put forward by the Government – for such delays.
22. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
A. Damages
23. The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
24. Additionally, the Government submitted that there was no causal link between the violation found and the non-pecuniary damage alleged and that no related documents to corroborate such damage had been provided by the applicant.
25. In the present case, the Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. The Court considers that it should award the full sum claimed.
B. Costs and expenses
26. The applicant also claimed EUR 2,904 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
27. The Government objected and argued that the amount was excessive.
28. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the full sum claimed for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
29. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR 2,904 (two thousand nine hundred and four euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 December 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş AracıHelen Keller
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy