CASE OF SAHAKYAN AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF SAHAKYAN AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA

(Application no. 51756/16)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

18 December 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Sahakyan and Others v. Armenia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Gilberto Felici, President,
 Mykola Gnatovskyy,
 Vahe Grigoryan, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 51756/16) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 9 August 2016 by three Armenian nationals (“the applicants”), whose relevant details are listed in the appended table, who were represented by Mr A. Ghazaryan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan, and Mr A. Zeynalyan, a non‑practising lawyer;

the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning the quashing of a final judgment in the applicants’ favour to the Armenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 27 November 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The present case concerns an alleged breach of the principle of legal certainty on account of the quashing of a final judgment in the applicants’ favour. They complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

2.  The applicants were, at the time of their application, members of New Generation Humanitarian, a non-governmental organisation whose goals include, among other things, to protect human rights, promote gender equality and diversity, and fight against stigma and discrimination.

3.  On 16 May 2014 Radio Liberty held an online press conference on Facebook, during which the Armenian jury members of the 2014 Eurovision Song Contest said that they had awarded the lowest points to Conchita Wurst – a homosexual, cross‑dressing man who had won that year’s competition – because of their “internal revulsion”, adding that “just as mentally ill people cause[d] aversion, so [did] such phenomena”. Many of the participants in the press conference, including the applicants, challenged the jury members by commenting on the Facebook press conference page (the third applicant posted a recording of the conference).

4.  On 17 May 2014 an article was published on the website of Iravunk (Law) newspaper, written and signed by its editor-in-chief, H.G., entitled “They serve the interests of the international homosexual lobby: the blacklist of enemies of the nation and the State” (see Minasyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 59180/15, §§ 6-9, 7 January 2025 for a detailed description of the publication in question). The article was followed by a list of hyperlinks to a number of Facebook profiles, including those of the applicants.

5.  On 29 May 2014 the applicants requested a retraction and an apology from the chairman of the editorial board of the newspaper, H.B., who was also an MP for the ruling Republican Party. No reply followed.

6.  On 19 June 2014 the applicants lodged a civil claim against H.G. and H.B. (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above), seeking a retraction of the article and a public apology published in the newspaper.

7.  On 25 June 2014 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”) notified the parties, including H.B., of the proceedings and the date of the preliminary hearing (4 September 2014).

8.  On 24 November 2014 the applicants lodged a further claim against the newspaper (with a mention of H.B.’s name) and H.G., requesting that the newspaper retract the article and publish the judicial decision adopted in respect of their claim, and that H.G. publicly apologise for insulting them and pay each applicant 3,000,000 Armenian drams (AMD – equivalent to approximately 5,800 euros (EUR) at the material time) for damage caused by the defamatory statements.

9.  On 15 December 2014 the respondents’ (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above) representative filed written submissions in reply, arguing, inter alia, that H.B. was not a proper respondent in the proceedings since the online outlet of the newspaper was owned by a legal entity, Iravunk Media LLC. Therefore, H.B. could not be held personally responsible for the content of the website.

10.  On 17 December 2014 the applicants lodged a further claim against the newspaper (Iravunk Media LLC) and H.G. as co-respondents, seeking a retraction by the newspaper of the defamatory statements contained in the article, a public apology by H.G. and the payment by him of AMD 3,000,000 (equivalent to approximately EUR 5,550 at the material time) in damages to each applicant for the defamatory and insulting statements he had made and an acknowledgment of incitement by H.G. to hatred and discrimination.

11.  By a judgment of 14 May 2015 (which mentioned Iravunk Media LLC and H.G. as respondents), the District Court granted the applicants’ claim in part. It ordered that the newspaper (Iravunk Media LLC) publish a retraction of the article and that H.G. publicly apologise to the applicants for his defamatory and insulting statements. Additionally, the District Court ordered H.G. to pay damages of a total amount of AMD 250,000 (equivalent to approximately EUR 460 at the material time) to each applicant. Neither the reasoning of the judgment nor its operative part contained any provision that would affect any right or obligation of H.B. in the context of the dispute.

12.  H.G. and the director of Iravunk Media LLC lodged an appeal, as did the applicants.

13.  On 8 October 2015 the Civil Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the District Court’s judgment in full.

14.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law.

15.  H.G. and Iravunk Media LLC also lodged an appeal on points of law. On 2 December 2015 the Court of Cassation returned their appeal, giving them three days to correct procedural errors as indicated. By a decision of 13 January 2016, the Court of Cassation left their resubmitted appeal without examination because they had introduced another procedural mistake.

16.  By a decision of 20 January 2016, the Court of Cassation refused to grant the applicants leave to appeal. The court held that the decision was final and not subject to appeal.

17.  H.G. and the director of Iravunk Media LLC lodged two further appeals on points of law (see paragraph 15 above). By decisions of 11 March and 13 April 2016, the Court of Cassation left those appeals unexamined.

18.  On 30 March 2016 H.B. (see paragraph 5 above) lodged an appeal against the District Court’s judgment of 14 May 2015 (see paragraph 11 above). H.B. requested the court to restore the missed time-limit for appealing against the judgment, arguing that his procedural rights as a party to the proceedings had been breached. Although he had been notified of the date of the preliminary hearing and had received a copy of the applicants’ claim together with the supporting documents (see paragraph 7 above), he had never been notified of the further hearings and had learned about the outcome of the proceedings from the public online judicial database only on 11 March 2016, when the judgment (see paragraph 11 above) had already become final. H.B. referred to, inter alia, the applicants’ further claim of 24 November 2014, which had mentioned him as respondent (see paragraph 8 above).

19.  On 2 May 2016 the Court of Appeal granted H.B.’s request to restore the missed time-limit for appeal and admitted his appeal for examination with reference to, in particular, Article 77 of the former Code of Civil Procedure (in force until 9 April 2018). In doing so, it stated that H.B. had missed the time‑limit for appealing against the District Court’s judgment “for reasons beyond his control”, since he had not been served with a copy of the judgment in due time.

20.  On 26 May 2016 the Court of Appeal quashed the District Court’s judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination as regards the applicants’ claims that had been granted by that judgment.

21.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of the Court of Appeal of 26 May 2016, arguing that it had been in breach of the res judicata principle.

22.  According to the applicants, on 20 July 2016 the Court of Cassation rejected the admissibility of their appeal. The Government did not comment on the matter.

23.  Further to the remittal of the case for fresh examination, the proceedings were still pending as of May 2021.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

24.  The applicants complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 14 May 2015 had been in breach of the principle of legal certainty guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

25.  The Court notes that the applicants did not provide a copy of the Court of Cassation’s decision of 20 July 2016 (see paragraph 22 above). The Court is, however, not called upon to decide whether the applicants exhausted the domestic remedies available to them – in the present case by having lodged a proper appeal on points of law – given that the Government did not raise a non‑exhaustion plea (see, mutatis mutandis, Dobrev v. Bulgaria, no. 55389/00, §§ 112-13, 10 August 2006; Solovyev v. Russia, no. 2708/02, § 124, 24 May 2007; and Iskandarov v. Russia, no. 17185/05, § 121, 23 September 2010).

26.  This complaint must therefore be declared admissible as it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and neither is it inadmissible on any other grounds.

27.  The right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty, encompasses the requirement that, where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII). A departure from that principle is justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character, such as the correction of fundamental defects or a miscarriage of justice (see Karen Poghosyan v. Armenia, no. 62356/09, § 44, 31 March 2016, and Tığrak v. Turkey, no. 70306/10, § 48, 6 July 2021 for a recapitulation of the relevant case-law principles). In cases where the principle of legal certainty is in issue, the Court has emphasised that respect for the principle of res judicata is imperative in that, by safeguarding the finality of judgments and the rights of the parties to the proceedings, it serves to ensure the stability of the judicial system and contributes to public confidence in the courts (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 238, 1 December 2020).

28.  In admitting H.B.’s belated appeal, the Court of Appeal relied on Article 77 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which, as in force at the material time, allowed a court, further to a party’s request, to restore a missed procedural time-limit if it considered the reasons for missing the relevant time-limit valid. It decided to admit H.B.’s out-of-time appeal for examination, which eventually led to the quashing of the final judgment in the applicants’ favour and fresh examination of the case with the result that the civil proceedings in question were still pending as of May 2021 (see paragraphs 19, 20 and 23 above). In doing so, the Court of Appeal accepted H.B.’s argument that he had been a party to the proceedings in question and had been unable to lodge a timely appeal because he had learned about the outcome of the proceedings only after a final judicial decision had been taken (see paragraph 18 above).

29.  While the renewal or the extension of the time‑limit for an ordinary appeal remains primarily within the domestic courts’ discretion, such discretion is not unlimited. The courts are required in every case to indicate the reasons for their decision, as well as to verify whether the reasons for renewal of a time-limit for appeal could justify the interference with the principle of res judicata, especially when the domestic legislation does not limit the courts’ discretion either on the time or on the grounds for the renewal of the time-limits (see, mutatis mutandis, Ponomaryov v. Ukraine, no. 3236/03, §§ 41-42, 3 April 2008, and Bezrukovy v. Russia, no. 34616/02, §§ 33-44, 10 May 2012).

30.  The applicants’ initial claim indicated H.B as respondent along with H.G. (see paragraph 6 above) and the latter’s name was also mentioned in the applicants’ further claim (see paragraph 10 above). However, after H.B.’s lawyer objected to H.B. being a proper respondent in the case (see paragraph 9 above), the applicants submitted a further claim in which only the newspaper and H.G. were indicated as respondents (see paragraph 10 above). While there was apparently no formal decision to replace H.B. with a proper defendant, the District Court’s judgment mentioned the newspaper and H.G. as respondents and, most importantly, its ruling concerned those parties alone (see paragraph 11 above). Furthermore, H.B. lodged his appeal on 30 March 2016, after several failed attempts (in December and January 2015) by the newspaper and H.G. to appeal against the judgment in question, and simultaneously to their further attempts (see paragraphs 15, 17 and 18 above).

31.  Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal, without any analysis of the above‑mentioned facts or of the procedural history of the case (see paragraph 19 above), granted H.B. leave to appeal against the District Court’s judgment, which had no implications for him personally and despite the fact that H.B.’s own lawyer had argued that he was not a proper respondent in the case (see paragraph 9 above). Nor did the Court of Appeal provide any reasons for accepting that H.B., who from the outset had been notified of the proceedings (see paragraph 7 above) and who was the chairman of the editorial board of the newspaper, which, along with its editor-in-chief, was involved in litigation against the applicants, had found out about the decisions taken in those proceedings only on 11 March 2016 as a result of consulting the public online judicial database (see paragraph 18 above).

32.  The Court, therefore, finds that the Court of Appeal failed to comply with its duty to verify whether there were sufficient reasons justifying the admission of an out-of-time appeal (see, mutatis mutandis, Karen Poghosyan, cited above, § 50).

33.  In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that, by admitting the out‑of-time appeal lodged by H.B. against the District Court’s judgment of 14 May 2015, the Court of Appeal failed to provide reasons of a substantial and compelling character and thereby infringed the principle of legal certainty, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

34.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

35.  The applicants claimed 2,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 2,902 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

36.  The Government contested those claims.

37.  The Court awards each applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

38.  Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the first applicant EUR 1,347 covering costs for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the first applicant.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros) to each of the applicants, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 1,347 (one thousand three hundred and forty-seven euros) to the first applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the first applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 December 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Martina Keller Gilberto Felici
 Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of applicants:

No.

Applicant’s Name

Year of birth

Place of residence

1.

Arman SAHAKYAN

1988

Yerevan

2.

Grigor GEVORGYAN

1992

Etchmiatsin

3.

Hovhanes MKRTCHYAN

1994

Artashat