FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF SAMANYUK v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 65686/17)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18 June 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Samanyuk v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Andreas Zünd,
Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 65686/17) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 23 August 2017 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Yakiv Yakovych Samanyuk (“the applicant”), who was born in 1957 and lives in Mykulychyn, and was represented by Ms V. Lysenko and Ms G. Zakharchuk, lawyers practising in Yaremche;
the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (alleged unfair court proceedings, including application of the statute of limitations, resulting in the unlawful and disproportionate deprivation of the applicant’s land bought from the local authorities) to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the decision to request further observations from the parties under Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court concerning the alleged lack of sufficient reasons in the Supreme Court’s decision to reject the applicant’s request for review on the basis of divergent case law; and
the parties’ observations and their additional observations;
Having deliberated in private on 28 May 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The present case concerns the invalidation of the applicant’s entitlement to land, which he had been using for years to run a café, as it fell within the railway exclusion zone. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
2. In 2002, following a relevant decision of the local authorities, the applicant bought from them a plot of land for the construction of a café. In 2004 he also leased an adjacent plot of land on which to install a summer terrace. Both plots of land were located in the immediate vicinity of a railway track. The applicant obtained all necessary approvals and permits for his land and had his titles duly formalised. He had been openly using the land and the buildings for his business.
3. In 2014, following an inspection, the national railway company, Ukrzaliznytsya (“the Railways”), initiated proceedings to have the sale and the lease of land to the applicant invalidated, as that land was allegedly located within the railway exclusion zone. The key question before the courts was whether the Railways had to have a duly formalised (registered) title to the land, or whether the technical documentation for the railway construction dating from the 1950s and the 1990s was enough to confirm their rights to the land with the special status of “land of transport” (see, for a similar factual situation and relevant domestic law, Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine, nos. 27849/15 and 33358/15, §§ 8-12, 16-19 and 21-22, 24 October 2024). During the proceedings, the applicant also argued that the Railways had missed the statutory three-year limitation period for the submission of their claim, which had to have been calculated from the date of the registration of his title and not from the date of the 2014 inspection.
4. After two re-examinations of the case, the Railways’ claims were eventually granted. The courts found that the technical documentation for the railway construction clearly specified the width of the exclusion zone in the area concerned and that this constituted sufficient grounds to classify the land as “land of transport”. Considering that both plots of land in issue were situated within the boundaries of that exclusion zone and could not be transferred into private hands, the courts concluded that they had to be reclaimed from the applicant. The courts also rejected the applicant’s argument regarding the limitation period, finding that it was in 2014 that the Railways had found out about the violation of their rights to the land.
5. At the stage of the examination of the case in the Higher Commercial Court, the claims regarding the lease and those regarding the sale were effectively “separated” in two sets of proceedings. The final judgments were adopted by the Higher Commercial Court on 20 December 2016 and 24 October 2017, respectively.
6. The applicant sought a review of those judgments by the Supreme Court of Ukraine on the basis of divergent application of law. He relied on several court judgments adopted previously, which he considered factually and legally similar, on the issues of both proof of property rights and the application of the statute of limitations. As regards the issues related to property rights, he mentioned cases nos. 926/1018/14 and 926/584/14, in which the Higher Commercial Court had rejected the Railways’ claims regarding certain plots of land in the Chernivtsi Region, which allegedly fell within railway exclusion zones, on the grounds that the Railways had failed to prove that they had duly formalised their rights to that land and expressly rejecting, in that connection, the reliance on technical documentation in respect of railway construction.
7. In rulings of 10 March 2017 and 1 March 2018, the Supreme Court refused to open review proceedings into the applicant’s requests. In the ruling dated 1 March 2018, delivered in the proceedings concerning the sale of the land, the Supreme Court started by emphasising that its jurisdiction mainly consisted of resolving inconsistencies in the domestic case-law by guiding the lower courts in the application of law in similar legal matters. It then restated the findings of the lower courts in the applicant’s case and in those cases which he had advanced as examples of divergent application of law, including cases nos. 926/1018/14 and 926/584/14 mentioned above. The Supreme Court further stated as follows:
“Therefore, the comparison of the contents of the above-mentioned [higher courts’] decisions with the conclusions [reached in the applicant’s case], which are the subject of the present request for review, does not give grounds to consider that there has been a divergent application by a cassation court of the same provisions of material law which led to the delivery of divergent court decisions in similar legal circumstances ...
In view of the [considerations] above, in the present case in which a request for review has been submitted and in the cases which resulted in the delivery of judgments provided for comparison, the subject matter of the claims and the normative regulation of legal circumstances involved are not similar and the courts have adopted their decisions depending on the particular circumstances of each case.”
8. In their further submissions, the parties informed the Court that in 2024 the Railways had initiated another set of proceedings against the applicant, seeking to have the plots of land on which the café stood vacated. Those claims had been rejected by the local and appellate courts, which had found that even though in previous proceedings the applicant’s entitlement to the land had been invalidated, he had been a bona fide owner of the real estate which he had been, at least until 2014, openly using without any objection (or any action) on the part of the Railways. The ordering of demolition without any compensation would, therefore, constitute an excessive burden on the applicant. In so concluding, the courts referred to, inter alia, the Court’s findings in Rysovskyy v. Ukraine (no. 29979/04, 20 October 2011) and Drozdyk and Mikula (cited above). On 27 August 2025 the Supreme Court refused to review the case on a cassation appeal lodged by the Railways.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 of Protocol no. 1 to THE CONVENTION9. The applicant complained that he had been unlawfully deprived of property which he had acquired in good faith and that no compensation had been offered to him. He also emphasised that the relevant approvals and permits had been obtained before the land had been transferred to him. He considered the courts’ judgments, in which they eventually ruled to his detriment, ill-founded.
10. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as he had not lodged a claim for damages following the invalidation of his title. They referred to several provisions of the Civil Code, arguing that the applicant could have either claimed damages as provided for in Article 1173 (on the obligation of public authorities to provide compensation for damage caused by their unlawful decisions, actions or omissions) or under Article 216 (on the legal consequences of the invalidity of a deed). Alternatively, he could also have claimed damages under Article 390 in relation to investments he had made in respect of the maintenance of the property. They provided examples from domestic case‑law. Lastly, they asserted that the applicant could have applied to the authorities to obtain another plot of land, but had not availed himself of that remedy.
11. Alternatively, as regards admissibility, the Government argued that the applicant could not claim to have had a “legitimate expectation”, as he had obtained the land in breach of the law. His complaint was thus manifestly ill-founded.
12. On the merits, the Government conceded that the invalidation of the applicant’s title to the land in question had constituted an interference with his property rights, but they contended that it had been lawful, as it had been based on relevant provisions of domestic laws on rights to land. The interference had also pursued a public interest, namely the protection of land serving transport facilities and its safe use. Under the proportionality head, they reiterated their argument that the applicant should have lodged a claim for damages at the domestic level. They further asserted that the applicant had not been precluded from continuing his business activities, which was, in their view, the thrust of his complaints.
13. The Court notes at the outset that, in the framework of the present case, it will only deal with the applicant’s complaints related to the plot of land which was purchased from the local authorities, as his relevant complaints in respect of the leased land were rejected as inadmissible by the Vice-President acting as a single judge at the stage of notification of the application to the Government.
14. The Court, furthermore, reiterates that the existence of a remedy that might have allowed an applicant to obtain compensation but would not have led to the reinstatement of title should be taken into account, not in the context of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, but for the purposes of assessing the proportionality of the interference and the calculation of pecuniary damage if a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is found (see, for example, Batkivska Turbota Foundation v. Ukraine, no. 5876/15, § 47, 9 October 2018). The Government’s arguments as to any compensation the applicant might have obtained will, therefore, be addressed in the framework of the Court’s assessment on the merits below, as will the Government’s assertion that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
15. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
16. The Court considers that the invalidation of the applicant’s duly registered and longstanding title to the disputed land constituted an interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
17. The general principles regarding interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions have been summarised in, for example, Kryvenkyy v. Ukraine (no. 43768/07, § 42, 16 February 2017). In particular, the Court must assess whether the interference was lawful and was effected in the public interest, and whether it pursued a legitimate aim by means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.
18. The Court observes that the crux of the present case is the question of proportionality of the interference. In a similar case, in which an applicant was deprived of land which he had bought from the local authorities, the Court found no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Zvonar v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 20532/16, 20 November 2025). In that case, the Court held, in particular, that the land had been bought under a contract of sale entered into with a local authority which had acted in the circumstances as any other private party under a civil contract would have done, and its actions in that regard had therefore been governed by the provisions of civil law, including in what concerns the consequences of invalidation of a contract of sale and the possibility of obtaining compensation for the amount paid (ibid., § 29). Considering that Ukrainian civil law provided for a compensatory mechanism which did not seem manifestly ineffective or inaccessible (ibid., § 34, with further references), the Court held that the applicant should have tried to obtain compensation for the reclaimed property (ibid., § 35, with further references; see also, mutatis mutandis, SAN11, TOV v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 42402/17, §§ 27-28 and 30, 23 October 2025; contrast Kosmatska v. Ukraine, no. 9953/16, § 48, 4 December 2025).
19. The Court sees no reason to depart from that conclusion in the present case. The applicant has not advanced any argument as to why he did not try to reclaim the money he had paid for the land or why that might have been impossible or inaccessible. Neither did he contend that such compensation, if it had been duly sought, would not have been adequate. The applicant has also not argued that he was at present precluded from making use of that opportunity.
20. In view of the above, the Court finds that the interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 did not breach the requirement that a fair balance be struck between the individual’s Convention rights and the public interest.
21. It follows that there has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
alleged violation of article 6 of the convention22. The applicant complained that the Supreme Court had failed to duly examine his well-reasoned request for review of the case on the basis of divergent application of law and had thus failed to ensure uniformity of domestic case-law.
23. The Government argued that the Supreme Court had duly examined the applicant’s case and had provided clear reasons for rejecting his request for review, particularly as regards the question of proof in respect of property rights. They also provided a detailed analysis of cases nos. 914/4649/13 and 363/100/15-ц in the context of divergent case-law on the question of application of the statute of limitations. The Government have not explained why they provided such an extensive analysis of judgments in cases which were not, apparently, relied on by the applicant (at least, as it appears from the documents available to the Court) and had not been analysed by the Supreme Court in its ruling.
24. The Government also emphasised the Court’s subsidiary role and that it was not for it to question the domestic courts’ conclusions as to facts or their interpretation of domestic law. Overall, they considered that the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-founded or that there had been no violation of his rights.
25. The Court notes at the outset that it has already examined the status and powers of the Supreme Court at they stood at the relevant time and found that, in respect of requests for review on grounds of pre-existing case-law, it was not an extraordinary review instance but an ultimate element in the chain of domestic remedies at the disposal of the parties. Therefore, where Convention issues subsequently raised before the Court stemmed from or were sufficiently related to pre-existing case-law divergence, the possibility of submitting an application for review to the Supreme Court on grounds of that divergence could be considered an effective domestic remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Vestra PP and others v. Ukraine ((dec.), no. 60680/16, §§ 48-50, 2 September 2025).
26. In the present case, the applicant sought review of his case by the Supreme Court precisely on the grounds of divergence between the higher courts’ conclusions in previous cases and those in his own case. He thus made use of an ordinary remedy available in the domestic legal order and, therefore, all guarantees of Article 6 applied in those proceedings.
27. In particular, Article 6 § 1 requires domestic courts to give reasons for their judgments. The relevant general principles on this matter have been summarised in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal ([GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, §§ 185 and 186, 6 November 2018, with further references). The Court also reiterates that it should not act as a court of fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the judgment of the national courts, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015, with further references).
28. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the key question with which the domestic courts had to deal was whether the Railways had duly proved their title to the relevant land and, in particular, which evidence they had to provide to prove that – a duly registered title or existing technical documentation in respect of railway construction (see paragraph 3 above). They eventually concluded that technical documentation was sufficient grounds to classify a plot of land as “land of transport”, thus belonging to the Railways. In his request for review, the applicant advanced examples of higher courts’ judgments which he considered contained an opposite conclusion in respect of that same legal matter and thus warranted examination by the Supreme Court to resolve possible divergent application of law. It appears that the two previous judgments he mentioned concerned, or at least to a great extent resembled, the same legal matters as those raised in his own case, and even involved the same party – the Railways (see paragraph 6 above).
29. In reply, in its ruling of 1 March 2018, the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s request, finding that the judgments he had relied on could not serve as “comparators” to establish divergent application of law. It did so in a rather summary manner without giving any detailed explanation (see paragraph 7 above), although even the Supreme Court’s own restatement of the facts of the applicant’s case and of the previous cases he had relied on showed that they were very similar, and even a lay person might have raised reasonable questions in that regard. In view of these circumstances, the Court cannot but conclude that in such situation detailed reasoning was required.
30. The Court therefore considers that the Supreme Court failed in its duty to provide reasons for its decisions and did not address pertinent and important arguments raised by the applicant. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
REMAINING COMPLAINTS31. The applicant also raised other complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (application of the statute of limitations, disregarding of certain evidence). The Court has examined that part of the application and considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.
32. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
33. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Declares the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (deprivation of the applicant’s land bought from the local authorities) and under Article 6 (lack of sufficient reasons in the Supreme Court’s ruling of 1 March 2018) admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;Holds that there has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 June 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Registrar President