CASE OF SAVCHENKO v. UKRAINE

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF SAVCHENKO v. UKRAINE

(Application no. 1574/06)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

22 September 2016

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Savchenko v. Ukraine,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Khanlar Hajiyev, President,
Faris Vehabović,
Carlo Ranzoni, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 30 August 2016,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 1574/06) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Savchenko (“the applicant”), on 23 December 2005.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr E.V. Markov, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented most recently by their Acting Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna of the Ministry of Justice.

3. The applicant complained, in particular, of two episodes of ill‑treatment by the police and of the lack of an effective investigation into them. He further alleged that his pre-trial detention had been unlawful and excessively long and that he had been denied a proper judicial review of its lawfulness. The applicant also complained that he had not had an effective and enforceable right to compensation for his detention in contravention of Article 5 of the Convention. He complained next that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been excessive and that he had not had an effective domestic remedy in respect of that complaint. Lastly, the applicant complained that the authorities had denied him the opportunity to obtain copies of documents from his case file which he had wished to submit to the Court to substantiate his application.

4. On 29 August 2013 the above complaints were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1973 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Sokyryany Prison no. 67.

A. The applicant’s arrest on 18 September 2001, his alleged ill‑treatment by the police and the investigation into the matter

6. In September 2001 the applicant and an acquaintance, F., decided to carry out a carjacking. On the night of 17-18 September 2001 they stopped a taxi for that purpose. F. shot the driver in the head and the two then took him to a forest, where F. and the applicant fired several more shots into the victim and abandoned the body. According to the applicant, he believed that the driver was already dead when he shot at him. When driving the car later on, the applicant and F. encountered the traffic police who ordered them to stop. They did not obey the order and attempted to flee. The applicant threw a grenade at the police, but it went wide. Eventually F., who was driving, lost control of the car, which caused it to stop. The applicant opened fire and seriously wounded one of the police officers.

7. In order to overcome the applicant’s resistance, the police officers hit him on the head several times with the handle of a gun. He lost consciousness and was handcuffed. His apprehension took place at about 3 a.m. on 18 September 2001.

8. While the parties were not in dispute as regards the facts summarised above, their account of subsequent events differed.

9. According to the Government, no further coercive measures were used against the applicant.

10. According to the applicant, he was seriously ill-treated after his arrest and his account of subsequent events is as follows. In his application form he submitted that once the police had seen him regain consciousness, at about 5 a.m., they had taken him to the Suvorivskyy district police station where they had beaten him. In his observations in reply to those of the Government, the applicant added that he had also been beaten in the two hours between his apprehension and transportation to the police station. The applicant also alleged that upon his arrival at the police station the officers had thrown him to the floor and had started kicking and punching him and hitting him with rubber truncheons. They had allegedly sought to take revenge on him for wounding their colleague and to make him confess to the criminal offences under investigation. The applicant’s beating had allegedly continued until 7 or 8 a.m.

11. At an unspecified time on the morning of 18 September 2001 a forensic medical expert examined the applicant. As noted in the report of the examination, the applicant was 195 cm tall and was of strong constitution. The following injuries were detected: four painful swellings (two of which were coupled with sores) of up to 4 cm in diameter on the back part of the head and on both temples, two oval bruises on the forehead of 8 x 5 cm and 5 x 4 cm, bruises on both eyelids, a slightly swollen bridge of the nose, bruises on the sides of the nose extending to the eyelids, and linear sores on both wrists. The expert found that the applicant could have sustained the injuries in question in the course of his arrest. The applicant stated to the expert that he had not been beaten in police custody.

12. According to the applicant, his medical examination was limited to the visible parts of his body not covered by clothes, and the expert failed to document the many bruises that covered the rest of his body. The applicant also alleged that the police officers had talked to the doctor in private before the examination. Furthermore, they had allegedly threatened the applicant that if he complained they would kill him.

13. As further submitted by the applicant, on 29 September 2001 the police tried to transfer him from the Kherson Temporary Detention Facility (“the ITT”, part of the police system) to the Kherson Pre-Trial Detention Centre (“the SIZO”), but the SIZO’s administration refused to admit him because of his many injuries.

14. On 5 October 2001 the applicant was transferred to the SIZO, where a doctor examined him. No injuries were documented. The applicant submitted to the Court, without providing any further details, that the report of the examination had been wrongly dated as 8 October 2001 (instead of 5 October) and that it had been false.

15. The applicant stated that throughout his detention in the ITT, from 18 September to 5 October 2001, he had been subjected to torture such as the administration of electric shocks, being suspended from a horizontal metal bar while his hands were handcuffed behind his back, suffocation with a gas mask and plastic bag, and having his fingers crushed in doors. The applicant also alleged that police officers had jumped on his chest from a desk while he lay on the floor.

16. With his observations to the Court of 16 July 2014 the applicant submitted a handwritten copy of a complaint to the Kherson regional prosecutor’s office (“the Kherson prosecutor’s office”) dated 5 October 2001 (with a handwritten confirmation by two inmates that the applicant had handed the complaint to the guard on duty for dispatching). He complained about his “continual beating, torture and humiliation” following his arrest on 18 September and during his detention in the ITT. He further submitted that the medical examination of 18 September 2001 had been incomplete and that the Kherson SIZO had disregarded his requests for a medical examination and the documentation of various injuries, which he did not specify.

17. According to another, similar handwritten note submitted to the Court on 16 July 2014, the applicant had on 7 October 2001 complained to the governor of the Kherson SIZO that the guards had torn up his complaints to the prosecution authorities on 5 and 6 October 2001. He also complained that although he had been taken to the SIZO on 5 October 2001 with injuries all over his body, the SIZO official on duty had rejected his request for a medical examination.

18. According to the applicant, on 9 October 2001 he sent another complaint to the Kherson prosecutor’s office.

19. On 18 February 2002 a forensic medical report was issued in respect of the applicant’s injuries following his arrest. Having studied the case file, the forensic expert stated that the applicant had had a hemorrhage in the soft tissues of his head, sores and bruises on his face and scalp, and sores on his wrists. The injuries in question could have been inflicted on 18 September 2001 in the circumstances the applicant had described during his questioning as an accused (that is resulting from being hit on the head with the handle of a gun). The expert classified the injuries as minor. There is no further information in the case file about the report or where it was used.

20. The applicant raised his complaint of ill-treatment during his trial at the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal (“the Kherson Court”, see, in particular, paragraphs 40 and 41 below). As a result, on 21 May 2003 a trial court judge requested that the Kherson prosecutor’s office carry out an investigation into the matter.

21. On 30 May 2003 the Kherson prosecutor’s office refused to open a criminal case against the police officers for lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The prosecutor relied on the statements of the police officers, who denied ill-treating the applicant and his co-defendants, as well as on documents from the SIZO administration, which stated that no injuries had been found on the defendants during their medical examinations and that they had not raised any complaints. According to the applicant, he had only been able to familiarise himself with the prosecutor’s decision after almost a year, on 2 March 2004.

22. As the applicant and his co-defendants maintained their complaints during the trial, in June 2003 the judge once again requested that the prosecution authorities investigate the matter.

23. On 7 November 2003 the Kherson prosecutor’s office again refused to open a criminal case against the police officers, using the same reasoning as before.

24. The applicant challenged that decision before the courts.

25. On 30 July 2004 a judge at the Kherson Komsomolskyy District Court (“the Komsomolskyy Court”), following a hearing which included the prosecutor but not the applicant or his lawyer, dismissed the applicant’s complaint as unfounded.

26. On 7 September 2004 the Kherson Court quashed that decision as being formalistic and lacking reasoning. It remitted the case to the same court for fresh examination by a different judge.

27. On 10 September 2004 the Komsomolskyy Court once again dismissed the applicant’s complaint. This time the applicant’s lawyer was present at the hearing. The judge heard the parties and studied the case file. He noted that the prosecutor had rightly dismissed the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment after questioning all those involved and studying the relevant reports on the medical examinations.

28. On 19 October 2004 the Kherson Court, siting as a panel of three judges, upheld that decision and its reasoning.

29. On 3 December 2004 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal against the above decisions on points of law on the ground that the criminal proceedings against him were still pending.

B. Criminal proceedings against the applicant and his detention

30. On 18 September 2001, at about 3 a.m., the applicant was arrested by the traffic police. At 10 a.m. the police drew up a report about his arrest. He was placed in the Kherson ITT.

31. On the same date criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of aggravated robbery and murder, illegal arms handling and an attempt on the life of law-enforcement officials. By that time there were already other criminal proceedings pending against him.

32. On an unspecified date further charges were brought against the applicant and several other people. Overall, the criminal proceedings in question involved twelve suspects and concerned twelve episodes of criminal activity, including numerous counts of theft, robbery and murder, committed between 1998 and 2001.

33. On 22 September 2001 the Komsomolskyy Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention for an initial period of two months. The court referred to the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and noted that he might abscond or hinder the investigation if at liberty. That decision could be challenged on appeal within three days of its pronouncement. The hearing took place in the presence of the prosecutor, but in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer. According to a handwritten note with the judge’s signature, the applicant was told of the decision on the day it was pronounced. The applicant, however, said that he became aware of it after a considerable delay, which prevented him from lodging an appeal.

34. On 24 September 2001 the investigator in charge of the case issued a decision to extend the term of the applicant’s detention in the ITT to ten days (instead of the legally allowed maximum of three days, after which the applicant had to be transferred to the local SIZO – see paragraph 77 below). That decision was explained by the need to carry out witness confrontations, crime reconstructions and other investigative measures with the applicant’s participation.

35. On 12 November 2001 the Komsomolskyy Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to four months on the ground that he was suspected of grave criminal offences and there were no reasons to change the preventive measure. The applicant’s lawyer, who was present at the hearing, did not object. The applicant could appeal against that decision within three days, but did not do so.

36. On 10 January 2002 the Kherson Court, following a hearing which included the prosecutor, but not the applicant or his lawyer, extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to six months (until 18 March 2002) on the same grounds as before. That decision was not amenable to appeal. According to the applicant, he only became aware of it after a long delay.

37. On 1 March 2002 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the applicant and his lawyer received access to the case file.

38. On 18 March 2002 the applicant complained to both the prosecution authorities and the courts that the period of his pre-trial detention had expired on that date and had not been extended. Accordingly, he requested to be released without delay. It appears that there was no follow-up to his complaints.

39. On 14 June 2002 the applicant and his co-accused were indicted.

40. On 5 August 2002 the Kherson Court held a preparatory hearing, during which it decided to keep the applicant in detention. The case file does not contain a copy of that decision.

41. On 7 December 2004 the Kherson Court found the applicant guilty of the charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

42. On 11 May 2006 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the same trial court for fresh examination. It held, in particular, that the applicant’s defence rights had been violated on account of his removal from the hearing, in breach of procedural rules. The Supreme Court also ruled to keep the applicant in detention as a preventive measure, without further reasoning.

43. On 20 April 2007 the Kherson Court delivered a new judgment convicting the applicant of various criminal offences and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment.

44. On 8 April 2008 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment in the part concerning the applicant on the grounds that the trial court had modified the charges against him without respecting the applicable procedural rules. Accordingly, the case was remitted for fresh consideration again. The ruling of the Supreme Court made no mention of any preventive measure in respect of the applicant pending the delivery of a new judgment.

45. On 29 December 2009 the Kherson Court again found the applicant guilty on a long list charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

46. On 20 September 2011 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment too and remitted the case to the trial court for fresh examination.

47. On 6 October 2011 the Kherson Court transferred the case to the Bilozerka Town Court (“the Bilozerka Court”) following jurisdiction‑related amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure.

48. In July, August and September 2012 the applicant applied to the trial court for release on an undertaking not to abscond. He submitted that he had already been detained for over eleven years and that his continued detention was unjustified. He referred, in particular, to the poor conditions of his detention and his deteriorating health. The applicant also noted that he had already settled the victims’ civil claims.

49. On 19 July, 6 August and 27 September 2012 the Bilozerka Court dismissed the applicant’s applications for release on the grounds that he had failed to show that he would not abscond or hinder the implementation of various procedural decisions if he was released.

50. On 6 August 2012 the Bilozerka Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant on a number of charges as they had become time‑barred.

51. On 8 October 2012 the same court found the applicant guilty of armed robbery, aggravated murder and an attempt on the life of a law‑enforcement official and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment.

52. In the absence of any appeals, on 28 October 2012 the judgment became final.

C. Alleged beating of the applicant by a guard in the Kyiv SIZO on 16 August 2005

53. During the daily outdoor walk on 16 August 2005 in the Kyiv SIZO one of the guards allegedly hit the applicant with a rubber truncheon in the stomach and on the hip. The applicant did not submit any further details about that incident.

54. On 12 September 2005 the applicant was transferred to the Kherson SIZO. According to the authorities, he was examined on the same day by doctors, who did not detect any injuries. The applicant submitted that no such examination had taken place.

55. On 20 September 2005 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the governor of the Kherson SIZO that the applicant had complained of having been beaten by a guard in the Kyiv SIZO. The lawyer therefore requested a medical examination of his client.

56. On 4 October 2005 a commission of three doctors examined the applicant. According to the applicant, that was his first examination in the Kherson SIZO. The doctors documented a 3.5-cm-long brown pigmented linear mark on the side of the applicant’s left hip and a round mark of slightly pigmented skin with irregular edges in the paraumbilical area of the left part of his stomach.

57. On 6 October 2005 the SIZO administration informed the applicant’s lawyer of the above report.

58. On 26 October 2005 three doctors examined the applicant again. Their findings were the same as on 4 October 2005. On a later, unspecified date the SIZO governor wrote about the findings to the applicant’s lawyer.

59. The applicant complained to various authorities that he had been beaten on 16 August 2005 and that his injuries had never been properly documented. His complaints were forwarded to the Kyiv city prosecutor’s office (“the Kyiv prosecutor’s office”).

60. Extracts from the applicant’s medical records in detention, which were provided to the Court by the Government, contain a copy of a report on a medical examination of the applicant in the Kherson SIZO of 13 February 2006. It mentioned, in particular, that the applicant had pigmented skin marks. Their description was identical to that given in the reports of 4 and 26 October 2005 (see paragraphs 56 and 58 above).

61. On 22 March 2006 the Kyiv prosecutor’s office wrote to the applicant that his complaints were without basis.

62. It is not known whether the applicant took that complaint further.

63. On 5 February 2014 the administration of the Kyiv SIZO informed the Government’s Agent that all the records for 2005 had been destroyed after the expiry of a five-year limit for their storage.

D. Conditions of the applicant’s detention from 5 October 2005 to 24 December 2012

64. During various unspecified periods from 5 October 2005 until his transfer to Sokyryany Prison on 24 December 2012, the applicant was detained in SIZOs in Kherson, Odessa and Kyiv.

65. According to the applicant, he was held in overcrowded, unheated and damp cells, with no ventilation and poor lighting. There were allegedly no laundry facilities for detainees, and the cells were infested with insects. The applicant also contended that his cell mates had smoked all the time and that he had been exposed to passive smoking. He submitted numerous statements by his cellmates confirming the accuracy of the above description of their conditions of detention. The applicant also submitted several colour photographs of his cells in the Kherson and Kyiv SIZOs showing, in particular, tight metal grids on the windows, an extremely small space between the various items of furniture in the cell, poor sanitary facilities, and a lavatory which could be seen from the door.

66. According to the Government, the conditions of the applicant’s detention were acceptable. They noted that the parts of the Kherson SIZO where he had been detained in 2005 had been demolished since that time because they had been dilapidated and not subject to capital repairs. The Government therefore submitted that they could not provide any more details about the conditions of detention there.

67. During his transportation between the SIZOs and to court hearings, the applicant was allegedly handcuffed at all times (sometimes for up to thirty-two hours), not given sufficient food and water, deprived of sleep and unable to use the toilet when needed.

68. The applicant complained about the conditions of his transportation to the prosecution authorities and sought to bring criminal charges against the escorting officers concerned.

69. On 29 June 2006 the Kyiv Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office refused to open criminal proceedings against the escorting officers owing to a lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged that decision before the courts at three levels of jurisdiction.

70. According to the Government, the conditions of the applicant’s transportation were not in breach of his rights.

71. The applicant also alleged that during his detention his health had seriously deteriorated. In particular, he had contracted tuberculosis and had had unspecified heart problems, for which he had not obtained adequate medical treatment. His requests for medical assistance had allegedly been refused by the authorities.

72. The Government provided the Court with detailed information in chronological order about the applicant’s health and the medical care provided to him in detention. His health-related concerns included the residual effects of tuberculosis (contracted in 2003), micro-cardiosclerosis, and some digestive disorders. As can be seen from the applicant’s medical file, he had regular medical examinations and received treatment for his health problems.

E. The applicant’s access to documents in the criminal file in the context of his application to the Court

73. In January 2007 the Court asked the applicant to submit copies of his cassation appeals against the judgment of 7 December 2004, showing the dates he had lodged them with the courts dealing with the criminal case against him.

74. On 11 March and 25 April 2007 the applicant asked the trial court to provide him with copies of all his cassation appeals and those of his co‑defendants.

75. On 7 May 2007 the trial court judge dealing with the criminal case in question wrote to the applicant that there were no grounds to grant his request as he had already received all the copies he had asked for, which was confirmed by acknowledgments of receipt with his signature in the case file. Furthermore, the judge noted that the applicant had also been given the possibility to familiarise himself with the case file.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

76. Article 97 concerning the obligation of prosecution authorities to investigate allegations of criminal offences, as well as other relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1960 (in force at the material time and repealed with effect from 19 November 2012) can be found in the judgment in the case of Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no. 23893/03, § 45, 15 May 2012).

77. Pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1960, persons remanded in custody were held in pre‑trial detention centres (SIZOs, part of the penal system). Exceptionally, they could also be held in temporary detention facilities (ITTs, part of the police system), but for no longer than three days. If it was impossible to ensure a transfer to a SIZO within the aforementioned time-limit, because of its remote location or lack of infrastructure, a detainee could stay in an ITT for up to ten days.

III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS

78. On 23 November 2011 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”) published the Report [CPT/Inf (2011) 29] to the Ukrainian Government on a visit to Ukraine from 9 to 21 September 2009, which had included a visit to the Kyiv SIZO. The relevant extracts from the Report read as follows (original emphasis):

“74. At the time of the 2009 visit, the total number of prisoners in Ukraine stood at 145,000 (including 36,000 on remand), compared to some 178,000 at the time of the 2005 visit. Thus, the positive trend towards a reduction of the prison population already noted in the report on the 2005 visit continues. That said, overcrowding persists in remand establishments, the ones in Kyiv, Kherson, ...Odessa ... being cited as the most problematic. The delegation observed for itself that the overcrowding was particularly acute in the Kyiv SIZO, where there was some 1 m² of space per prisoner in certain cells, with inmates sharing beds or sleeping on the floor ...

3. Prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment

87. The 2009 visit provided an opportunity to review the situation of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment. ... [The] Kyiv [SIZO was] accommodating ... 41 lifers at various stages of appeal processes.

88. [Material conditions] were ... acceptable in the lifers’ cells of the ... Kyiv [SIZO]; that said, the occupancy levels in the cells were too high (e.g. three inmates in cells measuring some 10 m²).

...

100. The SIZO in Kyiv occupies a complex of buildings in one of the central areas of Kyiv. Some of the detention buildings had been constructed some 140 years previously. ...

With an official capacity of 2,950 places, on 8 September 2009 the establishment was holding 3,440 inmates, including 217 women and 69 juveniles. The vast majority of the inmate population was on remand. The establishment was also holding 297 inmates awaiting the outcome of their appeal (including 41 life-sentenced prisoners), 93 prisoners in transit and 100 sentenced inmates assigned to work in the prison’s general services and maintenance. ...

101. The vast majority of the cells holding male prisoners were seriously overcrowded (for example, 52 prisoners in a cell measuring some 50 m² and containing 40 beds; 32 prisoners in a cell measuring 33 m² and containing 20 beds). In some cells, the number of prisoners exceeded the number of beds available, and inmates took turns to sleep on the available beds or slept on the floor. The cells were packed with double bunk-beds, leaving very little space for any other furniture. In some cells, there were TV sets which belonged to the occupants.

Because of the human mass, ventilation was almost non-existent and the cells were very hot and stuffy. The level of hygiene was also highly unsatisfactory: in some cells the delegation saw cockroaches, and prisoners also referred to the presence of mice and rats. The in-cell sanitary installations (a partitioned toilet and sink) were generally in a decrepit state and were clearly not sufficient for the numbers of inmates held in the larger cells.

The negative consequences of the deplorable material conditions described above were compounded by the fact that some prisoners had spent lengthy periods of time at the SIZO ... In the CPT’s view, the combination of negative factors to which a large number of prisoners were subjected at the Kyiv SIZO (overcrowding, appalling material conditions and levels of hygiene, and practically non-existent activity programmes) could easily be described as inhuman and degrading treatment. ...”

79. The CPT’s later report, which was published on 14 November 2012 and which concerned its visit to Ukraine from 29 November to 6 December 2011, also contained the following relevant extracts regarding the conditions of detention in the Kyiv SIZO (original emphasis):

“43. The delegation gained a generally positive impression of the material conditions in the units for juveniles at the [SIZO] in Kyiv ....

However, conditions of detention were quite simply appalling in many of the other detention units of the ... [SIZO]. Numerous cells were in a poor state of repair and had only very limited access to natural light. In addition, the CPT is concerned about the severe overcrowding observed in a number of detention units of [the establishment]. At the time of the visit, the Kyiv SIZO was accommodating 3,761 prisoners (official capacity: 2,850 places) ...

The Committee acknowledges the efforts made by the Ukrainian authorities to reduce overcrowding in the [SIZO] visited. ...”

80. The relevant extracts from some earlier CPT reports (following visits to Ukraine in 1998, 2000 and 2002) concerning the conditions of transportation of detainees in Ukraine are quoted, in particular, in the Court’s judgment in the case of Andrey Yakovenko v. Ukraine (no. 63727/11, §§ 71-73, 13 March 2014).

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT OF THE APPLICANT AFTER HIS ARREST ON 18 SEPTEMBER 2001

81. The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by police officers following his arrest on 18 September 2001 and that there had been no effective investigation into the matter. He relied on Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. The Court considers it appropriate, however, to examine the above complaints only under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A. Admissibility

82. The Government submitted that the applicant’s allegation of ill‑treatment was unfounded and not supported by any evidence.

83. The applicant insisted that his complaint was admissible.

84. The Court notes that the complaint of ill-treatment raises serious issues requiring an examination of the merits. Therefore, contrary to the Government’s submissions, the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention (see Serikov v. Ukraine, no. 42164/09, § 53, 23 July 2015). It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

85. The applicant maintained his complaint based on his account of the events (see paragraph 10 above). He submitted that immediately after his arrest on 18 September 2001 he had been severely beaten by the police. He contended that not all his injuries had been documented by a forensic medical expert on that date and that even those that had been documented had not corresponded to the level of force applied to him during his arrest. According to the applicant, the swelling and bruises on his head could not have been inflicted by two or three hits with the handle of a gun, but had resulted from more serious ill-treatment, which he had sustained after his arrest.

86. The applicant drew the Court’s attention to his prolonged detention in the ITT (for seventeen days instead of the legally established limit of three days – see paragraphs 34 and 77 above). According to him, that time had been required for his injuries to heal. At the same time, the applicant alleged that he had been continually tortured during that period (see paragraph 15 above).

87. The applicant also submitted that the domestic investigation into his allegation of ill-treatment had been ineffective, superficial and formalistic.

88. The Government contested the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment as not based on any evidence.

89. They submitted that he had only raised that complaint for the first time during his trial in 2003, that is, about two years after his alleged ill‑treatment. According to the Government, the domestic authorities investigated the matter in an expedient and efficient manner. Having found no evidence in support of the applicant’s complaint, they had rightly dismissed it as unfounded.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) Alleged ill-treatment

90. The Court has consistently pointed out in its case-law that, in respect of a person who is deprived of his liberty, or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his or her own conduct diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, § 38, Series A no. 336; and Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, § 101, 28 September 2015). The use of force in the context of an arrest, even if it entails injury, may fall outside Article 3, particularly in circumstances resulting from the applicant’s own conduct (see Berliński v. Poland, nos. 27715/95 and 30209/96, § 64, 20 June 2002).

91. In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 161, Series A no. 25). However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Ribitsch, cited above, § 34, and Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VII).

92. It is undisputed in the present case that the applicant vigorously resisted arrest and that the police applied force to restrain him. However, his complaint is not about that. The applicant has never contested the nature or intensity of that force and has consistently accepted the authorities’ account that the police officers hit him several times on the head with the handle of a gun with a view to securing his arrest. Nor has the applicant alleged that the force used against him was unjustified or disproportionate. The scope of his complaint under Article 3 is confined to his alleged ill-treatment by the police after his arrest and after he had been handcuffed.

93. More specifically, the applicant’s allegation concerns two episodes. Firstly, he complained of having been extensively kicked, punched and hit with rubber truncheons immediately after his arrest and prior to his medical examination on the same day, 18 September 2001. Secondly, he contended that he had been subjected to continual torture during the seventeen days of his detention in the ITT as a part of the police system (from 18 September to 5 October 2001).

94. The Court attaches particular weight to the forensic medical evidence submitted by the parties. It has often stated in this connection that the medical examination of persons in police custody, together with the right of access to a lawyer and the right to inform a third party of the detention, constitutes one of the most essential safeguards against ill‑treatment (see, among other authorities, Türkan v. Turkey, no. 33086/04, § 42, 18 September 2008).

95. The Court observes that in the present case the applicant underwent a forensic medical examination on the day of his arrest. The expert documented some injuries on his head and concluded that they could have resulted from being hit with the handle of a gun (see paragraph 11 above). Having regard to the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest, his general constitution and behaviour, as well as the nature, gravity and location of the injuries documented, the Court considers the explanation of the origin of those injuries to be plausible overall (compare with Danilov v. Ukraine, no. 2585/06, § 65, 13 March 2014). It further notes that the applicant explicitly stated to the expert that he had not been subjected to any ill‑treatment following his arrest.

96. The Court takes note of the applicant’s allegations that the police threatened him, that they talked to the expert in private and that the expert limited his examination of the applicant to the visible parts of his body and failed to document some injuries. However, those submissions are neither corroborated by any evidence nor supported by factual inferences, and the Court is not in a position to verify them. As regards the failure of the domestic authorities to investigate those allegations, it will be examined in the context of the applicant’s complaint concerning the effectiveness of the investigation into his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 103-113 below).

97. There is no indication in the case file that by the time of his medical examination on 18 September 2001 the applicant had sustained any injuries in addition to those inflicted on him during his arrest, which he did not complain about.

98. Nor does the Court discern any direct or indirect evidence in support of the applicant’s generally phrased allegation that he was subjected to continual torture from 18 September to 5 October 2001.

99. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that, as pointed out by the applicant, he was detained in the ITT for seventeen days, whereas the applicable legislation required his transfer to the SIZO within three days of his arrest (see paragraphs 34, 77 and 86 above). However, that fact alone is not sufficient to support a finding that he was ill-treated during that period (see, mutatis mutandis, Kapustyak v. Ukraine, no. 26230/11, § 69, 3 March 2016). Furthermore, the applicant’s submissions in this connection are not consistent. On the one hand, he explained his continued detention in the ITT by the authorities’ intention to conceal his ill-treatment by allowing time for his injuries to heal. On the other hand, he contended that he had been tortured throughout that period.

100. It is not without relevance that the medical examination of the applicant upon his arrival at the Kherson SIZO on 5 October 2001 did not detect any injuries. His related submissions to the Court and to the domestic authorities appear to lack consistency too. For example, he stated to the Court that he had undergone that examination, but alleged that it had been incomplete (see paragraph 14 above). In his submissions at the domestic level, however, he alleged that no such examination had in fact taken place (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above). Such contradictions provide grounds for the Court to draw factual inferences unfavourable for the applicant (see and compare with Khayrov v. Ukraine, no. 19157/06, §§ 53, 56 and 57, 15 November 2012).

101. It follows that the material in the case file does not provide an evidentiary basis sufficient to enable the Court to find “beyond reasonable doubt” that the applicant was subjected to the ill-treatment alleged following his arrest on 18 September 2001.

102. Accordingly, the Court cannot but conclude that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.

(b) Effectiveness of the domestic investigation

103. The Court emphasises that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully and in breach of Article 3, that provision requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. If this were not the case, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, § 102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VIII).

104. Although in the present case the Court has not found it proved, on account of a lack of evidence, that the applicant was ill-treated by the police after his arrest, that does not in principle preclude the complaint in relation to Article 3 from being “arguable” for the purposes of the positive obligation to investigate (see Böke and Kandemir v. Turkey, nos. 71912/01, 26968/02 and 36397/03, § 54, 10 March 2009, and Aleksandr Smirnov v. Ukraine, no. 38683/06, § 57, 15 July 2010).

105. It is not known when the applicant first complained to the domestic authorities about his alleged ill-treatment. According to him, he did so immediately after his transfer to the SIZO on 5 October 2001. To substantiate that statement, he submitted to the Court a handwritten copy of his respective complaints to the prosecution authorities and to the SIZO’s administration (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above). The Court notes some inconsistencies in the applicant’s submissions. For example, as his cellmates confirmed in writing on the copy of his complaint to the Kherson prosecutor’s office of 5 October 2001, the guard on duty had accepted the complaint for dispatching. However, two days later the applicant complained to the SIZO’s administration that the guards had torn up his complaints to the prosecution authorities on 5 and 6 October 2001. As regards the applicant’s supposed complaint to the prosecutor of 9 October 2001, the copy provided to the Court does not contain any evidence that such a complaint was indeed written, dispatched and received by its addressee.

106. In sum, the Court has no evidence before it showing that the applicant complained to the domestic authorities about his ill-treatment earlier than during his trial at the beginning of 2003 (see paragraph 20 above). Nor has the Court any basis for concluding that the applicant had in fact been prevented from raising such complaints.

107. However, even assuming that the applicant complained of his ill‑treatment in police custody only in 2003, as pointed out by the Government and confirmed by the documentary evidence, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the case, regard being had to the use of force against the applicant during his arrest and the fact that he underwent a medical examination after spending several hours in police custody, it was incumbent on the authorities to conduct an investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment (see Minikayev v. Russia, no. 630/08, § 64, 5 January 2016).

108. The Court has always emphasised in its case-law that an investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. The authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill‑founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure evidence concerning the incident including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see, for example, Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933/04, § 133, 29 July 2010).

109. The Court notes that in the present case the authorities contented themselves with delivering two identically reasoned decisions not to institute criminal proceedings following the applicant’s complaints of ill‑treatment, which were based largely on the accounts of the officers implicated in the events taken at face value (for the facts see paragraphs 21 and 23 above, and for the case-law see Kaverzin, cited above, § 175). The case file material discloses no meaningful effort to verify or disprove the applicant’s account of events, including by thoroughly questioning him, organising confrontations or posing specific questions to the independent medical experts (see Danilov, cited above, § 70).

110. The Court observes that it found the explanation of the applicant’s injuries as documented on 18 September 2001 to be plausible overall given the circumstances of his arrest and the absence of any complaints from the applicant, both at the national level and before the Court, as regards the force applied to him during that arrest (see paragraph 95 above). That circumstance alone does not, however, refute the applicant’s allegations about the incompleteness of the examination and the involvement of the police in its conduct. Although the applicant complained that the examination in question had been limited to an inspection of the visible parts of his body, the authorities did not consider it necessary to question the expert as regards the actual format of that examination. Nor did they make any effort to verify the applicant’s submission about the police communicating with the expert in private.

111. The case file before the Court contains a copy of another forensic medical report, dated 18 February 2002 (see paragraph 19 above). It appears that it merely reiterated the findings of the examination of the applicant of 18 September 2001. In any event, in the absence of any information as to whether that second report was ever relied on by the domestic authorities, the Court does not consider it to be of relevance for its assessment of the effectiveness of the domestic investigation.

112. The Court notes that in a number of other cases against Ukraine it has already condemned patterns of investigation similar to the one in the present case (see, inter alia, Drozd v. Ukraine, no. 12174/03, §§ 68-71, 30 July 2009; Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 38773/05, §§ 121-22, 26 July 2012; and Grinenko v. Ukraine, no. 33627/06, § 62, 15 November 2012). In the case of Kaverzin (cited above, §§ 173-80) the Court found that the reluctance of the authorities to ensure that a prompt and thorough investigation of the ill-treatment complaints by the criminal suspects was carried out constituted a systemic problem within the meaning of Article 46 of the Convention. In view of the circumstances of the present case and its earlier case-law, the Court concludes that in the present case, too, no serious effort was made to investigate the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment.

113. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb in this regard.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT OF THE APPLICANT ON 16 AUGUST 2005

114. The applicant also complained under Article 3 of the Convention that a SIZO guard had beaten him on 16 August 2005 and that the domestic authorities had failed to duly investigate the incident. He also relied on Article 13 in respect of the last-mentioned issue.

115. The Court will consider the above complaint only under Article 3 (see also paragraph 81 above).

116. The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted the remedies available to him under domestic law, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They contended that he could have raised his complaints before the public prosecutor in charge of supervising the general lawfulness of conduct in penal institutions. Any decision taken by the prosecutor could have been further challenged before the domestic courts.

117. The applicant disagreed. He maintained that he had done everything that could have reasonably been expected of him to raise his complaint before the domestic authorities. According to the applicant, the authorities were aware of his injuries, which had been documented in the medical examinations of 4 and 26 October 2005 (see paragraphs 56 and 58 above).

118. The Court does not consider it necessary to examine the Government’s objection, given that this part of the application is in any event manifestly ill‑founded for the reasons set out below.

119. The Court notes that the factual issues which arise in the present complaint fall within the knowledge of the domestic authorities. Accordingly, it could be accepted that the applicant experienced certain difficulties in procuring evidence to substantiate his allegations. Nevertheless, in such cases applicants may well be expected to submit at least a detailed account of the facts complained of and provide – to the greatest possible extent – some evidence in support of their complaints (see Khayrov, cited above, § 51). The Court also notes that the procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to investigate an allegation of ill-treatment only arises where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been subjected to ill-treatment prohibited by that provision (see, among many authorities, Assenov and Others, cited above, §§ 102 et seq.).

120. The Court observes that the applicant relied mainly on the reports of 4 and 26 October 2005 as the medical evidence for the injuries he had allegedly sustained on 16 August 2005. The Court notes that both reports documented the same pigmented skin marks on the applicant’s left hip and stomach, without any changes in their description or size. Moreover, it appears that exactly the same marks were reported during the applicant’s examination on 13 February 2006, that is about six months after the alleged ill-treatment (see paragraph 60 above). The applicant did not provide any comment on that last-mentioned report. Accordingly, the Court does not consider it to be proved that the applicant sustained any injuries in the Kyiv SIZO as he alleged.

121. Nor has the Court any basis for drawing factual inferences in support of that allegation. It notes that the applicant, in his submissions to both the domestic authorities and the Court, failed to provide any factual details as regards the incident, which purportedly took place on 16 August 2015. He did not mention the exact circumstances or sequence of events. Furthermore, the applicant failed to give any information able to facilitate the identification of the guard who had allegedly beaten him. Lastly, he provided no explanation as to what might have provoked the alleged violence against him.

122. In those circumstances the Court, having regard to the available material, considers that the present complaint is too vague and inconsistent and is unsupported by any evidence. It has not been properly substantiated and developed by the applicant and should be rejected as manifestly ill‑founded. The Court further considers that the applicant failed to make an arguable complaint of ill-treatment before the domestic authorities which would trigger the State’s procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation of ill-treatment.

123. Accordingly, the complaint should be rejected as inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE APPLICANT’S DETENTION

124. The applicant further complained of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of his detention in various detention centres from 5 October 2005 to 24 December 2012, including the physical conditions, medical care and transportation.

A. Admissibility

1. Physical conditions of detention

125. The Government submitted that this aspect of the case was inadmissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They contended that the applicant could have raised his complaints before the public prosecutor in charge of supervising the general lawfulness of conduct in penal institutions. Any decision taken by the prosecutor could have been further challenged before the domestic courts.

126. The applicant contested the effectiveness of the above remedies, considering that the problems complained of were of a structural nature.

127. The Court notes that it has already dismissed similar objections by the Government on a number of occasions, finding the remedy referred to by the Government ineffective on the ground that it had not been shown that recourse to such proceedings could have brought an improvement in the applicant’s conditions of detention (see, for example, Savinov v. Ukraine, no. 5212/13, § 36, 22 October 2015, with further references). The Court sees no reason to depart from that finding in the present case and therefore considers that this part of the application cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

128. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Medical care

129. The Government raised an objection based on non-exhaustion of domestic remedies similar to that concerning the applicant’s complaint about the physical conditions of his detention (see paragraph 125 above).

130. The applicant contested the Government’s arguments.

131. The Court does not consider it necessary to examine the Government’s objection given that this complaint is in any event manifestly ill‑founded for the following reasons.

132. The Court reiterates that an unsubstantiated allegation that medical care has been non-existent, delayed or otherwise unsatisfactory is normally insufficient to disclose an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. A credible complaint should normally include, among other things, sufficient reference to the medical condition in question, medical treatment that was sought, provided, or refused, and some evidence, such as, expert reports, which are capable of disclosing serious failings in the applicant’s medical care (see Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia, no. 57541/09, § 80, 24 January 2012; and Yevgeniy Bogdanov v. Russia, no. 22405/04, § 93, 26 February 2015).

133. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant’s complaint regarding his medical care in detention was limited to a vague and general statement which was not supported by any evidence. He failed to specify the health problems he had suffered from, what treatment he had actually required and why the medical care provided to him had been inadequate (compare with Ustyugov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 251/04, 1 September 2015).

134. At the same time, the Government submitted various documents relating to the applicant’s medical treatment in detention (see paragraph 72 above). Those materials disclose no serious shortcomings on the part of the national authorities in regard to the applicant’s treatment (see and compare with Yevgeniy Bogdanov, cited above, §§ 95 and 96).

135. In so far as the applicant complained of having contracted tuberculosis in a SIZO, the Court reiterates its consistent approach that even if an applicant did contract tuberculosis while in detention, that in itself would not imply a violation of Article 3, provided that he received treatment for it (see Alver v. Estonia, no. 64812/01, § 54, 8 November 2005, and Pitalev v. Russia, no. 34393/03, § 53, 30 July 2009, with further references). The applicant has not shown to the Court that his treatment for tuberculosis was inadequate.

136. Overall, the Court considers that the applicant’s allegations in respect of the medical care he received in detention are unsubstantiated and should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

3. Conditions of transportation

137. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

4. Conclusion

138. The Court declares the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention about the physical conditions of his detention and transportation admissible and rejects his complaint about the medical care in detention as inadmissible.

B. Merits

1. Physical conditions of detention

139. The applicant referred to his factual submissions (see paragraph 65 above) and maintained that the physical conditions of his detention in the Odessa, Kherson and Kyiv SIZOs had been incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention.

140. The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. At the same time, they noted that they were not able to provide more details about the conditions of his detention given that the part of the Kherson SIZO in question had been demolished (see paragraph 66 above).

141. The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention requires States to ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000-XI).

142. The Court notes that information about the physical conditions of detention falls within the knowledge of the domestic authorities. Accordingly, applicants might experience certain difficulties in procuring evidence to substantiate a complaint in that connection. Still, in such cases applicants may well be expected to submit at least a detailed account of the facts complained of and provide – to the greatest possible extent – some evidence in support of their complaints. The Court has considered as evidence in such situations, for example, written statements by fellow inmates or photographs provided by applicants in support of their allegations (see Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no. 32362/02, § 45, 20 May 2010, with further references, and Gavula v. Ukraine, no. 52652/07, § 73, 16 May 2013). After the Court has given notice of the applicant’s complaint to the Government, the burden is on the latter to collect and produce the relevant documents (see Korneykova and Korneykov v. Ukraine, no. 56660/12, § 133, 24 March 2016). A failure on their part to submit convincing evidence on material conditions of detention may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant’s allegations (see Gubin v. Russia, no. 8217/04, § 56, 17 June 2010, and Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, § 113, ECHR 2005‑X (extracts)).

143. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did not specify when he had been detained in the three SIZOs in question. Nor did he submit any details concerning the size of the particular cells in which he had stayed, for how long or the number of inmates held in each one. At the same time, the Court takes note of the evidence submitted by the applicant (the statements of his cellmates and photographs), which shows that at least some of the cells in which he was detained lacked space, were poorly lit and had inadequate sanitary arrangements (see paragraph 65 above). Accordingly, it was for the Government to refute his allegations. However, they contented themselves with a general statement that the relevant part of the Kherson SIZO had been demolished and that they could not therefore provide more details. The Government did not comment at all on the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the Kyiv and Odessa SIZOs. This provides grounds for the Court to make factual inferences favourable for the applicant.

144. The Court notes that it has already found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in another application brought by an individual detained in the same detention facilities (the Odessa and Kyiv SIZOs) in its judgment in the case of Andrey Yakovenko (cited above, §§ 92-97). Furthermore, the Court attaches weight to the CPT’s findings following its visits to Ukraine in 2009 and 2011, which found persistent overcrowding in Ukrainian pre‑trial detention facilities, with the three in which the applicant was detained in the present case (Kyiv, Kherson and Odessa) being cited as the most problematic (see paragraphs 78 and 79 above).

145. The Court also observes that the issues raised by the applicant concern serious structural problems in Ukrainian detention facilities, such as overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions, which the Court has criticised on many occasions (see, for example, Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286/01, §§ 102 and 103, 28 March 2006; and, for more recent references, Rodzevillo v. Ukraine, no. 38771/05, §§ 52-55, 14 January 2016; and Zakshevskiy v. Ukraine, no. 7193/04, §§ 61-69, 17 March 2016). The Court does not find any reason to depart from its previous approach in assessing these matters, and considers that the material conditions of the applicant’s detention were degrading.

146. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on this account.

2. Transportation conditions

147. The applicant maintained his complaint relying, in particular, on the relevant CPT reports (see paragraph 80 above).

148. The Government contended that the above complaint had been duly examined and dismissed by the domestic courts. The Government did not therefore comment on the conditions of the applicant’s transportation as such.

149. The Court notes that in his complaints relating to the conditions of his transportation, the applicant did not specify the exact dates and duration of his travel between the various transit points. At the same time, based on the material on file, the conditions complained of appear to have been similar to those which were sharply criticised by the CPT during its visits to Ukraine. Similar factual submissions also gave rise to the finding of a violation of Article 3 in the Court’s judgments in Yakovenko v. Ukraine (no. 15825/06, §§ 105-113, 25 October 2007) and Andrey Yakovenko (cited above, §§ 100-103). The Court does not find any reason to take a different approach in the present case and considers that the conditions of the applicant’s transport were in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE APPLICANT’S DETENTION

150. The applicant further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that there were no effective remedies for his complaints under Article 3 regarding the physical conditions of his detention and transportation, as well the medical care provided for him. The relevant provision reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

151. The Government contested those arguments.

A. Admissibility

1. Medical care

152. The Court reiterates that it has found that the applicant has not made out an arguable claim under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of his medical care in detention (see paragraph 136 above). The guarantees enshrined in Article 13 do not therefore apply to that complaint (see Vergelskyy v. Ukraine, no. 19312/06, § 124, 12 March 2009).

153. That part of the application is therefore inadmissible and must be rejected, in accordance with the requirements of Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

2. Physical conditions of detention and transportation

154. The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

155. With reference to its earlier case-law (see, among other authorities, Melnik, cited above, §§ 113-116; Ukhan v. Ukraine, no. 30628/02, §§ 91 and 92, 18 December 2008; Iglin v. Ukraine, no. 39908/05, § 77, 12 January 2012; and Rodzevillo, cited above, §§ 70 and 71) and the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that the Government have not proved that the applicant had an opportunity in practice to secure effective remedies for his complaints – that is to say, remedies which could have prevented the violations from occurring or continuing, or could have afforded the applicant appropriate redress.

156. The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for the applicant’s complaints regarding the physical conditions of his detention and transportation.

V. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION

157. The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention of the unlawfulness and length of his detention from 18 September 2001 onwards, excluding the periods from 7 December 2004 to 11 May 2006, from 20 April 2007 to 10 October 2007, and from 29 December 2009 to 20 September 2011. He further complained of a violation of his rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. Lastly, he complained under Article 5 § 5 that he had not had an effective and enforceable right to compensation for his detention in contravention of paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of that Article. The provisions relied on read as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so[.]

...

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.

4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.

5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”

A. Admissibility

158. The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Article 5 § 1 of the Convention

159. The applicant contended, in particular, that there had been a delay of about seven hours in documenting his arrest. He further submitted that there had been no legal basis for his deprivation of liberty after seventy-two hours had elapsed after his arrest and before his detention had been endorsed by a judicial decision.

160. The applicant next complained that his detention between the completion of the pre-trial investigation and the beginning of the trial had not been covered by any judicial decision.

161. Lastly, he submitted that his detention after his committal for trial had been unlawful given that the court had neither given any reasoning nor set any time-limits for it.

162. The Government maintained that the applicant’s detention had been in compliance with domestic legislation. They further emphasised that it had been justified given the gravity of the charges against the applicant and his lack of cooperation with the police in the past.

163. The Court notes that the applicant’s allegation about the delay in documenting his arrest appears to be supported by the case file material (see paragraphs 7 and 30 above). Furthermore, the Government have not refuted it. The Court therefore considers it established that the applicant was in unacknowledged detention from 3 a.m. to 10 a.m. on 18 September 2001.

164. The Court emphasises that the unacknowledged detention of an individual is a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention, and discloses a most grave violation of that provision. Failure to make a record of such matters as the date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the reasons for the detention, and the name of the person carrying it out must be seen as incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness and with the very purpose of Article 5 of the Convention (see, for example, Menesheva v. Russia, no. 59261/00, § 87, ECHR 2006‑III, with further references).

165. The Court has already found violations in cases where formalisation of an applicant’s status as an arrested crime suspect was delayed without a reasonable explanation (see, for instance, Smolik v. Ukraine, no. 11778/05, §§ 46-48, 19 January 2012; Grinenko, cited above, §§ 77 and 78; and Belousov v. Ukraine, no. 4494/07, §§ 84-88, 7 November 2013). It finds that the present case constitutes another regrettable example of that administrative practice.

166. The Court further observes that under Ukrainian legislation the police had seventy-two hours at most following the applicant’s arrest to either obtain a judicial order for his detention or release him.

167. The Court reiterates in this connection that when the maximum period of detention is absolute, laid down by the law, and thus known in advance, the authorities responsible for the detention are under a duty to take all necessary precautions to ensure that the permitted duration is not exceeded (see K.-F. v. Germany, 27 November 1997, § 72, Reports 1997‑VII, and, for a more recent reference, Gal v. Ukraine, no. 6759/11, § 26, 16 April 2015).

168. In the present case, the court order on the applicant’s detention was obtained on 22 September 2001. The exact time of the delivery of that decision is unknown. Even assuming that the court delivered the order at exactly 9 a.m. on 22 September 2001, it was still thirty hours after the expiry of the seventy-two-hour statutory period. The holding of the applicant in police custody during the period under examination was therefore not lawful (see Belousov, cited above, § 87).

169. The Court further notes that it has regularly found violations of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in Ukrainian cases as regards periods of detention not being covered by any court order, namely for the period between the end of the investigation and the beginning of the trial. The Court has concluded that this issue seemed to stem from a legislative lacuna (see Kharchenko v. Ukraine, no. 40107/02, §§ 70-72 and 98, 10 February 2011).

170. The Court has also held in other cases that the recurrent practice in Ukraine of having court orders during the trial stage which set no time‑limits for the further detention of a defendant, and which uphold rather than extend his or her previous detention, is not compatible with the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Kharchenko, cited above, §§ 76 and 98, and Kushch v. Ukraine, no. 53865/11, §§ 118-120, 3 December 2015).

171. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant’s detention, which had been ordered by the judicial decision of 10 January 2002, expired on 18 March 2002. Meanwhile, on 1 March 2002 the pre-trial investigation had been declared completed and the applicant had received access to the case file. On an unspecified later date the case had been referred to the first-instance court for trial. On 5 August 2002 the Kherson Court held its preparatory hearing, at which it ordered the applicant’s further detention as a preventive measure. It follows that his detention between 18 March and 5 August 2002 was not covered by any judicial decision.

172. The Court next notes that although the Kherson Court upheld the pre‑trial detention measure in respect of the applicant on 5 August 2002 it did not set a time-limit for his continued detention and did not give any reasons for its decision. That left the applicant in a state of uncertainty as to the grounds for his detention after that date.

173. The Court considers the above considerations sufficient for concluding that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in the present case.

2. Article 5 § 3 of the Convention

174. The applicant submitted that the length of his pre-trial detention had been excessive. He maintained that the judicial decisions to that effect had lacked sufficient or relevant reasons.

175. The Government contended that there had been sufficient grounds for the applicant’s detention given the seriousness of the charges against him and his behaviour prior to his arrest. They also maintained that the authorities had been diligent in dealing with his case.

176. The Court notes that when assessing the length of pre-trial detention where applicants were held in custody during investigation and trial and continued to be deprived of their liberty while the criminal proceedings were pending at the appeal stage and after, the Court has consistently regarded such multiple periods of pre-trial detention as a whole (see, among numerous authorities, Solmaz v. Turkey, no. 27561/02, §§ 34‑37, 16 January 2007, and Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826/03, § 125, 22 May 2012).

177. Accordingly, in the present case the following periods have to be taken into consideration: (1) from 18 September 2001 to 7 December 2004; (2) from 11 May 2006 to 20 April 2007; (3) from 8 April 2008 to 29 December 2009; and (4) from 20 September 2011 to 8 October 2012. The period in question amounted therefore to over seven years.

178. Having regard to the general principles established in its case-law (see I.A. v. France, 23 September 1998, § 102, Reports 1998‑VII; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 153, ECHR 2000-IV; and Iłowiecki v. Poland, no. 27504/95, § 61, 4 October 2001), the Court notes that the period of the applicant’s detention before conviction was particularly long. The Court accepts the Government’s view that the charges against the applicant were very serious. At the same time, regard being had to the length of the applicant’s detention, the Court considers that the competent authorities should also have expressly adduced other reasons justifying holding him in custody during the entire period at issue (see Kobernik v. Ukraine, no. 45947/06, §§ 50-52, 25 July 2013). However, the seriousness of the charges remained the only ground relied on by the authorities in justification of the applicant’s continued detention. The Court also takes note of the absence of any reasoning at all for keeping that very restrictive measure against the applicant in the Supreme Court’s ruling of 11 May 2006, by which the first-instance court’s judgment was quashed (see paragraph 42 above). Moreover, its later, similar ruling, of 8 April 2008, did not even mention the issue of preventive measures, while the applicant remained in detention thereafter (see paragraph 44 above).

179. In the light of the foregoing considerations the Court holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

3. Article 5 § 4 of the Convention

180. The applicant submitted that the domestic courts had provided only a purely formalistic review of the lawfulness of his detention. He drew the Court’s attention to the standard set of grounds that had been relied on in all the respective judicial decisions.

181. The applicant further noted that there had been a long delay in examining some of his applications for release at the trial stage. He submitted that the speediness of the review of the lawfulness of his detention at that stage had depended on the schedule of court hearings.

182. Lastly, the applicant contended that certain decisions on the extension of his pre-trial detention had been taken in his absence and had not been communicated to him in due time.

183. The Government submitted that the applicant had had at his disposal an effective procedure to challenge his detention. In particular, it had been open to him during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings to lodge appeals against the court decisions on his detention and its extension. However, the applicant had not done so. Furthermore, his right to apply for release during the judicial stage of the proceedings had not been restricted, and his respective applications had been examined without delay.

184. The Court notes that the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention was considered by the domestic courts on many occasions, both during the pre‑trial investigation and during the trial. However, those decisions cannot be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 4 because they merely reiterated a standard set of grounds for the applicant’s detention without any examination of the plausibility of such grounds in the circumstances of his particular situation. Furthermore, as regards the trial stage, the Court has already found that Ukrainian law did not provide for a procedure to review the lawfulness of continued detention after the completion of pre-trial investigations which satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see Kharchenko, cited above, §§ 85 and 100, and Kushch, also cited above, §§ 129 and 130).

185. The Court does not find it necessary to analyse each of the applicant’s arguments advanced in support of his complaint, as it considers the above considerations sufficient for finding a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

186. There has therefore been a violation of that provision.

4. Article 5 § 5

187. The applicant further complained that he had not had an enforceable right to compensation in respect of the aforementioned violations of the other paragraphs of Article 5.

188. The Government submitted that Ukrainian legislation provided for the possibility to claim compensation for unlawful detention subject to a judicial decision acknowledging such unlawfulness. It had not, however, been applicable to the circumstances of the present case because the applicant’s detention had been lawful.

189. The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 5 guarantees an enforceable right to compensation to those who have been the victims of arrest or detention in contravention of the other provisions of Article 5 (see Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, § 81, Reports 1998‑VII).

190. In the present case the Court has found several violations of Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4, in conjunction with which the present complaint is to be examined (see paragraphs 173, 179 and 186 above). It follows that Article 5 § 5 of the Convention is applicable. The Court must therefore establish whether Ukrainian law afforded or now affords the applicant an enforceable right to compensation for the breaches of Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention in his case.

191. The Court observes that the issue of compensation for unlawful detention is regulated in Ukraine by the Law on the Procedure for the Compensation of Damage caused to Citizens by the Unlawful Actions of Bodies in charge of Operational Enquiries, Pre-trial Investigation Authorities, Prosecutors or Courts (“the Compensation Act”). The right to compensation arises, in particular, where the unlawfulness of the detention has been established by a judicial decision.

192. The Court notes that as long as the applicant’s detention is in formal compliance with the domestic legislation it is impossible for him to claim compensation in that regard at the national level. Furthermore, there is no legally established procedure in Ukraine for bringing proceedings to seek compensation for a deprivation of liberty found to be in breach of one of the other paragraphs by the Strasbourg Court (see Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no. 42310/04, § 233, 21 April 2011).

193. This means that one of the principles of Article 5 § 5 – namely, that the effective enjoyment of the right to compensation guaranteed by it must be ensured with a sufficient degree of certainty (see Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 182, 17 January 2012, with further references) – does not appear to be met in the present case.

194. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention.

VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE LENGTH OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT

195. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in his criminal case had been unreasonable. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

A. Admissibility

196. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

197. The Government contested the applicant’s claim, stating that his case had been complex, from both a legal and factual point of view. In particular, he had been charged with a number of serious crimes and the proceedings in question had involved many co-defendants, victims and witnesses.

198. The applicant maintained that the authorities had been responsible for the protracted length of the proceedings in his case and that the overall duration of the proceedings had not been justified.

199. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, and the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).

200. The Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 18 September 2001 at the latest (there had already been criminal proceedings pending against the applicant at that time, but in the absence of further details, the Court will consider the above-mentioned date as the dies a quo in the present case). The proceedings in question ended on 28 October 2012, when the verdict in the applicant’s case became final. The period in question therefore lasted for about eleven years and one month.

201. The Court appreciates that the criminal proceedings at issue, which concerned several serious crimes and involved a number of co-defendants, victims and witnesses, were of a certain complexity.

202. The Court attaches weight, however, to the fact that the case was repeatedly remitted for retrial because of procedural violations, for which the courts were responsible (see paragraphs 42, 44 and 46 above). That appears to be the main reason for the delay in the proceedings.

203. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to those in the present case (see Pélissier and Sassi, cited above, and Gorbatenko v. Ukraine, no. 25209/06, §§ 152-56, 28 November 2013).

204. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.

205. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

VII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE COMPLAINT UNDER 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE LENGTH OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

206. The applicant further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that there were no effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint relating to the length of the criminal proceedings.

207. The Government contested that argument.

208. The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above (see paragraphs 195-205) and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.

209. The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see Kudła, cited above, § 156). The Court further refers to its earlier findings in other Ukrainian cases about the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for complaints in respect of the length of criminal proceedings (see Merit v. Ukraine, no. 66561/01, §§ 78 and 79, 30 March 2004; Shalimov v. Ukraine, no. 20808/02, §§ 94-97, 4 March 2010; and Drogobetskaya v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 41662/05, §§ 21 and 22, 3 January 2013).

210. The Court does not find any reasons to depart from that case-law in the present case.

211. There has, therefore, been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

VIII. COMPLAINT UNDER ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION

212. The applicant complained that the authorities had denied him the opportunity to obtain copies of his cassation appeals against the judgment of 7 December 2004, which the Registry of the Court had requested him to submit to substantiate his application (see paragraphs 73-75 above). He relied on Article 34 of the Convention, which provides as follows:

“The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”

213. The Government contended that Ukraine had complied with Article 34 of the Convention.

214. The Court has established that Article 34 of the Convention may impose on the State authorities an obligation to provide copies of documents to applicants who find themselves in situations of particular vulnerability and dependence and are unable to obtain the documents needed for their files without State support (see, as a recent authority, Naydyon v. Ukraine, no. 16474/03, § 63, 14 October 2010).

215. In the case of Naydyon (cited above), the Court took note of the applicant’s specific situation at the time he had lodged and pursued his application. In particular, it noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been completed and his criminal case file was being kept at the trial court. As he had been imprisoned, the applicant could not consult the file himself. He had no contact with his family and had only limited contact with the outside world. To complete his application, therefore, the applicant in that case was dependent on the authorities (§§ 64-69).

216. The Court notes that the applicant’s situation in the present case is different. In contrast to Naydyon (cited above), the applicant had ample access to the case material after he lodged his application with the Court as the criminal proceedings were still pending at that time. Furthermore, the applicant did not refute the authorities’ submission that the copies of the documents in question had been provided to him (see paragraph 75 above).

217. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the respondent State has not failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention.

IX. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

218. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

219. The applicant claimed EUR 500,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 30,000 in respect of pecuniary damage (expenses for medications and “compensation for the deterioration of his health”).

220. The Government submitted that the claims were excessive and unsubstantiated. They also considered that there was no causal link between the pecuniary damage claim and the alleged violations of the Convention.

221. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged and it therefore rejects that claim. However, deciding in equity, it awards the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

222. The applicant also claimed EUR 6,500 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court, to be paid directly to his representative, Mr Markov. That amount comprised EUR 6,300 for 63 hours of legal work at the rate of EUR 100 per hour and EUR 200 for administrative costs. To substantiate his claim, the applicant submitted a legal assistance contract with Mr Markov of 14 November 2013 and a report on the work performed of 25 June 2014.

223. The Government contested the above claim.

224. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the material in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to allow the applicant’s claim for costs and expenses in part and to award him the sum of EUR 1,000 covering costs under all heads, to be paid to his representative directly.

C. Default interest

225. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention about his alleged ill-treatment by a SIZO guard on 16 August 2005 and the domestic investigation into the matter, as well as his complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention regarding the medical care provided for him in detention inadmissible and the remainder of the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb in respect of the applicant’s alleged ill‑treatment after his arrest on 18 September 2001;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb in respect of the domestic investigation of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment after his arrest on 18 September 2001;

4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the physical conditions of the applicant’s detention and transportation between 5 October 2005 and 24 December 2012;

5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;

6. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;

7. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;

8. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention;

9. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant;

10. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the absence of an effective domestic remedy to complain about the physical conditions of the applicant’s detention and transportation between 5 October 2005 and 24 December 2012;

11. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the absence of an effective domestic remedy to complain about the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant;

12. Holds that the respondent State has not failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention;

13. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:

(i) EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; and

(ii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), to be paid directly to the applicant’s representative Mr Markov, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

14. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 September 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Milan BlaškoKhanlar Hajiyev
Deputy RegistrarPresident

Full & Egal Universal Law Academy