CASE OF SCIORTINO AND VELLA v. MALTA

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF SCIORTINO AND VELLA v. MALTA

(Application no. 25915/23)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

4 March 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Sciortino and Vella v. Malta,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Jolien Schukking, President,
 Faris Vehabović,
 Lorraine Schembri Orland, judges
and Simeon Petrovski, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 25915/23) against the Republic of Malta lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 20 June 2023 by two Maltese nationals, Ms Louise Sciortino and Ms Mary Josephine Vella (“the applicants”), who were born in 1960 and 1962, and live in Ta’ Xbiex and Swieqi respectively. They were represented by Dr W. Cuschieri, a lawyer practising in Mosta;

the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention to the Maltese Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Dr C. Soler and their co-Agent Dr J. D’Agostino, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 4 February 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The application concerns a complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the expropriation of the applicants’ property in 2012 and the relevant compensation for that taking.

2.  The applicants’ property (consisting of four apartments of which they own a part share), had been taken over by the State under title of public tenure in 1964 against a recognition rent of approximately 189 euros (EUR) annually. By means of a presidential declaration of 23 January 2012 the applicants were informed that the property was to be taken over by absolute purchase. The Commissioner of Land offered EUR 13,510 in compensation for the expropriation according to law (the recognition rent capitalised by 1.4%).

3.  The applicants lodged constitutional redress proceedings complaining, inter alia, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 6 of the Convention that they had no access to court to challenge the compensation established by law, that they had not been awarded compensation for the taking within a reasonable time, and that both the recognition rent, and the compensation offered for the expropriation had been inadequate.

4.  By a judgment of 4 October 2022, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found a continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in so far as the applicants had been paid an extremely low amount of recognition rent over the years for the taking under public tenure and that, despite the further taking under title of absolute purchase in 2012, they had not been paid any compensation for it. It also found a violation of Article 6 in so far as they had had no access to court to challenge the compensation. It ordered that the applicants be paid compensation for the expropriation on the basis of the value of the property in 2012 (amounting to EUR 258,333 corresponding to their share of the property which it believed to be 2/6) plus interest at 8% from the date of the judgment until payment; EUR 65,436 to cover pecuniary losses related to the low recognition rent received from 1987 to 2012 (based on their share), and EUR 10,000 in non‑pecuniary damage for the violations suffered. No costs were to be paid by the applicants.

5.  In so far as relevant, on appeal by the Lands Authority (about the amount of compensation awarded for the expropriation in 2012), and a cross appeal by the applicants (related to their share in the property), by a judgment of 29 March 2023 the Constitutional Court considered that, in the absence of an appeal about the merits it was limited in its findings. It thus confirmed the first court’s findings in relation to the violations found as well as the awards of EUR 65,436 and EUR 10,000 but revoked the award of EUR 258,333. In its view, any breach would have occurred in 1964 and therefore would be inadmissible ratione temporis, and not in 2012, as in 2012 the applicants had been adequately offered EUR 13,510 in exchange for their residual right to obtain EUR 189 annually. Thus, while the Constitutional Court could not quash the finding of a breach of rights, it could nonetheless determine when this took place and it considered that it had taken place in 1964. Thus, it was in relation to that date that compensation had to be calculated. According to the Constitutional Court, in 1964 the entire property’s value was EUR 168,516. Confirming that the applicants’ share was 2/6 it considered that they were due compensation in the amount of EUR 56,172, plus interest until date of payment. Two thirds of the costs were to be paid by the applicants.

6.  After notice of the application had been given to the respondent Government, the latter attempted to effect payment of the sums awarded by the Constitutional Court. However, the applicants considered that receiving such payment and signing the relevant deed of transfer would have prejudiced their case before the Court.

7.  The applicants complained of a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the expropriation of their property which had occurred in 2012, which was therefore the relevant year for the purposes of calculating compensation.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION

8.  The Court reiterates that an applicant is deprived of his or her status as a victim if the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded appropriate and sufficient redress for a breach of the Convention (see, for example, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-93, ECHR 2006-V, and B. Tagliaferro & Sons Limited and Coleiro Brothers Limited v. Malta, nos. 75225/13 and 77311/13, § 55, 11 September 2018).

9.  The Court notes that in the absence of an appeal on the merits, the Constitutional Court judgment should have had no impact on the violation ascertained by the first-instance court in relation to the taking under absolute purchase in 2012, which would have amounted to an acknowledgment of the violation complained of. Nevertheless, in substance, the Constitutional Court denied that a violation occurred in 2012. The Court need not enter into whether that course of action was at all within the parameters of domestic law, as in any event, in the circumstances of the present case – where the complaints before the domestic courts concerned interferences and/or deprivations of property under different titles all of which raising separate issues under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 – it is evident that the Constitutional Court did not acknowledge a violation in respect of the taking under title of absolute purchase in 2012 (see paragraph 5 above).

10.  In so far as, in support of their objection of incompatibility ratione personae, the Government challenged the findings reached by the Court in Carmelina Micallef v. Malta (no. 23264/18, §§ 48-49, 28 October 2021), confirming its other previous findings, the Court refers to the general principles under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (ibid., § 39) as applied in the Maltese context (ibid., §§ 43-47) and notes that none of the arguments put forward by the Government shed any doubt about those findings, but rather indicate a lack of understanding of the provision at issue. The Court observes that the applicants suffered an interference with their property consisting of a ‘control of use’ in 1964 when their property had been taken over by the Government under title of public tenure, until 2012. The latter has been acknowledged and redressed by the domestic courts and was not complained of before the Court. Subsequently, in 2012 the applicants lost full ownership of their property and thus suffered an expropriation constituting a deprivation of their possessions (see, mutatis mutandis, Carmelina Micallef, cited above, §§ 47-49). The Constitutional Court having in substance found no violation in the latter respect, the Government’s objection of lack of victim status, on the basis that the Constitutional Court acknowledged the violation complained of (and awarded appropriate redress), is therefore dismissed.

11.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

12.  The general principles concerning complaints of this nature have been summarized in, inter alia, Carmelina Micallef (cited above, §§ 40-42).

13.  Applying those principles to the present case, the Court considers that while there is no dispute about the lawfulness of the measure and that it pursued the public interest, the sum offered in compensation for the expropriation in accordance with the law is manifestly disproportionate to the market value of the property in 2012 (compare Carmelina Micallef, cited above, §§ 52-54, and Mifsud and Others v. Malta, no. 38770/17, § 102, 13 October 2020). The additional sum awarded by the Constitutional Court also had no relation to the value of the property in 2012 and was not in line with the principles set out in the Court’s case-law (ibid., § 114, and the case-law cited therein). Thus, the applicants continued to suffer an excessive burden.

14.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

15.  The applicants claimed 202,160.80 euros (EUR) “plus legal interest as of 5 January 2012” in respect of pecuniary damage (representing their share of the value of the property in 2012 from which was deducted the sum awarded by the Constitutional Court), as well as a sum to be determined by the Court in non-pecuniary damage and EUR 9,083.92 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts (based on a submitted taxed bill of costs) and EUR 2,000 for those incurred before the Court.

16.  The Government noted that no specified claim had been made for non‑pecuniary damage and that in any event this had already been awarded at the domestic level. They also disputed the claim for domestic costs, inter alia, noting that the costs at first instance had been attributed to the defendants who were obliged to pay their dues on the basis of the judgment which constitutes an executive title, and that the Court should not interfere with the allocation of the costs on appeal. They further noted that no invoice or other documentation substantiated the claim for costs before this Court.

17.  Bearing in mind the general principles on the award of pecuniary damage in such cases (see, for example, Carmelina Micallef, cited above §§ 61-62) and that the award of the Constitutional Court remains payable to the applicants, the Court awards the applicants, jointly, EUR 150,000 in pecuniary damage. The sum of non-pecuniary damage having remained unchanged on appeal, no further sum is warranted in this respect.

18.  Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 5,000, jointly, covering costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings, as these were incurred trying to redress a violation suffered at the domestic level which the Constitutional Court neither acknowledged nor redressed (see paragraphs 10 in fine and 13 above). It however rejects the claim for costs before this Court in the absence of any invoice or any other substation in this respect.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, jointly, within three months, the following amounts:

(i)  EUR 150,000 (one hundred fifty thousand euros), in respect of pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 March 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Simeon Petrovski Jolien Schukking
 Deputy Registrar President