CASE OF SELIMI AND KRASNIĆI v. SERBIA

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF SELIMI AND KRASNIĆI v. SERBIA

(Applications nos. 20641/20 and 20644/20)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

3 June 2025

FINAL

03/09/2025

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Selimi and Krasnići v. Serbia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

 Ioannis Ktistakis, President,
 Lətif Hüseynov,
 Darian Pavli,
 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
 Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,
 Mateja Đurović,
 Canòlic Mingorance Cairat, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications (nos. 20641/20 and 20644/20) against Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Serbian nationals, Mr Abdurahim Selimi (“the first applicant”) and Ms Bahrije Krasnići (“the second applicant”), on the dates indicated in the appended table;

the decisions to give notice to the Serbian Government (“the Government”) of those applications;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 13 May 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1.  The applications concern the suspension of pensions paid by the Serbian Pensions and Disability Insurance Fund (SPDIF) to applicants whose claims had been granted and paid by that fund’s branch office in Kosovo[1] before it came under international administration in 1999. In particular, the applicants complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the length of the related administrative and judicial review proceedings, as well as the fact that they had not been paid their pensions since 1999.

THE FACTS

2.  The applicants’ personal details are set out in the appended table, as are the dates of introduction of their applications to the Court and the information regarding their legal counsel.

3.  The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar.

4.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

5.  Following the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, in June 1999 Kosovo was placed under international administration.

6.  On 18 June 2004 the Serbian Ministry for Work, Employment and Social Policy responded to a query by informing Kosovo’s Ombudsman that the pension system in Serbia was based on the concept of “ongoing financing”: specifically, pensions were paid from current pension insurance contributions. Consequently, as the Serbian authorities had been unable to collect any such contributions in Kosovo since 1999, persons who had received their pensions from a Kosovo branch office of the SPDIF could not expect to continue receiving them. The Ministry also reminded the Ombudsman that the regulations on pensions in Kosovo provided for a separate pension system for those living in the territory (see paragraphs 71 and 103 below).

7.  On 5 December 1991 the first applicant was granted an old age pension by an SPDIF branch office in Kosovo, backdated to 1 July 1990.

8.  The first applicant received his monthly pension instalments regularly until 1 March 1999. However, the payments then stopped.

9.  The first applicant thereafter repeatedly complained to the SPDIF about the suspension of the payment of his pension, but apparently received no answer.

10.  On 30 April 2013 the first applicant lodged a formal request with the SPDIF for the resumption of his monthly pension payments, as well as the payment of the accrued pension arrears.

11.  On 6 December 2013 the SPDIF dismissed the first applicant’s request, holding that he was already being paid the basic Kosovan pension and could not receive two pensions simultaneously (see paragraphs 69 and 103-106 below).

12.  On an unspecified date thereafter the first applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with a higher SPDIF administrative authority, but on 5 February 2014 that authority upheld the SPDIF’s decision.

13.  Following five subsequent remittals in administrative and judicial review proceedings, on 11 October 2021 the Administrative Court again remitted the case to the SPDIF for re-examination. In its reasoning the court referred to, inter alia, various provisions of the Pensions and Disability Insurance Act (see paragraphs 68-70 below, Articles 110, 119 and 123). It held that the SPDIF had failed to give reasons for its decision, including as regards why it had assumed without there being any supporting evidence that the first applicant had indeed not opted in favour of an SPDIF pension rather than a Kosovan one.

14.  Following a further administrative remittal, on 27 July 2022 the SPDIF ruled against the first applicant, rejecting his request for the payment of his pension to be resumed. In so doing, it noted, inter alia, that the first applicant had been receiving a basic Kosovan pension since 2004. Moreover, he could not have been paid a pension since 1999 firstly because of the armed conflict in Kosovo and subsequently because the SPDIF was no longer in possession of the relevant documentation. In any event, the first applicant did not report in a timely manner the fact that he was receiving a basic Kosovan pension, and this information was something that the SPDIF could not have obtained itself.

15.  The first applicant maintained that he had not been served with the decision of 27 July 2022, and on 17 October 2022 asked the SPDIF to send him a copy of it.

16.  Ultimately, on 11 October 2023, the applicant lodged an appeal against the SPDIF decision of 27 July 2022 (see paragraph 14 above).

17.  On 20 January 2024 the first applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the delay in his case.

18.  On 1 February 2024 the Administrative Court ordered the first applicant’s lawyer to provide it with a form authorising him to act, signed by the first applicant and certified by a notary.

19.  On 13 March 2024 the first applicant stated to the Administrative Court that, inter alia, he had already provided it with an original authorisation form signed by himself, which had been attached to his complaint of 1 February 2024. As for the order to have the form certified by a notary, the first applicant maintained that there was no such requirement in the relevant procedural legislation in a situation where, as in the present case, the person representing a client was a registered and practising lawyer.

20.  On 9 February 2024 the appeal against the SPDIF decision of 27 July 2022 (see paragraphs 14 and 16 above) was dismissed by the higher SPDIF authority. It upheld the reasoning given at first instance and further stated that, inter alia, the first applicant had to decide which pension he wanted to receive and, if he wanted to receive the SPDIF pension, he should renounce his Kosovan pension and resubmit his request to the SPDIF.

21.  In response to the first applicant’s earlier complaint about the delay in the administrative proceedings (see paragraph 17 above), on 19 August 2024 the Administrative Court made essentially the same order as it had on 1 February 2024, asking for a notarised form of authority to act (see paragraph 18 above).

22.  On 28 August 2024 the first applicant’s lawyer made a further submission to the Administrative Court, essentially restating his arguments of 13 March 2024 (see paragraph 19 above). The lawyer added that, in any event, there were no notaries in Kosovo that were recognised by the Serbian authorities.

23.  On 26 March 2018 the first applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court. He complained about the overall length of the administrative and judicial review proceedings, as well as about breaches of his property and pension rights. The first applicant also referred to the guarantees contained in Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and sought compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered.

24.  The first applicant later supplemented his appeal on several occasions.

25.  On 9 December 2021 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the first applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time, ordered that the proceedings in question be expedited and awarded him the equivalent of 900 euros (EUR) in Serbian dinars for non-pecuniary damage. The remaining complaints, as well as the first applicant’s pecuniary damage claim, were all dismissed as premature given that the disputed administrative proceedings were still ongoing.

26.  On 1 June 2022 the Ministry of Justice paid the first applicant the sum awarded to him by the Constitutional Court.

27.  The first applicant repeatedly complained about the delay in the administrative proceedings under the relevant provisions of national law (see paragraphs 83, 84, 91 and 94 below).

28.  On 21 June 2004 the Kosovan authorities certified that the first applicant had been receiving a “basic” Kosovan monthly pension since 2004 (see paragraph 103 below).

29.  On 15 October 2019 the Kosovan authorities additionally certified that as of 2 June 2004 the first applicant had been receiving a “basic” Kosovan monthly pension. In addition to that, as of 1 January 2008, the first applicant had been receiving a contributory pension provided for under the Kosovan regulations (see paragraphs 103-109 below).

30.  In 2024 the first applicant’s lawyer tried to get in touch with the first applicant but could not reach him. In April 2024 the lawyer was informed by the first applicant’s son that his father had died on 5 March 2024. On that occasion the son informed the lawyer that Ms Sabile Selimi, that is, his mother and the first applicant’s wife, wished to continue with the proceedings before the Court: the first applicant’s children were not interested in doing so. The son also stated that an application for the first applicant’s wife to be declared his sole successor would be brought as soon as possible.

31.  On 24 September 2024 the first applicant’s lawyer was provided with the relevant birth, death and marriage certificates issued by the Kosovan authorities. These documents were then forwarded to the Court itself, together with the filled-in pages nos. 1, 2 and 3 of the Court’s application form. The third page included the signature of the first applicant’s wife authorising the first applicant’s lawyer to represent her in the ongoing case before the Court.

32.  On 30 May 1986 the second applicant was granted a survivor’s pension with a protective allowance by an SPDIF branch office in Kosovo, backdated to 1 September 1985.

33.  The second applicant received those monthly payments regularly until 15 February 1999, when they stopped.

34.  The second applicant complained to the SPDIF about the effective suspension of her pension, together with the allowance, but apparently received no answer.

35.  On 16 March 2017 the second applicant lodged a formal request for the resumption of the payments from the SPDIF, as well as for the payment of the accrued arrears.

36.  On 26 June 2017 the SPDIF dismissed the second applicant’s request, holding that she had not provided sufficient evidence of whether she was already being paid the “basic” Kosovan pension and that she could not receive two pensions simultaneously (see paragraphs 69 and 103-109 below).

37.  On 17 July 2017 the second applicant lodged an appeal with a higher SPDIF administrative authority, but on 21 September 2017 that authority upheld the disputed decision.

38.  Following four subsequent remittals in administrative and judicial review proceedings, on 2 November 2021 the SPDIF again ruled against the second applicant. It noted, in particular, that information in the case file showed the second applicant to be receiving Kosovan “basic” and contributory pensions. In those circumstances, the second applicant was asked to choose between being paid her Kosovan pensions or having her SPDIF pension reinstated. However, the second applicant did not make a choice and she also failed to provide the documentation requested. When the case file was looked at again, it was realised, inter alia, that a copy of an invalid identity card had been filed and that the certificate confirming that the second applicant was still alive dated from 2017.

39.  The second applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against that decision with the higher SPDIF administrative authority, contesting its conclusions and the application of the relevant domestic law. The lawyer included a statement of the difficulties she had had recently in contacting the second applicant.

40.  It would appear that on 22 December 2021 the second applicant’s lawyer lodged a further appeal against the SPDIF decision of 2 November 2021 (see paragraph 38 above), this time on behalf of the second applicant’s son, it having become apparent that the second applicant had died.

41.  On 10 February 2022 the second applicant’s lawyer informed the SPDIF that the second applicant had died on 16 August 2021 and that her son, Mr Ramadan Krasnići, wanted to continue with the proceedings. The lawyer also provided the relevant Kosovan death and birth certificates, certified by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). On the death certificate, however, it was stated that the second applicant had died on 24 December 2020 but that the death had been formally registered on 16 August 2021.

42.  On 9 May 2022 the SPDIF invited the second applicant’s lawyer to provide a written authority, signed by her deceased client’s son and certified by the appropriate Serbian authorities, which would authorise her to represent the second applicant’s successor in the proceedings. The lawyer was warned that, should she not comply with this request, the appeal she had lodged against the SPDIF decision of 2 November 2021 would be dismissed. The SPDIF lastly stated that all other evidence in the proceedings also had to be provided in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Serbia.

43.  On 20 June 2022 the second applicant’s lawyer responded to the SPDIF’s request. She stated that:

(i) she had obtained an authorisation form signed by her former client’s son and certified by a notary in Kosovo;

(ii) Mr Ramadan Krasnići had attempted to have the authorisation form certified by the Serbian authorities, but could not do so since he did not have a Serbian identity card and it would take many years for him to obtain one;

(iii) Mr Ramadan Krasnići might also be asked to bring legal proceedings before the Serbian courts in order to have his mother’s death formally recognised; and

(iv) in any event, Serbian law did not require an authorisation form to be certified by anyone when, as in the present case, the person being authorised was a practising lawyer.

44.  On 5 August 2022 the appeal against the decision of 2 November 2021 (see paragraph 38 above) was dismissed by the SPDIF as having been pursued by an unauthorised person. It was held, in particular, that the second applicant’s lawyer had not filed a properly certified authorisation form signed by her former client’s successor authorising her to represent him in the proceedings.

45.  There was a further remittal in the administrative proceedings on 29 December 2022. The court found the appeal lodged by the second applicant’s lawyer on behalf of her son to be admissible. On 18 January 2023 the SPDIF again dismissed the second applicant’s substantive claim. It noted, inter alia, that the second applicant had been receiving a “basic” Kosovo pension since 2002 and could not receive two pensions simultaneously.

46.  On 1 February 2023 the second applicant’s lawyer, now representing Mr Ramadan Krasnići, the second applicant’s son, lodged an appeal against that decision.

47.  On 21 June 2023 the higher SPDIF administrative authority revoked the disputed decision and remitted the case for re-examination. It observed that the facts had yet to be properly established and that adequate legal reasons likewise needed to be given.

48.  On 23 October 2023 the SPDIF dismissed the second applicant’s request for the payment of her pensions to be resumed. It observed, inter alia, that she had been paid the “basic” Kosovan pension until the day of her death and could not have received two pensions simultaneously. The SPDIF furthermore referred to a number of provisions of the Pensions and Disability Insurance Act (see paragraphs 69 and 70 below).

49.  On 2 November 2023 the second applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against that decision.

50.  On 27 December 2023 her appeal was dismissed by the higher SPDIF administrative authority. The impugned decision rendered at first instance was thereby upheld and it reasoning affirmed.

51.  In response to a complaint about the delay in the administrative proceedings, on 5 February 2024 the Administrative Court asked the second applicant’s lawyer to provide a written authority signed by her deceased client’s son and certified by the relevant Serbian authorities which would authorise her to represent the second applicant’s successor in the proceedings. The lawyer was warned that should she not comply with this request her client’s complaint would be rejected.

52.  On 12 February 2024 the second applicant’s son challenged the decision of 27 December 2023 (see paragraph 50 above) and sought a judicial review of it in the Administrative Court (see paragraph 93 below).

53.  On 23 February 2024 the second applicant’s lawyer responded to the Administrative Court’s request of 5 February 2024 (see paragraph 51 above). She stated that she had already provided an original authorisation signed by her former client’s son. In any event Serbian law did not require an authorisation form to be certified by anyone when, as in the present case, the person being authorised was a practising lawyer.

54.  On 25 March 2019 the second applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court. She complained about the overall length of the administrative and judicial review proceedings and that there had been a breach of her property and pension rights. She referred to the guarantees in Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and sought compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.

55.  The second applicant supplemented her appeal on several occasions.

56.  On 20 May 2021 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the second applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time, ordered that the proceedings in question be expedited, and awarded her the equivalent of EUR 500 in Serbian dinars for non-pecuniary damage. The remaining complaints, as well as the second applicant’s pecuniary damage claim, were all dismissed as premature given that the disputed administrative proceedings were still ongoing.

57.  In April 2022 the second applicant’s lawyer informed the Ministry of Justice that her client had died and that her son Mr Ramadan Krasnići, as her legal successor, had authorised her to receive the compensation awarded by the Constitutional Court. In this connection, the second applicant’s lawyer apparently also provided the Ministry of Justice with an authorisation form signed by the second applicant’s son which had been certified by a notary in Kosovo and verified by UNMIK, as well as the relevant death and birth certificates verified by UNMIK. However, since that documentation was considered incomplete and inadequate, the Ministry of Justice had refused to authorise payment.

58.  According to the second applicant’s lawyer, the sum of EUR 500 awarded by the Constitutional Court has still not been paid because the second applicant’s son does not have a Serbian identity card, which would take years to obtain, and does not have a Serbian-issued decision declaring him his mother’s legal successor. The Serbian authorities did not recognise such decisions certified by Kosovan notaries.

59.  In 2019 the second applicant lodged a civil claim against the SPDIF with the Belgrade Court of First Instance for payment of the pension arrears accrued between March 2016 and February 2019 plus statutory interest and litigation costs.

60.  On 10 March 2020 the Court of First Instance ruled partly in favour of the second applicant and acknowledged a breach of her property rights. It also ordered the SPDIF to pay the second applicant’s pension arrears from the period between March 2016 and December 2018, together with the appropriate statutory interest and litigation costs. The court furthermore referred to, inter alia, domestic legislation, the Court’s judgment in Grudić v. Serbia (no. 31925/08, 17 April 2012), and the Kosovan authorities’ certificate of 4 February 2019 that the second applicant was not then receiving a disability pension, a survivor’s pension or a contributory pension. The Court of First Instance lastly held that the three-year statutory limitation period was not relevant in the specific circumstances of the case.

61.  The parties both lodged appeals against that judgment.

62.  On 13 April 2023 the Court of Appeal sent the case file back to the Court of First Instance for rectification of the judgment.

63.  On 9 August 2024 the Court of First Instance rectified its initial judgment by correcting the spelling of the late second applicant’s first name.

64.  The proceedings on appeal would appear to be still ongoing.

65.  The second applicant repeatedly complained about the delay in the administrative proceedings under the relevant provisions of the domestic law (see paragraphs 83, 84, 91 and 94 below).

66.  On 26 March 2019 the Kosovan authorities issued a document, certified by UNMIK, stating that the second applicant was not receiving a disability pension, a survivor’s pension or a contributory pension (see paragraphs 103-109 below).

67.  On 26 March 2019 the Kosovan authorities issued an additional document, certified by UNMIK, to the effect that the second applicant had been receiving a “basic” Kosovan pension since 1 January 2002.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

68.  Article 110 of this Act provides, inter alia, that a person’s pension and disability rights must be terminated if he or she no longer meets the statutory requirements. However, should a current pensioner obtain an additional pension from another pension and disability insurance fund established by one of the other States within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the pension paid to him or her by the SPDIF must, unless an international agreement provides otherwise, be recalculated based on the pensionable employment period (penzijski staž) already taken into account by the other State.

69.  Article 119 provides that when a pensioner is entitled to two or more pensions within the territory of the Republic of Serbia, only one of those pensions may be paid, the choice as to which being the pensioner’s.

70.  Article 123 provides, inter alia, that pension instalments which have not been paid owing to circumstances for which the pensioner is responsible, such as the failure to provide relevant but officially unavailable information, documentation or authorisation, are payable only for the twelve months preceding the date on which the pensioner lodged the request for payment.

71.  These Opinions stated, inter alia, that the pension system in Serbia was based on the concept of “ongoing financing”: specifically, pensions were paid from current pension insurance contributions. Since the Serbian authorities had been unable to collect any such contributions in Kosovo since 1999, persons who had been granted SPDIF pensions in Kosovo could not expect, for the time being, to continue receiving them. It was furthermore stated that Regulation 2001/35 on pensions in Kosovo, which had been adopted by UNMIK, provided for a separate pension system for persons living in the territory (see paragraph 103 below).

72.  Article 172 § 1 of this Act provides that a legal entity, which includes the State, is liable for any damage caused by one of “its bodies” to a “third person”.

73.  Article 372 § 1 provides, inter alia, that the limitation period for claims relating to payments which are made once a year or more frequently is three years. Time runs from the date when each payment becomes due.

74.  Article 376 §§ 1 and 2 provides, inter alia, that the limitation period for civil compensation claims is three years from the date on which the claimant first learnt of the damage in question, but that, in any event, the absolute deadline is five years from the time the damage occurred.

75.  In response to the situation in Kosovo, this Opinion stated, inter alia, that a person’s recognised right to a pension may only be restricted on the basis of Article 110 of the Pensions and Disability Insurance Act (see paragraph 68 above). Recognised individual pension rights could not depend on whether current pension insurance contributions could be collected in a given territory.

76.  The Supreme Court explained that administrative proceedings (upravni postupak) and, if necessary, judicial review proceedings (upravni spor) would be the appropriate avenue for a challenge to a restriction of pension rights.

77.  Lastly, the Supreme Court observed that, in this context, the civil courts had jurisdiction only in cases involving claims of unlawful and improper action (nezakonit i nepravilan rad) by the SPDIF.

78.  Article 1 § 2 of this Act provides that a deceased’s estate consists of all rights that belonged to the deceased at the time of his or her death and which can be inherited.

79.  Article 206 § 1 provides, inter alia, that when a person dies, his or her estate will be “opened”.

80.  Article 212 § 1 provides that a deceased’s estate passes to the deceased’s legal successors by operation of law at the moment of his or her death.

81.  Article 87 of this Act provides, inter alia, that a decision taken in inheritance proceedings determines who the deceased’s legal successors are, which property belongs to his or her estate, and who will inherit.

82.  Article 122 § 1 provides that when it has been established which persons have the right to inherit, those persons must then be declared the deceased’s legal successors.

83.  Article 208 § 1 of this Act provided, inter alia, that in simple matters an administrative body had to issue a decision within one month of the date on which the claimant had lodged his or her request. In all other cases, the administrative body had to give a decision within two months.

84.  Article 208 § 2 enabled a claimant whose request was not decided within the time-limits set in the preceding paragraph to lodge an appeal as if his or her request had been refused. Where an appeal was not allowed, the claimant had the right to directly bring an administrative dispute in a court.

85.  This Act was repealed and replaced on 1 June 2017 by the 2016 General Administrative Proceedings Act (see paragraphs 86-92 below).

86.  Article 49 § 2 of this Act provides, inter alia, that if there are doubts as to the genuineness of an authorisation form, the administrative authority concerned is to order the claimant to submit a certified original.

87.  Article 50 § 1 provides that the administrative authority is to make sure, throughout the proceedings, that the person designated to represent the claimant is indeed authorised to do so.

88.  Article 52 § 1 provides, inter alia, that authorisation to represent a claimant in the proceedings does not end automatically with the death of the claimant, but that the claimant’s legal successor may revoke the authorisation previously granted.

89.  Article 123 provides, inter alia, that foreign documents that have the probative value of a public document in the country in which they were issued have, under the condition of reciprocity, the probative value of a domestic public document, if they are duly authenticated. A certified translation must be attached to a document drawn up in a foreign language, if necessary.

90.  Article 145 provides, inter alia, that when proceedings are instituted at the request of a claimant, or by an administrative authority itself but in the interests of the claimant, and when direct decision-making is possible, the administrative authority concerned is to give its decision within a period of thirty days after the commencement of the proceedings.

91.  Article 173 provides, inter alia, that when an administrative authority does not give a decision within the deadline specified by law, a higher administrative authority must require it to provide an explanation. Should the higher authority find that the reasons given are sufficient, it must extend the deadline by thirty days at the most. Should the higher authority find that the stated reasons are not sufficient, it must take the decision itself or order the lower authority do so within an additional period of no more than fifteen days. Should that authority again fail to comply, the higher authority must decide on the matter itself.

92.  On 1 June 2017 this Act repealed and replaced the 1997 General Administrative Proceedings Act (see paragraphs 83-85 above).

93.  Articles 3-6 of this Act provide, inter alia, that judicial review proceedings may be brought against an administrative authority that makes a decision that is later disputed.

94.  Article 19 § 1 provides, inter alia, that should a higher administrative authority have failed to decide an appeal lodged more than sixty days earlier, and should it again fail to do so in another seven days after receipt of a claimant’s repeated request to that effect, the claimant may institute judicial review proceedings directly, as if his or her appeal had been dismissed.

95.  Article 43 provides, inter alia, that when it finds that a disputed administrative decision should be set aside, the court itself may, under certain circumstances, adjudicate the administrative matter itself, if the nature of the case allows it and if the established facts provide a reliable basis for so doing. The court’s judgment will in that situation replace the disputed administrative decision in all respects.

96.  Article 3 of this Act provides, inter alia, that public documents issued abroad can be used inside Serbia only if they have been certified by the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by one of Serbia’s diplomatic or consular missions abroad. Foreign public documents are not subject to authentication, within the meaning of this provision, if, on the basis of reciprocity, Serbian public documents are also not subject to authentication in the foreign country concerned.

97.  In its decision Rev. no. 862/2015 of 24 February 2016 the Supreme Court of Cassation held, inter alia, that the acquired right to a pension was a possession of the claimant and that therefore the suspension of payment of it was in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. A claim for pension arrears was a recurring monetary claim to which the statutory three-year time limit applied under Article 372 or Article 376 of the Obligations Act (see paragraphs 73 and 74 above). The court lastly referred to Article 172 of the same Act (see paragraph 72 above) and observed that regardless of whether a claim for pension arrears was based on compensation for the pecuniary damage suffered or on unjust enrichment there were no grounds for allowing a longer limitation period.

98.  On 27 June 2017 the Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Cassation decided on the quantum to be awarded where pensions had been suspended (Zaključak usvojen na sednici Građanskog odeljenja Vrhovnog kasacionog suda održanoj 27. juna 2017. godine, Bilten br. 3/2017). In cases involving compensation for the pecuniary damage suffered as a consequence of the “non-payment of [SPDIF] pensions to persons from the territory of ... Kosovo and Metohija”, the “amount of money received by the plaintiff from UNMIK” must be “taken into account” and the compensation reduced accordingly (see paragraph 99 below).

99.  The Government provided copies of a total of twenty-four civil judgments and decisions taken by the Belgrade Court of Appeal between 30 August 2018 and 11 January 2023. Fifteen of them were in favour of claimants seeking SPDIF pension arrears. In all of the judgments and decisions, the court applied the reasoning described in paragraphs 75-77, 97 and 98 above as regards:

(a) the non-payment of pensions arrears;

(b) compensation for the pecuniary damage suffered;

(c) the three-year limitation period; and

(d) the need to take into account, based on relevant documentation issued by UNMIK or the Kosovan institutions, any other pensions being received in Kosovo at the material time (see Gž. nos. 5099/18, 8936/18, 9764/19, 6955/19, 4970/19, 5681/20, 7356/20, 3955/20, 6714/21, 6434/21, 4744/21, 5508/21, 5371/21, 6386/21, 5584/21, 5821/22, 5560/22, 3921/22, 3888/22, 1826/22, 2325/22, 2990/22, 2471/22 and 6291/22).

100.  In judgements Gž. no. 1826/22 of 14 April 2022 and Gž. no. 2471/22 of 2 June 2022, respectively, the Belgrade Court of Appeal accepted an inheritance-related decision and a certificate that a claimant was still alive issued by a Kosovan notary.

101.  On 9 December 2021, in Gž. no. 6386/21, the Belgrade Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that the validity of an inheritance-related decision issued by a Kosovan notary was not decisive since it was, in any event, clear that the claimant was her mother’s only legal successor, even in the absence of a formal decision to this effect, by virtue of Article 212 of the Inheritance Act (see paragraph 80 above).

102.  In Gž. no. 6291/22 of 11 January 2023 the Belgrade Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that an inheritance-related decision issued by a Kosovan notary was inadmissible given that it had not been made in accordance with the required procedures and or by the relevant bodies of the Republic of Serbia.

103.  These regulations provide for a separate system whereby all persons aged sixty-five or over “habitually residing” in Kosovo have the right to a “basic pension”.

104.  On 13 June 2008 the Kosovan Assembly passed this Act, which essentially endorsed the system set up by the two Regulations cited above, but transferred the functional competencies from UNMIK to the Kosovan authorities.

105.  These regulations provide, inter alia, that the basic pension referred to in paragraph 103 above, in the amount of EUR 40 monthly, could be increased to EUR 75 for all pensioners aged sixty-five or over habitually residing in Kosovo who could prove, inter alia, that they had been paying pension insurance contributions to the SPDIF for at least fifteen years and were not in receipt of another contributory pension on the same basis.

106.  These regulations essentially affirm the regulations described in paragraph 105 above, but raise the pension from EUR 75 to EUR 80 monthly.

107.  Articles 3 (1.4) and 7 § 1 of this Act provide, inter alia, that a “basic [old] age pension”, that is, a “minimal regular monthly pension”, will be paid to all permanent residents of Kosovo who have identity documents and are aged sixty-five or over, regardless of whether they had ever been employed.

108.  Articles 3 (1.5) and 8 § 1 provide, under certain conditions, for an old “age contributory pension”, that is, a “regular monthly pension” for those who were formerly employed in Kosovo and had paid contributions to the SPDIF prior to 1 January 1999. Article 8 § 2 provides that all persons entitled to a contributory pension will be categorised taking into account the applicable pensionable employment period, as well as other relevant criteria.

109.  Article 13 provides, inter alia, for the Kosovan authorities to adjust pension rates annually by reference to living costs and the rate of inflation.

110.  This legislation amends and supplements certain evidential and procedural provisions contained in the 2014 Pension Schemes Financed by the State Act.

111.  Articles 2, 4 and 5 of this Act, by means of amending and supplementing the relevant provisions contained in the 2014 Pension Schemes Financed by the State Act, provide, inter alia, that:

(i) a person is “resident in Kosovo” if he or she is physically present for more than one hundred and eighty-three days in a period of twelve months;

(ii) in certain situations related to termination of employment, persons who had not paid the required fifteen years of contributions to the SPDIF could still obtain a reduced old age pension; and

(iii) the payment of a pension under this legislation is to be terminated if the pensioner concerned ceases to be a resident of Kosovo.

112.  According to the Council of Europe’s department for the execution of the Court’s judgments, in 2013 a public invitation to eligible persons to apply for resumption of payment of their SPDIF pensions to which they had contributed in Kosovo was published by the Serbian authorities in a number of national and local newspapers, as well as on the SPDIF website[2].

113.  That public invitation said, inter alia, that a beneficiary of an SPDIF pension from the territory of Kosovo, whose pension had been suspended as from 9 June 1999, would need to contact the relevant SPDIF branch office, with certain evidence, within a period of sixty days from the date of the publication of the invitation to have the pension reinstated. The evidence necessary for the resumption of payment of an SPDIF pension included:

(a) an SPDIF decision that the person was entitled to receive a pension;

(b) evidence confirming the identity of the pensioner concerned and his or her personal details;

(c) evidence of not being paid at present or having been paid in the past a pension by the Kosovan authorities or UNMIK;

(d) a valid certificate that the person was alive or an application in person to the SPDIF for the resumption of pension payments; and

(e) in the case of an application for a survivor’s pension, evidence that the claimant was not insured personally and, where appropriate, proof of the fulfilment of certain educational requirements.

All of the above evidence had to be provided “in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Serbia”[3].

114.  The Court’s judgment in Grudić (cited above) was enforced under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. That enforcement ended on 7 December 2017 because the Committee of Ministers was satisfied that all the measures required under Article 46 of the Convention, both individual and general, had been taken by the Serbian Government[4]. The Committee of Ministers also referred to the Action Report prepared by the Government which, inter alia, outlined the various domestic administrative, civil and constitutional remedies available. The Committee of Ministers also referred to the above-mentioned public invitation[5].

115.  According to the Government’s Action Report of September 2017, following the public invitation of 2013 the Serbian authorities had received a total of 9,790 requests for the resumption of payment of SPDIF pensions. In 3,920 of those cases, the relevant documents were provided, while in the remaining 5,870 cases the claimants provided incomplete documentation. Since 1 March 2013 the SPDIF had agreed to a total of 533 requests for pensions to be reinstated in accordance with the applicable domestic statutory requirements, while 3,387 requests were rejected, mostly because those claimants were already receiving other pensions in Kosovo. Namely, pursuant to the domestic relevant legal provision, a pension beneficiary entitled to two or several pensions on the territory of Republic of Serbia could only exercise the right to one pension according to his/her own preference[6].

THE LAW

116.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

117.  The Government maintained that both the domestic proceedings and the proceedings before the Court could only have continued after the first applicant’s death if there was a formal statement by an interested party of an intention to continue the proceedings. In the present case, however, there had been no such statement. The first applicant’s lawyer had only had a telephone conversation with his former client’s son in which the son had said that his mother, the first applicant’s wife, was willing to continue with the proceedings before the Court. The birth, death and marriage certificates provided were not capable of proving that anyone was the deceased’s legal successor. The first applicant’s successors would, of course, have a material interest in continuing with the proceedings, but their status as such had to be determined through the appropriate legal channels (see paragraphs 80-82 above). According to the Government, the Court itself also had to be properly informed of those facts, as well as of any successor’s relevant procedural intentions.

118.  The first applicant’s lawyer said that in 2024 she had tried to get in touch with the first applicant but had been unsuccessful. In April 2024 she had been informed by her client’s son that his father had died on 5 March 2024. On that occasion the son had also told her that Ms Sabile Selimi, his mother and the first applicant’s wife, wished to continue with the proceedings before the Court. According to the first applicant’s lawyer, her late client’s son had said that proceedings declaring the first applicant’s wife as her husband’s sole legal successor would be brought as soon as possible.

119.  The Court notes at the outset that it has established in its case-law that it views the situation when an applicant dies after having lodged the Court application differently from that where the applicant has died before an application has been made. In particular, where an applicant dies after lodging an application, the Court accepts that the next of kin or successor in title may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 97, ECHR 2014, with further references; see also Burlya and Others v. Ukraine, no. 3289/10, § 68, 6 November 2018). In such circumstances, the crucial point is not whether the rights in question are or are not transferable to the person who wishes to pursue the procedure, but whether that person can in principle claim a legitimate interest in asking the Court to deal with the case on the basis of the applicant’s wish to exercise his or her individual and personal right to lodge an application with it (see Singh and Others v. Greece, no. 60041/13, § 26, 19 January 2017, and Burlya, cited above, § 69). Moreover, the formal status of a legal successor, as regards the relationship between the individual wishing to pursue the application and the deceased applicant, is likewise not, in itself, decisive as long as the person concerned can lay a claim to be the deceased applicant’s next of kin (see, for example, Burlya, cited above, § 69, and contrast Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000‑XII, where the Court accepted that a relative who had not been recognised as the deceased’s successor in title nevertheless had standing, with Thévenon v. France (dec.), no. 2476/02, ECHR 2006‑III, where it did not recognise the standing of an individual who was not the applicant’s relative even though he was his friend and universal legatee).

120.  Turning to the present case and in view of the above, the Court observes that the first applicant died after having lodged the application. Furthermore, his wife expressed her unequivocal wish to continue with the proceedings before the Court, in which connection on 24 September 2024 the first applicant’s lawyer was provided with the relevant birth, death and marriage certificates issued by the Kosovan authorities (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above). Those documents were then forwarded to the Court itself, together with pages nos. 1-3 of the Court’s application form, all appropriately filled in. The signature of the first applicant’s wife on page 3 authorised her late husband’s lawyer to represent her in the ongoing proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 31 above).

121.  The Court considers that the lack of a decision formally declaring the first applicant’s wife as her husband’s legal successor does not disqualify her from continuing with the proceedings before it since she is clearly a person who can claim to be his next of kin (see the case-law cited in paragraph 119 above), as well as a person with a material interest in the outcome of the proceedings before it (see paragraph 80 above; see also, mutatis mutandis, the Government’s own statement regarding the first applicant’s successors in paragraph 117 above, in fine).

122.  Accordingly, the Court finds that the first applicant’s wife has standing to continue with the proceedings before it in her husband’s stead and dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection in that respect (see, mutatis mutandis, and among other authorities, Borisov and Others v. Ukraine, no. 34091/03, §§ 7 and 11, 24 April 2008, in the context of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1; see also, mutatis mutandis, Burlya, cited above, § 76).

123.  For practical purposes, however, reference will still be made to “the first applicant” throughout the ensuing text.

(a)   The parties’ submissions

124.  The Government noted that the application form lodged by the second applicant was not signed by her at all, but by a lawyer allegedly authorised by her. In fact, what the second applicant claimed was her authorisation only had her fingerprint on it. It was signed by a certain Ramadan Krasnići, and next to her signature “confirmed by son” had been added, without any further explanation.

125.  The second applicant maintained that her fingerprint in the authorisation part of the application form was genuine, and that her son’s signature was there merely to confirm that fact. The second applicant had also had an official Serbian identity card at that time.

(b)   The Court’s assessment

126.  The Court has previously held in cases of similar challenges by Governments that a general assessment of all of the relevant evidence was called for and, in particular, an assessment of whether the applicant had an interest in the proceedings before it (see, mutatis mutandis, Velikova v. Bulgaria, no. 41488/98, § 48, ECHR 2000-VI, with further references).

127.  While in the present case the Government do not allege in express terms that the application was made without the second applicant’s consent, their objection nevertheless seems to question implicitly the validity of the application, and in particular to question the validity of the written authority given to the second applicant’s lawyer.

128.  In this context, the Court observes that it would be natural for an apparently illiterate or seriously enfeebled applicant to leave a fingerprint in place of a signature. Furthermore, the signature of the second applicant’s son next to the fingerprint would, if anything, add to rather than detract from the credibility of the claim that the fingerprint in question was indeed that of his mother. The Government have also offered no forensic evidence that the fingerprint was not left by the second applicant personally, which is something that they could have done given that the national authorities had already provided the second applicant with a Serbian identity card. Lastly, the Court observes that the second applicant’s lawyer, whose name appears on the disputed written authority to act provided with the Court’s application form, has been her legal representative for many years and in various proceedings domestically (see Velikova, cited above, § 51).

129.  In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the information contained in the case file includes nothing suggesting that the second applicant’s authorisation of her lawyer was flawed in any way, that the application itself was lodged without her understanding and consent, or that there was any doubt as to her will to pursue her complaints (see Velikova, cited above, §§ 50 and 51).

130.  The Court, therefore, cannot but find that the application has been validly submitted on behalf of the second applicant and it dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection in this connection.

(a)   The parties’ submissions

131.  The Government maintained that the Constitutional Court was not informed of the second applicant’s death, which was why it decided on the violation of her constitutional rights after her death (see paragraphs 41 and 56 above). In the Government’s view, the compensation awarded by the Constitutional Court was therefore also a result of that successful attempt to deliberately mislead the Constitutional Court in its deliberations. It followed that the second applicant had abused her right of individual application, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.

132.  The second applicant maintained that there was no abuse of the right of individual application. Her lawyer had admittedly had some issues in reaching her client at the time in question, but she had acted professionally throughout the proceedings before the Court and had provided all of the necessary information and documentation.

(b)   The Court’s assessment

133.  The Court reiterates that an application may be rejected as abusive under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention if, inter alia, it was knowingly based on untrue facts and false declarations (see, for example, Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, no. 798/05, § 63, 15 September 2009; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 97, ECHR 2012; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810/10, § 28, ECHR 2014; and Zličić v. Serbia, nos. 73313/17 and 20143/19, § 55, 26 January 2021).

134.  The submission of incomplete and thus misleading information may also amount to an abuse of the right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation has been provided for the failure to disclose that information (see Hüttner v. Germany (dec.), no. 23130/04, 19 June 2006; Kowal v. Poland (dec.), no. 2912/11, § 32, 18 September 2012; Gross, cited above, § 28; and Zličić, also cited above, § 55). However, even in such cases, the applicant’s intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty (see Al-Nashif v. Bugaria, no. 50963/99, § 89, 20 June 2002; Nold v. Germany, no. 27250/02, § 87, 29 June 2006; and Zličić, cited above, § 55).

135.  Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the Government’s objection refers to domestic proceedings, specifically those before the Constitutional Court. In this connection, while domestic proceedings should, of course, be pursued by applicants in accordance with the relevant domestic procedural rules and in good faith (see paragraph 57 above), the Court cannot but observe that any shortcomings in the conduct of the second applicant’s proceedings before the Constitutional Court had nothing to do with this Court or her communication with it. Those shortcomings are therefore of no relevance in the context of the Government’s abuse allegations raised under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Paun Jovanović v. Serbia, no. 41394/15, §§ 50 and 51, 7 February 2023).

136.  It follows that the Government’s preliminary objection must be dismissed.

(a)   The Government’s submissions

137.  The Government argued that the second applicant’s son had no standing to continue with the proceedings either domestically or before the Court itself after his mother’s death. Notably, his status as the second applicant’s successor in title was as yet unconfirmed by a formal decision, which would also have had to be taken in accordance with the relevant Serbian legislation. The second applicant’s son had merely provided birth and death certificates, but this was not sufficient to show him to be his late mother’s legal successor (see paragraphs 80-82 above).

138.  Moreover, Registry records in Kosovo were known to be unreliable, which was why even the family relationship between the late second applicant and a person wishing to continue with the proceedings in her stead could be disputed. The problem with official documents in general had been widely acknowledged and there were therefore plans to establish reliable registry records in Kosovo with the help of the international community and the participation of interested parties.

139.  Alternatively, a person wishing to continue with the proceedings would have to produce a decision declaring him or her as the second applicant’s legal successor in the form that was agreed upon in negotiations between the competent authorities, through the mediation of the European Union. That procedure would have been conducted through the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Serbia and would have involved the Delegation of the European Union and the Office of the Special Representative of the European Union in Priština, which would have liaised with judicial and other bodies in Kosovo.

140.  Even if Kosovo were to be seen as an independent State, which the Republic of Serbia does not accept, the requirements contained in the Legalisation of Public Documents in the International Context Act were not complied with in the present case (see paragraph 96 above). Despite its general relevance, the Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents never entered into force between Kosovo and Serbia.

141.  Article 123 of the General Administrative Procedure Act was also not complied with by the person wishing to continue with the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 89 above). Article 52 of the General Administrative Procedure Act, which provided that a written authorisation to act remained effective after death unless revoked, was likewise relevant (see paragraph 88 above). In any event, after the death of a party, the lawyer cannot continue to take procedural steps domestically as if that party were still alive, which is what the late second applicant’s lawyer had done.

142.  Lastly, the Government maintained that the purported signatures of the second applicant’s son on the application form and on the written authority for his late mother’s lawyer to continue with the proceedings before the Court on his behalf were not the same, which raised an additional obstacle.

(b)   The second applicant’s submissions

143.  The second applicant’s lawyer confirmed that she had submitted the relevant death and birth certificates and duly signed a genuine authorisation form, and that this was sufficient under the Inheritance Act for the domestic proceedings and the proceedings before the Court itself to be continued (see paragraphs 79 and 80 above). Furthermore, the relevant provisions of the General Administrative Proceedings Act as to authorisation forms had also been complied with (see paragraphs 86-88 above).

(c)   The Court’s assessment

144.  The Court has already held that the first applicant’s widow could continue with the proceedings before it after his death, notwithstanding the absence of a formal decision declaring her as her husband’s legal successor (see paragraphs 119-123 above). For the same reasons, mutatis mutandis, the Court is of the opinion that the second applicant’s son too can continue with the proceedings before it following the death of his mother.

145.  In any event, the Court is not bound by any domestic procedural rules or indeed the specifics of the situation in Kosovo. It has instead relied on its own free assessment of all of the relevant evidence contained in the case file (see, mutatis mutandis, the case-law cited in paragraph 126 above).

146.  It is also noted that the Government have offered no evidence that the birth or death certificates presented to the Court following the second applicant’s death are not genuine. They have not questioned the validity of the second applicant’s death certificate and have merely stated that public records in Kosovo were factually unreliable which was why even the family relationship between the second applicant and the person wishing to continue with the proceedings in her stead could be disputed. The Court, however, considers that this cannot be seen as a substantiated objection in the context of the present case but rather as a mere assumption on the part of the Government.

147.  Turning to the signatures provided by the second applicant’s son, the Court disagrees with the Government’s submissions. It does not find any obvious difference between his signature on the application form of 14 April 2020, placed next to his mother’s fingerprint, and that on the written authorisation of 6 April 2022 for his late mother’s lawyer to continue acting in the proceedings before the Court on his behalf (see, mutatis mutandis, Aliev v. Georgia, no. 522/04, § 45, 13 January 2009). The Government have likewise offered no forensic evidence suggesting that one or both signatures were not genuine or had otherwise been tampered with. In these circumstances, the Court has no reason to doubt that the second applicant’s son has expressed a genuine and valid wish to continue with the proceedings before it after the death of his mother (see, mutatis mutandis, Aliev, cited above, § 49).

148.  Lastly, with respect to the conditions for the continuation of the domestic proceedings after the second applicant’s death, this is clearly a matter of domestic law and as such unrelated to whether the second applicant’s son can continue with the proceedings before the Court itself.

149.  Accordingly, the Court finds that the second applicant’s son has standing to continue with the proceedings before it in his mother’s stead and dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection in that respect (see the case-law cited in paragraph 119 above).

150.  For practical purposes, however, reference will still be made to “the second applicant” throughout the ensuing text.

151.  The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that they had not been paid their SPDIF pensions since 1999 and that there was no effective domestic means of redress. Their complaints included the failure to pay the arrears of their pension and the failure of the relevant authorities to resume payment of their pensions pro futuro.

Article 1 of Protocol No.1 reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

(a)   The Government’s submissions

152.  The Government maintained that the first applicant had failed to make use of a civil claim for damages in order to obtain his pension arrears (see paragraphs 72-77 and 97-99 above), which had been recognised by the Court itself as an effective remedy in that context (see, mutatis mutandis, Skenderi and Others v. Serbia (dec.), nos. 15090/08 and 4 others, §§ 100 and 101, 4 July 2017).

153.  As for the administrative proceedings, the first applicant had failed to properly pursue them. In particular, his lawyer had insisted on obtaining the payment of the entire amount of pension arrears through the administrative proceedings, without taking into account that this was not an appropriate avenue of redress and that the SPDIF could only decide about the resumption of pension payments for the future. Moreover, the SPDIF had to be provided with the required evidence before the payment of a pension could be resumed. The documentation in question was specified by the Grudić Action Plan proposed by the Government and accepted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The SPDIF could not, however, legally have restricted the making of repetitive or incomplete requests by the first applicant, which were then used to create the impression that the administrative authorities were ineffective. In conclusion, the SPDIF had complied with the relevant provisions of the Pensions and Disability Insurance Act, as well as the Grudić Action Plan. To conclude otherwise would undermine the findings of the Committee of Ministers in this regard (see paragraphs 68-70 and 112-115 above).

154.  The Government lastly maintained that an appeal to the Constitutional Court has consistently been accepted as an effective remedy by the Court within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In the first applicant’s case, the Constitutional Court had found that his right to a fair trial had been violated by the excessive length of the administrative and judicial review proceedings, and had awarded adequate compensation for the non-pecuniary harm suffered. However, as regards the first applicant’s request for the resumption of his pension payments since their suspension in 1999, it could not but reject this as premature given that the administrative proceedings in this connection were still pending and that no civil proceedings for pension arrears had even been brought.

(b)   The first applicant’s submissions

155.  The first applicant maintained that he had made use of all available and effective domestic remedies. Moreover, since the payment of his SPDIF pension had not been resumed, he had also not been afforded any redress for the violation of his property rights. Skenderi and Others, referred to by the Government, was not relevant since it concerned only civil proceedings. The first applicant also pointed out that his complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerned the ineffectiveness of administrative and judicial review proceedings, not the ineffectiveness of civil proceedings as such. In any event, a civil claim was not capable of providing for the resumption of his pension payments pro futuro.

(c)   The Court’s assessment

(i)      As regards the payment of the first applicant’s SPDIF pension arrears

156.  The relevant principles as regards the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention have been recently summarised in Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], no. 21881/20, §§ 138-146, 27 November 2023 (see also, among many other authorities, Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014).

157.  In view of the above and turning to the present case, the Court finds it clear from the available domestic legislation, case-law and jurisprudence that there was an avenue for the first applicant to obtain redress for his SPDIF pension arrears that constituted an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 72-77 and 97-99 above; see also, mutatis mutandis, Skenderi and Others, cited above, §§ 100 and 101, albeit in the context of the statutory limitation periods applicable to such proceedings). With this in mind and since the first applicant never made use of the civil claim in question, the Court accepts the Government’s objection in so far as it concerns the first applicant’s pension arrears. The first applicant’s complaint in that respect must therefore be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

(ii)    As regards the resumption of payment of the first applicant’s SPDIF pensions pro futuro

158.  With respect to the Government’s submissions concerning the administrative and judicial review proceedings (see paragraph 153 above), the Court is of the opinion that these matters go to the very heart of the question of whether the first applicant suffered a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and should, as such, more appropriately be examined at the merits stage. The Court therefore decides to join this objection to the merits of the first applicant’s complaint in so far as it concerns the resumption of payment of his pensions pro futuro.

159.  The Court furthermore notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

(iii)   As regards the proceedings before the Constitutional Court

160.  The Court considers the Government’s remarks concerning the proceedings before the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 154 above) to be merely a clarification of their position on the domestic proceedings rather than a separate admissibility objection regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies and will therefore not address it separately.

(a)   Submissions of the parties

161.  The Government essentially restated, mutatis mutandis, their objection as to the requirement to exhaust the domestic remedy of a civil claim, as described in paragraphs 152-154 above in relation to the first applicant.

162.  The Government argued that the second applicant’s complaints were premature and should therefore be rejected under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, since there were civil proceedings still ongoing. The Government also said that a civil judgement had been delivered in favour of the second applicant at first instance, awarding her the pension arrears in question, although those proceedings were still pending on appeal.

163.  According to the Government, the second applicant’s pension payments were not reinstated because she did not provide evidence as to whether she was receiving a Kosovan pension at the relevant time (see paragraphs 69 and 113 above). The administrative and judicial review proceedings were thus not ineffective when it came to future pension payments in so far as they concerned periods when the second applicant was not already in receipt of another, Kosovan, pension.

164.  The Government pointed out that the Constitutional Court had found a violation of the second applicant’s right to a fair trial within a reasonable time and awarded adequate compensation for the non-pecuniary harm suffered. However, as regards her request for the resumption of her pension payments for the future, the Constitutional Court rightly rejected it as premature.

165.  The second applicant essentially restated, mutatis mutandis, the first applicant’s arguments as summarised in paragraph 155 above.

(b)   The Court’s assessment

(i)      As regards the payment of the second applicant’s SPDIF pension arrears

166.  The Court has already held that the first applicant’s complaint about his pension arrears had to be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraph 157 above). For the same reasons, mutatis mutandis, the Court rejects the second applicant’s complaint about her own pension arrears as premature given that the civil proceedings in her case are still pending (see paragraphs 59-64 above).

167.  Accordingly, the second applicant’s complaint regarding pension arrears must likewise be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

(ii)    As regards the resumption of payment of the second applicant’s SPDIF pensions pro futuro

168.  For the reasons already given in paragraph 158 above, mutatis mutandis, the Court is also of the opinion that the Government’s submissions concerning the administrative and judicial review proceedings, contained in paragraphs 161 and 163 above, go to the very heart of the question of whether the second applicant suffered a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and should, as such, more appropriately be examined at the merits stage. The Court therefore decides to join this objection to the merits of the second applicant’s complaint in so far as it concerns the resumption of payment of her pensions pro futuro.

169.  The Court furthermore notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

(iii)   As regards the proceedings before the Constitutional Court

170.  As in the first applicant’s case (see paragraph 160 above), the Court considers the Government’s remarks concerning the proceedings before the Constitutional Court to be merely a clarification of their position on the domestic proceedings rather than a separate admissibility objection regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court will not therefore examine those remarks as such.

(a)   The applicants’ submissions

171.  The applicants reaffirmed their complaints and restated their arguments as summarised in paragraphs 151 and 155 above. They furthermore disputed the Government’s assertion that the State had not had the documentation needed to authorise the resumption of the payment of SPDIF pensions to beneficiaries in Kosovo. They asserted that the SPDIF had continued paying some of the beneficiaries throughout the time in question, without suspending payments to them, and had resumed the payment of pensions to others, which would not have been possible if they had not had the documentation. The applicants also submitted that they had not contributed to the delay in the administrative and judicial review proceedings in any way whatsoever.

(b)   The Government’s submissions

(i)      As regards the first applicant

172.  The Government maintained that following the Grudić judgment in 2012, the State had been ordered, inter alia, to take appropriate general measures so as to enable the unhindered exercise of SPDIF pension and disability insurance rights for all entitled persons in Kosovo, as well as the payment of their pension arrears. The supervision of the execution of the Grudić judgment was the responsibility of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. By 2017 the Committee of Ministers was satisfied that the Government had complied with its obligations under Article 46 of the Convention, that is the individual and general enforcement requirements stemming from the Grudić judgment, and closed its examination, thus deeming it fully executed. In so doing, the Committee of Ministers, inter alia, accepted the Government’s Action Plan and the public invitation addressed to persons with SPDIF pension-related claims in Kosovo (see paragraphs 112-114 above).

173.  Turning to the impugned administrative and judicial review proceedings, the first applicant did not submit the necessary evidence or did not have it. Therefore, the mere fact that the SPDIF did not establish the resumption of payment of his pension, as requested, cannot be seen as anything but a failure on the first applicant’s part to properly engage in those proceedings. Furthermore, the first applicant’s apparent disagreement with the requirements as set out in the Government’s Action Plan and accepted by the Committee of Ministers, as well as his disagreement with the substance of Article 119 of the Pensions and Disability Insurance Act, did not disclose any shortcomings in the conduct of the proceedings by the SPDIF itself. On the contrary, the SPDIF strictly adhered to the Action Plan and the relevant legislation (see paragraphs 69 and 112-114 above). Lastly and as already noted above, the first applicant did not make use of a civil claim for damages which would have been an effective way for him to obtain redress for any pension arrears to which he may have been entitled.

174.  In view of the forgoing, the Government maintained that there has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

(ii)    As regards the second applicant

175.  The Government restated their observations, mutatis mutandis, already described in paragraphs 172 and 173 above.

176.  They added that any Kosovan pensions paid simultaneously obviously had to be taken into account and that an SPDIF pension had to be reduced accordingly (see paragraphs 98 and 99 above). Furthermore, SPDIF pension payments were reinstated for the future in all cases where the relevant legal provisions and the requirements of the Grudić Action Plan were complied with (see paragraph 113 above). In terms of the SPDIF pension arrears, a civil judgment was delivered in the second applicant’s case whereby she was awarded the accrued pensions for a specified period of time. These proceedings are currently still pending, with the purpose of identifying the second applicant’s legal successors (see paragraphs 59-64 above).

177.  Therefore, the Government was of the opinion that the second applicant’s allegations of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were unfounded.

178.  The relevant principles as regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, in relation to the specific circumstances of the present case, have been summarised in the Grudić judgment (cited above, §§ 72-76).

179.  Furthermore, although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 contains no explicit procedural requirements, any relevant domestic proceedings must afford the individuals concerned a reasonable opportunity of putting their claims to the responsible authorities for the purpose of effectively challenging the measures interfering with the rights guaranteed by this provision. In ascertaining whether this condition has been satisfied, a comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable procedures (see, for example, Jokela v. Finland, no. 28856/95, § 45, ECHR 2002-IV; see also, mutatis mutandis, AGOSI v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 24 October 1986, Series A no. 108, p. 19, § 55, and Hentrich v. France, judgment of 22 September 1994, Series A no. 296-A, p. 21, § 49).

180.  The said Grudić judgment involved similar issues as the ones raised by the applicants in the present case. In that case, however, the Court held that the interference with the applicants’ “possessions”, namely the suspension of payment of their SPDIF pensions, had not been in accordance with the relevant domestic law. That conclusion made it unnecessary for the Court to ascertain whether a fair balance had been struck between the demands of the general interests of the community on the one hand and the requirement of protecting the individual’s fundamental rights on the other. The Court thus found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and ordered the respondent State to pay the applicants all of their pension arrears due as of the dates of their suspension (see Grudić, cited above, §§ 77-83 and 92).

181.  Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the administrative and judicial review proceedings regarding the resumption of the first and second applicant’s SPDIF pensions were brought on 30 April 2012 and 17 March 2017 respectively and would appear to be still ongoing, many years later and after repeated remittals to the relevant authorities (see paragraphs 10-22 and 35-53 above; see also, mutatis mutandis and as regards the repeated remittals, paragraph 203 below). The Court therefore concludes that the applicants, both of whom were elderly and died in the meantime, were clearly not afforded a reasonable opportunity of putting their claims to the responsible authorities in order to effectively challenge the interference with their rights guaranteed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see the case-law cited in paragraph 179 above).

182.  The Government made various allegations to the effect that the applicants had not properly engaged in the disputed administrative proceedings or had not provided required evidence. Even assuming that these allegations are partly substantiated, the Court’s considers that the proceedings in question had to be conducted and concluded in such a way as to make it clear that the applicants had indeed had an opportunity to effectively challenge the interference with their possessions. However, the very fact that the applicants died many years after the commencement of their respective administrative and judicial review proceedings but before those proceedings had reached any conclusion is ample demonstration that they did not have that opportunity (notwithstanding the procedural tools at the disposal of the national authorities, including those described in paragraphs 91 and 95 above). Indeed, the Constitutional Court itself held that the length of the proceedings in question was excessive and thus in breach of the Serbian Constitution (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above).

183.  That said, it is obviously not the Court’s role, either under the Convention or under Protocol No. 1, to prejudge the outcome of the disputed domestic proceedings (see, for example and mutatis mutandis, Rakić and Others v. Serbia, nos. 47460/07 and 29 others, § 44, 5 October 2010, with a further reference therein). The present case should also be distinguished from the Court’s decision in the Čekić v. Croatia case (no. 15085/02, 9 October 2003) where, inter alia, the issue, in the context of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, was whether the applicants, having already made use of all national remedies and having been rejected definitely, unlike the applicants in the present case, were simultaneously entitled to two separate pensions on the basis of the same pensionable employment period.

184.  Lastly, the Court observes that the Grudić Action Plan referred to by the Government and the conclusions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted in this connection (see paragraphs 112-114 above) concern the overall approach of the Serbian authorities to the general issues identified in the Grudić judgment (see paragraph 180 above), not the specific difficulties encountered by the applicants in the present case, that is, in their attempts to have the payment of their SPDIF pensions resumed.

185.  In view of the forging, the Court concludes that there has been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of each of the applicants and dismisses the Government’s objections raised in that connection (see paragraphs 158, 159, 168 and 169 above). It is lastly recalled, in this respect, that in paragraph 99 of the Grudić judgment the Court had already opined that “the respondent Government ... [was to] ... take all appropriate measures to ensure that the competent Serbian authorities implement the relevant laws in order to secure payment of the pensions and arrears in question”, and that “certain reasonable and speedy factual and/or administrative verification procedures may be necessary in this regard”.

186.  The applicants also complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, of the length of the administrative and judicial review proceedings.

187.  This provision, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“In the determination of his [or her] civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

(a)   The Government

188.  The Government argued that the Constitutional Court had found a violation of the first applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time and had awarded him an appropriate sum on account of non-pecuniary damage. This compensation was subsequently also paid to the first applicant (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). The first applicant could not therefore, according to the Government, still claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

189.  As for the second applicant, the Government observed that the Constitutional Court had also found a violation of her right to a trial within a reasonable time and had awarded her EUR 500 for non-pecuniary damage (see paragraphs 56 and 57 above). Had this amount been paid to the second applicant, she would have lost her victim status. However, following the second applicant’s death, the payment could not be made because the person claiming to be her legal successor had failed to produce the relevant documentation proving his status. It followed, according to the Government, that neither the second applicant nor the person claiming to be her legal successor had victim status within the meaning of the Convention.

(b)   The applicants

190.  The applicants maintained that they were still victims of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, given that the disputed administrative proceedings were still ongoing and despite the Constitutional Court’s decision adopted in their cases, whereby they were awarded, respectively, clearly inadequate sums as compensation for the non-pecuniary harm suffered. The second applicant’s legal successor had also not been paid the sum previously awarded to the second applicant. The applicants lastly maintained that after numerous remittals the disputed domestic proceedings had effectively become never-ending and pointless both at the same time.

191.  The Court reiterates that an applicant’s status as a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention depends on whether the domestic authorities acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention in question. Only when these conditions are satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention preclude examination of an application (see, for example, Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, § 71, ECHR 2006‑V, and Cataldo v. Italy (dec.), no. 45656/99, 3 June 2004; see also Vidaković v. Serbia (dec.), no. 16231/07, § 26, 24 May 2011).

192.  The Court observes in this respect that the Constitutional Court found that the first and second applicants’ right to a determination of their respective claims within a reasonable time had been violated (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above), thus acknowledging the breach complained of and, effectively, satisfying the first condition laid down in the Court’s case-law.

193.  The applicants’ victim status then depends on whether the redress afforded was adequate and sufficient having regard to just satisfaction as provided for under Article 41 of the Convention (see, for example, Dubjaková v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 67299/01, 19 October 2004, and Vidaković, cited above § 28).

194.  Where a complaint concerns the excessive length of proceedings, one of the characteristics of sufficient redress which may remove a litigant’s victim status is the amount of compensation awarded. This amount depends, in particular, on the characteristics and effectiveness of the remedy. Thus, States which, like Serbia, have opted for a remedy designed both to expedite proceedings and provide compensation are free to award amounts which – while being lower than those awarded by the Court – are not unreasonable (see Cocchiarella [GC], cited above, §§ 96-97, and Vidaković, cited above, § 29).

195.  On 9 December 2021 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the first applicant’s rights and awarded him EUR 900 for non-pecuniary damage (see paragraph 25 above). On 1 June 2022, almost six months later, he was paid that sum by the Serbian authorities (see paragraph 26 above). The disputed administrative and judicial review proceedings, however, continued and would appear to be still pending more than three years and four months after the Constitutional Court’s decision and even after the subsequent death of the first applicant himself (see paragraphs 10-22 and 30 above). In these circumstances, and quite apart from whether the sum awarded to the first applicant on 9 December 2021 was appropriate at the time, it cannot be said that the first applicant had adequate and sufficient redress for the violation alleged.

196.  As for the second applicant, on 20 May 2021 the Constitutional Court found a violation of her right to a fair trial within a reasonable time and awarded her EUR 500 for the non-pecuniary damage suffered (see paragraph 56 above). This sum, however, was never paid to the second applicant personally or to her son after her death (see paragraphs 57 and 58 above). Moreover, as in the first applicant’s case, the disputed administrative and judicial review proceedings continued for almost four years after the Constitutional Court’s decision and are still pending (see paragraphs 35-53 above). The second applicant also died during the proceedings (see paragraph 41 above). In these circumstances, and whether or not the sum awarded to the second applicant on 20 May 2021, by the Constitutional Court, was appropriate at the time, it cannot be said that the second applicant had adequate and sufficient redress.

197.  In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the Government’s objections to the effect that the applicants had lost their victim status within the meaning of the Convention must be rejected.

198.  The applicants’ complaints are also neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. Their complaints must therefore be declared admissible.

199.  The applicants reaffirmed their complaints (see paragraph 186 above). They added that they did not contribute in any way to the delay in the administrative and judicial review proceedings.

200.  The Government maintained that the proceedings in question were complex. Moreover, as explained in paragraphs 188 and 189 above, they asserted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. As regards the second applicant in particular, the Government maintained that her son had been unable to collect the compensation awarded to his mother because he had failed to provide the documentation required.

201.  The reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be determined in the light of the circumstances of a case and with reference to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal ([GC], no. 35382/97, § 19, ECHR 2000-IV).

202.  The period to be taken into account in the present case began between December 2013 and February 2014, as regards the first applicant, and on 17 July 2017 as regard the second applicant (see paragraphs 11, 12 and 37 above). Those were the dates on which the applicants lodged their respective appeals against the decisions taken at first instance (see Živaljević v. Montenegro, no. 17229/04, § 75, 8 March 2011). The Court furthermore observes that the disputed proceedings are apparently still ongoing (see paragraphs 10-22 and 35-53 above). The process overall seems to have been unreasonably lengthy. There would furthermore appear to be no exceptional circumstances justifying the length of the proceedings in question (see, mutatis mutandis, Glavinić and Marković v. Croatia, nos. 11388/15 and 25605/15, § 79, 30 July 2020).

203.  Proceedings may be particularly prolonged where, as in the present case, the matter is repeatedly remitted for rehearing. While it is not the Court’s function, under Article 6 of the Convention, to analyse the manner in which the national courts or administrative bodies interpret and apply the domestic law, it nonetheless considers that decisions quashing previous findings and remitting the case are usually due to perceived errors committed by the lower courts or other authorities. Repeated remittals may furthermore point to a shortcoming in a given State’s justice system (see, for example and mutatis mutandis, Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 147, 29 November 2016).

204.  The domestic proceedings, involving the resumption of payment of SPDIF pensions, were not entirely straightforward. However, they were not exceptionally complex either. Indeed, the Government themselves have maintained that the criteria for the resumption of payment of SPDIF pensions were set out plainly in the Grudić Action Plan (see paragraphs 173 and 176 above). The subject-matter of the disputed proceedings alone cannot therefore justify their overall length, nor can any delays which might be attributable to the applicants themselves. If the State’s administrative and judicial authorities had considered that the applicants were not entitled to have their pension payments resumed because they had not complied with the requirements of the Grudić Action Plan, they could have so adjudicated within a reasonable period of time and without the repeated remittals discussed above.

205.  As regards what was at stake for the applicants, the Court reiterates that special diligence is necessary in pension disputes. The applicants’ pension had previously been suspended and therefore, in view of their age, the proceedings complained of were of undeniable importance for them (see, for example, H.T. v. Germany, no. 38073/97, § 37, 11 October 2001, and Počuča v. Croatia, no. 38550/02, § 46, 29 June 2006). Both the first applicant and the second applicant died before their SPDIF pension-related claims were resolved domestically.

206.  Having examined all the material submitted to it and noting in particular the Constitutional Court’s own finding to the effect that the applicants had suffered a violation of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time (see paragraphs 25 and 56 above), the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Taking account of its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the present case, the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

207.  There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of both applicants.

208.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

209.  The first applicant claimed EUR 5,000 less the amount already awarded by the Constitutional Court in respect of non-pecuniary damage suffered. The first applicant also sought payment of his adjusted SPDIF pensions backdated to 15 February 1999 by way of compensation for pecuniary damage.

210.  The second applicant claimed EUR 5,000 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered. She also sought payment of her adjusted SPDIF pensions between 15 February 1999 and 24 December 2020 (in view of the fact that the civil proceedings concerning her pension arrears were still pending; see also paragraphs 59-64 above) as compensation for pecuniary damage.

211.  The Government contested the applicants’ claims. In particular they asserted that that the applicants had lost their victim status in relation to their complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and so could not claim any compensation. Regarding Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and given that the applicants had either brought no civil proceedings at all or that those proceedings were still pending, their claims for compensation for pecuniary damage also had to be rejected. In any event, according to the Government, the amounts requested by the applicants were too high.

212.  The Court does not discern any causal link between the kind of violations found in the present case and the pecuniary damage alleged (see, mutatis mutandis, Đurić v. Serbia, no. 24989/17, §§ 88 and 90, 6 February 2024); it therefore rejects these claims in their entirety. However, the Court awards the first and second applicants the EUR 5,000 sought by them, respectively, as regards the non-pecuniary damage suffered, less any amounts which have or may have already been paid to them or their legal successors on the same basis, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

213.  The said amounts shall be payable to the first applicant’s widow, Ms Sabile Selimi, and the second applicant’s son, Mr Ramadan Krasnići, respectively.

214.  The first applicant and the second applicant claimed a total of approximately EUR 3,210 and EUR 4,540 in Serbian dinars, respectively, for the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings, as well as for those incurred before the Court.

215.  The Government contested those claims.

216.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and were also reasonable as to their quantum. That is, the applicant must have paid them or be bound to pay them pursuant to a legal or contractual obligation, and they must have been unavoidable in order to prevent the violation found or to obtain redress (see, among other authorities, Đurić, cited above, § 95, with further references). In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award each applicant the sum of EUR 2,000 covering costs and expenses under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.

217.  The said amounts shall be payable to the first applicant’s widow, Ms Sabile Selimi, and the second applicant’s son, Mr Ramadan Krasnići, respectively.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant’s widow, Ms Sabile Selimi, and the second applicant’s son, Mr Ramadan Krasnići, each and within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) less any amount already paid on the same basis domestically, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to Ms Sabile Selimi and Mr Ramadan Krasnići, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 June 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Milan Blaško Ioannis Ktistakis
 Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of cases:

No.

Application no.

Case name

Lodged on

Applicant
Year of Birth
Place of Residence
Nationality

Represented by

1.

20641/20

Selimi v. Serbia

22/04/2020

Abdurahim SELIMI
1939
Gnjilane

Serbian

Refija GARIBOVIĆ

2.

20644/20

Krasnići v. Serbia

14/04/2020

Bahrije KRASNIĆI
1934
Prizren
Serbian

Refija GARIBOVIĆ

[1] All reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text shall be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo.

[2] See https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=004-7320, accessed on 19 December 2024.

[3]  See https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=DH-DD(2013)50E, accessed on 19 December 2024.

[4]  See https://search.coe.int/cm?i=090000168076f1fb, accessed on 19 December 2024.

[5] See https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=DH-DD(2017)1088E, accessed on 19 December 2024.

[6] See https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=DH-DD(2017)1088E, accessed on 19 December 2024.