CASE OF SEREGINA v. RUSSIA

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF SEREGINA v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 12793/02)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG 

30 November 2006

FINAL

28/02/2007

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Seregina v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

MrB.M. Zupančič, President,
MrJ. Hedigan,
MrC. Bîrsan,
MrA. Kovler,
MrV. Zagrebelsky,
MrsA. Gyulumyan,
MrDavid Thór Björgvinsson, judges,

and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 9 November 2006,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 12793/02) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Maya Timofeyevna Seregina (“the applicant”), on 6 October 2001.

2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr P. Laptev, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

3. On 14 September 2005 the Court decided to communicate the application to the Government.

4. Under Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in the town of Kholmsk of the Sakhalin Region.

1. The background of the case

6. In 1987 the applicant and her sister V. decided jointly to build a residence in the town of Azov on two adjacent land plots allocated to them by a local council. The plots were registered respectively in the applicant's name and in the name of V.'s son Z.

7. The construction works started in 1989 and in 1990 the title over the second land plot was transferred to V.

8. According to the applicant, in 1992 V. died leaving a will by which she bequeathed her part of the house to the applicant.

9. By 1995 the construction works had been nearly completed.

10. On 11 October 1995 Z. obtained a decision of the local administration transferring to him the title to the second land plot and moved into the house.

11. In response to the applicant's complaints that Z. had forged an official document concerning his share in V.'s inheritance, the local police refused to institute criminal proceedings for the lack of evidence of a crime.

12. The local prosecutor also advised the applicant that it would be possible to evict Z. from the house only on the basis of a court decision. It does not appear that the applicant brought proceedings for his eviction.

2. First round of proceedings

13. In October 1996 the applicant lodged with the Azov Town Court (“the Town Court”) a complaint concerning the decision of the local administration transferring the land title to Z.

14. On 23 October 1996 the complaint was registered and accepted for examination.

15. By decision of 20 January 1997 the court decided to suspend the proceedings with reference to the need to request the evidence.

16. On 31 July 1997 the applicant lodged a separate civil action against Z., requesting the court to confirm her property rights in relation to the part of the house formerly owned by V. with reference to her sister's will, the fact that it was her and her sister's joint possession and that the applicant had borne a major part of the construction expenses. She also asked the court to restore the time limits for acceptance of her share in V.'s inheritance and establish that she had in fact accepted it.

17. In response, Z. filed a counterclaim requesting the court to invalidate V.'s will.

18. The proceedings concerning the decision of the local administration resumed on 25 August 1997. By decision of 17 November 1997 the court joined the applicant's claims against the local council and Z. in one set of proceedings.

19. By the same decision the court also accepted Z.'s waiver of claims against the applicant. The waiver was subsequently declared unlawful and quashed by the Rostov Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) on 14 January 1999.

20. On 22 December 1997 the court decided to request the Kholmsk Town Court to question a number of witnesses. The request was executed and on 9 April 1998 the court received the necessary evidence.

21. On 5 May 1998 the Convention entered into force in respect of Russia.

22. The hearing of 3 June 1998 did not take place because of Z.'s failure to appear.

23. On 29 July 1998 the Town Court dismissed the applicant's claims as unfounded.

24. The Rostov Regional Court quashed this judgment on appeal and remitted the case at first instance on 26 August 1998.

3. Second round of proceedings

25. The case was returned to the Town Court and accepted for examination on 8 September 1998.

26. The court decided to start the hearings in the case on 20 November 1998. On that date the parties failed to appear and the hearing was postponed.

27. On 27 January 1999 the applicant successfully challenged the judge and the case was transferred to a different court composition.

28. The hearing of 1 April 1999 did not take place as the defendant's counsel failed to appear. The hearing was postponed until 19 May 1999. On that date a counsel for the local administration failed to appear and the court again rescheduled the hearing.

29. On 24 June 1999 the applicant's lawyer dropped the claims for the restoration of time limits and the establishment of the fact of acceptance of inheritance. She also retracted the submission that the applicant's ownership to her sister's part of the house should be declared in accordance with the will, claiming ownership only on the ground that the house had been a joint possession and that the applicant had borne the major construction expenses.

30. By decision of the same date the Azov Town Court granted this motion and discontinued the proceedings in respect of these claims accordingly. The applicant submitted that she had not authorised her lawyer to do so and that she had not been aware of this decision.

31. On 27 August 1999 the court decided to split the proceedings into two parts and examine the defendant's counterclaim separately. The parties filed an interlocutory appeal against this decision and on 1 September 1999 the proceedings were suspended awaiting the examination of the appeal.

32. The Rostov Regional Court refused to examine the appeal on 4 October 1999 on the ground that the decision of 27 August 1999 had been final and not subject to appeal.

33. Thereafter the proceedings resumed, but on 9 December 1999 the Town Court ordered an expert examination and again suspended the examination of the case.

34. On 28 April 2000 the completed expert examination reached the court and the proceedings resumed.

35. The hearing of 11 July 2000 did not take place because of the absence of the applicant's counsel.

36. The expert who was summoned to the hearings of 3 August and 14 September 2000 failed to appear and the hearings were adjourned.

37. On 26 October 2000 for an unspecified reason the case was transferred to a different court composition.

38. The hearing scheduled for 8 December 2000 did not take place for the failure of the parties to appear.

39. On 25 January and 12 March 2001 the court decided to adjourn the hearing with reference to the applicant's failure to attend.

40. By decision of 27 April 2001 the court ordered an additional expert examination and suspended the proceedings.

41. On 24 May 2001 the examination was completed and on 30 May 2001 the proceedings resumed.

42. By judgment of 5 June 2001 the Azov Town Court held in the applicant's favour. It declared her the owner of the house at issue and voided the decision of the local administration for transfer of land title to Z. as breaching the applicant's rights

43. Z. appealed against this judgment.

44. On 11 July 2001 the Rostov Regional Court rejected his appeal and upheld the first instance judgment in full. The judgment became final on the same day.

4. Supervisory review of the decisions in the applicant's favour

45. On an unspecified date the acting President of the Rostov Regional Court lodged with the Presidium an application for supervisory review of the judgment of 5 June 2001 and the appeal decision of 11 July 2001.

46. On 13 September 2001 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court examined the case. It appears that the applicant stated her case at the hearing in person.

47. By decision of the same date the Presidium quashed the impugned decisions. It found that the trial and appeal courts had erroneously applied the provisions of the Civil Code of 1996 to the events which had taken place before its entry into force. The Presidium also referred to discrepancies between the facts established by the lower courts and the courts' conclusions and remitted the case for a fresh examination at first instance.

48. On 26 August 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's complaint about the decision of 13 September 2001 and noted that she was free to advance her arguments during the fresh examination of her case at first instance.

5. Third round of proceedings

49. The proceedings in the case resumed on an unspecified date.

50. On 11 October 2001 a presiding judge withdrew from the case and on 25 December 2001 it was transferred to a different court composition.

51. By decision of 30 January 2002 the court scheduled the hearing for 20 February 2002. On the latter date the presiding judge was sick and the hearing was postponed.

52. On 21 March 2002 the court suspended the proceedings with reference to the applicant's illness.

53. The proceedings resumed on 8 October 2002 and the next hearing was scheduled for 11 November 2002.

54. On that date the court decided to request further evidence and adjourned the hearing again.

55. On 29 November 2002 the defendant failed to appear and the hearing was adjourned.

56. By judgment of 15 December 2002 the Azov Town Court rejected the applicant's claim of ownership of the disputed part of the house. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the house was a joint possession and that the applicant had assumed the major construction expenses. It further established that the applicant's ownership could not be based on the will either since the will was invalid. As to the land plot, the court granted the applicant's claim and voided the decision transferring title over land to Z.

57. On 26 February 2003 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment on appeal and it became final.

6. Second supervisory review of the case

58. The applicant filed several applications for supervisory review of the judgment of 15 December 2002 and the decision of 26 February 2003. She also sought to set aside the decision of 24 June 1999 alleging that she had not authorised her lawyer to drop the claims.

59. In response to these applications, by decision of 7 May 2004 the President of the Regional Court ordered that the applicant's case be examined on the merits by the Presidium of the Regional Court.

60. On 10 June 2004 the Presidium of the Regional Court examined the case.

61. It quashed the decision of 24 June 1999 on the ground that the applicant's counsel had gone beyond her authority when he had dropped a part of the claims and that the applicant had been unaware of the decision in question. The Presidium ordered a fresh examination of this part of the claim. It also ordered re-examination of the issue as to whether the applicant could claim ownership to V.'s part of the house as V.'s heir.

62. As to the judgment of 15 December 2002 and the appeal decision, the court ordered the exclusion from the courts' reasoning of the references to the validity of V.'s will and upheld them as to the rest.

7. Fourth round of proceedings

63. On 7 July 2004 the case was accepted for examination by the Town Court.

64. On 16 July 2004 the court scheduled the hearing for 7 September 2004. On that date the applicant dropped her claims against the local administration and the court adjourned the hearing with reference to the need to request the evidence.

65. The hearings of 29 September and 19 October 2004 did not take place for the same reason.

66. On 22 November 2004 the court ordered an additional expert examination and suspended the proceedings.

67. By decision of 2 December 2004 the court admitted the new evidence in the case and forwarded it for examination to the expert institution.

68. The proceedings resumed on 21 March 2005. The next hearing was scheduled for 12 April 2005.

69. By judgment of 12 April 2005 the Town Court dismissed the applicant's claims and granted Z.'s counter-claim in full.

70. The judgment was upheld by the Regional Court on appeal on 18 May 2005.

71. On 11 November 2005 the applicant's application for supervisory review of the case was dismissed.

II. Relevant domestic law

72. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1964 (Гражданский процессуальный кодекс РСФСР), as in force at the relevant time, provided that regional and higher courts could conduct supervisory review of the activities of the lower courts.

73. According to Sections 319, 320 and 327 of the Code, certain senior judicial officers could, at any time, on the request by the person concerned or on their own motion, lodge with a higher court an application for supervisory review of a final decision of a lower court on points of law and procedure.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 ON ACCOUNT OF THE SUPERVISORY REVIEW OF 13 SEPTEMBER 2001

74. The applicant complained about unfair proceedings in her case. In particular, she submitted that on 13 September 2001 the supervisory instance court had unlawfully quashed the court decisions in her favour, which had been in the process of being enforced.

75. These complaints fall to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which, insofar as relevant, read as follows:

Article 6 § 1

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

76. The Government alleged that the decisions in the applicant's case had been erroneous in that the domestic courts had wrongly interpreted and applied the relevant law and that therefore the quashing had been justified. They contended that the decisions had been reversed with a view to correct a judicial error.

77. The applicant contested the Government's submissions and maintained her complaints.

A. Admissibility

78. The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

79. The Court first notes that the property dispute at issue was of a pecuniary nature and indisputably concerned a civil right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1.

80. The Court observes that the issue of the present case is whether the supervisory review procedure permitting a final judgment to be quashed can be considered compatible with Article 6 § 1 and, more specifically, whether on the facts of the present case the principle of legal certainty was respected.

81. The Court finds that this case is similar to the case of Ryabykh v. Russia (no. 52854/99, ECHR 2003‑IX), where it was said, in so far as relevant to the instant case:

“51. ... the Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which declares, in its relevant part, the rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which requires, among other things, that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question...

54. The Court notes that the supervisory review of the judgment ... was set in motion by the President of the Belgorod Regional Court – who was not party to the proceedings ... As with the situation under Romanian law examined in Brumărescu, the exercise of this power by the President was not subject to any time-limit, so that judgments were liable to challenge indefinitely.

55. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way it embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect. However, that right would be illusory if a Contracting State's domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. It would be inconceivable that Article 6 § 1 should describe in detail procedural guarantees afforded to litigants – proceedings that are fair, public and expeditious – without protecting the implementation of judicial decisions; to construe Article 6 as being concerned exclusively with access to a court and the conduct of proceedings would be likely to lead to situations incompatible with the principle of the rule of law which the Contracting States undertook to respect when they ratified the Convention (see Hornsby v. Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑II, p. 510, § 40).

56. The Court considers that the right of a litigant to a court would be equally illusory if a Contracting State's legal system allowed a judicial decision which had become final and binding to be quashed by a higher court on an application made by a State official.”

82. Furthermore, the Court has made the following finding in this respect in the judgment of Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine (no. 48553/99, § 77, ECHR 2002‑VII):

“...judicial systems characterised by the objection (protest) procedure and, therefore, by the risk of final judgments being set aside repeatedly, as occurred in the instant case, are, as such, incompatible with the principle of legal certainty that is one of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, read in the light of Brumărescu ...”

83. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that on an unspecified date the acting President of the Rostov Regional Court lodged a special appeal against the judgment of 5 June 2001 and the appeal decision of 11 July 2001 in the applicant's favour that had become final and binding. On 13 September 2001 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court quashed the aforementioned decisions as erroneous and remitted the case for a fresh consideration at first instance.

84. The Court does not find any reason for departing from its aforementioned judgments and considers that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in respect of the quashing of the final and binding judgment given in the applicant's case.

2. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

85. The Court reiterates first that the judgment of the Azov Town Court of 5 June 2001 recognised the applicant as a rightful owner of the house at dispute and voided the decision of the local administration for transfer of land title to Z. This judgment became final after it had been upheld by the Rostov Regional Court on appeal on 11 July 2001.

86. The Court finds that the decision of the Rostov Regional Court of 13 September 2001 and subsequent proceedings eventually rejecting the applicant's claims in full constituted an interference with the applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, §§ 67-70, ECHR 1999‑VII).

87. Having regard to its case-law (see §§ 78-80 in the Brumărescu judgment cited above) and the conclusions under Article 6 § 1 above, the Court considers that, even assuming that the interference in question could be shown to serve some public interest, a fair balance was upset and that the applicant bore and continues to bear an individual and excessive burden.

88. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS

89. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

90. The Government contested that argument and submitted that the proceedings had not breached the reasonable-time requirement of Article 6.

91. The Court recalls that the proceedings in question commenced on 23 October 1996 when the applicant filed a complaint with the District Court against the local administration. However, the period to be taken into consideration began on 5 May 1998, when the Convention entered into force in respect of Russia. Nevertheless, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account may be taken of the state of proceedings at the time. The Court finds that the period in question ended on 18 May 2005 when the judgment of 12 April 2005 was upheld on appeal.

92. Furthermore, only the periods when the case was actually pending before the courts are to be taken into account, thus excluding the periods between the adoption of final and binding judgments and their annulment in the course of extraordinary proceedings (see Markin v. Russia (dec.), no. 59502/00, 16 September 2004). Accordingly, in the present case only the periods between 23 October 1996, i.e. the date of institution of proceeding, and 11 July 2001, when the judgment of 5 June 2001 was upheld on appeal, as well as from 13 September 2001, when the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court re-opened the case by way of supervisory review, to 26 February 2003, when the Regional Court rejected the appeal against the judgment of 15 December 2002, and between 7 May 2004, when the third round of supervisory review was instituted, and 18 May 2005, which is the date of the appeal decision of the Regional Court upholding the judgment of 12 April 2005, fall to be examined by the Court.

93. Thus, the total length of the proceedings was of seven years, two months and three days of which five years, eight months and two days fall within the Court's competence ratione temporis.

A. Admissibility

94. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

95. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the conduct of the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).

96. The Court notes that the case was of a certain complexity, as it concerned a number of intertwined property claims and involved three parties. It furthermore considers that the applicant's conduct, at least to a certain extent, contributed to the length of the proceedings as her counsel failed to appear at the hearing of 11 July 2000. In addition, on 25 January and 12 March 2001 the applicant herself failed to attend which on all of the occasions resulted in the adjournment of the hearings. In addition, between 21 March and 8 October 2002 the proceedings were suspended due to the applicant's illness.

97. As regards the conduct of the judicial authorities, the Court notes that it led to substantial delays in the proceedings, especially during the second examination of the applicant's case at first instance. Having regard to the above, to the fact that the case was not particularly complex, that the proceedings within the Court's competence ratione temporis lasted over five years and eight months and in view of the fact that on the date of ratification the proceedings were already pending for almost a year and a half, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings did not satisfy the “reasonable-time” requirement. Accordingly, there has been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

98. The applicant also complained that Z. had unlawfully moved into the house which she had constructed and that the authorities had failed to evict and prosecute Z. for the alleged fraud. She also complained about the supervisory review proceedings of 13 September 2001, arguing that they breached her rights to respect for home under Article 8 of the Convention.

99. As to the complaints concerning the actions of Z. and the alleged failure of the authorities to evict him, the Court observes that the applicant was free to bring a separate set of civil proceedings concerning the allegedly unlawful actions of Z. or proceedings for his eviction but clearly failed to do so. Insofar as the applicant complained about the failure of the authorities to prosecute Z., the Court recalls that the Convention does not guarantee, as such, the right to bring criminal proceedings against a third person. Finally, as regards the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention about the supervisory review proceedings of 13 September 2001, the Court recalls that the existence of “home” for the purposes of the Convention depends on whether there is a continuous and sufficient link with a particular place, there being no need for it to be lawfully established (see Prokopovich v. Russia, no. 58255/00, § 36, ECHR 2004‑...). On the facts, the Court observes that from the materials in its possession it transpires that the applicant's only place of residence was in the town of Kholmsk in the Sakhalin Region and there is nothing to suggest that at the relevant period she undertook any steps with a view to moving to the house in dispute in Azov or, indeed, resided there on a permanent basis. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the proceedings of 13 September 2001 did not concern the applicant's “home” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.

100. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

101. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

102. The applicant claimed EUR 120,000 as a value of the lost house and EUR 18,000 as an accrued interest for the period from 1993 to the present. She also claimed EUR 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

103. The Government contested these claims as manifestly excessive. As regards the value of the house, they submitted that there was no causal link between the violation and the pecuniary damage alleged.

104. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court finds it necessary to award the applicant EUR 70,000 representing the value of the lost house and the accrued interest, plus any tax that may be chargeable on the amount.

105. As regards the non-pecuniary damage, the Court takes the view that the applicant has suffered some non-pecuniary damage as a result of the violations found which cannot be made good by the Court's mere finding of a violation. Nevertheless, the amount claimed is excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant the sum of EUR 1,400 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

B. Costs and expenses

106. The applicant also claimed EUR 24,361 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

107. The Government considered this amount as excessive and unsubstantiated.

108. Regard being had to the information in its possession and the Government's submissions, the Court finds it appropriate to grant the applicant EUR 300 in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on the above amount.

C. Default interest

109. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the complaints concerning the supervisory review of 13 September 2001 and the length of proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the supervisory review of the final judgment in the applicant's favour;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of proceedings;

4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 70,000 (seventy thousand euros) in respect of pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 1,400 (one thousand four hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(iii) EUR 300 (three hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses;

(iv) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 November 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Vincent BergerBoštjan M. Zupančič
RegistrarPresident

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