FIRST SECTION
CASE OF SEVOSTYANOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 4665/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21 October 2010
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Sevostyanova v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Commitee composed of:
Khanlar Hajiyev, President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Dean Spielmann, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 30 September 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 4665/04) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Valentina Aleksandrovna Sevostyanova (“the applicant”), on 15 December 2003.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr A. Savenkov, former acting representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
3. On 11 March 2008 the President of the First Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No. 14, the application is assigned to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Chelyabinsk.
5. On 30 September 1996 the applicant sued Chelyabinsk municipal hospital No. 9 (Городская клиническая больница № 9) seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage allegedly caused by medical malpractice. In particular, the applicant submitted that she had become disabled as a result of a poorly performed leg surgery.
6. On 6 June 1997 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk (“the District Court”) ordered a medical examination and stayed the proceedings.
7. On 28 May 1998 the District Court received a letter from head of the State regional forensic examinations bureau containing a request to provide a copy of the court’s decision and to obtain certain medical documents. The court was also informed that it was necessary to make an advance payment for the examination.
8. On 19 June 1998 the District Court demanded the case file back from the forensic examinations bureau.
9. Upon receiving the case file, on 21 October 1998 the District Court scheduled a hearing to decide whether it was necessary to conduct a medical examination and to allocate the expenses.
10. On 23 February 1999 the case file was sent back to the forensic examinations bureau.
11. In April and June 1999 the court sent inquiries to the State health care department and to the municipal hospital in an effort to obtain the documents required for the medical examination.
12. On 27 December 1999 the remaining documents were sent to the forensic examinations bureau.
13. On 16 February 2000 head of the forensic examinations bureau decided to return the case file to the court as, in his opinion, the court’s order for a medical examination was addressed to the State health care department.
14. On 10 April 2000 the District Court again sent the case file to the forensic examinations bureau with explanations.
15. On 27 September 2000, 15 January, 30 July and 21 August 2001 the District Court inquired with the forensic examinations bureau about the reasons of the delay in carrying out the examination.
16. On 15 August 2001 the forensic examinations bureau informed the court of the cost of the pending examination.
17. On 24 August 2001 the court invited the applicant to make the payment but she refused.
18. On 7 September 2001, following the applicant’s complaint of the delays in her proceedings to the Chelyabinsk Regional Court (“the Regional Court”), the judge in charge of the applicant’s case informed her in a letter about the reasons of the delays. The Court is not in possession of this document.
19. Following the respondent’s refusal to pay for the medical examination, on 2 October 2001 the District Court demanded the case file back from the forensic examinations bureau.
20. On 29 October 2001 the applicant amended her claims. The court adjourned the hearing and invited the applicant’s surgeon as a third party to the proceedings.
21. By a judgment of 13 November 2001 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claims. The judgment was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 11 February 2002.
22. On 12 March 2002 the applicant requested that the region’s prosecutor lodge an extraordinary appeal for supervisory review of the court decisions adopted in her case.
23. The prosecutor’s appeal was granted, and on 15 May 2002 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 13 November 2001 and the appeal decision of 11 February 2002 by way of supervisory review, and remitted the case to the first instance for fresh consideration. The court held that a medical examination had been necessary to resolve the dispute and that the applicant had not been obliged by law to bear its costs. In addition, the Presidium issued a special statement in which it reprimanded acting president of the District Court for the breach of procedural time-limits for preparation and examination of the case.
24. By a decision of 15 August 2002 the District Court again commissioned a medical examination, allocating the costs to the respondent. The examination was held between 5 and 18 February 2003, and on 3 April 2003 the case file together with the experts’ report arrived to the court.
25. The hearing of 29 April 2003 was adjourned to 12 May 2003 to give the applicant time to familiarise herself with the experts’ report.
26. By a judgment of 12 May 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claims. On 28 July 2003 the Regional Court upheld the judgment.
27. On 28 October 2003 the Presidium of the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s application for supervisory review of the above decisions.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
28. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in her case was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement as provided in Article 6 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
29. The Court is satisfied that the proceedings lasted from 30 September 1996 to 28 July 2003, when the domestic courts considered the applicant’s case twice at two levels of jurisdiction. The period from 11 February to 15 May 2002 has to be excluded from the overall length as the case was not pending, and so does the part of the proceedings that occurred before 5 May 1998, the date of entry into force of the Convention in respect of Russia. Thus, the aggregate length of the proceedings within the Court’s competence ratione temporis amounts approximately to five years.
A. Admissibility
30. The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint of undue length of the proceedings was manifestly ill-founded and should be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
31. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
32. The Government contested the applicant’s arguments in substance. In particular, they argued that the case had been complex due to the necessity to conduct a medical examination and to engage third parties. They further alleged that the applicant bore a certain responsibility for the delays because she had amended her claims, refused to pay for the medical examination and lodged complaints to the appeal court and the supervisory instance.
33. The applicant did not submit any further comments on the merits.
34. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). In addition, only delays attributable to the State may justify a finding of a failure to comply with the "reasonable time" requirement (see, among other authorities, Zimmermann and Steiner v. Switzerland, 13 July 1983, p. 11, § 24, Series A no. 66; see also Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
35. The Court considers that even though the applicant’s case involved allegations of medical malpractice and required the taking of an expert opinion, it was not particularly complex. The domestic courts held only a small number of hearings and relied almost fully on the conclusions of the experts’ report to form their opinion.
36. With regard to the Government’s argument concerning the applicant’s own responsibility for the delays, the Court reiterates that an applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by the national law in defence of his interests (see, mutatis mutandis, Yağcı and Sargın v. Turkey, 8 June 1995, § 66, Series A no. 319‑A). In any event, the delays attributable to the applicant and resulting from such actions as amendment of claims and complaints to the superior courts are entirely insignificant in relation to the overall length of the proceedings.
37. Turning to the conduct of the authorities, the Court observes one major deficiency that occurred in the course of the proceedings. It recalls that between 5 May 1998 and 2 October 2001, that is for three years and five months, the proceedings were effectively thwarted, mostly due to unexplained procrastination in carrying out of the medical examination and flawed cooperation between the district court and the forensic examinations bureau. The Court is particularly mindful that the authorities substantially acknowledged the fact of the delays, as evidenced in the correspondence between the district court and the forensic examinations bureau and in the reprimand issued by the supervisory instance in respect of the district court. It recalls in this respect that the principal responsibility for the delay due to the expert opinions rests ultimately with the State (see Capuano v. Italy, 25 June 1987, § 32, Series A no. 119). Seeing that the delay associated with the taking of an expert opinion accounted for most of the length of the proceedings in the applicant’s case, the Court is of the opinion that the reasonable expedition displayed by the courts subsequently is not sufficient to redress the long period of inactivity.
38. Regarding what was at stake for the applicant, the Court recalls that the case concerned a dispute over allegations of medical malpractice as a result of which the applicant allegedly became disabled and was seeking compensation. It considers that those circumstances required a particular diligence on the part of the domestic authorities.
39. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that that the “reasonable time” requirement has been breached in the applicant’s case.
40. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
41. The applicant also complained that the courts unlawfully made her pay for the medical examination, belatedly informed her about the expert report which she was unable to challenge, mistakenly relied on the experts’ wrong conclusions, refused to assist her in collecting evidence and dismissed her application for supervisory review of the unfavourable judgments.
42. Having regard to all the materials in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in these provisions in that respect. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
43. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
44. Regarding her claims for just satisfaction, in her letter of 10 September 2008 the applicant referred the Court to her statement of claims lodged with the domestic court. However, the Court observes that the suffering inflicted as a result of alleged medical malpractice has no relation to the damage that could have been sustained by the applicant as a result of the violation found by the Court above. In addition, the applicant amended her claims on a few occasions throughout the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court considers that the just satisfaction claims are not sufficiently well‑founded and that there is no call to award the applicant any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning undue length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the undue length of the proceedings.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 October 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André WampachKhanlar Hajiyev
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy